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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1. Introduction 
 
 
This thesis answers the research question, ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ This introduction 
defines this question by establishing the context and purpose for this study, by 
expanding on the research question asked, and by explaining the significance of this 
work. Additionally, this chapter delimits the scope of this work and establishes the 
parameters of the research. Lastly, this chapter outlines the organization of this thesis. 
 
 
 
2. The Context and Purpose of this Thesis 
 
 
On March 20, 2003 the US, and its coalition partners, including the United Kingdom, 
invaded Iraq.
1
 Popular reports continually spoke of this invasion as ―unilateral,‖2 so the 
term unilateral became, in a sense, shorthand for all the justifications advanced for the 
US led invasion. These justifications were complex and evolved over the course of the 
events that led up to the incursion into Iraq. First, the invasion of Iraq was justified as an 
act of preemptive self-defence. Second, the invasion of Iraq was defensible because Iraq 
was in defiance of UNSC Resolutions by possessing and making WMD. Consequently, 
military action was appropriate to enforce these resolutions. Third, the invasion of Iraq 
was warranted as a humanitarian act to bring democracy to the Iraqi people.  
                                                 
1
 ―Iraq Timeline: July 16, 1979 to January 31, 2004‖ The Guardian (London) available online at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/page/0, 12438, 793802,00.html> accessed on 29 January 2009. 
2
 See, for example, Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations who stated of the invasion of 
Iraq: ―If the US and others were to go outside the Security Council and take unilateral action they would 
not be in conformity with the [UN] Charter.‖  
K Annan as quoted in R Norton-Taylor, ―Law Unto Themselves: A Large Majority of International 
Lawyers Reject the Government‘s Claim that UN Resolution 1441 Gives Legal Authority for an Attack 
on Iraq‖ The Guardian (London)  available online at <http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/14/iraq.richardnortontaylor> accessed on 29 January 2009. 
Further, British Cabinet Minister Robin Cook argued, when he resigned from the Government over the 
invasion of Iraq, that: ―Britain is not a superpower. Our interests are best protected not by unilateral 
action, but by multilateral agreement and a world order governed by rules.‖ 
R Cook, ―Why I Had to Leave the Cabinet‖ The Guardian (London) available online at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/mar18/foreignpolicy.labour1> accessed on 29 January 2009. 
These two examples illustrate that the term ―unilateral‖ was widely used, even by senior politicians, in 
reference to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
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 The first justification of the invasion, preemptive self-defence, was initially 
advanced by President Bush in 2002; it became the official US policy of in the United 
States‘ National Security Strategy of 2002.3 This non-binding policy document stated 
that US: 
 
 
….will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by 
…defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at 
home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches 
our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the 
support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if 
necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-emptively 
against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people 
and our country…4 
 
 
 
In this policy the US expanded their definition of self-defence under international law to 
include preemptive action to prevent terrorism. This policy was a response to the belief, 
held by the US and other states, that Iraq possessed WMD, and had not hesitated to use 
them against their own people, particularly against the Kurdish people of Northern Iraq. 
Yoo, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Council, United 
States Department of Justice, from 2001-2003,
5
 explains the standard for preemptive 
self-defence established for the invasion of Iraq as follows: 
 
 
The use of force in anticipatory self-defence must be necessary and 
proportional to the threat. At least in the realm of WMD [weapons of mass 
destruction], rogue nations and international terrorism, however, the test for 
determining whether a threat is ―imminent‖ to render the use of force 
necessary at a particular point has become more nuanced… Factors to be 
considered should now include the probability of an attack; the likelihood 
that this probability will increase, and therefore the need to take advantage 
of a limited window of opportunity; whether diplomatic alternatives are 
practical; and the magnitude of harm that could result from the threat... 
Applying the reformulated test to for using anticipatory self-defense to Iraq 
reveals that the threat of a WMD attack by Iraq, either directly or by Iraq‘s 
                                                 
3
 H Charlesworth, ―Is International Law Relevant to the War in Iraq and Its Aftermath?‖ (Telstra Address, 
National Press Club, Canberra Australia, 29 October 2003) available online at 
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support of terrorism, was sufficiently imminent to render the use of force 
necessary to protect the United States, its citizens and allies. 
6
 
 
 
 
The argument for preemptive self-defence was soon supplemented by a second 
argument that invasion of Iraq was warranted by Iraqi failure to implement UNSC 
Resolutions that required it to destroy its WMD.
7
 This argument rested on the fact that 
earlier resolutions had demanded this disarmament, justifying invasion, and on the 
ambiguity of the UNSC resolutions involved in this debate. Yoo explains this argument 
as follows: 
 
 
Resolution 678 authorized members states ―to use all necessary means to 
uphold and implement resolution 690 (1990) and all subsequent resolutions 
and to restore international peace and security in the area.‖ One of the most 
important ―subsequent relevant resolutions‖ was Resolution 687. Pursuant to 
resolution 678, the United States could use force not only to enforce 
Resolution 687‘s cease-fire, but also to restore ―international peace and 
security‖ to the region. In Resolution 1441, the Security Council 
unanimously found that Iraq was in material breach of these earlier 
resolutions and its continued development of WMD programs, its support 
for terrorism, and its repression of the civilian population presented a strong 
ongoing threat to international peace and security. These findings triggered 
Resolution 678‘s authorization to use force in Iraq. Suspending the cease-
fire and resuming hostilities in Iraq was an appropriate response to Iraq‘s 
material breaches of Resolution 687.
8
  
 
 
The final rationale advanced for invading Iraq was humanitarian; some argued that the 
invasion of Iraq was necessary to bring democracy to the Iraqi people.
9
 Each of these 
justifications was put forward and debated by politicians, academics and the popular 
press. However, the second justification – that invasion was authorized by UNSC 
Resolutions – appears to have been the ultimate justification of the coalition‘s invasion 
of Iraq in spite of the fact that this justification was not universally accepted. 
Therefore, in 2003 the term unilateral act was commonly used to refer to a 
range of justifications for the US‘, and its coalition partners', actions in Iraq; actions that 
                                                 
6
 J C Yoo, ―International Law and the War in Iraq‖ Public Law and Legal Theory Research Series Paper 
No. 145 (2004) available online at < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=492002> 
accessed on 12 February 2009. 
7
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8
 Yoo ―International Law‖ (n 6). 
9
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were undertaken without support, or arguably approval, of any multilateral institution. 
In light of this range of justifications the precise meaning of a unilateral act was unclear, 
and the assessment of the legality of such acts was widely debated. Further, the debate 
over the invasion of Iraq was part of a wider trend in international law. The US had 
repeatedly acted in its preemptive self-defence before invading Iraq. Yoo notes 
incidents in Libya, Panama, Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan.
10
 Consequently, in 2003 
unilateral action was a political policy of the US and had been so for many years. This 
made the question of the legality of unilateral acts both timely and important as the US, 
the world‘s most powerful actor, continued to assert that its unilateral actions were 
legal.  
Additionally, unilateral acts have been part of the practice of countries other than 
the US.  For example, Israel has engaged in at least three acts that can be considered 
unilateral: the bombing of the Osirak reactor in Iraq, and the withdrawals from Lebanon 
in 2000 and Gaza in 2005. When examined, these examples demonstrated the range of 
acts commonly termed ―unilateral‖ as well as the difficulty in classifying these acts as 
―legal‖ as opposed to political acts. 
 The first example of a unilateral act by Israel was Osirak. In 1981, Israel, acting in 
response to what it believed was Iraqi pursuit of nuclear weapons, bombed the Osirak 
nuclear reactor at the Tuwaitha Research centre near Baghdad.
11
 Israel argued that it had 
to act as Iraq would have been capable of possessing nuclear weapons by 1985, and 
therefore it was necessary for it to act unilaterally and preemptively to prevent this from 
occurring. States did not accept this argument; the bombing was condemned by both the 
Security Council and the General Assembly.
12
 Thus, the unilateral act in this case 
referred to an action undertaken outside the unilateral framework in preemptive self-
defence. 
 The second example was the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. In the late 1960s 
tensions between Israel and Lebanon began to rise. Nascent Palestinian liberation 
movements, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the PLO, 
began to use Lebanese territory as a hub.
13
 These movements exacerbated rising internal 
divisions within Lebanon. These internal tensions led to a civil war that lasted from 
1975 to 1990.
14
 The first large scale Israeli intervention into Lebanese territory came in 
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1978 when Israel invaded Lebanon. Israeli troops pushed north to the Litani River in 
response to Palestinian forays into Israeli territory.
15
 This act provoked a response from 
the United Nations in the form of a Security Council Resolution, UNSC Resolution 425. 
This resolution called on Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory.
16
 It also 
established a peacekeeping mission to stabilize the area. Israel did not ―withdraw‖ at 
this time but it did slowly hand over authority to a Christian Lebanese militia. This was 
the status quo until 1982, when the Israeli Ambassador to London was assassinated. The 
assassination was carried out by Palestinian movements based in Lebanon. This 
provoked Israel to invade Lebanon for the second time. By 1983 an Israeli withdrawal 
was agreed upon in exchange for a security buffer zone in South Lebanon. Most Israeli 
troops left Lebanon by 1985. Some troops remained to support the South Lebanon 
Army, a Christian militia that acted as an Israeli proxy. This was the status quo until 
2000. Throughout this period there were Israeli air strikes on Lebanon-based 
movements, including Syrian/Iranian supported Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon. Israel 
suffered steady casualties in the Lebanese security zone, and civilian areas within 
northern Israel were targeted by rockets from Lebanon. As a result the Israeli 
understanding of the Lebanon war changed over time. By the late 1990s it was widely 
held by the Israeli public that the price of staying in Lebanon was no longer acceptable. 
Ehud Barak likely won the 1999 election in Israel because of his promise to withdraw 
from Lebanon.
17
  This promise led to a cabinet vote on 5 March 2000 to unilaterally 
withdraw all troops from Lebanon.
18
 The deadline for the withdrawal was set for July. 
The UN was informed by Letter to the Secretary General of Israeli intention to comply 
with UNSC Resolution 425.
19
 The July deadline was advanced by six weeks. Hezbollah 
took advantage of the impending withdrawal to attack the vulnerable security zone. The 
South Lebanese Army was unable to withstand this onslaught, and so the final 
withdrawal was affected May 24, 2000.
20
 Complete withdrawal and compliance with 
UNSC Resolution 425 was ultimately confirmed by the UN.
21
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 This act illustrated the complex interplay between a unilateral act and its context 
that was also seen in justifications of the invasion of Iraq. This unilateral act was 
justified on three separate grounds: that Israel was responding to a UNSC Resolution 
that required withdrawal; that Israel was responding to the complex web of Lebanese 
internal politics; and that Israel was responding to the politics of the region including 
Palestinian Liberation movements, such as Hezbollah and others. Therefore, the 
justifications of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon were just as complex and open to 
interpretation as the justifications of the invasion of Iraq.  
 A third example of a unilateral act by Israel was the 2005 pullout from Gaza. This 
example revealed similar patterns to the Lebanon withdrawal. In 2003 Israel announced 
a new policy of ―unilateral disengagement‖ from some of the territories it had occupied 
since 1967.
22
 The policy focused on a unilateral withdrawal by Israel from the Gaza 
Strip and the Northern West Bank.
23
 It entailed the dismantling of settlements 
established there and the removal of a military presence.
24
 This policy was implemented 
between August and September 2005.
25
 Settlements were dismantled and settlers were 
withdrawn. Israel maintained control over borders and air space in the Gaza Strip, and 
reached a deal with Egypt to monitor Gaza‘s Egyptian border.26 In this example, Israel 
justified its actions through a public declaration of its unilateral intention to withdraw 
from some of the territories it had occupied since 1967. This declaration was public and 
presumably manifested a unilateral intention to be bound.  Again, the justifications for 
this action were complex. Primarily this withdrawal was justified on internal grounds, as 
Prime Minister Sharon stated at the time.
27
 However, Israel also justified this 
withdrawal as a show of good faith to the Palestinian people in solving their territorial 
disputes, and this act was also justified as an act of compliance with both United 
Nations Resolutions (such as UNSC Resolution 242),
28
 and multilateral negotiation 
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programs such as the Quartet‘s (US, European Union, Russia and the United Nations) 
―Roadmap‖ to peace in the Middle East.29 
 These acts all shared several characteristics. First, these actions were all 
commonly referred to as unilateral acts, and they were all undertaken without direct 
oversight of multilateral institutions. Second, the legality of each of these acts was 
widely debated. Further, the legality of these acts was contested in one of two ways.  
Either the legality of the action itself was questioned (as in Iraq or Osirak), or the legal 
nature of the act was never determined (as in cases like Sudan or Lebanon).  Further, 
each of these acts was justified on multiple grounds, from humanitarian concerns to 
preemptive self-defence, from compliance with UN resolutions to internal concerns. No 
single justification seemed to prevail as various arguments were used at different points 
to either support or contest the legality of the unilateral act. These controversies over the 
legality of unilateral acts suggested questions about the concept of unilateral acts more 
generally. One question in particular seemed to emerge: Why was it so difficult to 
ascertain when a unilateral act is legal? This question suggested a gap in the doctrine 
between the claim of legality (or illegality) of a specific unilateral act and the ability to 
justify this claim. This question, and the gap it highlighted, indicated a fruitful avenue 
for further study. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to explain the gap between 
the claim that a unilateral act is legal or illegal and the ability to justify that claim in 
legal doctrine. 
 
 
3.  Problem Identification  
 
 
The context of this thesis suggests a problem with identifying the legality of unilateral 
acts. The example of the 2003 invasion of Iraq illustrates that the term unilateral act 
often serves as a convenient catch-all phrase for competing explanations of an act 
undertaken without reference to multilateral institutions.  In the case of Iraq, the 
competing justifications for invasion include preemptive self-defence, implementation 
of UNSC Resolutions (when the UN is refusing to act collectively) and humanitarian 
action. Each of these justifications indicates different requirements to determine 
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whether the invasion is legal or illegal. For example, the justification of preemptive self-
defence requires an assessment of the meaning of the ban on use of force under Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter, the exception to Article 2(4) for self-defence under Article 51 of 
the UN Charter, and the interpretation of self-defence under customary international 
law.
30
 The second justification for the invasion is Iraqi possession of WMD, and their 
non-compliance with UNSC Resolutions requiring them to destroy these weapons.
31
 
While this justification appears to have been factually misguided, it is the primary 
justification for the invasion. Further, this justification is not uncontroversial. For 
example, Members of the Security Council, particularly France, vetoed a second UNSC 
Resolution that would have explicitly authorized use of force against Iraq.
32
 The third 
justification of legality, humanitarian intervention, has been most prominently advanced 
by Prime Minister Blair of the United Kingdom, arguably in order to secure popular 
support for British participation in the invasion of Iraq. In his view the invasion of Iraq 
can be justified by the need to protect Iraqi civilians from a violation of their human 
rights.
33
 The legality of this approach is also controversial as it challenges the notion of 
state sovereignty, a cornerstone principle of the international order. As Goodman notes, 
―[t]he legal status of humanitarian intervention poses a profound challenge to the future 
of global order‖34 Other critics go further and question whether the situation in Iraq 
should be categorized as a humanitarian intervention. Roth, of Human Rights Watch, 
argues that: 
 
 
Iraq failed to meet the test for intervention. Most important, the killing in 
Iraq at the time was not of the exceptional nature that would justify such 
intervention. In addition intervention was not the last reasonable option to 
stop Iraq atrocities. Intervention was not motivated primarily by 
humanitarian concerns. It was not conducted in a way that maximized 
compliance with international law.‖35 
 
 
                                                 
30
 See, for example, SD Murphy ―Brave New World of US Responses to International Crime: The 
Doctrine of Preemptive Self-defence‖ (Symposium) (2005) 50 Vil L Rev 699 at p 3. 
31
 R Wedgwood, ―The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-defence‖ 
(2003) 97 AJIL 576. 
32
 S Tharoor, Undesecretary General, Department of Public Information interviewed on World Chronicle, 
available online at <http://un.org/webcast/worldchronicle/trans900.pdf> accessed on 1 February 2009. 
33
 J Hoagland, ―Tony Blair Reflecting‖ Washington Post (6 March 2005) B7 available online at 
<www.washingtonpost.com> accessed 2 February 2009. 
34
 See R Goodman, ―Humanitarian Interventions and Pretexts for War‖ (2006) 100 AJIL 107 at p 107.  
35
 K Roth, ―War in Iraq Not a Humanitarian Intervention‖ available online at 
<www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k/w/3/htm> accessed on 2 February 2009. 
21  Betina Kuzmarov 
Consequently, examination of the three justifications for the invasion of Iraq indicates 
disagreement about both the substantive basis and the formal nature of this act. Well 
informed people disagree on this issue, raising profound questions about the very nature 
of unilateral acts more generally. This disagreement leads to the formulation of the 
problem this thesis investigates: ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ 
 The problem of legality of unilateral acts becomes even more apparent when 
unilateral acts are examined in other contexts. For example, the Israeli bombing of 
Osirak was contested at the time, and yet it set a legal precedent for the US in its 
invasion of Iraq. Further, Israel‘s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 is commonly 
referred to as unilateral. However, like the invasion of Iraq, the withdrawal raises 
questions about the justification for the Israeli action. Is the withdrawal an act of 
compliance with UN resolutions? Or is it a response to political pressure? And do these 
various considerations impact on the withdrawal‘s legality? Similarly, Israel‘s 2005 
withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 is called a unilateral act, but its legality is never clearly 
determined. These questions indicate problems with ascertaining the legality of 
unilateral acts and their use in international law. Consequently, this difficulty suggests a 
problem worthy of investigation: ―are unilateral acts legal?‖  
 
 
4.  Research Question 
 
 
The previous section highlights the difficulty in determining the legality of unilateral 
acts.  This problem leads to the following research question that is the focus of this 
thesis: ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ To answer this question requires answering three 
further questions: First, what is the definition of unilateral acts? Second, what is the 
definition of legality? And third, do unilateral acts meet the definition of legality? The 
first question, the definition of unilateral acts, is addressed in Chapter 2: Background to 
Unilateral Acts and the second question, the definition of legality, is explored in 
Chapter 3: Method. The third question, do unilateral acts meet the definition of legality, 
forms the body of this thesis and is answered in Part 2. However, these questions are 
briefly outlined here in order to clearly define the research questions of this thesis. 
 The first sub-question, the definition of unilateral acts, is difficult to answer. The 
examples of the Iraq war, the bombing of Osirak, and the withdrawals from Lebanon 
and Gaza demonstrate that the term unilateral act is used to refer to a wide range of acts 
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of states. Consequently, unilateral acts can be defined broadly, based on the one 
similarity all these examples share: a unilateral act is an action that a state undertakes 
without reference to another state.
36
 However, not all acts that meet this definition are 
clearly legal (or illegal). This too is evident from the examples of Iraq, Osirak, Lebanon 
and Gaza. Therefore, creating a definition of unilateral acts that encompasses all these 
types of acts, and criteria for their legality, is a difficult task. In fact, the problems with 
undertaking such a definition are highlighted in the recent work of the ILC on this topic. 
 The ILC is the creation of the United Nations. It fulfils the General Assembly‘s 
mandate of ―…encouraging the progressive development of international law and its 
codification.‖37 This mandate is set out in Article 13 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. To fulfil this mandate, the Commission is composed of Members who serve in 
their individual capacities. Topics considered for progressive development or 
codifications are often assigned a Special Rapporteur. The Special Rapporteur is 
entrusted with preparing detailed reports for consideration by the Plenary of the 
Membership. They delineate the topic and make proposals for its development. They 
work closely with a Drafting Committee on draft documents in their topic area. The 
Drafting Committee is entrusted with drafting and filling in the gaps in substance of the 
documents that they feel need to be considered by the Membership. The Commission 
may also create a Working Group, an ―ad hoc‖ body of the plenary with specific powers 
assigned by the larger group. 
38
 The Members, Rapporteurs and Committees work 
together to produce draft documents available for UN or state approval. 
 The ILC proposed the topic of unilateral acts in 1996.
39
 The next year the General 
Assembly passed a resolution formally inviting consideration of the feasibility of the 
topic.
40
  This led the ILC to establish a Working Group to report on the ―admissibility 
and feasibility‖ of the topic. The ILC considered the report of the Working Group on the 
topic and appointed a Special Rapporteur, Victor Rodriguez Cedeño. This led to an 
endorsement of the topic by the General Assembly, at which point unilateral acts were 
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added to the Commission‘s program of work. This topic was then considered by the ILC 
until 2006.
41
  
 The ILC‘s work proceeded slowly and with considerable debate over the content 
of the concept. To provide an overview of this debate, the ILC‘s consideration of the 
topic from 2005 was most relevant; this was because in 2005 the Commission was at an 
impasse having not yet defined unilateral acts. This led the Commission to request that 
the Working Group present ―preliminary conclusions or proposals on this topic.‖42 
These conclusions were presented the next year. The Members of the ILC subsequently 
debated, amended and approved a version of these conclusions as non-binding 
principles. They could not secure agreement on binding principles, or a definition of 
unilateral acts. As the ILC noted: 
 
 
Having examined the nine reports submitted by the Special Rapporteur and 
after extensive debates, the Commission believes it necessary to come to 
some conclusions on a topic, the difficulties and the value of which have 
both become apparent. Clearly, it is important for States to be in a position 
to judge with reasonable certainty whether and to what extent their unilateral 
conduct may bind them on the international plane.
43
 
 
 
 
They continued in the next paragraph 
 
 
The Commission is aware, however, that the concept of a unilateral act is 
not uniform. On the one hand, certain unilateral acts are formulated in the 
framework and the basis of express authorization in international law, 
whereas others are formulated by States in exercise of their freedom to act 
on the international plane; in accordance with the Commission‘s previous 
decisions, only the latter have been examined by the Commission and its 
Special Rapporteur. On the other hand, in this second case, there exists a 
very wide spectrum of conduct covered by the designation ―unilateral acts‖, 
and the differences among legal cultures partly account for the 
misunderstandings to which this topic has given rise as, for some, the 
concept of a juridical act necessarily implies an express manifestation of a 
will to be bound on the part of the author State, whereas for others any 
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unilateral conduct by the State producing legal effects on the international 
plane may be categorized as a unilateral act.
44
  
 
 
The ILC acknowledged the difficulties in codifying this topic and confirmed that states 
were uncertain about when unilateral acts took legal effect. As a result they recognized 
that the concept was vast and not uniform. A brief analysis of principles they proposed 
expands on these difficulties.  
 The principles, called ―Guiding Principles,‖ tried to reconcile the contradictory 
definitions of a unilateral act.  For example Guiding Principle 1 stated that  
 
 
Declarations publicly made and manifesting the will to be bound may have 
the effect of creating legal obligations. When conditions for this are met, the 
binding character of such declarations is based on good faith; States 
concerned may then take them into consideration and rely on them; such 
States are entitled to require that such obligations be respected.
45
 
 
 
Principle 1 established three criteria for unilateral acts to have legal effect. These were: 
will, which was related to intention; the public nature of the statement; and the 
requirement that they are binding in good faith.  
 Other guiding principles elaborated details of these criteria. For example, 
Principle 2 addressed the capacity of states to enter into unilateral legal obligations. 
Principle 3 addressed the ―circumstances‖ of the unilateral act. This principle 
challenged the autonomous nature of a unilateral act. An act was not unilateral if 
circumstances and reactions factored into its legal effect. Principle 4 discussed the 
persons who had authority to enter into unilateral acts on behalf of a state. Principle 5 
clarified the form of unilateral declarations. They could be written or unwritten. 
Principle 6 confirmed that unilateral declarations may be erga omnes. This principle 
conflicted with principle 3, circumstances. In this instance an act could be made to the 
world at large. However, it also had to provoke a reaction by a specific state to become 
binding.  
 Principle 7 adopted the restrictive rules of interpretation outlined in the Nuclear 
Tests cases. Principle 8 confirmed that an act may not violate a peremptory norm. 
Principle 9 established that unilateral obligations were binding only on the state creating 
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the obligation. Principle 10 affirmed that unilateral acts were not arbitrarily revocable.
46
 
This last principle confirmed the requirement of revocability.  
 Each of these principles expanded on Principle 1 in some way but did not clarify 
the contradictory criteria established in Principle 1. These Principles were approved by 
the General Assembly and have become non-binding recommendations to states.   
 The difficulties the ILC faced in defining unilateral acts are reflected in confusion 
over these acts in major international law texts. The consensus among major 
international law textbooks is that unilateral acts are a ―legal‖ category. However there 
is no agreement over where such acts fit into the doctrine of international law. Jennings 
and Watts in Oppenheim place the detailed discussion of unilateral acts in a chapter 
titled ―on international transactions in general‖ in a subheading ―transactions besides 
negotiation and treaties.‖47 Brownlie places them in the chapter ―Other transactions 
including agency and representation.‖48 Conversely, Cassese discusses unilateral acts 
under his Part III ―Creation and Implementation of International Legal Standards‖ in a 
chapter titled ―other law making processes‖ in a section headed ―unilateral acts as 
sources of obligation.‖49 In contrast to these approaches Shaw places unilateral acts in 
his chapter on ―sources.‖ He considers these acts under a heading ―Other possible 
sources of international law.‖50  Alternatively, Kindred et al discuss unilateral acts in 
their chapter ―creation and ascertainment of international law‖ as part of their treatment 
of treaties.
51
  This approach is similar to the approach proposed by the Rodriguez 
Cedeño at the ILC.
52
 Confusing the issue even further is Skubiszewski‘s cryptic 
approach. He remarks that although his analysis of this topic ―…belongs to a larger 
portion of the book entitled ―Sources of international law‖, a unilateral act of state does 
not constitute any source of that law.‖53 Skubiszewski follows Bos who categorizes 
unilateral acts merely as a source of obligation.
54
  
 The confusion over the definition of unilateral acts stems from the lack of 
precision in the case law that the ILC and the texts are interpreting. These sources 
define unilateral as a category of legal obligation that is formalized by the ICJ in the 
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Nuclear Tests cases,
55
 paired ICJ decisions of 1974. This decision is discussed in detail 
in chapter 2, but for present purposes it is necessary to note that this decision is regarded 
as establishing the category of unilateral acts as a separate category of obligation in 
international law. Therefore, the criteria for unilateral acts established in this case are 
central to the definition of unilateral acts in this thesis. In this case the Court formalizes 
at least three criteria for a unilateral act to take legal effect: intention, autonomy and 
revocability.  To be considered legal a state must undertake a unilateral act with the 
intention to create a legal obligation. This is the requirement of intention. Further, a 
unilateral act should not be undertaken for an exchange with another state or a quid pro 
quo. This is the requirement of autonomy. Lastly, once a state undertakes a unilateral 
act with the intention to be obligated by the act, the act is no longer revocable in good 
faith. This is the requirement of revocation.
56
 Ostensibly, when an act meets these three 
criteria it is legally binding.  Consequently, it is these criteria that are required for a 
unilateral act to have legal effect and it is these criteria that provide a basis for the 
assessment of legality of a unilateral act. However, in spite of these criteria the ILC and 
major international law texts have been unable to reach an agreed definition of a 
unilateral act. This thesis argues that when the criteria established in the Nuclear Tests 
cases are compared to the doctrine of international law it becomes clear that these 
criteria cannot define a category of legal obligation. This explains why it is so difficult 
to determine the legality of specific unilateral acts, such as Iraq, Osirak, Lebanon or 
Gaza.  
 Further, even if one can define unilateral acts, questions have been raised as to 
whether or not these acts can be considered legal acts. This requires clarifying what is 
meant by the term legal. The second sub-question is expanded on in Chapter 3, the 
chapter on method, but a brief overview of the definition of legality used in this work is 
provided here. 
 Legality is defined as the ―quality or state of being legal,‖57 and to say that 
something is legal is to describe it as being ―related to, based on, or required by the law‖ 
or possibly ―permitted by law.‖58 Therefore, to define a unilateral act as legal means that 
the act meets the requirements of law, that the act is subject to law in a manner the law 
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recognizes, and so this thesis must define the requirements of law.  In the context of 
unilateral acts this leads to the difficult question of whether the criteria for a unilateral 
act established in the Nuclear Tests cases meet the requirements of law.  
 Tamanaha notes that legal scholars and social scientists have debated the question 
―what is law‖ and have not reached agreement on the requirements of law.59 One result 
of this lack of agreement is that any attempt to define law, and therefore legality, is 
merely theoretical, in the sense that it is ―a supposition or system of ideas intended to 
explain something…‖60  Additionally, when a theory is applied to a practical problem it 
can be defined as a method for analysis.
61
  Consequently, the answer to the research 
question "what is legality?" also provides a justification of the method used in this 
thesis.  While the method used in this thesis is expanded on in Chapter 3, it is outlined 
briefly here. 
 Ratner and Slaughter identify seven ―current methods‖ of international law: 
positivism, the New Haven school, international legal process, critical legal studies, 
international law/international relations, feminist jurisprudence, and law and 
economics.
62
 To this list can be added natural law as one of the foundational methods of 
international law. However, of these methods, only critical legal studies provides an 
appropriate framework to answer the question, ―what is legality.‖ To justify this 
assertion one can begin with the classic debate between positivists and natural law 
theorists over the requirements of law. This debate peaked in the argument between 
positivist HLA Hart and his foil the natural law theorist LL Fuller.
63
 However, Hart 
explicitly discusses the futility of this debate and of trying to define law more 
generally.
64
 As Hart notes:  
 
 
[t[here are of course many other kinds of definition besides the very simple 
traditional form which we have discussed, but it seems clear, when we recall 
the character of the three main issues which we have identified as 
underlying the recurrent question, ‗What is law?‘, that nothing concise 
enough to be recognized as a definition could provide an answer to it. 
65
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Having said that, though, he does then try to explain ―a central set of elements‖ which 
are common to all these questions – his theory of positivism.66 Conversely, Fuller 
―rejected legal positivism‘s distorted view of law as a ‗one way projection of authority‘: 
the sovereign gives orders and the citizens obey.‖67 Instead, he sees law as a product of 
its own internal morality.
68
 These are clearly opposed approaches to defining law, 
although each definition is logically defensible and each definition is practically 
plausible.  Further, neither of these definitions has uncontested support as ―the‖ 
definition of law. Similarly, any definition of law advanced in this work is open to 
refutation and debate. This suggests that law is what Gallie calls ―an essentially 
contested concept.‖69 An essentially contested concept is a concept like art, or, as 
argued here, law, in which the core elements of the definition of the concept remain 
undefined.
70
 Consequently, defining legality through the core concept of law seems only 
to lead to more questions than answers. Similarly, the New Haven school defines 
legality as the result of policy that is ―empirical knowledge‖ aimed at a ―purposive 
outcome‖ determined by the values of the legal system.71 This method builds on a 
criticism of positivism, that it is insufficiently responsive to ―real world‖ concerns in 
defining law. However, the New Haven school‘s reliance on ―values‖ means that this 
method defines law in relation to predetermined preferences. As a result the New Haven 
school is similar to natural law methods. The values towards which the law is directed 
may be derived from empirical study but how these values are defined is not ultimately 
agreed. Therefore, this method is open to contestation.  
 The international legal process method is similar to the New Haven school in its 
focus on practical observation of international relations. However, unlike the New 
Haven school, international legal process focuses on ―understanding how international 
law works.‖72 Unfortunately, this focus on observation leads to criticism of this method 
for its lack of theoretical cohesion. The result of this ―normative deficit‖73 is that 
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international legal process cannot offer a comprehensive method for evaluating legality, 
as it has no cohesive explanation of ―what legality is.‖ 
 Alternatively, feminist jurisprudence, international law and international relations 
and law and economics methods are all interdisciplinary methods; they draw on insights 
from theories outside of the law -- feminist theory, international relations theory and 
economic theory -- to study legal phenomenon. Ratner and Slaughter observe that all of 
these methods believe they bring ―rigor‖ to the analysis of law, although they suggest 
that the rigor they bring is contested; each method rejects other outside theories as 
―diversionary variables.‖74 Consequently, these two strengths of interdisciplinary 
methods – their borrowing from other disciplines and their rigour -- also limit their 
usefulness for answering the question ―what is legality‖ in two ways. First, the 
―borrowing‖ of methods from other disciplines makes it difficult for these disciplines to 
assess legality. As Ratner and Slaughter note, these methods often define legality in 
positivist terms (feminist jurisprudence excepted) and are thus susceptible to the same 
criticisms as positivist methods.
75
 Second, even when these methods do have a unique 
definition of law, as in feminist jurisprudence, the definitions used lack sufficient 
specificity by which to assess legality. This is implied from the concern over the 
―rigour‖ of these methods as this debate is concerned with whether outside methods 
enhance or diminish the understanding of law. Lack of resolution of this argument 
points to a lack of specificity in the application of the theory of law in each method that 
makes it more difficult to answer the question ―what is legality?‖. Therefore, the 
positivist, the natural law, the New Haven school, the international legal process and the 
interdisciplinary methods can all be excluded as methods of analysis in this thesis.   
Unlike the other methods examined, critical legal studies methods can avoid a 
contestable definition of law while providing sufficient specificity with which to define 
and assess legality.
76
 While critical legal studies is a diverse and amorphous method, 
certain strands of critical legal studies take an approach to law that ―takes legal doctrine 
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seriously.‖77 Hunt describes this version of critical legal studies as a ―narrow‖ position 
―in which law is described by the internal understanding lawyers hold of their subject 
matter.‖78 This type of critical legal studies accepts that lawyers hold a coherent internal 
understanding of law that is produced by their study of legal doctrine, without defining 
law explicitly. To explain further: if one understands doctrine as ―2. That which is 
taught…b. esp. that which is taught or laid down as true concerning a particular subject 
or department of knowledge, as religion, politics, science, etc; a belief, theoretical 
opinion; a dogma tenet…,‖79 then the narrow version of critical legal studies allows for 
a doctrinal analysis of law without having to define law. It provides a way for law to 
explain what is ―laid down as true‖ about its discipline based on the understanding of 
law that lawyers hold about their subject matter. Therefore, narrow critical legal studies 
methods answer both concerns that have emerged in the attempt to define legality: that 
legality cannot be defined by definitions of law; and that legality requires a way of 
determining what is legal from what is not legal. 
 As a result this thesis adopts the ―narrow‖ critical legal studies method to define 
legality. Arguably, the two most prominent scholars to apply critical legal studies to 
international law, Kennedy
80
 and Koskenniemi
81
, both adopt this narrow approach. 
Kennedy and Koskeniemmi are both interested in the rhetorical patterns of legal 
arguments that lawyers adopt patterns that they argue structure international law. In 
other words, Kennedy and Koskenniemi examine the doctrine of international law. 
Further, this narrow version of critical legal studies is defined as a ―structuralist‖ 
approach, since it does not attempt to define what law is, but to uncover the internal 
understandings – the doctrine - that structures law.  
 The structure of international law has been described in several ways by narrow 
critical legal studies scholars. For example, Koskenniemi argues that the doctrine of law 
is based on two concepts, apology and utopia.
82
 However, Kennedy, in his original work 
on international legal structures, focuses on three areas of rhetoric which work together 
to provide ―internal cohesiveness,‖ a structure, to the doctrine of international law. He 
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identifies these as sources, substance and process
83
 doctrines. Kennedy‘s doctrinal 
structure is adopted in this thesis. His method is preferred over Koskenniemi‘s for three 
reasons: First, Kennedy‘s structure corresponds closely to categories studied by critical 
legal scholars outside of international law. For example, in one of the earliest works of 
critical legal studies Kennedy examines the ―form and substance‖ of private law 
adjudication.
84
 Form in private law corresponds to sources doctrine in international law 
because form can be defined as ―way in which a thing exists or appears‖85 Similarly, 
sources doctrine is concerned with the way in which the authority of international law is 
determined. To determine authority requires effectively establishing the way law must 
appear. Consequently the terms form and substance are used interchangeably. Second, 
Kennedy specifically identifies his structure by using terminology common in 
international texts.
86
 This makes his approach accessible and persuasive as a measure of 
the internal structure of law. Third, he explicitly identifies his rhetorics as doctrines, and 
pursues a doctrinal analysis that corresponds to the definition of doctrine used in this 
thesis. Therefore, sources, substance and process are the doctrines that define law for 
the purposes of this thesis. 
Each of the doctrines Kennedy identifies has a specific role in the structure of law.  
He notes that 
 
 
…sources doctrine is concerned with the origin and authority of 
international law – a concern it resolves by referring the reader to authorities 
constituted elsewhere. Process doctrine  – the bulk of modern international 
public law—considers the participants and jurisdictional framework for 
international law independent of both the process by which international law 
is generated and the substance of its normative order. Substance doctrine 
seems to address issues of sovereign co-operation and conflict more 
directly.
87
 
 
 
Therefore, sources are the way law must manifest itself to gain authority – the form 
international law must take. Substance refers to areas on which states agree to cooperate 
– that is the substance of law that has been given normative treatment.88 Process refers 
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to ―the rules by which the game of international law is to be played.‖ It refers to the 
processes by which substance is given form.
89
 Consequently, a narrow CLS approach 
addresses different aspects of legality, its source, its substance and its process. Each of 
these doctrines is distinct and explains a different rhetoric of the structure of 
international law and, as will be developed further in chapter 3, it is the interplay of 
these doctrines that shapes the structure of international law. 
This thesis defines legality through the method of the ―narrow‖ version of critical 
legal studies. This method understands legality as the product of the internal 
understandings of the doctrine of law. More specifically, it understands that law is 
produced through the accepted ―rhetorics‖, doctrines, of sources, substance and process. 
Through this structure this thesis can assess whether or not unilateral acts are considered 
legal, without having to define law itself. It is sufficient for unilateral acts to be 
considered legal if they can be integrated into the structure of law identified by the 
narrow school of critical legal studies. To reframe this statement and explain further: 
Legality occurs when an act is considered law. For purposes of this thesis, an act is 
considered law when it can be explained within the doctrine of international law. The 
doctrine of international law is, in turn, the way the discipline of law defines its own 
subject matter.  According to the narrow version of critical legal studies, the doctrine of 
international law is a structure produced from an internal understanding of the discipline 
of law about the sources, substance and process of law. Consequently, unilateral acts 
can be considered legal if they can be explained within this structure.  
The final sub-question identified in this thesis is: do unilateral acts meet the 
definition of legality?  Based on the two sub-questions defined above, this question can 
be further refined to ask: do unilateral acts, as defined in the Nuclear Tests cases, meet 
the requirements of legality established by the doctrine of international law?  Using the 
definition of legality established above it is hypothesized that unilateral acts, defined by 
the criteria established in the Nuclear Tests cases - intention, autonomy and revocability 
- do not meet the requirements of legality. This hypothesis is tested in Part 2, Chapters 4 
through 6, of this thesis. 
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5. Delimitation of the Scope and Assumptions  
 
 
The research question, ―are unilateral acts legal,‖ is a broad and difficult question. As a 
result this question is further limited by three sub-questions. These questions are: First, 
what is the definition of unilateral acts? Second, what is the definition of legality? And 
third, do unilateral acts meet the definition of legality? Based on this formulation of the 
research question, the first limitation on the scope of this thesis is the definition of 
unilateral acts. For purposes of this thesis unilateral acts are defined by the criterion for 
unilateral acts established in the Nuclear Tests cases.
90
 This limitation is necessary to 
establish parameters for the analysis in this thesis and it is defensible based on the 
literature.
91
 However, this definition restricts the analysis in part 2 of this thesis to acts 
which can be analysed according to the established criteria. These criteria exclude some 
acts that are not multilateral but are not unilateral according to this definition. In 
particular this definition rules out certain categories of acts that otherwise seem to be 
unilateral: unilateral acts of retaliation under trade agreements, notifications required by 
treaties and humanitarian interventions by regional or multinational organizations. An 
example of the first type of act excluded is a trade sanction, an example of the second 
type of act is notification such as when a state deposits a treaty. An example of the third 
type of act is the NATO bombing of Kosovo which unlike the invasion of Iraq was 
undertaken by a multinational organization as opposed to states acting in coordination. 
These acts are excluded from the definition of unilateral acts because they do not 
manifest the autonomy required of a unilateral act according to the Nuclear Tests cases. 
Consequently, the definition of a unilateral act acts as a significant limitation on the 
scope of this thesis. 
 The second sub-question, the definition of legality, is a second limitation on the 
scope of this thesis. In order to assess whether unilateral acts are legal it is necessary to 
determine which acts possess the qualities of law. This makes it necessary to define 
these qualities. In the research question section, a brief justification is put forward for a 
specific definition of legality. This thesis examines the current methods of international 
law. It begins with theories that attempt to define the elements of law, natural law and 
positivism. However, these theories cannot agree on a definition of legality and this lack 
of agreement makes any definition put forward by these methods open to contestation 
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that proves difficult to defend. Therefore, three other methods are considered that do not 
define law, the New Haven school, International Legal process and Interdisciplinary 
methods. However, these methods are ultimately rejected because they lack clear 
criteria of law, criteria that are necessary for this thesis. As a result this thesis adopts a 
narrow version of critical legal studies to define legality, as this method avoids the 
difficulties of defining law and yet provides a structure within which to analyse legality. 
This is because this method of legality is doctrinal, and this means that it takes law 
seriously on its own terms. Second, a doctrinal method provides a structure within 
which this thesis can assess legality. It provides a specific response to the question of 
legality. Narrowing the scope of the thesis in this way allows the assessment of legality 
of unilateral acts to become a manageable comparison of the requirements of unilateral 
acts to the doctrine of international law. However, adopting this method is a significant 
limitation on the scope of the thesis, as it restricts the analysis of legality of unilateral 
acts not only to a doctrinal analysis, but to an analysis formed by a narrow critical legal 
studies method which sees law as the product of the doctrine of international law. 
Addressing these limitations is important in order to understand the scope of the 
analysis this thesis does undertake, a doctrinal analysis of the legality of unilateral acts. 
This examination leads directly to the following question: in spite of these limitations 
what is the significance of this study? 
 
 
6. The Significance of this Thesis 
 
 
This thesis emerges out of the context of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This act is 
commonly referred to as unilateral and yet three different justifications are put forward 
for why this act is legal (or, conversely, these three justifications are rejected as illegal).  
 Therefore, this act is constantly referred to as unilateral and yet it is not clear that 
this claim has legal implications. A similar confusion over the meaning of legality is 
seen in the examples of Osirak and the withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza. These 
examples highlight a gap between the assertion that an act is unilateral and the ability to 
assess the legal implications of these acts. This gap leads to the research question for 
this thesis: ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ 
This question is significant because context gives rise to a gap between the claim 
of legality and the ability to assess legality that has not been addressed 
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comprehensively. That is, the requirements of unilateral acts, defined as the 
requirements of unilateral acts established in the Nuclear Tests cases, have not been 
compared to the doctrine of international law, defined as a structure established by a 
narrow version of critical legal studies. Unilateral acts are examined in recent studies of 
the structure of international law, but they are not the focus of these examinations.
92
 
Further, there have been attempts to clarify the requirements of unilateral acts. For 
example, as noted above the ILC has recently completed a significant programmatic 
attempt to codify the doctrinal requirements of unilateral acts.
93
 Therefore, there is 
significant examination in the literature of legality and there is significant study of the 
requirements of unilateral acts. However, this thesis contributes to the literature by 
comparing these two areas of study in a thesis that focuses exclusively on the legality of 
unilateral acts. Further, this thesis does so to address an apparent gap in understanding – 
the gap between the claim that unilateral acts are legal, and the ability to assess this 
legality in practice.  
Resolving this question is both timely and important in the face of ongoing 
debates about the legality of acts such as the invasion of Iraq. Further, one of the 
justifications for invasion, preemptive self-defence is, for now, still the official policy of 
the US.
94
 Moreover, the power of the US indicates that unilateral acts will continue to 
be of significance for the foreseeable future. Consequently, this thesis is significant for 
its application of a narrow critical legal studies method to the requirements of unilateral 
acts. This thesis also has practical application because it resolves an ongoing difficulty 
for the doctrine of international law – the difficulty in applying the requirements of 
unilateral acts to specific acts of states.  Lastly, this thesis adds to ongoing debates in the 
doctrine about the role of unilateral acts. Therefore, this thesis makes a significant 
contribution to the literature.  
 
 
 
7. Organization of the Thesis 
 
 
This chapter provides context and purpose for studying the research question ―are 
unilateral acts legal?‖ The scope of this research question is limited by the need to 
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define a unilateral act and the need to define legality for purposes of this thesis. Once 
this is done a comparison is undertaken between the criteria of unilateral acts and the 
requirements of legality.  Consequently, Part 1 of this thesis is concerned with 
definitions. Chapter 2, Background to Unilateral Acts, provides a history of unilateral 
acts, introduces the requirements of unilateral acts and justifies the adoption of these 
requirements to define unilateral acts in this work. Chapter 3, Method, explains and 
justifies the meaning of legality for purposes of this thesis and expands on the overview 
provided in this Chapter.   
Part 2 of this work addresses the research question directly by answering the 
question, ―are unilateral acts legal?‖  It does this by comparing the criteria of unilateral 
acts defined in Chapter 2 to the doctrine of international law defined in Chapter 3. Each 
chapter in this Part corresponds to one doctrine in international law that is identified in 
Chapter 3. Each chapter begins by introducing the doctrine, then introducing the 
criterion of unilateral acts that most closely performs the function of this doctrine. 
Finally, in several chapters a practical example is presented to illustrate the analysis in 
the chapter. This format for each chapter allows for an assessment of whether the 
requirement of unilateral act studied meets the definition of legality. Consequently, 
Chapter 4 focuses on the doctrine of sources. Sources doctrine is ―concerned with the 
origin and authority of international law‖.95 The requirement of a unilateral act that 
performs this function is intention. An example of an act that displays the uneasiness 
between the doctrine of sources and intention is the Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons. 
As a result this chapter defines the sources of international law and compares the 
requirements of these sources to the criterion of intention in unilateral acts. If intention 
cannot be explained by the doctrine of sources this aspect of a unilateral act is not legal.  
A similar comparison is performed for the doctrine of substance in Chapter 5. 
Substance doctrine is the doctrine that can ―address issues of sovereign co-operation and 
conflict more directly.‖96 In unilateral acts the function of substance is performed by the 
requirement of autonomy. Chapter 5 begins by outlining the doctrine of substance. Then 
the requirement of autonomy in unilateral acts is examined and compared to the 
doctrine of substance. Lastly, the example of the San Juan River case is used to 
illustrate the practical implications of this comparison. 
In Chapter 6 process is examined. This chapter begins by establishing that process 
―considers the participants and jurisdictional framework for international law 
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independent of both the process by which international law is generated and the 
substance of its normative order.‖97 From this basis the meaning of process in the 
doctrine of international law is expanded upon. Then the requirement of unilateral acts 
that most closely performs the function of process, revocability is explored and assessed 
to see if it can be explained by the doctrine of process. Finally, in Chapter 7, conclusion, 
the conclusion in each chapter is summarized and final conclusions are drawn. Then 
analysis in this thesis is put into the context first outlined in the introduction and the 
significance of this thesis is examined. Lastly, some directions for future research are 
suggested and implications of the thesis are assessed. Following this organization this 
thesis will answer the research question, ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ 
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PART 1: DEFINITIONS 
39  Betina Kuzmarov 
Chapter 2: Background to Unilateral Acts 
1. Introduction 
 
 
This chapter answers the research question, ―what are unilateral acts?‖ by providing an 
overview of the research question, by outlining the history of unilateral acts, by 
providing an overview of the leading case in this area – the Nuclear Tests cases - and by 
establishing the importance of the criteria for legality established in this case for the 
definition of unilateral acts. Consequently, this chapter presents the criteria for 
unilateral acts that will be used in this thesis and establishes that these criteria form the 
definition of unilateral acts used in this work. 
 
 
2. The Research Question 
 
 
The question ―what are unilateral acts‖ is difficult to answer.  The examples of the Iraq 
war, the bombing of Osirak, and the withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza, presented in 
the previous chapter, demonstrate that the term unilateral act is used to refer to a wide 
and varied range of acts of states.  This variety seems to point to a broad definition of 
unilateral acts: as an act that a state undertakes without reference to another state.
98
 
However, not all acts that meet this definition have identifiable legal implications. 
Moreover, the situations in which unilateral acts are considered legal are not settled as is 
evident from the difficulty the ILC has had defining unilateral acts.   
 Over the six years it dealt with the topic, the ILC could not define unilateral acts 
and as a result it confirmed that the concept was vast and not uniform. One consequence 
of the lack of uniformity of unilateral acts was that the ILC could not arrive at a 
codification of the principles of unilateral acts, nor in fact a definition of these acts. 
Instead it substituted criteria of legality in place of a definition. The ILC published these 
criteria in ―Guiding Principles,‖ non-binding recommendations to states about the 
obligations that could arise from unilateral acts.  For example, Guiding Principle 1 
established that  
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Declarations publicly made and manifesting the will to be bound may have 
the effect of creating legal obligations. When conditions for this are met, 
the binding character of such declarations is based on good faith; States 
concerned may then take them into consideration and rely on them; such 
States are entitled to require that such obligations be respected.
99
 
 
 
Principle 1 established three criteria for unilateral acts to have legal effect. These were: 
will; the public nature of the statement; and the requirement that they are binding in 
good faith.  
 Other guiding principles elaborated details of these criteria. For example, 
Principle 10 affirmed that unilateral acts were not arbitrarily revocable.
100
 This last 
principle confirmed the requirement of revocability. Each principle expanded on 
Principle 1 in some way but did not clarify the contradictory criteria established in 
Principle 1.  
 Consequently, the work of the ILC establishes that there is no agreed definition 
for unilateral acts. Therefore, in order to understand what unilateral acts are, one can 
only look at the criteria for determining if a unilateral act is legal. In this instance the 
work of the ILC is instructive but not original, as the work of the ILC draws heavily on 
established doctrine to try to establish consensus about the legality of unilateral acts. 
Particularly, as the Working Group of the ILC noted when it recommended codifying 
this area of law, there is established jurisprudence in this area that establishes criteria for 
unilateral acts, specifically a decision of the ICJ, the Nuclear Tests cases.
101
 As a result 
to understand the ―Guiding Principles‖ of the ILC and the requirements they adopt, one 
must return to the core criteria on which they based their analysis, the Nuclear Tests 
cases. As will be developed below, this case is central to the doctrine of unilateral acts. 
It established three main criteria for legality of unilateral acts, intention, autonomy and 
revocation. However, as the ILC also acknowledged, these criteria are ambiguous and 
therefore not a substitute for a clear definition.
102
 This helps explain why it is so 
difficult to prove the legality of specific unilateral acts, such as Iraq, Osirak, Lebanon or 
Gaza.  
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 This chapter develops this idea by examining the history of unilateral acts, by 
outlining the decision in the Nuclear Tests cases and by establishing the importance of 
the criteria established in the Nuclear Tests cases for the definition of unilateral acts. 
 
 
3. The History of Unilateral Acts 
 
 
The introductory chapter illustrates the wide variety of contexts in which unilateral acts 
operate. This diversity leads to debate as to when unilateral acts are considered legal. 
There appears to be a gap between the assertion that a unilateral act is legal (or illegal) 
and the ability to identify the legality of this act in practice. Therefore, to analyse the 
research question for this thesis, ―are unilateral acts legal‖, requires an understanding of 
the definition of unilateral acts. This chapter begins to unpack this definition by 
examining the history of unilateral acts. In particular this section illustrates that 
unilateral acts have not, historically, been considered legal.   
 This section begins with the observation that it is only recently that unilateral acts 
have been considered legal. As Yasuaki observes ―[f]or most of the time since the 
human species appeared in history, the human sphere of activities did not cover the 
entire globe. People lived as members of various societies, communities or worlds, 
ranging from families to clans, villages, cities, states, empires and civilizations.‖103 
However, societies and peoples always interacted, primarily for trade and war. 
Therefore, there was a need for norms to structure these interactions.
104
  In spite of this 
need the law governing relations between these groups was not universal. This lack of 
uniformity leads Bederman to caution that current international law cannot be justified 
by the past;
105
 the rules that historically governed group interactions all operate within 
their own context.
106
 Consequently, current ideas about unilateral acts emerged as part 
of the formation of modern international law. Therefore, this section begins with the 
development of the doctrine in the mid 19
th
 century and focuses primarily on the post-
World War II history of unilateral acts.  
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In the 19
th
 century states
107
 accepted that unilateral acts could give rise to rights 
and obligations indicated by a binding treaty.
108
 However, the majority of acts that were 
classified as unilateral acts were not considered ―legal acts‖; they were considered 
―political‖ or ―diplomatic‖ acts and they did not have legal effect until they were 
codified in treaty form. This view of unilateral acts was illustrated by the Monroe 
Doctrine. In 1823 President Monroe included in his annual address a unilateral 
statement of US policy in the Americas. This doctrine contained three primary 
assertions.
109
 First, President Monroe reiterated the independence of all states in the 
Americas: ―the American continents, by free and independent condition which they 
have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future 
colonization…‖110 Second, he warned European powers that, ―…we should consider 
any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as 
dangerous to our peace and safety.‖111 Third, he asserted that the US would take a 
position of neutrality in European affairs.
112
 This declaration has shaped US policy 
towards the Americas since its formulation.
113
 However, it was not initially perceived as 
a legal declaration. As Root noted in 1914, ―[n]o one ever pretended that Mr. Monroe 
was declaring a rule of international law or that the doctrine which he declared has 
become international law.‖114 Similarly, in 1920 Tower argued that the doctrine ―was a 
declaration of policy, a rule of conduct in regard to our own independent position in the 
world.‖115 Consequently, at the start of the 20th century the Monroe Doctrine was not 
considered legal; however, this changed over the course of the century. By the 1960s the 
doctrine was interpreted as creating a legal obligation. This was exemplified by an 
opinion given to President Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis. 
116
 This legal 
opinion argued that the Monroe Doctrine was a special law of the Western Hemisphere 
and as a result this doctrine authorized unilateral military action by the US. This advice 
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was rejected by President Kennedy.
 117
 In spite of Kennedy‘s reticence this opinion was 
important. Legal doctrine now considered that a formerly political act had become a 
binding legal obligation.  
 The opinion given to President Kennedy - that the Monroe Doctrine was a special 
law - expanded on an approach that emerged in the doctrinal writing of the 1950s. Prior 
to this opinion the idea that unilateral acts could have independent legal effect had 
already been ―floated‖ by scholars who tried to separate these acts from treaties.118  
These scholars argued that it was necessary to have an enforceable category of 
unilateral obligations to maintain good faith in international relations. Two scholars in 
particular contributed to this argument, Schwarzenberger and Fitzmaurice.  
 Schwarzenberger and Fitzmaurice were proponents of the view that an obligation 
arose from the intention of a state and autonomy of the act. Prior to their writings, many 
authors preferred to see unilateral acts as a tacit treaty. One example from the earlier 
literature was an article from the 1930s by Garner. Garner conceptualized unilateral 
declarations as a form of oral agreement. In analyzing a case that was current at the 
time, the Eastern Greenland case, he explained that ―[t]he conclusion to the whole 
matter would seem to be that an oral agreement between states is, or may be, as binding 
upon the parties as if it were recorded in writing, and will be applied by international 
tribunals whenever the facts as to the agreement may be proved.‖119  Garner argued that 
binding unilateral acts were oral agreements and he never mentioned intention as a 
criterion for unilateral acts.  
 Over 20 years later, Schwarzenberger took a different approach; he asserted the 
legal character of unilateral acts in a course at The Hague Academy in 1955. He argued 
that 
 
 
If a subject of international law chooses to take a position in relation to a 
matter which is legally relevant and communicates this intent to others it 
is bound within such limits to accept the legal implications of such a 
unilateral act. If it acts contrary to its notified intent, it breaks the rule on 
the binding character of communicated unilateral acts.
120
 
 
                                                 
117
 Chayes (n 116) at p 468-469. 
118
 See, G Schwarzenberger, ―The Fundamental Principles of International Law‖ (1955) 87 Rec Des 
Cours 195; G Fitzmaurice, Sir, ―The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-1954: 
Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points‖ (1958) 33 BYIL 302. 
119
 JW Garner, ―The International Binding Force of Unilateral Oral Declarations‖ (1933) 27 AJIL 493 at p 
497. 
120
 Schwarzenberger (n 118) at p 312.  
44  Betina Kuzmarov 
 
 
He traced the legitimacy of this rule to the ―obnoxiousness of contradictory behaviour‖ 
enshrined in the principle of venire contra factum proprium. He argued that this 
principle had assisted in developing the rule of opinio juris in custom. From this basis it 
had developed into a self-justifying rule of international law.
121
 He provided two 
examples of state practice to justify this contention, state recognition and wartime 
blockades. For his example of recognition, Schwarzenberger referenced a note by the 
British Government to the Government of Persia (now Iran) that confirmed the 
independence of Afghanistan. This note confirmed earlier acts of recognition by the 
British Government. As an example of a wartime blockade Schwarzenberger discussed 
British practice during the US Civil War. During the civil war Britain asserted its right 
as a neutral state to sail into Confederate ports closed by Union ships. The British 
government argued that preventing their ships from entering these ports was a violation 
of their rights as a neutral state.
122
  
 Schwarzenberger‘s analysis had two problems. The first problem was his 
derivation of a separate category of unilateral acts from the principle of contra factum. 
The second problem was the appropriateness of his examples of state practice. In the 
first instance Schwarzenberger offered no proof as to where or how the doctrine of 
contra factum became substantively separate from its role in creating opinio juris. He 
did not clarify how this principle was distinct from estoppels, stating his point as a 
matter of fact. Further, the examples of state practice presented by Schwarzenberger 
were inappropriate. They were both obscure and narrow. Britain‘s recognition of 
Afghanistan was more accurately a refusal to bow to Persian pressure to withdraw 
recognition of Afghanistan. It was not a new unilateral act; it was the continuation of an 
original act of recognition. Consequently, this example did not prove 
Schwarzenberger‘s point, as it did not establish that states believed it was illegal, as 
opposed to politically expedient or diplomatic, to continue the previous recognition of a 
state. Additionally, it was a stretch to argue that British practice during the US Civil 
War was a unilateral act. Schwarzenberger implied that recognition of a state was a 
unilateral act with legal effect. This act ostensibly allowed third states to exercise their 
rights of neutrality, an action which was unilateral in nature. However, 
Schwarzenberger did not demonstrate the act‘s independent legal effect. This example 
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affirmed that states could always exercise rights of neutrality they possessed under 
customary international law. Therefore, the suitability of these two examples was 
questionable. If these were the most appropriate examples, then Schwarzenberger 
changed legal doctrine on thin precedent. In spite of these weaknesses Schwarzenberger 
confidently stated that unilateral acts had ―legal effect.‖ He based this obligation on the 
intention on the part of the state to be bound by their actions. 
 Similarly, a few years later - in the late 1950s - Fitzmaurice published a review 
and comment on the jurisprudence of the ICJ. In this review he discussed the concept of 
unilateral declarations. He asserted that unilateral declarations were of three kinds, ―(i) 
[b]ilateral or multilateral Declarations which are unilateral neither in substance nor in 
form; (ii) unilateral Declarations that are unilateral in form and substance; and (iii) 
unilateral Declarations that are unilateral in form but not in substance.‖123 He argued 
that unilateral acts in category (i) were tacit treaties and that as treaties these acts had 
legal effect according to the principles of treaty interpretation.
124
 He also contended that 
acts in category (iii) were contractual and that declarations in this category were made 
in exchange for a ―quid pro quo.‖  Therefore, these acts were not really unilateral; the 
exchange element made it similar to a contract, a form of treaty. As a result these acts 
were also interpreted according to principles of treaty interpretation. He cited the 
Iranian Oil case in this regard.
125
 Acts in categories (i) and (iii) were binding because of 
their reciprocity or exchange that led to a ―quid pro quo‖. 
 Fitzmaurice‘s second category was particularly important to the history of 
unilateral acts. This category dealt with the situation in which a declaration was 
unilateral in form and substance. These acts were unilateral ―in the sense that it is not 
made in return for, or simultaneously with, any specific quid pro quo or as part of any 
general understanding.‖126 These acts were legal if ―clearly intended to have that effect, 
and held out so to speak, as an instrument on which others may rely and under which 
the Declarant purports to assume obligations.‖127  Consequently, if the state undertaking 
the act intended it to be legal, it was, and it was open to interpretation according to 
principles of treaty interpretation. Fitzmaurice provided no references to doctrine or 
state practice to back up his definition of a unilateral act. It was suggested that he may 
have had the Iranian Oil case in mind. However, as noted he had already used this case 
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as an example of an act unilateral in form but not substance.
128
 In short, Fitzmaurice‘s 
second category of unilateral act, an act unilateral in form and substance, was novel and 
unsubstantiated.
129
  As a result Schwarzenberger and Fitzmaurice each proposed 
original criteria for binding unilateral acts. These criteria were later adopted by the ICJ. 
Schwarzenberger proposed that a unilateral act had legal effect when a state intended to 
be bound by its act. Fitzmaurice severed this type of act from a tacit treaty by asserting 
the unilateral nature or autonomy of the act.   
 Often these scholars examined Eastern Greenland case, a PCIJ decision, as an 
example of a unilateral declaration.
130
  Therefore, this case was important to the 
development of the jurisprudence of unilateral declarations.
131
 To explain, the Court in 
the Eastern Greenland case identified the issue before it as follows:  
 
 
Nevertheless, the point which must now be considered is whether the 
Ihlen declaration -- even if not constituting a definitive recognition of 
Danish sovereignty -- did constitute an engagement obliging Norway to 
refrain from occupying any part of Greenland.
132
   
 
 
The Court was concerned with the capacity of a statement made by a foreign minister to 
bind their government; its reasoning centred on the capacity of a diplomat make a 
binding declaration for his state in the course of ongoing negotiations.
133
   The decision 
stated that  
 
 
The Court considers it beyond all dispute that a reply of this nature 
given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on behalf of his Government in 
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response to a request by the diplomatic representative of a foreign 
Power, in regard to a question falling within his province, is binding 
upon the country to which the Minister belongs.
134
 
 
 
The declaration was treated as a question of fact. The Court asked whether a statement 
made by a foreign minister in international negotiations could be binding on the state 
that made the statement. The Court was not concerned with whether the state had the 
intention to be bound.  Applying Fitzmaurice‘s schema, the Ihlen Declaration was 
unilateral in form but not in substance.
135
 This statement was made in the context of 
ongoing negotiations and was part of an exchange, a quid pro quo. This focus on 
negotiations meant that the Eastern Greenland case was really concerned with a tacit 
treaty. Indeed, the differences between these two cases leads Rubin to argue that before 
the Nuclear Tests cases a ―rule‖ regarding the legal effect of ―truly‖ unilateral acts did 
not exist.
136
 Rubin asserts that 
 
 
[a]side from writings derived directly from this article by Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice, there is no support in learned opinion prior to the ICJ 
judgement in the Nuclear Tests cases for the proposition that the 
intention to be bound of a state publicly issuing a unilateral declaration 
is by itself sufficient to create a legal obligation.
137
 
 
 
Rubin‘s conclusions are not entirely accurate. Schwarzenberger had previously asserted 
that unilateral acts could be binding in good faith.  However, in this quotation Rubin 
raises the key point that the Nuclear Tests cases had no precedent in the case law. 
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4. The Nuclear Tests Cases 
 
 
The previous section demonstrated a trend towards legalization of unilateral acts that 
culminated with the Nuclear Tests cases decision. Before this decision there was no 
agreement that unilateral acts were a type of legal obligation and when they were 
considered legal, unilateral acts were often considered an oral treaty.  Therefore, this 
decision has been called ―revolutionary‖138 for its clear determination that ―oral 
statements by government officials – until then unperfected legal acts – could 
henceforth be deemed binding.‖139 Unperfected legal acts were acts in which the legal 
requirements had not been completed.
140
 Thus, the Nuclear Tests cases established the 
criterion for perfecting unilateral acts, acts that had previously been viewed as 
―unperfected‖ and perhaps even ―un-perfectible.‖ In the Nuclear Tests cases the Court 
formalized the requirements of a new form of obligation. As a result this decision will 
form the basis of the answer to the question: ―what are unilateral acts?‖ To answer this 
question, this case must be examined in detail. 
 The Nuclear Tests cases were separate actions brought to the ICJ by Australia and 
New Zealand. The judgments in these actions were so similar that they were often 
treated together.
141
 In these cases Australia and New Zealand each sued France for 
testing nuclear weapons on the Muraroa Atoll in the South Pacific. The testing was 
above ground and took place between 1966 and 1972.
142
  Australia and New Zealand 
challenged the legality of these tests. They argued that fallout from the nuclear testing 
had been deposited on their territory. Australia and New Zealand claimed that these 
tests gave rise to environmental and health concerns.
143
  In June 1973 the Court issued 
an order for interim measures. These measures enjoined France from further nuclear 
testing. France ignored the interim order and conducted above ground tests on the atoll 
in the summer of 1973 and fall of 1974.
144
 France did not participate in the proceedings 
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before the ICJ. They withdrew from the proceedings on the grounds that the Court had 
no power to hear the matter.
145
   
 In France‘s absence the ICJ held that ―a number of authoritative statements have 
been made on behalf of the French Government concerning its intentions as to future 
nuclear testing in the South Pacific Ocean.‖146 These statements led the Court to 
establish the ―existence of a dispute.‖147 Further, based on previous diplomatic 
correspondence the Court held that Australia and New Zealand‘s ―object‖ in the dispute 
was to have France end its above ground nuclear testing.
148
 Constructing the ―object‖ of 
the dispute in this manner allowed the Court to conclude that French statements 
―…could have been constructed by Australia as ‗a firm explicit, and binding 
undertaking to refrain from further atmospheric tests‘, [and] the applicant Government 
would have regarded its objective as having been achieved.‖149   
 This was very convenient for the Court.  If French statements were binding then 
France was legally obligated to stop above ground nuclear testing regardless of the 
lawsuit against them and Australia and New Zealand‘s lawsuit was without purpose.  
Consequently, the primary evidence the Court analysed was French public statements. 
These statements were analysed in order to determine whether these declarations were 
binding. The Court was concerned whether the statements by French officials
150
 
accurately reflected France‘s intention to stop nuclear testing.  The Court concluded that 
―…France made public its intention to cease its conduct of atmospheric nuclear tests 
following the conclusion of the 1974 series of tests.‖151 The Court found that French 
statements reflected the intention of the state. As a result it then considered whether 
France‘s statements of intention could have legal effect. The Court examined the legal 
―status‖152 of these statements, beginning its analysis of France‘s statements with a 
general ―review‖ of the ―law‖ in this area: 
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It is well recognised that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, 
concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating 
legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very 
specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that 
it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on 
the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being 
thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent 
with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind if made publicly and 
with the intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of 
international negotiations is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in 
the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the 
declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other states is required 
for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be 
inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by 
which the pronouncement by the state was made.
153
 
 
 
 
The Court found that a unilateral act created a legal obligation when the state intended 
the act to be binding. When the state had this intention it could not arbitrarily revoke its 
unilateral act. Further, the act had to be autonomous in nature. No quid pro quo or other 
exchange had to occur. In a single paragraph the Court established the core criteria of a 
―legal‖ unilateral act: any act of a state undertaken with intention to create a legal 
obligation that was not undertaken for an exchange or a quid pro quo was legally 
binding on that state. The act could no longer be revoked.  When these criteria were met 
the state was obligated by its act.  Further, to ascertain when these criteria were met the 
Court offered the following guidance:   
 
 
[o]f course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a state may 
choose to take up a certain position in relation to a particular matter with 
the intention of being bound - the intention is to be ascertained by 
interpretation of the act. When states make statements by which their 
freedom of action to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called 
for.
154
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The Court concluded that the statements by French officials demonstrated intention to 
stop nuclear testing.
155
 The ICJ decided, by 9 votes to 6, that the object of the dispute 
was met. There was no longer a purpose to Australia‘s and New Zealand‘s claim, thus 
there was no reason to proceed to a decision on the merits of this case. 
156
  
 Therefore, in the Nuclear Tests cases the Court found a way around ruling on the 
contentious issue of nuclear testing, a stance pragmatic for the Court. France was 
unlikely to recognise the decision and ruling on this issue would have put the Court in 
an awkward position. They would have had an unenforceable decision on a contentious 
issue, thereby damaging the stature of the Court.
157
 Instead the ICJ clarified the criteria 
for unilateral declarations to take legal effect. Any public statement made with the intent 
to be bound was potentially of legal effect. In reaching this conclusion the Court may 
have had in mind Schwarzenberger and Fitzmaurice, or at least their spirits.
158
 The 
Court adopted Schwarzenberger and Fitzmaurice‘s two core requirements for a 
unilateral act to have legal effect. The act had to be autonomous and the state had to 
intend to be legally bound by their act. 
 Importantly, these criteria were not uncontested. Once the suit was started New 
Zealand and Australia did not believe that French statements could substitute for the 
decision of the Court, as, in spite of their earlier statements to the contrary, they sought 
a judgment on the issues.
159
  Further, some judges were concerned that the Court had 
radically reinterpreted the submissions of the parties in its decision. The Joint 
Dissenting Opinion of Judges Onyeama, Dillard, Jiminez de Arechaga, and Waldock 
noted, ―[w]hile the Court is entitled to interpret the submissions of the parties, it is not 
authorized to introduce into them radical alterations…‖  160 and the dissent continued,  
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[t]he judgment revises, we think, the applicant‘s submission by bringing 
in other materials such as diplomatic communications and statements 
made in the course of the hearings and governmental press statements 
which are not part of the judicial proceedings. These materials do not 
justify, however, the interpretation arrived at in the Judgment. They 
refer to requests made repeatedly by the Applicant for an assurance from 
France as to the cessation of tests. But these requests for assurance 
cannot have the effect attributed to them by the Judgment….‖161 
 
 
In the dissent it was suggested that New Zealand did not want to restrict its right to sue. 
New Zealand sought a declaration of illegality and was claiming compensation for past 
tests. This meant that New Zealand did not just want to stop tests going forward
162
 but 
also wanted to receive damages for past harms. Limiting New Zealand‘s right to sue on 
the basis of French statements made outside the Court changed New Zealand‘s claim. 
As a result the object of New Zealand‘s claim was not entirely met.  
 Additionally, some members of the ICJ felt that French officials had not intended 
their statements to be binding. In a dissenting opinion Judge (Ad Hoc) Garfield Barwick 
argued that the Court‘s interpretation of French statements was ―indicative of a failure 
on the part of the Court to perform its judicial function.‖  He accepted that France‘s 
promises were valid. Further, he acknowledged that New Zealand could always accept a 
promise by France. New Zealand could choose to discontinue the litigation, but this did 
not occur here. Consequently, it was not up to the Court to enforce a compromise on the 
litigant‘s behalf.163  In a similar dissent to the Australian decision Judge Barwick 
asserted that French statements should have been recognized as findings of fact, not of 
law. There was ―…judicial impropriety of deciding the matter without notice to the 
Parties of the questions to be considered…‖164 This was particularly unfair to France, 
now legally bound to all nations for all time. Moreover Judge Barwick was sceptical 
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whether the statements led to the conclusion that France had intended to be bound to 
such a wide promise.
165
 
 Similarly, Judge de Castro felt it was correct to take account of the statements. 
However, these statements had little ―legal worth.‖ He stated that ―the fact remains that 
not every statement of intent is a promise, there is a difference between a promise which 
gives rise to a moral obligation and a promise which legally binds the promisor‖166  but 
identifying French intention required evidence. France had to intend to renounce above 
ground nuclear testing indefinitely and this standard was not met by the French 
statements. Consequently, Judge de Castro noted, ―I see no indication warranting a 
presumption that France wished to bring into being an international obligation, 
possessing the same binding force as a treaty – and vis-à-vis whom the whole 
world?‖167  French statements were primarily evidentiary and were not an indication of 
a unilateral declaration. Judge de Castro‘s opinion supported the argument that prior to 
the Nuclear Tests cases unilateral declarations were considered as oral treaties.  In his 
opinion unilateral acts were an obligation to a specific party, not to the world at large. 
Judge de Castro supported the view that Nuclear Tests cases fundamentally reshaped 
the law as the decision created new criteria for a unilateral act to have legal effect. The 
criteria of intention and autonomy were novel. 
 The Nuclear Tests cases also established a doctrinal basis for unilateral acts. The 
Court tied the legal effect of unilateral acts to the principle of good faith.
168
 The 
decision stated: 
 
 
 
One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of 
legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith. 
Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation, in 
particular in an age where co-operation in many fields is becoming 
increasingly essential. Just as the very rule of pacta sunt servanda in the 
law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of 
an international obligation assumed by unilateral declaration. Thus 
interested states may take cognizance of unilateral declarations and 
place confidence in them, and are entitled to require that the obligation 
thus created be respected.
169
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The ICJ echoed Schwarzenberger‘s assertion of contra factum, resulting in the Court‘s 
assertion that a unilateral declaration was binding in good faith.  Consequently, states 
were able rely on unilateral declarations made in good faith. This requirement was 
expanded to unilateral acts categorically yet this requirement was problematic because it 
confused the binding nature of a unilateral act with reliance on that act. This case raised 
questions about the autonomous nature of the unilateral act. It also led to other questions 
considered by the Court: When was a state entitled to change their intention? Was a 
unilateral act revocable? In the Nuclear Tests cases the ICJ held that the ―unilateral 
undertaking resulting from [the French] Statements cannot be interpreted as having been 
made in an implicit reliance on arbitrary power of reconsideration.‖170 Therefore, the 
decision limited the ability to change a unilateral act and so this case established that a 
unilateral act cannot be revoked arbitrarily.  
 As a result this case formalized two things. First, it established that unilateral acts 
could be the basis of a legal obligation. Second, it established the criteria for unilateral 
acts; it clarified that to create a legal obligation a unilateral act required intention, 
autonomy and revocation. The next section demonstrates the importance of these 
criteria to the definition of unilateral acts. 
 
 
5. The Importance of the Nuclear Tests cases to the Definition of 
Unilateral Acts 
 
 
This section demonstrates the importance of the Nuclear Tests cases to the definition of 
unilateral acts. However, it also illustrates the difficulty in applying the criteria 
established in the unilateral acts to analysis in the jurisprudence and the literature.  
 To begin this analysis a review is helpful. The Nuclear Tests cases developed 
three criteria for unilateral declarations: First, the act had to be autonomous. Second, the 
state undertaking the act had to intend the act to have legal effect. Third, once legal 
effect was ascertained the state could not arbitrarily reconsider or revoke its act. Other 
criteria have sometimes been derived from this decision. For example, publicity is 
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another criteria often mentioned. However, these three criteria are the main 
requirements for unilateral acts to take legal effect. Consequently, they have been 
applied to unilateral acts in various formulations since this decision. 
 Three prominent cases have applied the Nuclear Tests cases.
171
 The first case was 
the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua case. This case arose 
out of covert US intervention in Nicaragua. The US began providing ―training advice 
and support‖ to the Contra guerrilla fighters. The Contras were fighters who opposed 
the communist leaning government of Nicaragua. This government had taken power in 
a revolt by the Sandinista rebels. This revolt had lead to the fall of the Somoza 
dictatorship, in 1979 -80.
172
  In response to American interference Nicaragua filed a 
claim at the ICJ. Nicaragua asked the ICJ ―to condemn the United States support of the 
‗contras‘ as a violation of the basic norms of conventional and customary and 
international law.‖ Nicaragua also requested an order to require the US to cease ―all 
overt or covert uses of force or intervention in Nicaraguan affairs and to receive 
damages for those activities already undertaken.‖173  The US attempted to block the 
litigation, issuing a statement that became known as the ―Schultz declaration.‖ Through 
this declaration the US retroactively rescinded their consent to the jurisdiction of the 
Court. On this basis it tried to have Nicaragua‘s claim removed from the Court‘s list. 
The US argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the merits of the case. 
The Court did not accept these arguments and consequently the US withdrew from the 
litigation.
174
 
 This decision forced the US to justify its interference in Nicaragua. The US 
argued that they took action because the Nicaraguan Government was ignoring its 
―‗solemn commitments to the Nicaraguan people, the US and the Organisation of 
American States‘‖ to institute a democratic government, including elections.175  As a 
result the ICJ had to determine if Nicaragua had made a unilateral promise to transition 
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to a democratic form of government and hold elections. 
176
  This argument was not 
addressed by Nicaragua in its pleadings or oral arguments.
177
  Therefore, the Court held 
on the evidence that the promise to have elections was a domestic act, not an 
international act. The Court did not find any evidence of a unilateral act by Nicaragua 
and the ICJ was not prepared to entertain this promise as an obligation as erga omnes. 
In fact the Court did not refer directly to the Nuclear Tests cases in this regard. The 
Court asserted that even if the Nicaraguan government had made such a promise, it 
would have been made to the Organisation of American States, not to the US.
178
 This 
case was not an example of the principles in the Nuclear Tests cases as the Court did 
not assess the intention of a state undertaking an autonomous legal act. It examined a 
unilateral obligation undertaken between specific parties.
179
 In this specific situation the 
Court did not find the intention required for an act to take legal effect. 
 The second case in which unilateral acts were considered was the Case 
Concerning the Frontier Dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali.
180
  This case arose 
out of a border dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali. To resolve this dispute a 
Mediation Commission was set up and in the course of the work of this Commission the 
Head of State of Mali stated that the recommendations of the Mediation Commission 
were binding, even though the body had not been given binding powers. The Court 
considered whether this statement could have legal effect. Mali denied that the 
statements were intended to have legal effect and called them a ―witticism.‖181 The 
Court held that the statements were not made in the context of negotiations. Therefore, 
the Court considered the statements similar to the statements in the Nuclear Tests 
cases.
182
 However, unlike in that case the ICJ adopted a narrow interpretation of 
intention; they considered intention to be applicable in the same circumstances as the 
Nicaragua case.  The Court took a cautious approach finding that non-directed 
statements, such as the general statements of Mali‘s Head of State, were not legally 
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binding.
183
 The Court held that in the Nuclear Tests cases the broad subject matter and 
the situation of the parties to the litigation necessitated an erga omnes statement. In this 
case the Court felt the parties had the option of reaching an agreement. Mali did not 
intend to be bound by their statements.
184
 
 The third case in which unilateral acts were considered was the Case Concerning 
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge.
185
 In 
this case the ICJ considered sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, which 
was a source of friction between Singapore and Malaysia. The Parties agreed that the 
dispute ―crystallized‖ in 1980 when Singapore protested publication of Malaysian maps 
showing Malaysian sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh Island, although 
the date is less clear as to the dispute over the middle rocks and south ledge, with the 
Court settling on 1993 as the date of crystallization of the latter claim.
186
 Of primary 
concern to the present discussion is correspondence in 1953 between Singapore and the 
British Advisor to the Sultan of Johor (in Malaysia) asking to confirm sovereignty of 
Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh.
187
 A reply written by the Acting Secretary of State for 
Johor disclaimed ownership of the Island.
188
 This letter, known as the Johor reply, was 
interpreted variously by the parties; Malaysia argued the letter disclaimed ―ownership,‖ 
not sovereignty, and was written without authority. Singapore claims the letter 
disclaimed title, and therefore sovereignty over the Island.
189
 The ICJ held that the letter 
was not a clear disclaimer of title to the Island, and that moreover Singapore could not 
prove the detrimental reliance necessary to estop Malaysia in its claim.
190
 Most 
importantly, the Court considered the unilateral nature of the ―Johor reply.‖ The Court 
acknowledged that the statement was made without reference to a claim or dispute with 
Singapore and so cannot be taken to indicate a unilateral obligation.
191
 According to the 
ICJ the ―Johor reply‖ was merely an answer to a question posed by Singapore and was 
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not an indication of a legal obligation that affected sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau 
Batu Puteh.
192
 Therefore, the ICJ declined to find a unilateral act in this case.   
 Additionally, the ICJ will consider unilateral action again in an ongoing case, the 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by 
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, in which the UN General 
Assembly has asked for an advisory opinion on the unilateral declaration of 
independence of Kosovo.
193
 Consequently, the Nuclear Tests cases identified the 
criteria for unilateral acts to have legal effect; three of these criteria are intention, 
autonomy, and revocability.  However, the ICJ has found it difficult to apply these 
criteria in subsequent cases and has always distinguished these later cases from the 
Nuclear Tests cases.  
 Similarly, there are many examples where the literature has considered the 
Nuclear Tests cases as establishing the legality of unilateral acts.  For example, Dupuy 
considers the nature of unilateral acts. He believes such acts are Janus-like. By this he 
means that they have two aspects, ―one properly legal, the other more deliberately 
political...‖194 He defines the legal aspect as the ―taking of unilateral legal action.‖195 He 
cites the Nuclear Tests cases and asserts there is a ―proper legal nature‖ to unilateral 
acts.
196
  He then goes on to question the effects of unilateral acts but not their legal 
nature. In the same vein, Kennedy even defines this decision as the ―classic‖ case of 
unilateral declarations.
197
  Finally, many if not all the texts noted in the introduction 
consider this case as part of their analysis.   
 Lastly, the Working Group of the ILC considered the topic of unilateral acts 
suited for codification because it had been considered in the jurisprudence and 
particularly in the Nuclear Tests cases, although they noted that the criteria in this case 
were not unambiguous.
198
 This case also appeared as core criteria in the typology 
proposed for unilateral acts at the ILC.
199
 Therefore, subsequent case law, literature and 
ILC demonstrate that the criteria established in the Nuclear Tests cases are central to the 
understanding of unilateral acts.  The meaning of each of these requirements in the 
doctrine is examined in great detail in Part 2 of this work, intention in Chapter 4, 
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autonomy in Chapter 5 and revocation in Chapter 6. To conclude: in this thesis 
unilateral acts are defined as any act that meets the criteria of intention, autonomy and 
revocation. These criteria are established in the Nuclear Tests cases and are fleshed out 
in subsequent case law, literature and the work of the ILC.  These criteria will be 
examined in detail in Part 2 of this work. 
 
 
6. Conclusion: What are Unilateral Acts? 
 
 
This chapter asks the question ‗what are unilateral acts?‘ This chapter notes that the 
variety of acts classified as unilateral makes defining these acts difficult. In fact the ILC 
worked on this topic for six years and could not secure widespread agreement on a 
definition, beyond non-binding ―Guiding Principles‖ which establish criteria for 
unilateral acts to become legal.  Therefore, there is no single definition of unilateral 
acts. What are unilateral acts, then? They are the result of the history and development 
of the doctrine in this area.  
To arrive at this conclusion this chapter examines the history of unilateral acts, 
and establishes that prior to the ICJ decision in the Nuclear Tests cases, there is no 
doctrinal certainty that unilateral acts create a legal obligation. Consequently, the 
Nuclear Tests cases ―revolutionize‖ the category of unilateral obligations by 
establishing criteria for assessing when unilateral acts are legal. This case establishes 
three main criteria for unilateral acts to be considered legal, intention, autonomy and 
revocation. These criteria are applied in subsequent case law, and they are treated as 
important in the literature. Additionally, they are cited as a justification for the work of 
the ILC. As a result a unilateral act, for purposes of this work, is any act that applies the 
criteria from the Nuclear Tests cases. Therefore, these criteria are the working definition 
of unilateral acts in this thesis. When the term unilateral act is used in this thesis it refers 
to acts that meet the criteria of intention, autonomy and revocation established in the 
Nuclear Tests cases.  
60  Betina Kuzmarov 
Chapter 3: Method  
1. Introduction 
 
 
This chapter answers the research question ―what is legality?‖ By answering this 
question this chapter explains the method of analysis adopted in this thesis. This chapter 
answers this question by providing an overview of the research question, by outlining 
possible methods, by justifying the choice of a narrow critical legal studies method, by 
providing an overview of the narrow critical legal studies and by establishing the 
importance of this method as a framework for answering the question of legality. 
Consequently, this chapter presents the method that is used in this thesis, a narrow 
critical legal studies method, and establishes that this method provides the definition of 
legality used in this work. 
 
 
2. The Research Question 
 
 
This chapter answers the research question ―what is legality?‖ Answering this question 
is necessary to establish a basis upon which to assess the legal nature of unilateral acts.  
However, legality is imprecisely defined as the ―state of being legal‖200 and the term 
legal is defined as ―related to, based on or required by law.‖201 Ostensibly ―required by 
law‖ could be further defined to identify the subjects and nature of law, but it is at this 
point definitions break down as the requirements of law are a matter of debate; there is 
no single answer to the question, ―what is required by law?‖ Consequently, any 
definition of legality is the product of a theory – a ―conceptual apparatus or framework‖ 
– that helps answer the research question posed.202  Therefore, when a theory is applied 
to the practical question of the legality of unilateral acts it becomes a method, as a 
method is defined as an applied theory.
203
 Therefore, the theory used to answer the 
question ―what is legality?‖ is also the method used in this thesis. As a result the next 
part of this chapter evaluates the methods of international law that could be applied to 
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answer the question ―what is legality?‖  This chapter then goes on to offer a rationale 
for the method adopted in this thesis, a narrow critical legal studies method. Subsequent 
parts of this chapter then analyse this method in depth and outline its application to the 
question of legality of unilateral acts. 
 
 
3. The Methods of International Law 
 
 
This section surveys the methods of international law. From this survey the following 
section analyses the relative merits of each method for answering the question ―what is 
legality?‖ and then a method is chosen and justified. Consequently, this section begins 
by identifying the current methods of international law.  
 In a symposium on this issue, Ratner and Slaughter survey the field and identify 
seven current methods in international law: positivism, the New Haven school, 
international legal process, critical legal studies, international law and international 
relations, feminist jurisprudence and law and economics.
204
 Ratner and Slaughter 
acknowledge that these are not the only ―methods of international law.‖ However, they 
assert that this list represents the methods that are most often used in modern 
international law.
205
 This is an accurate survey of current methods of international law; 
however, it ignores one other current method, natural law. Ratner and Slaughter dismiss 
this method merely on the basis of their symposium's space constraints.
206
 However, 
natural law methods are alive and influential in several areas of international law, 
particularly the discussion of the hierarchy of norms
207
 and in the question of the 
universality of international law.
208
 As a result natural law methods remain central to 
international law in a way in which other methods excluded from the symposium do 
not. For example, Ratner and Slaughter mention that they exclude comparative law 
methods and functionalism.
209
 The first of these methods, comparative law, is used 
mostly in private international law and so is not relevant here. The second of these 
methods, functionalism, has not had the historical relevance of natural law theory and 
therefore does not merit the same consideration. Consequently, this section surveys 
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eight methods of international law: positivism, natural law, the New Haven School, 
international legal process, feminist jurisprudence, international law/international 
relations, law and economics and critical legal studies.  
 
 
3.1 Positivism 
Hart, the pre-eminent Anglo-American positivist of the 20
th
 century, traces the 
intellectual history of positivism to Bentham and Austin.
210
  The key insight of this 
method is the separation of law and morality – what law is from what it ought to be.211  
Therefore law is a social fact and it must be studied ―…as it is, backed up with effective 
sanctions, with reference to formal criteria, independently of moral or ethical 
considerations.‖212 Applied to international law, Ago notes that a rich tradition develops 
from Grotius on of using ―positive law‖ to refer to law created by an act of will of a 
sovereign state.
213
 By this definition positivism privileges states as the primary actors in 
international law and gives states unfettered freedom of action when no positive law 
exists to limit their sovereignty.
214
 Ratner and Slaughter note that this method is still 
widely used in European international law.
215
  
 
 
3.2 Natural Law 
―The traditional view of natural law is that it is a body of immutable laws superior to 
positive law.‖216 In the twentieth century this is understood as either the ―objective 
moral content of a legal norm‖ or the ―universal ideal‖ of law.217 The recent debate over 
the content of peremptory norms is an example of the application of natural law 
principles in modern international law.
218
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3.3 The New Haven School 
The New Haven school is identified most closely with the work of Lasswell and 
McDougal at Yale.
219
 The New Haven school grows out of a realist perspective that law 
is the product of power, but offers the more hopeful view ―that world order is not 
simply a function of state power, as political realists would have it, but of human 
agency as well.‖220 Therefore, the New Haven school denies the positivist assumption 
that law is the sum of the rules created by the sovereign, and the realist contention that 
law is merely power. Instead they argue that international law is the product of 
authoritative decisions and the process by which these decisions is reached.
221
 To New 
Haven scholars, ―[a]uthority is the structure of expectation concerning who, with what 
qualifications and what mode of selection is competent to make decisions by what 
criteria and what procedures‖222 Consequently, international law is considered ―legal‖ 
when an empirical study reveals that a decision is reached by a competent decision 
maker which is later followed.  
 
 
3.4 International Legal Process 
This method is exemplified by the work of Chayes, Henkin, Ehrlich and Lowenfeld,
223
 
who are concerned with the way in which process – defined as lawyers and institutions 
– is effective in guiding international relations.224 Their goal is to explain how law acts 
to ―constrain‖ actors in international relations.225 
 
 
3.5 International Law and International Relations 
IR/IL, as international law and international relations is often abbreviated, is an 
interdisciplinary method that identifies areas of ―convergence‖ between international 
law and international relations theory. It recognizes the commonality between the two 
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disciplines and it strives to create a joint research agenda in areas of common interest to 
both disciplines.
226
 
 
 
3.6 Feminist Jurisprudence 
Feminist international law method seeks to uncover how law reflects male 
dominance.
227
 As Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright explain, ―[i]nternational legal 
structures and principles masquerade as ―human‖ – universally applicable set of 
standards. They are more accurately described as international men‘s law.‖228 
 
 
3.7 Law and Economics 
International law and economics is an interdisciplinary method that seeks to apply 
principles of economics to international law. It is concerned with applying economic 
principles such as rational choice and game theory to international decision making. 
Particularly it has been considered relevant to questions such as regulatory competition, 
international organizations, environmental law, law and development and institutional 
analysis.
229
 
 
 
3.8 Critical Legal Studies 
Critical legal studies have focused on the role of language in creating and structuring 
international law.
230
  Critical legal studies represent a wide variety of methods that try 
―… to move beyond what constitutes law or the relevance of law to policy to focus on 
the hypocrisies and failings of international legal discourse.‖231 Some of these scholars 
focus on the role of culture,
232
 but other critical legal scholars take an approach to law 
that, to quote Hunt, ―takes legal doctrine seriously.‖233 Hunt describes this version of 
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critical legal studies as a ―narrow‖ position ―in which law is described by the internal 
understanding lawyers hold of their subject matter.‖234 This branch of critical legal 
studies accepts that lawyers hold a coherent internal understanding of law, that law is 
the product of legal doctrine, but they do not define law or legality. This branch of 
critical legal studies has been particularly important in applications of the critical legal 
studies method to international law.
235
  
 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to address in detail each method just surveyed. 
However, the overview just provided is sufficient to allow a discussion of the most 
appropriate method to answer the question ―what is legality?‖  This will be the subject 
of the next section of this chapter. 
 
 
4. Analysis of the Methods of International Law 
 
 
To determine which method is most appropriate to answer the question ‗what is 
legality?‘ requires analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each method. This 
section undertakes this analysis. As a starting point the eight methods just summarized 
can be further grouped together into five main categories for analysis:  Positivism and 
natural law, the New Haven school, international legal policy, interdisciplinary methods 
and critical legal studies. These five categories are examined for strengths and 
weaknesses of the methods analysed. 
 
 
4.1 Positivism and Natural Law 
In the Anglo-American tradition, positivist methods are closely aligned with analytic 
philosophy.
236
 Positivism that is based on analytic philosophy assumes that international 
law is a concept that relates to people‘s actual experience of the world in some way.237 
Analytic philosophers understand this relationship as a process of application. People 
comprehend the world by applying a priori criteria to unconnected instances in the real 
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world.
238
 These a priori criteria form the concept by providing people with standards by 
which they can measure real world events. These a priori criterions form the ―pure‖ 
concept.
239
  
 The ―pure‖ concept is always elusive as real events rarely match the a priori 
criterion for the concept. Consequently, all concepts are only partial explanations of this 
―pure‖ concept.240 These partial explanations are called conceptions and are a reflection 
of the ―pure‖ concept. This analytical method explains how it is that individuals share 
an idea of ―international law.‖ However, this method has not been unproblematic in the 
doctrine as conceptions are characterized in various ways. For example, Swanton 
identifies types of conceptions that describe political concepts. The first type of 
conception provides a schema of a concept.
241
 The second type of conception is drawn 
from Rawls (a follower of Hart
242
) and Lukes and is based on the commonalities 
between understandings of the concept.
243
  Dworkin also adopts this method.
244
 The 
third type of conception is found in Gallie who asserts that there is an ―original 
exemplar‖ of a concept from which all conceptions derive.245 All of these 
characterizations of conceptions share one weakness. They all rely on the fact that there 
is a core or ―pure‖ concept which can be identified even when the conceptions 
themselves are contested.
246
 This analytic method is sound so long as the concept has a 
schema, core or original exemplar.
247
 However, analytic philosophers admit that not all 
concepts yield to such an analysis. For example, Gallie finds it difficult to apply his 
method of identifying these common elements to the idea of art; he even admits there 
has been no ―original exemplar,‖ or common conception of the meaning of art.248 A 
similar difficulty exists with the concept of law. There is no ―pure‖ concept of law. 
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There are no agreed upon a priori criteria,
249
 whether a schema, common core, or an 
exemplar, for law.  In this way, concepts like art, or law, differ from scientific concepts. 
Scientific concepts can be determined ―at least temporarily and provisionally.‖250  Art or 
law cannot be determined because such concepts
251
 are social concepts.
252
 Social 
concepts lack agreed upon a priori criteria that can resolve debates about the core of the 
concept. Such deficiencies are compensated for by acting as if there are clear criteria for 
the concept.
253
 As a result the analytic method cannot answer the question ―what is 
legality‖ as it cannot offer definitive criteria by which to analyse legality. Any criteria 
proposed are at best unresolved and are at most, as Gallie notes, essentially contestable.  
 Natural law theories suffer from similar difficulties. Like positivism, natural law 
relies on a notion of a priori criteria of legality. The main difference between positivism 
and natural law is the location of the criteria, either in morality or in social fact. 
Moreover, as Choloros points out, modern natural law methods are also a branch of 
analytics as these methods ascertain legality from the premise that there is a ―core 
concept‖ of law.254 However, as Gallie notes, there are concepts that cannot be reduced 
to a core. These concepts resist definition in analytic terms, as any determination of a 
core concept is challenged and debated. Law is arguably one such concept because there 
are competing conceptions of law. Consequently, the positive law and natural law 
methods cannot resolve debates about legality and are therefore difficult to apply to the 
research question ―what is legality?‖ 
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4.2 The New Haven School 
Falk notes that McDougal and Lasswell, the leaders of the New Haven school, view the 
requirements of law ―…as the end result of an authoritative decision making 
process.‖255 The New Haven school describes this process as ―empirical knowledge‖ 
directed towards a ―purposive outcome,‖ an outcome which is defined by values 
necessary in a free society.
256
 Kennedy observes that by taking this approach the New 
Haven school is critical of both natural law and positive law methods for their 
formalism,
257
 but replaces this formalism with a ―realism‖ that matches with the values 
of Western democracies in the cold war.
258
  
 Problematically, this method of study turns away from a focus on legal norms to 
focus on requirements of law derived from authoritative decision making and values. 
Reliance on these values means that legality becomes coextensive with the values this 
method defines as relevant for international coexistence.
259
 In this sense, the New 
Haven school faces the same difficulty as the analytic theorists – that legality, and the 
requirements of law, are defined in reference to ―core‖ criteria, in this case preferred 
values exemplified by authoritative decision making. As with positivist and natural law 
methods; these core values are ultimately contestable and cannot resolve debates about 
legality. 
 
 
4.3 International Legal Process 
International legal process method focuses solely on ―understanding how international 
law works.‖260 Consequently, international legal process methods explain law by 
focusing on the practical role international law plays in international society. 
261
 
However, this practical bent means that international legal process method does not 
have a theory of legality. In fact, a main criticism of this method, in its original form, is 
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that it suffers from a ―normative deficit.‖262 This deficit means that legal process, in its 
most recent uses, returns to defining process in reference to values.
263
 
 Neither the original international legal process method nor its recent uses can 
adequately assess legality. The original purpose of the legal process method is to define 
law solely by reference to ―what it does.‖ As a result it offers no method of determining 
legality outside description of the process followed. Further, in its recent iterations, 
international legal process suffers from the same weakness as the New Haven school 
method in which there are no agreed upon values by which one can define legality; 
ultimately each definition of values proposed by the international legal process method 
is open to questions about its validity. 
 
 
4.4 Interdisciplinary Methods 
Feminist jurisprudence, IR/IL, and law and economics have one similarity – they each 
rely on insights from other disciplines to arrive at their method of international law: they 
are interdisciplinary methods. Further, as Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood note, there 
has been a trend towards interdisciplinarity in law, particularly between law and other 
social sciences.
264
 These methods claim to add rigour to legal method.
265
 However, as a 
result these methods often dissolve the question of legality into assessments of insights 
from other disciplines. For example, Ratner and Slaughter note that there is a concern 
that non-positivist methods may not have a distinctive ―legality quality‖;266 so there is 
concern that these methods cannot define legality in a way that is distinct from other 
social processes. While this is not, generally, a problem for these methods, in fact it 
means that they avoid the problem of definition endemic to the methods already 
examined. Further, it also means that these methods cannot answer a research question 
that defines the requirements of law. To summarize, these methods add to our 
understanding of law as part of society but they are not useful for answering the 
question ―what is legality?‖    
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4.5 Critical Legal Studies 
Similar to the interdisciplinary methods, critical legal studies methods resist attempts to 
define law and draw insight from other disciplines. However, unlike the 
interdisciplinary methods discussed above, the strand of critical legal studies method 
most often applied in international law, the narrow version of critical legal studies, turns 
its focus inward on the ―failings‖ of ―international legal discourse‖.267 It is the focus on 
the role language
268
 plays within law that separates critical legal studies from the other 
interdisciplinary methods. The focus on language allows critical legal studies to look 
inward at laws‘ rhetorical structures and biases, law‘s doctrine. This strand of critical 
legal studies, according to Hunt, ―takes legal doctrine seriously.‖269 Hunt describes this 
version of critical legal studies as a ―narrow‖ position ―in which law is described by the 
internal understanding lawyers hold of their subject matter.‖270  The internal 
understanding lawyers hold of their subject matter is law‘s doctrine. Doctrine is defined 
as ―2. That which is taught…b. esp. that which is taught or laid down as true concerning 
a particular subject or department of knowledge, as religion, politics, science, etc; a 
belief,  theoretical opinion; a dogma tenet…‖271 and the narrow version of critical legal 
studies takes an internal understanding of law seriously without having to define law. It 
provides a way for law to explain what is ―laid down as true‖ about its discipline based 
on the understanding of law that lawyers hold about their subject matter. Narrow critical 
legal studies methods seem to answer both concerns that have emerged in the attempt to 
define legality; that legality cannot be defined by definitions of law; and that legality 
requires a way of determining what is legal from what is not legal. Further, this branch 
of critical legal studies has been particularly important in applications of the critical 
legal studies method to international law.
272
 
As a result the narrow version of critical legal studies is the method adopted in 
this thesis. This version of critical legal studies avoids the problems raised about 
positive law and natural law methods, New Haven school, international legal process 
methods and interdisciplinary methods. These methods either propose definitions of 
legality that are based on preferences cloaked in certainty or they do not provide 
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sufficient guidance to identify the requirements of law.  The narrow version of critical 
legal studies responds to both these concerns. As in the New Haven school, 
international legal process school and interdisciplinary methods, which criticize positive 
law and natural law, this strand of critical legal studies sees law as part of society. 
However, unlike these methods, and like positive law and natural law, it takes legal 
doctrine seriously on its own terms.  
In sum, this section examines the applicability of various methods of international 
law to the question ―what is legality‖ and determines that the most viable method for 
answering this question is a narrow version of critical legal studies. This is the method 
that is adopted in this thesis. Consequently, the next part of this chapter will proceed to 
explain this method in greater detail and explain how this method will be applied in this 
thesis. 
 
 
5. The Critical Legal Studies Method 
 
 
This section of the thesis outlines the critical legal studies method that is used in this 
thesis. For purposes of this thesis law is constructed from its doctrine and the analysis of 
the impact or effect of that doctrine in a specific social context. This doctrine makes up 
―international law.‖  Further, as justified above, a narrow critical legal studies method is 
adopted in this thesis. In this method the doctrine of international law is not an absolute; 
it is a structure which provides a way of understanding the doctrine of international 
law.
273
 Critical legal studies method identifies three types of doctrinal debates or 
―discourses‖ that form part274 of structure the doctrine international law. These are 
referred to in this work as sources, substance and process.
275
 As Trimble notes, these 
discourses ―are not in any way idiosyncratic.‖276 As Kennedy points out, standard 
casebooks follow this pattern.   
 Consequently, more relevant to understanding the narrow critical legal studies 
method is the origin of these structures.  The basic assumption of critical legal studies is 
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derived from Foucault, that ―[i]n Western societies since the Middle Ages, the exercise 
of power has always been formulated in terms of law.‖ 277  The idea that law serves 
power requires critical legal studies methods to examine how law manifests power 
relationships. Critical legal scholars argue that there are discursive structures underlying 
the doctrine of international law. These structures force law to serve power in 
―Western‖ states278 as a result of the liberal democratic model on which ―Western‖ law 
is built. The liberal democratic model creates tensions within liberal societies that the 
doctrine of law then tries to mediate by providing a structure within which these 
tensions can be debated – made legal.  
 The first doctrine of international law is the doctrine of sources. The doctrine of 
sources establishes the way in which the authority of international law is determined. 
Koskenniemi asserts that sources doctrine is ―often understood from two perspectives: 
as a description of the social processes whereby states create law (concreteness) and as 
a methodology for verifying the law‘s content independently of political opinions 
(normativity).‖279 Therefore, in sources doctrine there is a tension between how law 
must appear – either as a concrete rule or as a process for verifying the law‘s content. In 
practice these manifest themselves as two different perspectives on how the authority of 
law is determined. Koskenniemi refers to these perspectives as consent – the capacity of 
a source to reflect the will of the state - and what is ―just‖ – the existence of law by 
virtue of the consensus it embodies.
280
 These two views of the authority of law and the 
debate they engender shape the doctrine of sources. Therefore, sources doctrine in this 
work will refer to the debate between consent and consensus as establishing the 
authority of international law. 
 The second tension that legal doctrine mediates is law‘s substance. The substance 
of law is its subject matter, 
281
 and there is rhetorical tension in liberal societies about 
the proper subject matter that law should regulate. This tension stems from the fact that 
the form of law, the way law must appear, is not conclusive, but is derived from the 
tension between facts and values. This can be best explained as follows: the origin and 
authority of law are indeterminate, thus creating a problem.  Without a concrete form it 
is hard to identify the substance of law. Kennedy argues that the inconclusive nature of 
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the substance of law leads the doctrine to manifest larger goals of liberal societies. 
These goals reveal two conflicting impulses within liberal societies. People want things 
for themselves. They also want to be community minded.
282
  The substance of law 
reflects a tension between‘s society‘s goals of individualism and altruism. 
Individualism is  
 
 
the making of a sharp distinction between one‘s interests and those of 
others, combined with a belief that a preference for conduct in one‘s 
own interest is legitimate, but that one should be willing to respect the 
rules that make it possible to coexist with others similarly self 
interested.
283
 
 
 
Conversely, altruism ―is the belief that one ought not to indulge a sharp preference for 
one‘s own interest over those of others.‖284 Kennedy argues that liberal societies are 
inordinately skewed to favour individualist thinking
285
 as they favour laws that protect 
property and individual rights and reject collectivism. At the international level this 
debate also exists. States wish to protect their sovereignty, which is a form of 
individualism. However, states also need mechanisms of ensuring international co-
ordination
286
  as they are not always able to act alone. This is a form of altruism.  The 
substance of international law reflects the conflict within states about whether 
international society is interest based or communal; this conflict forms the doctrine of 
substance.  
 The third area of tension doctrine mediates are the debates over process. Process 
refers to ―the rules by which the game of international law is to be played‖; it is 
necessary for substance to take on a legal form. Consequently, the doctrine in this area 
establishes the ways in which acts can become law. The doctrine of process identifies 
the processes for substance to take legal effect. These processes are ―independent‖ of 
both the sources of law and its substance
287
 yet they are related to them.  This 
relationship exists because process ensures that the substance the law wants to regulate 
is given a legal form through a recognized source of law. Process achieves this function 
by balancing the tension that exists in liberal societies between the need for predictable 
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processes by which law is created and allowing the law to change in response to 
changes in either the desired substance or form of law.
288
 The tension between 
maintaining stability and promoting change is mediated by the doctrine of process.  
To summarize and make clear the application of this structure to international law: 
sources/form, substance and process are the doctrines that together structure 
international law. These doctrines emerge to mediate tensions that exist in liberal 
societies by providing structure within which these tensions can be resolved.  As 
Kennedy notes: 
 
 
 
…sources doctrine is concerned with the origin and authority of 
international law – a concern it resolves by referring the reader to authorities 
constituted elsewhere. Process doctrine – the bulk of modern international 
public law – considers the participants and jurisdictional framework for 
international law independent of both the process by which international law 
is generated and the substance of its normative order. Substance doctrine 
seems to address issues of sovereign co-operation and conflict more 
directly.
289
 
 
 
Therefore, sources are the way law must manifest itself to gain authority – the form 
international law must take. Substance refers to areas on which states agree to cooperate 
– that is the substance of law that has been given normative treatment.290 Process refers 
to ―the rules by which the game of international law is to be played.‖ It refers to the 
processes by which substance is given form.
291
 Each of these doctrines is distinct and 
explains a different aspect of the structure of international law. 
 Sources, substance and process each operate independently.
292
 However, these 
doctrines are also dependant on each other. As Kennedy notes, ―For all their structural 
similarity, the discourses of source, process and substance seemed to both distinguish 
themselves and relate to their brother [sic.] discourses in a series of quite distinctive 
rhetorical manoeuvres. Quite paradoxically, each discourse seemed to distinguish itself 
by referring to its brothers for the completion and continuation of its project.‖293 Each 
doctrine interacts to complete and continue the doctrine of international law. Sources, 
                                                 
288
 This is what Kennedy calls, in a different context, stasis and motion; Kennedy, International Legal 
Structures (n 83) at p 294; Bederman also discusses the problem stability and change pose for 
international law. Bederman is considered in Chapter 6, below.  
289
 Kennedy, International Legal Structures (n 83) at p 8. 
290
 Kennedy, International Legal Structures (n 83) at p 193. 
291
 Kennedy, International Legal Structures (n 83) at p 110. 
292
 See above. 
293
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Law Scholarship‖ (1988) 7 Wisconsin J of Int‘l L 1 at p 27. 
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substance, and process are simultaneously independent and interdependent doctrines. 
Each doctrine performs a specific role within the overall structure of international law. 
However, it is the way that form, substance and process interact that provides structure 
to international law.  
  Every act that is ―legal‖ must fit within this structure. Otherwise it is not 
considered doctrinally sound. However, the place of an act within this structure can be 
contested. Laws are often ambiguous enough that they can be justified by both goals of 
the doctrine. This is law‘s indeterminacy. Consequently, the interaction among the 
doctrines of form, substance and process provide a structure for the doctrine of 
international law. This interaction allows international law to appear doctrinally 
complete. Koskenniemi explains, 
  
 
[m]y descriptive concern was to try to articulate the rigorous accounting 
for its political open-endedness - the sense that competent argument in 
the field needed to follow strictly defined formal patterns that, 
nevertheless, allowed (indeed enabled) the taking of any conceivable 
position in regard to a problem.
294
 
 
 
Law is not clearly formulated and it is always open to interpretation.  Consequently, the 
doctrines of sources, substance and process act as limits of the interpretations which are 
accepted as legal.  
 Further, these doctrines are also interdependent. Each of the doctrines relies on 
the other for its authority. As Kennedy notes, indeterminacy of form leads to 
indeterminacy of substance and process tries to mediate between form and substance. It 
is this interaction and interdependence which allows international law to appear to be an 
internally coherent doctrine.
 295
  Consequently, for purposes of this thesis a doctrinal 
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 Koskenniemi, Apology (n 81) at p 563-4. 
295
  As Kennedy has written, 
These referential patterns seem to reinforce this general purport of public international 
law in three quite distinct ways. First, it seems that the rhetorical system as a whole is 
able to assert itself quite firmly as an international regime while sustaining a very 
humble and deferential tone. Public international law seems a quite well articulated and 
complete legal order even though it is difficult to locate the authoritative origin or 
substantive voice in the system in any particular area. Each doctrine seems to free ride 
somewhat on this overall systemic image -- an image which is sustained by a continual 
reference elsewhere for authority or decisiveness. Sources refers us to the states 
constituted by process and grounded in the violence defined and limited by substance. 
Process refers us to its origin in sources and its determination in substance. Substance 
refers us to the boundaries of process, its origins in sources and its resolution in an 
institutional system of application and interpretation. Thus, the variety of references 
among these discursive areas always shrewdly locates the moment of authority and the 
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analysis of unilateral acts assesses how unilateral acts fit within the structure of 
international law; moreover, the structure of international law is found in the doctrine of 
sources, the doctrine of substance and the doctrine of process. This method of analysis 
will be used to analyse the legality of unilateral acts. The next part of this thesis 
undertakes this analysis. This part is divided into three chapters. Each chapter is 
devoted to a detailed examination of one doctrine – sources, substance or process. Each 
chapter then proceeds to examine the requirement of a unilateral act that relates to that 
doctrine. Finally, each of these requirements is analysed for their relation to the doctrine 
of international law.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter established the method this thesis will use to answer the question ―what is 
legality,‖ by examining the current methods of international law and by justifying the 
choice of a narrow critical legal studies method for the analysis of legality. This method 
defines legality through the structure of the doctrine of international law and in this 
method three doctrines provide the structure of international law: sources, substance and 
process. Consequently, legality is the result of a concept being justifiable within the 
structure of international legal doctrine. Therefore, this structure can be applied as a 
method to answer the broader research question of this thesis: ―are unilateral acts 
legal?‖  As a method each of the components of the structure of international law can be 
compared to the corresponding requirement of a unilateral act in order to assess whether 
these requirements can be justified within the structure of international law (and 
therefore legal doctrine). This analysis is undertaken in the next part of this work, which 
is divided into three chapters that each correspond to a doctrine which structures 
international law – sources, substance and process. Within each chapter the doctrine is 
analysed, the requirement of a unilateral act which corresponds to that doctrine is 
introduced, and the ability of that requirement to fit within that doctrine is analysed. In 
this way the ―legality‖ of unilateral acts is assessed. In a concluding chapter the results 
of each chapter‘s doctrinal analysis is analysed, conclusions reached about the legality 
                                                                                                                                               
application in practice elsewhere -- perhaps behind us in process or before us in the 
institutions of dispute resolution. 
Kennedy, International Legal Structures (n 83) at p 293. 
77  Betina Kuzmarov 
of unilateral acts are discussed and then these conclusions are applied to the context of 
this thesis to provide further analysis and relevance to the substance of this thesis.  
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PART 2: ARE 
UNILATERAL ACTS 
“LEGAL”? 
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Chapter 4:  The Sources of International Law 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
 
This chapter begins the analysis of the research question ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ 
Specifically, this chapter focuses on one aspect of ―legality‖ defined in Chapter 3, the 
doctrine of sources. It asks the question: can unilateral acts be explained by the doctrine 
of sources? To answer this question this chapter provides an overview of the research 
question and outlines the sources of international law and the requirements of unilateral 
acts that provide the ―source‖ of a unilateral act, intention. This chapter then compares 
the doctrine of sources to the source of unilateral act, intention, in order to reach 
conclusions about the ―legality‖ of the source of unilateral acts. Consequently, this 
chapter examines the sources of international law; discusses the requirement of a 
unilateral act as the ―source‖ of a unilateral act‘s legality, intention; and compares the 
two doctrines in order to establish whether unilateral acts can be explained by the 
doctrine of sources. Some context for this analysis will be provided through the example 
of Iran‘s pursuit of nuclear weapons, and conclusions will be drawn from the chapter. 
 
 
2. The Research Question 
 
 
This chapter examines one aspect of the question ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ 
Particularly, it focuses on the question ―can unilateral acts be explained by the doctrine 
of sources?‖ To explain why this question is necessary, a brief summary is helpful. As 
noted in the introductory chapter, answering the question ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ 
requires answering two subsidiary questions: ―what are unilateral acts?‖ And ―what is 
legality?‖  Chapter 2 establishes that unilateral acts are defined by three core 
requirements that separate these type of obligations from other legal obligations: 
intention, autonomy and revocability. Chapter 3 establishes a method of assessing 
legality derived from a narrow critical legal studies method – a doctrinal analysis of 
unilateral acts based on the structure of international law. This method clarifies that the 
doctrinal structure of unilateral acts is derived from three primary, interlinked doctrines 
– sources, substance and process.  Consequently, any analysis of the ―legality‖ of 
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unilateral acts requires a comparison of the requirement of a unilateral act in relation to 
the doctrine of international law. If unilateral acts can be explained within the doctrinal 
structure they must be considered legal, otherwise unilateral acts pose a problem for the 
doctrine of international law. 
This chapter begins the analysis of the legality of unilateral acts by examining one 
doctrine of international law, sources doctrine, and the requirement of a unilateral act 
that establishes the legal authority of a unilateral act, intention. This analysis is 
necessary because comparing the requirement of intention to sources doctrine 
determines whether unilateral acts can be considered to be a ―source‖ of authority in 
international law. This leads to the question that guides this chapter: Can unilateral acts 
be explained by the doctrine of sources? If unilateral acts cannot be explained by 
sources doctrine this makes their place in the structure of international law doctrinally 
weak, and leads to questions about the legality of obligations created by unilateral acts. 
 
 
3. Sources Doctrine 
 
 
Sources doctrine establishes the ways in which the authority of international law is 
determined.
 296
 Koskenniemi asserts that sources doctrine is ―often understood from two 
perspectives: as a description of the social processes whereby states create law 
(concreteness) and as a methodology for verifying the law‘s content independently of 
political opinions (normativity).‖297 Therefore, in sources doctrine there is a tension 
between how law must appear – either as a concrete rule or as a process for verifying 
the law‘s content. In practice these manifest themselves as two different perspectives on 
how the authority of law is determined. Koskenniemi refers to these perspectives as 
consent, the capacity of a source to reflect the will of the state, and what is ―just,‖ the 
capacity of a source to reflect a consensus amongst states.
298
 These two views of the 
authority of law and the debate they engender shape the doctrine of sources. 
Consequently, in this thesis sources doctrine refers to the debate between consent and 
consensus as establishing the authority of international law. To explain this further the 
following section will develop the link between the sources of international law and the 
concepts of consent and consensus.  
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3.1 The Sources of International Law and the Concepts of Consent and Consensus 
 
Sources doctrine establishes the sources of authority in international law; put 
differently, sources determine the ways in which international law is considered ―legal.‖ 
Sources doctrine explains that international law has a ―legal‖ source when it is created 
by consent or consensus. To explain, sources doctrine considers a concept to have legal 
authority in two circumstances: when states express their consent to the obligation, or 
there emerges a consensus among states that a legal obligation exists.
299
 The doctrinal 
distinction between consent and consensus is clear simply from the dictionary 
definitions of these terms. Consent is a verb defined as to ―give permission‖ or to ―agree 
to do.‖ Consent is also a noun defined as ―permission or agreement.‖300 Consensus is a 
noun indicating a "general agreement.‖301  These definitions illustrate the opposed 
nature of consent and consensus. Consent forms international law through the 
permission of an individual state. It explains how states cooperate with one another. 
Conversely, consensus explains how states achieve collective agreement. It describes 
how international law emerges from the collective interests of states. Sources doctrine 
mediates the debates over whether consent or consensus is the source of authority of 
legal obligations. This debate must be mediated by doctrine because each source of 
international law is imprecisely defined. Each source supports defensible arguments that 
it is established by either consent or consensus.
302
  
 A brief example provides context for this assertion. International law has three 
primary sources: treaty, custom and general principles of law. Each source is explained 
by both consent and consensus. For example, treaty law is codified in the VCLT
303
 and 
as a result the definition of a treaty in this convention is the most widely accepted 
definition of a treaty. Therefore, "treaty" is defined in Article 2(1)(a) of the VCLT as 
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…an international agreement concluded between States in written form 
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its 
particular designation.
304
 
 
 
According to Article 2, a treaty is an international agreement concluded in writing. The 
term agreement connotes that a treaty is primarily the result of the consent of the state to 
the obligation contained in the treaty. However, a treaty is also ―concluded between 
States.‖ This implies that a treaty represents more than just the state‘s consent to create 
a legal obligation. This suggests negotiation and compromise between states prior to the 
consent that produces an agreement. This means that the written agreement to which 
states may consent does not represent the will of one state alone. It is created by 
compromise. This indicates that consensus must be reached on the text of treaty. This 
demonstrates that treaties are primarily formed by consent; the legal obligation is 
created when states consent to the treaty. However, treaties are premised on consensus – 
negotiation of a text to which states may then consent. This demonstrates that treaties 
are given legal force by both consent and consensus. This example also demonstrates 
that sources doctrine invokes both consent and consensus to determine the authority of 
law. For example, consent is used to explain treaty law. As Kennedy puts it,  
 
 
[t]hroughout sources discourse doctrines repeatedly invoke a distinction 
between consensually and non-consensually based norms. Most of the 
rhetorical strategies developed by sources discourse can be understood to 
recapitulate this basic distinction in one form or another.‖305   
 
 
In this quotation Kennedy refers to the role of both consent and consensus as sources of 
authority in international law. However, Kennedy coins the term non-consensual to 
describe consensus-based norms. Kennedy‘s broad terminology is deliberate but it is not 
used in this thesis because it is also potentially inaccurate. The word consensual is 
defined as ―relating to or involving consent or consensus.‖306  By definition, non-
consensual sources include consent-based sources. This is not Kennedy‘s intention. 
Kennedy wishes to separate consent based and ―non-consensual‖ sources. He searches 
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for a term that refers to all sources ―not consent based.‖ The conventional term used to 
refer to ―non-consent based‖ sources in international law is consensus. Kennedy wants 
to create a broader term than consensus. However, by definition, the term non-
consensual cannot explain the difference between consent and non-consent based 
sources. The sources of authority in international law are more clearly explained by the 
conventional terminology of consent and consensus and it is this terminology that is 
used in this thesis. 
 Sources doctrine defines the origin of authority in international law. The two basic 
explanations of the authority of international law are that law gains authority from the 
consent of states or from a consensus among the community of states. Each source of 
international law is ambiguous enough to display elements of both types of authority. 
Consequently, this ambiguity leads to debate over whether a source of international law 
is primarily consent based or consensus based. This debate must be mediated by sources 
doctrine. The next sections of this chapter will offer a detailed examination of the 
sources of international law in order to illustrate the ways in which sources doctrine 
mediates the debate between consent and consensus in international law.   
 
 
3.2 The Sources of International Law 
 
It is customary to begin a discussion of the sources of international law with a review of 
Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ.
307
 This Article lists the sources of international law 
the ICJ can apply in its decisions. Article 38(1) a-c lists the three primary sources of law 
treaty, custom and general principles of law. Article 38(1) d lists the secondary sources 
the Court can apply. The secondary sources are judicial decisions and decisions of 
publicists.
308
  Technically this Article is only a treaty provision.
309
 However, the 
provision holds power beyond its scope, as it  
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 As Kennedy notes, ―[t]he discussion usually revolves around the four classic sources contained in 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.‖ D Kennedy, ―Sources of International 
Law‖ (1987) 2 American U J Int L & Pol 1 at p 2.  
308
  Article 38 states that 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et 
bono, if the parties agree thereto. 
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…can be looked at two ways. It has to be applied by the International 
Court itself because it is part of the Statute by which it is governed; but it 
may also be referred to by other tribunals generally, because it can now be 
regarded as an authoritative statement of the sources of international law as 
a consequence of the backing of general practice accepting it as such. It 
governed the international court because it is in its statutes; it guides 
generally because it has come to be seen as a convenient statement of 
accepted practice. 
310
 
 
 
This Article‘s authority stems from the fact that it is the only widely agreed upon 
statement of the sources of international law. Further, this Article is so widely agreed 
upon as a statement of the sources of law because it ―reflects state practice.‖311  
 The sources listed in Article 38 are not of equal weight. Treaty and custom are 
considered the main sources of international law. 
312
 As a result general principles of 
law are often marginalised because of the conceptual confusion regarding the scope, 
meaning and application of general principles of law as compared to treaty and custom.
 
313
  Similarly, the subsidiary sources of law identified in Article 38(1) d are also given 
lesser weight as they are derived from treaty, custom and general principles of law. 
They are considered as ―indirect‖314 sources because they merely provide evidence of a 
treaty, custom or general principle of law. As such, they are not considered 
―independent‖ sources of international law, so the focus of this section is on the 
independent sources of law, treaty, custom and general principles. This section 
examines each source in the order in which they appear in Section 38(1) of the Statute 
of the ICJ.  
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3.2.1 Treaty 
 
As noted above a treaty is an 
 
 
 
international agreement concluded between States in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or 
in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation…315  
 
 
The ―essential characteristic‖ of treaties ―is twofold: that the consent is common to the 
parties, i.e. that there is an agreement; and that this agreement is in writing.‖ 316  As a 
result of the requirement of common consent treaties are bilateral or multilateral in 
form.
317
   
 Bilateral treaties are negotiated and agreed by two parties whereas multilateral 
treaties are negotiated and agreed to by multiple (more than two) parties. The distinction 
between bilateral and multilateral treaties is usually explained by two analogies. 
Treaties are analogized to contracts in municipal law or to legislation. For example, 
Lauterpacht describes the analogy between treaties and contracts. He observes that, 
―[l]ike contracts, they [treaties] fulfil a large variety of purposes. They lay down the 
rules of law to be followed by the parties as a matter of legal obligation.‖318  However, 
some treaties also perform a legislative function. As Lauterpacht also notes, ―[h]aving 
regard to the absence, in the present state of international organization, of legislative 
machinery in the proper sense of that term, treaties fulfil in many respects a functions 
similar to that performed by the national legislature within the state.‖319 The analogy 
between treaty and contract is often applied to bilateral treaties. The analogy between 
treaties and legislation is often applied to multilateral treaties.
320
  
 These analogies correspond to another categorization often used to describe 
treaties. Treaties are often divided into law-making and non law-making treaties. Many 
treaties only obligate the parties to the treaty. They do not create general ―international 
law‖ and as a result they are not considered ―law making.‖ Alternately, Brownlie 
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describes law-making agreements as treaties that ―create general norms for the future 
conduct of the parties in terms of legal propositions and the obligations are basically the 
same for all parties.‖321 Therefore, law-making treaties contain general legal 
propositions, which have an influence on customary international law, and these are 
opposed to non law-making treaties which reflect only the consent of the parties to the 
treaty. However, this division is not uncontested as it is debated whether there is a 
difference between the norm created by a law-making treaty and its obligation.
322
 
Moreover, whichever analogy is relied on to describe treaties it is clear that treaties 
manifest both consent and consensus, as both contracts and laws require both consent (a 
vote or signature) and negotiation (consensus or aggregation of interests). Further, 
within treaties the relationship between consent and consensus is most clearly illustrated 
by the requirements of treaty formation which is ―codified and in part developed‖ 323  in 
the VCLT.  
 The VCLT requires two phases of treaty formation. The first phase is the 
negotiation of a final agreed text. The second phase is the assent of the state to the 
obligations in that text.
324
  These two phases must be examined in order to illustrate that 
consent and consensus are present in treaty doctrine. First, the VCLT establishes the 
way that states can agree upon the text of a treaty. This is formally called ―adoption of 
the text,‖ and its requirements are established by Article 9 of the Convention. Article 9 
states:  
 
 
1. The adoption of the text of a treaty takes place by the consent of all the 
States participating in its drawing up except as provided in paragraph 2. 
2. The adoption of the text of a treaty at an international conference takes 
place by the vote of two thirds of the States present and voting, unless by 
the same majority they shall decide to apply a different rule.
325
 
 
 
 
Article 9(1) applies to all bilateral treaties and to some multilateral treaties. The text is 
adopted when states who are party to the negotiations consent to the final text. Article 
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9(1) affirms the function of consent in treaty formation. However, in certain multilateral 
settings negotiation of a treaty text is more complex. Unanimous consent is not required 
so that a text is considered authoritative when states negotiating the treaty approve the 
text. This is the requirement unless states adopt another formality. Consequently, a state 
must consider the text authoritative even if it does not consent to the final text. This 
often occurs when a treaty text is adopted by a consensus that is indicated by a majority 
vote. It is then up to individual states to decide whether to consent to the final text or 
not. 
 Further, the VCLT establishes the ways in which states can consent to the text of a 
treaty.  Article 11 states: 
 
 
The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by 
signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.
326
 
 
 
A state must consent to the text of a treaty. Consent is given by signature and 
ratification, signature alone or exchange of instruments. A state may also accede to a 
treaty once it is in force. This illustrates the function of consent in treaty doctrine. 
 Article 9 and Article 11 of the VCLT demonstrate that both consent and 
consensus are present in rules on treaty formation. Article 11 promotes the view that 
treaty law is a consent-based obligation. States must consent to a treaty in order to be 
obligated by it. However, the text of the treaty is not always established by consent.
327
 
As Article 9(2) illustrates, a treaty text may be finalized by consensus. 
328
  A state may 
consent to a treaty that reflects a consensus achieved by negotiators on a range of issues. 
A state may not consent to any specific provision of a treaty during the finalization of 
the text; it may choose to consent to the treaty as a whole.  Therefore, the doctrine of 
treaty law reflects consent to the consensus of states. Treaties are explained by both 
consent and consensus. This demonstrates that sources doctrine serves to mediate 
between consent and consensus as sources of authority for treaty obligations. 
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3.2.2 Custom 
 
Custom is an ―ancient‖ source of international law. 329  Customary obligations require 
two elements, ―constancy and uniformity of practice‖ and ―that [the] practice must be 
followed under the impulse of the sense of obligation, opinione necessitatis.‖330  The 
requirement of ―constancy and uniformity‖ is commonly referred to as ―state practice.‖ 
The second requirement of a ―sense of obligation‖ is generally referred to as opinio 
juris, from the saying opinione juris et necessitatis.
331
 Custom is formed by the action 
of states when that action is carried out with a sense of obligation, so custom results 
from what Condorelli calls a ―broad social consensus.‖332   
 Consequently custom is primarily produced by consensus. However, consistently 
determining when consensus exists about a custom is difficult as questions arise as to 
timing and amount of practice required for a customs to become obligatory. Generally 
speaking custom formation is considered more an art than a science as it is premised on 
an accumulation of state practice coupled with a psychological belief in the legality of 
that practice.  These are not precise measures but subjective standards.  
On state practice Lauterpacht writes that  
 
 
[c]onstancy and uniformity of practice are a matter of degree. There is no 
rule of thumb to predict with any degree of assurance what amount of 
precedent will cause an international tribunal to assume in any given case 
that the degree of accumulation of precedent qualifies as custom. 
333
 
 
 
 
There is no standard for a practice to become a custom. It is a matter of judgment and 
consensus over time. However, opinio juris is more esoteric then state practice as it is 
the psychological element, a mental state.
 334
  It is a subjective belief that the custom is 
legal. The subjectivity of opinio juris leads to doctrinal debate in this area. On one side 
of the debate are theorists who believe that the mental element of custom is conflated 
with the will of the state and is identified by tacit consent. This position is contested
335
 
although opinio juris is often considered a form of consent.
336
 On the other side of the 
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debate are theorists who believe that ―opinio juris is indeed the product of consensus 
and not consent.‖ 337 
 The requirement of opinio juris creates a paradox. This paradox emerges from the 
fact that ―…every act or claim geared towards the creation of new law, and which 
would perforce be different from existing law, would be in contravention of that 
existing law and would thus be unlawful.‖338  This problem produces diverse responses. 
One explanation is that the state acts on an erroneous belief that its action is legal. 
Another explanation is that the concept is unworkable and opinio juris should be 
abandoned entirely.
339
 For example, Elias and Lim propose the ―stages‖ approach. This 
approach equates opinio juris with consent.
 340
 In contrast, Wolfke asserts that opinio 
juris is meaningless and that custom formation only requires an accumulation of state 
practice. Once there is sufficient practice it can be presumed that the act is recognised as 
law.
341
  
 The difficulty in determining opinio juris has implications for state practice as the 
mental element is often de facto determined by what states actually do. Koskenniemi 
identifies this relationship as follows:  
 
 
…we cannot automatically infer anything about State wills or beliefs - the 
presence or absence of custom - by looking at the State‘s external 
behaviour. The normative sense of behaviour can be determined only once 
we first know the ―internal aspect‖ - that is, how the State itself 
understands its conduct. But if, in custom-ascertainment, we have to rely 
on the internal aspect, then we lose custom‘s normativity. 342 
 
 
Consequently, opinio juris is subjective but is determined by objective indicators such 
as state action. This objectivity permits the interpretation of the state‘s beliefs through 
external evidence of that belief. This is problematic because this interpretation may be 
contrary to the state‘s belief. However, the alternative, a subjective interpretation of 
opinio juris, is equally problematic because as Koskenniemi notes, if opinio juris is 
interpreted as subjective it is an ―internal‖ belief of  the state and as an internal belief it 
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can never provide any normative force.
343
 Koskenniemi identifies this problem as the 
―circularity‖ of custom. He writes ―[t]o sum up: doctrine about customary law is 
indeterminate because circular.‖344  
 Arguably, the circularity Koskenniemi notes results from the relationship between 
consent and consensus in custom. Custom relies on state practice and a subjective belief 
in the legality of that practice. However, the doctrinal debate within this source of law 
centres on the assessment of this subjective standard. One response is to assert that 
opinio juris is a form of tacit consent, consent being identified through state practice. A 
second response is to interpret opinio juris as subjective. This subjectivity renders 
opinio juris ineffective and reliance is placed on state action to identify custom 
Consequently, opinio juris is explained by either consent or consensus which means that 
there are elements of both consent and consensus in custom formation. Custom 
confirms that consent and consensus are the heart of the debate that shapes sources 
doctrine. 
 
3.2.3 General Principles of Law 
General principles of law are applied when there is no custom or treaty to guide the 
Court on an issue.
345
 The ICJ rarely applies general principles of law.
346
 There is no 
agreed upon definition of a general principle of law.
347
 Consequently, general principles 
of law are considered a lesser source of international law.
348
  Some scholars even 
suggest that general principles of law are not an independent source of law.
349
  In this 
view, custom and general principles of law form a single ―common law‖ of the 
international system.
350
 Similarly, Tunkin and Guggenheim  
 
 
…maintain that paragraph (c) adds nothing to what is already covered by 
treaty and custom; for these authorities hold that general principles of 
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national law are only part of international law only to the extent they have 
been adopted by states in treaties or recognised in state practice.
351
 
 
 
These authors argue that general principles of international law become a source of law 
only when they are incorporated by consent of states in a treaty or through recognised 
custom. General principles of law are not often considered because they are not consent 
based. 
 Another interpretation of general principles does not require consent. In this view 
general principles of law ―authorise the Court to apply the general principles of 
municipal jurisprudence, insofar as they are applicable to relations of states.‖352 Brierly, 
for example, expands on this view when he argues that general principles of law are 
derived from private law principles.
353
 A second common interpretation is that general 
principles of law are derived from general principles of international practice.
354
 In this 
interpretation, general principles of law are derived from the practice of states over 
time. They perform the function of consensus. 
 Doctrine accepts that both positions are true,
355
 from which it follows that general 
principles of law are explained by both consent and consensus. As Waldock notes, the 
―majority‖ of ―jurists‖  
 
 
… do not accept the view that Article 38 incorporates ―natural‖ law in the sense 
of ―ideal‖ law in international law; nor do they at the same time consider that 
general principles, which have already found concrete expression and 
recognition in national systems of law, must necessarily have had prior 
recognition in treaties or state practice before they are available for application 
by an international tribunal.
356
 
 
 
 
Waldock‘s jurists do not accept that general principles of law are formed exclusively by 
consent or exclusively by consensus. For example, Lauterpacht asserts that general 
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principles are a source of law because they are listed in Article 38. They are a source of 
law as a result of their pre-existing status as customary law. They are also a source of 
law because of ―the reason of the thing.‖ Lauterpacht argues general principles are 
explained at various times by consent, consensus and natural law.
357
 
 Alternatively, Cheng‘s leading work on general principles of law takes a practical 
approach. He identifies principles as they are applied in international law. He uses this 
analysis to suggest categories of general principles that have created legal obligations.
358
  
Similarly, Parry differentiates general principles from custom through their use as 
―principles‖ of law as opposed to rules of law. He writes ―[t]he upshot may thus be that 
the term general principles may be used variously. Sometimes it connotes actual rules of 
international law which are, however, of so broad a description that it is not improper to 
refer to them as principles.‖359    
 General principles of law are seen as either the product of the consensus of states 
or the result of the tacit consent of states. Doctrine mediates between these two views by 
using the pragmatic approach that general principles are the built up practice of states 
identified through comparative law methodologies. General principles of law are the 
subject of debate in the doctrine. As a result, general principles of law can be explained 
by sources doctrine as a product of consent, as a product of consensus, or as a pragmatic 
combination of the two.  
 
 
3.3 The Relationship between the Sources 
The sources of law mediate debates over the authority of international law. These 
debates concentrate on two main sources of authority, consent and consensus. Each 
source is more easily explained by favouring one of these sources of authority over the 
other but is ambiguous enough to display elements of both consent and consensus. 
Consequently, to fit within the doctrine a source of law must be capable of being 
explained by both consent and consensus. Therefore, doctrinal debate over the 
relationship between the sources of law is a debate over the basis of authority in 
international law in either consent or consensus. This part discusses the relationship 
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between the sources. This relationship is discussed through the examples of the 
―hierarchy of sources,‖ and the problem of non liquet.   
 
 
3.3.1 The Hierarchy of Sources
360
 
There is debate over the hierarchy of the sources of law. Henkin argues, ―State consent 
is the foundation of international law.‖361 Consistent with this position, Henkin asserts 
that treaties are the primary source of law. In opposition, Kelsen argues that ―[t]he 
norms of customary international law represent the highest stratum in the structure of 
the international legal order.‖362 Friedmann363  and Thirlway364 make a more moderate 
argument. They argue that custom is being superseded by treaty as the primary source 
of international law.  Positions regarding the hierarchy of law are so absolute and 
uncompromising that some scholars dismiss the question of hierarchy altogether as an 
unresolved area of doctrinal debate. For example, Jennings asserts that ―[i]t seems 
doubtful that this is a fruitful line of enquiry.‖365 These positions shape the parameters 
of the debate over the hierarchy of sources. 
 Arguing for the primacy of a source makes that source superior and able to 
supersede other sources. Consequently, debates about the hierarchy of sources are 
arguments about the ―ultimate‖ source of authority for international law.366 This means 
that each source is a battleground for a viewpoint on the hierarchy of sources. This 
debate occurs because each source can be explained by both consent and consensus. As 
a result, the hierarchy of sources confirms that the sources of international law are 
structured by the concepts of consent and consensus. 
 One way to enter the doctrinal debate over hierarchy of sources is to examine the 
relationship between treaty and customary international law. This relationship is, to 
paraphrase Oscar Schacter, ―entangled.‖367 Schacter notes 
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[t]he different positions taken in respect to the relation of treaty and customary 
law cannot be adequately understood solely on the basis of the principles 
referred to in the cases or the empirical data on State practice and belief. Other 
factors linked to political and pragmatic considerations as well as philosophical 
conceptions of social change are also likely to influence the positions taken. 
These instances emerge more clearly when we bear in mind that treaty and 
custom are not only alternative sources of international law but also competitive 
with each other. International lawyers have tended to lean toward to one or the 
other ‗source.‘368  
 
 
The hierarchy of sources uncovers a predisposition towards either consent or consensus 
as the ultimate ―authority‖ of international law. 369 
 The preference for consent or consensus is highlighted when treaty and custom 
conflict. Villiger examines this problem in detail.
370
 He starts with the assumption that 
there is no hierarchy of sources. Villiger also suggests that the argument over the 
supremacy of consent and consensus cannot be determined because treaty and custom 
are equally authoritative sources.
371
 Consequently, the general rules of interpretation 
apply. These rules are that the specific overrides the general and the later in time 
governs. 
372
  The general rules of interpretation also apply to conflicts among 
multilateral treaties and within custom itself
373
 so that in absence of an established 
hierarchy consent may sometimes trump consensus and vice versa. 
 The situation becomes even more complicated when sources co-exist. For 
example, a treaty may codify existing law. In this case, either the treaty ―crystallizes‖ 
the existence of custom
374
 or a non-ratifying state ―harmonises‖ its acts with the treaty. 
Both crystallization and harmonisation create custom.
375
 However, crystallization and 
harmonisation strain the relationship between the sources. If a treaty codifies a custom 
the treaty is redundant as the custom is already law. Additionally, ratification of a treaty 
is evidence of state practice. However, ratification is not evidence of opinio juris. When 
a state ratifies a treaty it does not act out of a belief in the legality of the contents of the 
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treaty, but out of a belief that the treaty has created a legal obligation.
376
 States obey 
treaties because they consent to the obligation. They do not have a subjective belief in 
the legality of the contents. However, collective ratifications of a treaty provide 
evidence of custom. Once a treaty is ratified custom becomes ―subordinate‖ to the 
treaty. The treaty is a specific obligation that supersedes the general obligation of the 
custom.
377
 In sum: the hierarchy of sources is relative. The doctrine is explained by both 
consent and consensus; these are the parameters of the doctrine of sources of 
international law.  
 Thirlway raises another serious problem for the hierarchy of sources. He explores 
the problem of a treaty that codifies existing custom. There are three elements to this 
examination. First, states may be persistent objectors to the custom. Second, a persistent 
objection is ineffective if the state does not object when the rule is ―crystallizing.‖ 
Third, if there are a sufficient number of states that dissent from the codification this 
may create a competing custom.
 378
 Custom can develop after a treaty is in force and 
custom can change a treaty if it is the more recent of the two obligations.
379
  
 Villiger considers the ―dynamic impact‖ of custom on treaty. He focuses on the 
fact that codification always modifies custom. This is because a codification is only 
interpreted in light of the reservations to the treaty. This brings a customary element 
into the treaty. A treaty reflects the state of the law at the time of codification.
380
 
Villiger explains, 
 
 
Custom and treaty rules may exert a strong influence on each other. 
Nonidentical rules of one source can modify rules of the other or cause 
them to pass from use. Identical rules can parallel each other and assist in 
their mutual interpretation and ascertainment. Do such processes in any 
way affect the identity or individuality of the sources of customary law and 
treaties? Clearly, if the rules of one source may bear in such a manner on 
the other, this results in considerable relativization of the sources with 
regard to one another.
381
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The ―entanglement‖ of treaty and custom is illustrative of the interdependence of 
consent and consensus in sources doctrine. Custom may change treaty law and treaty 
may crystallize custom. Consensus sometimes supersedes consent and vice versa. As a 
result, consent and consensus both function as explanations of doctrine of the sources of 
international law. Another example of the relationship of consent and consensus is the 
debate over non liquet in the doctrine. This will be the subject of the next section. 
 
 
3.3.2 Non Liquet  
There is debate over whether the ICJ can pronounce a non liquet.  Non liquet is the 
ability of the Court to ―decline to give judgment on the ground of insufficiency or 
obscurity of law.‖382 The debate considers the Court‘s ability to use general principles 
of law to avoid a declaration of non liquet. The debate over non liquet further illustrates 
that consent and consensus provide structure to the sources of international law. 
 Lauterpacht emphatically argues that the Court cannot declare a non liquet. He 
writes that  
 
 
…the international legal system must be regarded as complete in the sense 
that an international judicial or arbitral tribunal, when endowed with 
requisite jurisdiction, is bound and able to decide every dispute submitted 
to it, by allowing or dismissing the claim advanced by the plaintiff State.
383
 
 
 
Lauterpacht‘s position is highly contested. In fact, he enters into one of the great debates 
of the twentieth century on this issue with Stone. The Lauterpacht/Stone debate reaches 
its zenith in the middle of the twentieth century. However, this debate over non liquet is 
still current.  In 1996, the ICJ issued its decision in the Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.
384
  The Court declared that there was 
no law prohibiting or permitting the use of nuclear weapons.
385
 In dissent Judge Higgins 
asserted that this holding was tantamount to declaring a non liquet.
386
 This advisory 
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opinion has renewed interest in the problem of non liquet and has ensured that this is 
again a live legal issue.
387
  The ―high point‖ of this doctrinal dispute is the 
Stone/Lauterpacht debate.   
 Lauterpacht examines the intention of the drafters of Article 38 of the Statute of 
PCIJ.
388
 This Article is later copied directly into the Statute of the ICJ and therefore it is 
still relevant. Lauterpacht concludes that some drafters inserted this provision to prevent 
declarations of non liquet. Building on this interpretation of Article 38 Lauterpacht 
asserts that international law is a complete system. There are no ―gaps‖ in the law.389 
Further, he argues that the completeness of law is an ―a priori assumption of every 
system of law.‖390 There can never be a declaration of non liquet by the Court. 
Consequently, the Court is required to fill perceived gaps ―by reference to or by way of 
analogy with a wider legal principle derived in first instance from international law.‖391 
This includes the principle that in the absence of a clear rule of law a state is free to act 
―according to discretion.‖ The state is obligated only by its duty to act in good faith.392  
General principles of law act as a method of ―completing‖ international law, thereby 
―confirming‖ that there are no gaps in the law.393 However, ―the completeness of the 
international order is a general principle of law.‖394   
 Lauterpacht asserts that ―[i]f consent is the essential condition for the existence of 
a rule of international law then a revealed and deliberate absence  of agreement would 
point to a gap on the subject.‖395 Nonetheless, this is not the case as the gap in law 
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disappears when the state agrees to obligatory adjudication. Accepting the jurisdiction 
of the Court confers on the Court competence to reach a judgment.
396
 The Court has to 
reach a decision. The Court generally uses positive law to reach a decision. However, if 
no custom or treaty exists then the Court has to apply general principles of law to 
prevent a declaration of non liquet.  
 Lauterpacht‘s argument relies on both consent and consensus. It begins with the 
statement that international law is a complete system. Gaps in international law have to 
be filled by general principles of law. General principles of law are created by 
consensus of state practice. Consequently, Lauterpacht‘s argument strives for 
consensus. However, his approach also has an element of consent. The completeness of 
international law is translated into a meaningful premise for adjudication when states 
consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ.  Through their consent, states agree that the Court 
can reach a judgment. Therefore, Lauterpacht‘s arguments about non liquet are 
explained by both consent and consensus.  
 In contrast, Stone argues that ―[t]he non liquet question, in the present view, 
inevitably draws one into controversies concerning the source of validity of 
international law, and the authority of international tribunals…‖397 Stone goes to the 
root of Lauterpacht‘s position. He does not think that international law is a complete 
system. He disagrees that the ICJ is entitled to create law.  Lauterpacht argues that in 
significant cases the Court has never declared a non liquet. This illustrates that it is a 
custom of international law that a non liquet cannot be declared.
 398
  Stone argues that 
this conclusion is weak. The fact that a non liquet has never been declared does not 
mean that the Court cannot declare a non liquet.
399
  This is because ―…obviously even 
the mere permissibility of a non liquet would refute the view that there is a prohibition 
of non liquet in international law.‖400  The contrary only demonstrates that the Court has 
not chosen to declare a non liquet.
401
  There is no proof that the Court believes that it 
cannot declare a non liquet. 
 Stone then turns on Lauterpacht‘s arguments for the completeness of international 
law. He uses the adversary principle as the basis of his argument. This principle holds 
that ―unless the court finds that there is a rule of law supporting the Applicant‘s claim 
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judgment must be for the Respondent.‖402  Stone argues that the adversary rule 
encourages the Court to engage in law creation by operating when the Court does not 
choose to apply a principle of law.
403
  Discretion to apply the law has the same effect as 
a declaration of non liquet.  If 
 
 
…the court gives judgment for the Respondent on the ground that no 
rule of law has been found to support the Applicant‘s case, this 
judgment certainly determines that the Applicant does not win, and that 
the rule on which his case depends does not exist. But then, a 
declaration of non liquet by the court would also have the same 
effect.‖404 
 
 
 Prohibiting non liquet ensures that the ICJ always exercises its jurisdiction. This 
grants the Court the power to create law to cover situations in which they would have 
declared a non liquet. This power of law creation is ―limited only by the novelty and 
range of matters coming before it for decision.‖405 By refusing to declare a non liquet, 
the ICJ is choosing to create law.
406
 As such, a declaration of non liquet is a policy 
decision. When parties consent to adjudication at the Court they are agreeing that the 
Court can create law to adjudicate their dispute. Stone finds this problematic in an 
international system that has no legislature to correct judicial errors.
407
  Consequently, 
he suggests that  
 
 
[b]ecause no general answer to this can be given the present writer 
believes that it should be left open to a tribunal, in the absence of 
contrary request by both parties, to decide that the legal materials and 
other resources available for judgment do not in the particular case 
enable it to make a binding judgment.
408
 
 
 
Stone appears to favour state consent; but, his position actually privileges consensus 
over consent. At first glance Stone argues that a Court can only apply law that has been 
consented to by states. However, Stone ignores the fact that states begin litigation in 
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order to obtain a statement of law. Consequently, a declaration of non liquet is an 
admission by the Court that there is no consensus among states about the law. 
Therefore, Stone‘s argument ultimately privileges the clear consensus among states as 
to the existence of the law.  
 Lauterpacht and Stone debate the function of state practice at the ICJ. Their 
argument concerns the permissibility of a declaration of non liquet. Lauterpacht argues 
that declarations of non liquet are not permitted. He underlines the consensus-based 
nature of a non liquet because he believes that international law is a complete system 
where all gaps are filled by general principles of law. However, consent is also present. 
States consent to have gaps in the law filled when they consent to adjudication by the 
Court. State consent allows the Court to create law based on state practice. State 
practice is derived from a consensus of state action. In consequence, Lauterpacht‘s 
argument supports both consent and consensus.  
 Stone highlights a problem for Lauterpacht. Lauterpacht cannot prove that 
declarations of non liquet are prohibited. He can only assert that the ICJ has never 
declared a non liquet. Moreover, the fact that they have not declared a non liquet does 
not mean they cannot do so. Stone argues that the Court can declare a non liquet. Parties 
to litigation can and do consent to the possibility of a declaration of non liquet. Stone 
adopts the opposite approach to Lauterpacht. In absence of consensus on the existence 
of the law the Court must declare a non liquet. A declaration of non liquet is a 
declaration that law is formed by consensus. The consent of states to adjudication does 
not obviate the need for consensus to exist. Consequently, Stone favours consent based 
law and consensus based adjudication. Lauterpacht favours consensus in the law and 
consent in adjudication. The Stone/ Lauterpacht debate illustrates the relationship 
between consent and consensus in sources doctrine. 
 
 
 
3.3.3 Analysis 
The debate over the hierarchy of sources and the debate over non liquet illustrate that 
sources doctrine mediates the tension over the ultimate source of authority in 
international law - consent or consensus. The interaction of these sources illustrates the 
entwined nature of consent and consensus as the sources of authority that structure the 
international law.  
101  Betina Kuzmarov 
 Further, the authority of international law is structured by consent and consensus, 
as consent is justified in terms of consensus and vice versa. In this way, consent and 
consensus structure the debate in sources doctrine. Writers such as Kennedy 
409
 and 
Koskenniemi
 410
 explore this relationship in detail; they begin from the starting point 
that sources doctrine is independent of considerations of substance and process.
411
  
Sources perform different functions than substance or process within the structure of 
international law. Additionally, sources doctrine is also able to provide authority for 
substantive and procedural questions.  Also, the sources of authority within the doctrine, 
consent and consensus, are themselves entwined. The interdependence of consent and 
consensus leads Kennedy to characterize sources doctrine as follows: 
 
 
In sources argument one characteristically seeks to convince someone 
that a state which does not currently believe it to be in its interests to 
follow a given norm should do so anyway. Sources rhetoric provides 
two rhetorical persuasive styles which we might call ―hard‖ and ―soft.‖  
A ―hard‖ argument will seek to ground compliance in the ―consent‖ of 
the state to be bound. A ―soft‖ argument relies upon some extra 
consensual notion of the good or the just.
412
 
 
 
To Kennedy, consent is a source of law that is ―binding‖ whereas consensus is merely 
―authoritative.‖413  This is why ―hard‖ sources are sometimes preferred; other times 
―softer‖ custom and general principles are required.414 These preferences are illustrated 
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by the doctrines of treaty and custom.
415
 However,  ―[d]espite the allocation‖ of custom 
as soft and treaty as hard, ―commentators have sought to characterize Article 38 as 
dominantly hard or soft, and continue to differentiate sources from one another by their 
relative hardness or softness.‖416 According to Kennedy doctrine tries to straightjacket 
sources to one of the types of authority accepted within international law. However, the 
sources of international law are explained by both consent and consensus.
417
  
 As a result, sources doctrine is preoccupied with mediating between the seemingly 
contradictory sources of authority in international law. In fact the conflict between the 
sources creates a doctrinal problem. As Koskenniemi notes, doctrine can never ―explain 
their assumed objective needs so as to avoid the criticism of arguing for an essentially 
political position.‖418  Koskenniemi characterizes this problem as defining ―… consent 
in terms of justice and justice in terms of consent.‖419    
 To explain, Article 38(1) (a)-(c) of the Statute of the ICJ lists the three primary 
sources of law, treaty, custom and general principles of law.  The sources in Article 38 
represent the agreed upon sources authority in international law and are known as 
sources doctrine. Sources doctrine mediates between two opposed sources of authority 
that are present in Article 38 (1) (a)-(c). International law has authority because it is 
based on either the consent of states or on the consensus among states. Each source of 
law traditionally favours one of these bases of authority accepted by the doctrine. 
However, each source is also ambiguous enough to be explained by either consent or 
consensus. For example, debates over the hierarchy of sources illustrate that sources are 
formed by both consent and consensus. Similarly, non liquet is a debate over the ability 
of general principles of law to fill ―gaps‖ in the law. These debates are premised on 
consent or consensus. These examples illustrate the ―entangled‖ relationship between 
the sources and they demonstrate that each source can be given authority by either 
consent or consensus or even a combination of the two. The nature of this relationship 
leads Kennedy to characterize sources doctrine as ―frustratingly fluid.‖420  This fluidity 
does not stop the doctrine from proceeding as if it is settled. Consequently, sources 
doctrine tries to reconcile ―incompatible rhetorics,‖ debates over the functions of the 
doctrine of sources that act as the parameters of the doctrine.
421
   
                                                 
415
 Kennedy, ―The Sources of International Law‖ (n 307) at p 28. 
416
 Kennedy, ―The Sources of International Law‖ (n 307) at p 28. 
417
 Kennedy, ―The Sources of International Law‖ (n 307) at p 20. 
418
 Koskenniemi, Apology (n 81) at p 314. 
419
 Koskenniemi, Apology (n 81) at p 387. 
420
 Kennedy, ―The Sources of International Law‖ (n 307) at p 88. 
421
 Kennedy, ―The Sources of International Law‖ (n 307) at p 89. 
103  Betina Kuzmarov 
 Debate in the doctrine results from the fact that the sources are of law are 
ambiguous. Koskenniemi explains that ―[s]ources argument will, on its own premises, 
remain in continuous flight from having to admit its own political character.‖422 These 
are the conditions that ―explain its indeterminacy.‖423 This implies that the 
indeterminacy of sources is both a cause and consequence of the conflict over the 
authority of consent and consensus. The ambiguity of each source is necessary to allow 
sovereigns ―to remain autonomous within a binding normative order.‖424 However, 
sources doctrine tries to ―bind states against their own perception of their interests.‖425   
 Sources doctrine also explains the normativity of law.
426
  As Kennedy notes, 
 
 
People who discuss the sources of international law are trying to do two 
things. They seek the norm which can bind states against their own 
perception of their interests. They seek to elaborate the normative order in 
a way which does not presume away the diversity of State interests. 
Sources discourse argues about the normative forms which can bind states 
without overthrowing their authority. The discourse is about the form of 
the catalogue of norms. It is about the sources of normative authority in 
the system of autonomous sovereigns.
427
  
 
 
Therefore, debate over sources doctrine structures international law by providing an 
explanation for law‘s authority. Kennedy notes emphatically, ―the turn to sources 
doctrine thus seems to provide an escape from fruitless theoretical argument, moving us 
toward legal order, precisely by opening up an endlessly proliferating field of legal 
argumentation.‖428  
 In sum: the sources of international law explain law's authority as deriving from 
either consent or consensus. The doctrine of sources provides a way for mediating this 
debate through the sources of law listed in Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the ICJ. 
Consequently, the doctrine of unilateral acts must also be explained consent or 
consensus in order to be considered to have ―legal‖ authority – be a source of law. As 
such, assessing whether unilateral acts fit within this doctrine will be the subject of the 
next section. 
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4. Unilateral Acts, Intention and the Sources of International Law 
 
 
Intention is the requirement that gives a unilateral act its legal authority; a unilateral act 
does not create a legal obligation unless and until there is an intention to create a legal 
obligation. Therefore intention is the requirement that acts as the ―source‖ of the 
obligation contained in the act. This section expands on this statement and justifies the 
use of the requirement of intention as an indicator of a unilateral act‘s ―legality‖ within 
the doctrine of sources.   
 
 
4.1 The Issue of Intention at the International Law Commission 
Intention was examined by the ILC where it was a contested part of the definition of a 
unilateral act. Examining this definition is relevant as it was the most recent attempt to 
establish the ―legal‖ source of a unilateral act. Further, the difficulties the ILC faced 
defining intention raises questions about the ability of intention to provide authority for 
unilateral acts; this is particularly evident in the difficulty the ILC had in relating 
unilateral acts to the accepted sources of authority in international law, consent and 
consensus. This section of the chapter reviews the consideration of intention by the ILC 
and its relationship to the sources of authority in international law.  
 In 1996 unilateral acts of states were proposed as a topic for consideration by the 
ILC.
429
 The General Assembly approved the topic. The ILC set up a Working Group 
that reported in time for the Commission‘s 1997 meeting.430 In its first report the 
Working Group established intention as a central feature of its analysis. Moreover, 
intention was one justification for undertaking the codification of unilateral acts but the 
Working Group offered three reasons why pursuing codification would be ―advisable 
and feasible.‖ The first reason was: 
 
 
In their conduct in the international sphere States frequently carry out 
unilateral acts with the intent to produce legal effects. The significance of 
such unilateral acts is constantly growing as a result of the rapid political, 
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economic and technological changes taking place in the international 
community at the present time and in particular the great advances in the 
means of expressing and transmitting the attitudes and conduct of 
States.
431
  
 
 
Their second reason was state practice. There was sufficient state practice, academic 
writing and international judgments to analyse. Their third reason was necessity, as it 
was felt that codification would promote ―certainty, predictability and stability‖ in the 
law.
432
  This last requirement suggested that unilateral acts did not promote these three 
conditions. The Working Group assumed that it was a practical fact that states acted 
internationally with intent to create legal obligations. Codification was designed to 
determine the circumstances in which intention created a legal obligation. Intention was 
one of the key requirements for a unilateral act.  
 As a result of this decision the ILC began work on this topic at its 1997 session. 
The Commission appointed a Special Rapporteur, V Rodriquez Cedeño.
433
  Rodriguez 
Cedeño issued his first report at the 1998 meeting of the Commission.
434
 From the 
outset Rodriguez Cedeño considered the requirement of intention. He defined intention 
as an expression of will on the part of the acting state.
435
 As Rodriquez Cedeño 
explained it, 
 
 
…in the case of strictly unilateral acts the obligation arose neither when 
that obligation was accepted nor at the time that the State which was a 
beneficiary of that obligation subsequently engaged in any particular form 
of conduct. Rather it arose when the State which performed the unilateral 
act intended that it should arise. A State was able to assume an obligation 
in this way by exercising the power of auto-limitation which was 
conferred upon it by international law.
436
 
 
 
In this quotation Rodriquez Cedeño was articulating his understanding of the 
relationship between the unilateral act and its source of legal authority.  He clarified that 
a unilateral act was binding upon the acting state as a result of the intention with which 
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the act was performed; intention that arose out of an act of will of the state. 
Nevertheless, he was never able to clearly articulate the relationship between will and 
intention. As a result, Rodriguez Cedeño defined a unilateral act  
 
 
…as an autonomous expression of clear and unambiguous will, explicitly 
and publicly issued by a State for the purpose of creating a judicial 
relationship -in particular, of creating legal obligations - between itself and 
one or more States which did not participate in its elaboration, without it 
being necessary for those States to accept it or subsequently to behave in 
such a way as to signify such acceptance.
437
 
 
 
Here Rodriguez Cedeño conflated the concept of intention with the concept of will.  
This lack of distinction between will and intention was extremely important for reasons 
that will be developed throughout the rest of this section. 
 However, to briefly summarize, Rodriguez Cedeño‘s approach was important 
because of the relationship between consent and will that directly conflicts with the 
purpose of intention. The Oxford English Dictionary primarily defines intent as ―[t]he 
act or fact of intending or purposing; intention, purpose (formed in the mind)‖.438 This 
indicates that intending is an internal mental state. Conversely, the Oxford English 
Dictionary offers over twenty definitions of ―will.‖ The most pertinent definition in this 
context is ―[t]he action of willing or choosing to do something; the movement or 
attitude of the mind which is directed with conscious intention to (and, normally, issues 
immediately in) some action, physical or mental; volition.‖439 This definition is clarified 
further in a sub-definition as ―[i]ntention, intent, purpose, determination.‖440 Moreover, 
will is also the ―[i]ntention or determination that something shall be done by another or 
others, or shall happen to take place; (contextually) an expression or embodiment of 
such intention or determination, an order, command, injunction.‖441 Consequently, the 
idea of ―will‖ connotes taking action on an intention. This indicates that intention is a 
purely mental exercise that requires ―manifestation‖ as an act of will. This indicates that 
intention in and of itself may provide sufficient evidence of legal authority. This also 
may explain why Rodriguez Cedeño asserts that intention is unknowable until it 
                                                 
437
 ILC Report 1998 (n 434) at par 142. 
438
 Concise OED (n 57) ―Intent‖ 
439
 Concise OED (n 57) ―Will.‖ 
440
 Concise OED (n 57) ―Will.‖ 
441
 Concise OED (n 57) ―Will.‖ 
107  Betina Kuzmarov 
displays itself as the ―will‖ of the state. Rodriguez Cedeño appears not to delve into this 
distinction in any detail, preferring to treat will as equivalent to intention. 
 Perhaps it was Rodriguez Cedeño‘s decision to conflate will with intent that made 
this definition controversial; what is known is that not all of the Members of the ILC 
accepted this definition.  The 1998 Report noted that some Members supported this 
definition of intention while  
 
 
[o]thers disagreed, arguing that while it might be necessary in the case of 
certain types of unilateral acts for there to be an intention on the part of 
their authors that they produce legal effects, this was not so in the case of 
others. Indeed the jurisprudence suggests that States could perform a 
unilateral act without realizing it. An international tribunal might, for 
example, find that a unilateral declaration which contained a promise was 
binding upon its author in international law, even though that State might 
maintain that it had no intention to assume any such intention when it 
performed the act.
442
 
 
 
Some Members argued that intention was not an expression of will of the state. These 
Members felt that intention was constructed ex post facto by an international tribunal. 
Intention did not require an expression of will by the state as intention was always 
assessed objectively by third party observers as in, for example, the judgment of an 
international tribunal. Members who adopted this view followed the precedent of the 
Nuclear Tests cases.  In that case, the ICJ determined that it was be the arbiter of a 
state‘s intention.443  
 Members who opposed Rodriguez Cedeño‘s definition premised their opposition 
on an objective definition of intention. Objective interpretations of intention view 
unilateral acts as resulting not from the intention of the acting state, or even their will, 
but from the interpretation of that act by a tribunal or other state. In this view the source 
of authority of a unilateral act was the fact that the act could be interpreted as displaying 
evidence of intention to create a legal obligation. Members who opposed this approach 
took a subjective view of intention; in this view the obligation resulted from the will of 
the state regardless of interpretations of the act.  
  The debate among Members of the ILC over Rodriguez Cedeño‘s proposed 
definition of intention demonstrated an ongoing tension in the doctrine. This tension 
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arises because intention is a mental state that can never be known with any certainty. As 
a result, intention always requires interpretation in order to produce a legal obligation. 
The tension arises over which interpretation of intention should be given primacy: the 
objective interpretation or the subjective interpretation - the interpretation of the act or 
the actual will of the state.  The doctrine in this area tries to mediate this tension but it 
meets with two related yet separate problems. How does a state manifest its intention? 
And how does a state manifest its intention to create a legal obligation? Each of these 
questions presents problems for the definition of intention and so these questions will be 
examined in further detail. 
  The first problem the ILC faced in defining intention was the need to determine 
how a state can manifest its intention. In this regard unilateral acts are different from 
treaties and other ―consent‖ based sources of authority in law.  For example, in treaty 
law a state uses the symbols of treaty formation, such as a signature, to demonstrate its 
consent to the substantive obligation contained in the treaty. In treaty law, a state‘s 
obligation is separate from the manifestation of its intention to accept that obligation. 
The former is indicated by the latter. However, in unilateral acts there is no way to 
determine when a state has indicated an intention to accept an obligation apart from the 
act itself – the act and the obligation is one and the same. To demonstrate this difference 
a practical example is helpful. You may want a sandwich but you do not have bread in 
your house. You intend to go to the store to buy bread. As you leave, your telephone 
rings and you speak to your friend until the store closes. You do not go to buy bread. 
You rummage in your cupboard and have pasta instead. There is no indication of your 
intention to buy bread - will and intention are conflated. However, if you agree to buy a 
pair of trousers and leave them for tailoring in the store there may be objective 
indications of your will. You may leave a deposit, you may pay a bill or a receipt may 
be written. These are expressions of your will that indicate an intention to create a legal 
obligation. You wish to return for your trousers. There is a subtle difference between 
legal obligations such as treaties, in which the manifestations of the intention of the 
state and obligation indicated by that intention are separated by indications of consent, 
and legal obligations such as unilateral acts, in which the intention and the act are one 
and the same. It is true that a state that wants to create a unilateral obligation can choose 
to provide separate indicators that their intention is coextensive with their actions. 
However, this is not necessary for a legal obligation to result from an act. In the 
paradigmatic example of the Nuclear Tests cases French statements were similar to the 
example of the bread; there was no evidence in French statements or actions that clearly 
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indicated their intentions. There was no ―receipt‖ or any indication of how France 
intended its statements. Further, they did not participate in the Court proceedings so no 
evidence of their intention was given. Consequently, in unilateral acts the only way 
intention is known is through objective interpretation of the act itself.  
 The requirement of objective interpretation of intention creates an additional 
difficulty for the ILC: the problem of establishing intention to create a legal obligation. 
Rodriguez Cedeño‘s definition of intention requires a manifestation of will.  However, 
there is no clear way to differentiate between a state‘s intention to act in a certain way 
and a state‘s intention to manifest the will to create a legal obligation from that act. This 
problem becomes clear in the following example: State A announces that it will not test 
nuclear weapons. It contradicts this act by continuing with its nuclear tests. States 
affected by this act then have two options. First, they might do nothing. In this option, it 
is irrelevant whether State A intends to create a legal obligation by its statements. If 
states do not respond to State A‘s actions, their promise does not have meaning. It 
remains legally ambiguous as it is irrelevant whether or not there was an intention on 
the part of State A to create a legal obligation.  Second, other states may become aware 
of State A‘s act and demand that State A live up to its stated obligation. For simplicity, 
consider these ―states‖ State B. This second scenario gives State B two further options. 
One, State B can approach State A directly and demand that it live up to its obligation. 
In this case, the unilateral act becomes a matter of negotiation between the parties. It is 
not necessary to determine State A‘s intention because their original intention becomes 
subsumed in a new context, bilateral negotiations. In this situation State A‘s act is now 
part of a series of acts that involve State A and State B, so that any obligation that 
results is no longer unilateral. This situation is similar to that of the Eastern Greenland 
case, in which acts are undertaken in the context of negotiations. These acts are not 
considered unilateral. Consequently, intention is only relevant in the final option. In this 
option, State B asserts that State A is bound by the act and State B claims against State 
A as a result. This option may arise if negotiation fails or may be pursued directly. State 
B brings its claim to a Court or other adjudicative body. This body is then placed in a 
position in which it must assess State A‘s intention. This is the only option where State 
A‘s intention is assessed. Moreover, this assessment is an ―objective‖ assessment of 
intention as the Court assesses intention through the evidence it hears. This evidence 
includes the facts that led State B to believe State A meant the act to create a legal 
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obligation.
444
  This is necessary because a Court cannot effectively assess State A‘s 
intention without interpreting the evidence presented by both State A and State B as to 
the meaning of the act. State B can present evidence of its belief that State A meant its 
act to create a legal obligation. Therefore, the ―objective‖ search for intent must always 
include an assessment of responses to the act.
445
 However, once the Court considers 
evidence presented by State B, it is no longer clear that State A‘s obligation results 
solely from their intention; their obligation may result instead from interpretation of that 
intention by other states. This results in a situation in which others interpret the meaning 
of a state‘s intention regardless of what that intention actually was.  A state‘s actual 
intention is meaningless as it is the interpretation of that intention that creates the legal 
obligation. 
 The inability to differentiate between an intention to act and an intention to create 
a legal obligation arises because conceptually intention is subjective; it is always 
unknown to other actors. This creates a need to objectify a state‘s intention based on 
indications of intent, will.
446
 However in unilateral acts the indications of the will of the 
state are determined through interpretations of intention. Consequently, international 
law is faced with a situation similar to the determination of mens rea in Anglo-
American criminal law although the analogy is not perfect. A state cannot have a ―state 
of mind,‖ but  its representatives can indicate a state‘s intent. In both situations, it is 
through objective evidence about subjective understanding that intention is 
determined.
447
  It is assumed that people will foresee the natural consequences of their 
actions. Mens rea is a useful analogy for those who introduce objective indicators of 
will into intention.  
 As a result of the differing views on intention as either objective or subjective, the 
ILC did not adopt Rodriguez Cedeño‘s definition. In his 1999 Report Rodriguez Cedeño 
again presented his will-based approach to determining intention and, perhaps in 
response to the criticisms noted above, he further proposed analogising intention to the 
requirements of treaty law established in the VCLT.  He used the Convention as a basis 
for a proposed draft Article, Article 6, about which the  
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…Special Rapporteur stressed that in order for a legal act to be valid under 
international law, it must be attributable to a State, the representative of 
that State must have the capacity to engage it at the international level, the 
act must be the expression of its will and free of irregularities and it must 
be formulated in the proper manner. It had to have a lawful object and 
must not derogate from prior obligations. Article 6 referred specifically to 
obligations: the State must not be able to acquire rights through its acts 
and, conversely, it must not be able to place obligations on other States 
without their consent. Intention was fundamental to the interpretation of 
the act.
448
 
 
 
Members were still not in unanimous agreement with this characterization of intention. 
Some Members argued that intention ―… could not always be discerned clearly in every 
instance.‖449 Again, these Members were reiterating the difficulty noted above in 
differentiating between an intention to act and an intention to create a legal obligation 
with clear legal authority. This debate became acute in discussions of Rodriguez 
Cedeño‘s draft definition of unilateral acts. Some Members favoured going further than 
Rodriguez Cedeño. These Members wished to remove the reference to intention 
altogether. They preferred to define unilateral acts by the ―unequivocal‖ will of the 
state.
450
  The use of unequivocal will signalled a stronger move towards an objective 
interpretation of intention by reinforcing the requirement of will as an unequivocal 
indication of intent.  However, unequivocal will was itself a contestable standard. It was 
open to interpretation in several areas and so Members‘ reactions to Article 6 were 
mixed. For example, some Members argued that the standard for ―consent‖ was overly 
reliant on standards of the VCLT.
451
  There was some concern that the analogy to the 
VCLT was an attempt to place an objective test on a subjective standard. The criticisms 
of reliance on the treaty model led to the reconstitution of a Working Group for the 
topic.  
 The reconstituted Working Group soon proposed its own definition of a unilateral 
act. A unilateral act was ―[a] unilateral statement by a State by which such State intends 
to produce legal effects in its relations with one or more States or International 
Organizations and which is notified or other [wise] made known to the State or 
organization concerned.‖452  This definition adopted a subjective view of intention, 
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however, it too required notification. Therefore, this definition represented a retreat 
from the objectivity of Rodriguez Cedeño‘s definition, although it was not adopted 
either.  
 As a result, in his 2000 Report Rodriguez Cedeño once again reiterated that 
intention was defined by the will of the state. However, he also asserted that intention 
was a ―fundamental element‖ of unilateral acts, and was central to the determination of 
whether the act was legal or political.
453
 Will and intention were not differentiated. On 
this basis a new draft definition was proposed. This definition was largely a reiteration 
of the Working Group‘s proposed definition. The only change was that the word 
―statement‖ was replaced with the word ―act.‖ ―Statement‖ was considered too 
―restrictive.‖454 Additionally, at the start of the definition, the phrase ―a unilateral act 
means an unequivocal expression of will‖ was added and ―notified or otherwise made 
known‖ was changed to ―is known to that state or International Organisation…‖ The 
new definition read,  
 
 
For the purposes of the present articles, unilateral acts of a state means an 
unequivocal expression of will which is formulated by a State with the 
intention of producing legal effects in relation to one or more other States 
or international organizations, and which is known to that State or 
international organisation.
455
 
 
 
 
 Some members approved of the draft definition‘s focus on intention. Other 
Members focused on the double wording of will and intention. Some Members argued 
that will and intention were two separate concepts, a point noted above.
456
 These 
Members opposed the approach of Rodriguez Cedeño. In response Rodriguez Cedeño 
reiterated that the ―unequivocal nature of the will‖ was central to the determination of 
the state‘s intent.457  Additionally, draft Provision 6 was removed from the new draft.  
Members‘ criticism of the draft Article and scepticism about the applicability of treaty 
law to unilateral acts led to its removal.
458
  Members expressed a range of views on the 
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applicability of treaty law to unilateral acts. Some Members supported the analogy, 
some Members rejected the analogy and some Members expressed moderate views in 
between.
459
  
 The debate continued, so in his 2001 Report, Rodriguez Cedeño again defended 
the analogy between unilateral acts and treaty law and he argued that treaty law 
provided the soundest basis for the codification of unilateral acts.
460
 Therefore, the 
continued repetition of the appropriateness of the treaty model was necessary. As a 
result, some Members remained sceptical of the applicability of treaties to unilateral 
acts,
461
 so the ILC was not convinced that will was the same as intent.  
 Rodriguez Cedeño also drafted a provision on interpretation of unilateral acts. 
This draft Article was modelled on Article 31 Paragraph 1 of the VCLT. This provision 
of the VCLT asserted that acts should be interpreted in good faith in light of their object 
and purpose. This new draft provision was considered useful
462
  and this led some 
Members to observe that 
 
 
…the draft articles contained some contradictory elements in that they posed 
intention as a primary criterion yet placed among the supplementary means of 
interpretation the main ways in which intention could be asserted in connection 
with a unilateral act, namely preparatory work and circumstances at the time of 
the act‘s formulation. Some doubts were expressed on giving paramount 
importance to intention in the interpretation of unilateral acts and consequently 
preference was voiced for the approach of the international court of justice to 
give due regard to intention without interpreting unilateral acts in light of 
intention. States other than the author state were entitled to rely on the act per se, 
not on the intention which might be subjective and which, in many cases, quite 
elusive. However, according to one view, the real will of the author State should 
constitute the decisive factor in the interpretation of unilateral acts since, in 
many cases, the contents of the unilateral act did not correspond to the State‘s 
real will, since it was adopted under strong pressure by other States or 
international public opinion and committed the State in a manner that went 
beyond what it might consider necessary. There was thus a dichotomy between 
the real will and the declared will of the State, a matter which favoured adopting 
a restrictive interpretation of the unilateral act.
463
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In this quotation the ILC acknowledged the core difficulty in defining intention – that 
intention was a subjective concept that required objective interpretation in order  to 
create a legal obligation. This problem first emerged in the Nuclear Tests cases where 
the ICJ held that intention was required for a unilateral act to create a legal obligation. 
However, the Court did not provide practical guidance as to how to determine intention. 
This led to confusion over the definition of intention, a problem that has evidently also 
confounded the ILC.  
 This confusion over intent carried into the next year‘s ILC meetings. In 2002 the 
problem was that unilateral acts as a ―…mechanism was impossible to describe in terms 
of a voluntary scheme in which States had the intention of creating legal effects and in 
which they formulated actions that then did so.‖464 Some suggested that intention should 
be replaced by reliance as the core requirement of legal obligation.
465
 However, some 
Members felt the two approaches were complementary.
466
 The debate over intention had 
come full circle and the ILC had not determined the issue of intention. 
 By this time Commission had become bogged down over issues such as intention. 
To ensure the work continued the Working Group proposed a series of 
recommendations. These recommendations were arrived at by consensus of the 
Working Group. One recommendation was to define a unilateral act as a statement 
―expressing the will or consent‖ of the state.467 There was no resolution of the issue of 
intent in the 2004 Report of the ILC.
468
 Similarly, the 2005 Report did not discuss this 
issue directly. However, in 2006 the ILC decided to end its work on the topic. In spite of 
the ongoing debates about intention, the Commission adopted ―Guiding Principles‖ for 
unilateral acts.
469
 These acts were not legal obligations but were designed to be 
persuasive upon states. 
 In 2006 the Commission considered the report of a reconstituted Working Group. 
From this report they developed 10 Guiding Principles for Unilateral Acts discussed in 
the earlier chapters. These Guiding Principles were considered at the Sixth Committee 
of the United Nations. These principles were ―taken note of‖ by the Committee. They 
                                                 
464
 ILC, ‗Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Fourth Session‘ (2002) 
UN Doc A/57/10, Supplement 10 at par 335 available online at 
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2002/2002report.htm > accessed on 29 June 2005. 
465
 ILC Report 2002 (n 464) at par 339. 
466
 ILC Report 2002 (n 464) at par 349. 
467
 ILC, ‗Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Fifth Session‘ (2003) UN 
Doc A/58/10, Supplement 10 at par 306, available online at 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2003/2003report.htm> accessed on 17 June 2008. 
468
 See generally ILC, ‗Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Sixth 
Session‘ (2004) UN Doc A/59/10, Supplement 10 at par 306, available online at < 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2004/2004report.htm > accessed on 17 June 2008. 
469
 ILC Report 2006 (n 41) at par 170. 
115  Betina Kuzmarov 
were then commended for ―dissemination‖ in a General Assembly Resolution that 
accompanied the Report of the Sixth Committee.
470
 The ILC sought a resolution to this 
topic. However, it could not agree on core principles let alone a legal document to 
govern unilateral acts. These principles were simply a statement of the current 
understanding of unilateral acts. As the Commission noted,  
 
 
The Commission is aware, however, that the concept of a unilateral act is 
not uniform. On the one hand, certain unilateral acts are formulated in the 
framework and on the basis of an express authorization under international 
law, whereas others are formulated by States in an exercise of their 
freedom to act on the international plane; in accordance with the 
Commissions previous decisions only the latter have been examined by 
the Commission… On the other hand, in this second case there exists a 
very wide spectrum of conduct covered by the designation ―unilateral 
acts,‖ and the difference among legal cultures partly account for the 
misunderstanding to which this topic has given rise, as for some the 
concept of a juridical act necessarily implies an express manifestation of a 
will to be bound on the part of the author State, whereas for others any 
unilateral conduct by the State producing legal effects on the international 
plane may be categorized as a unilateral act.
471
 
 
 
There was never agreement over the meaning of intention. Some proposed definitions 
preferred to give primary importance to objective interpretations of intention. Other 
definitions tried to discern a subjective intent and still other approaches dismissed 
intention entirely. Consequently, the ILC adopted a hybrid definition of intention. 
Intention was defined as:  
 
 
[D]eclarations publicly made and manifesting the will to be bound may 
have the effect of creating legal obligations. When the conditions for this 
are met, the binding character of such declarations is based on good faith. 
States concerned may then take them into consideration and rely on them; 
such States are entitled to require that such obligations be respected.
472
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 In this definition the ILC paid homage to various approaches to intention. First, 
they included the will to create a legal obligation. Will connoted a manifestation of a 
state‘s intention which could then be objectively interpreted. This was a response to the 
problem of manifestation of intention. Second, unilateral declarations were determined 
by good faith in the act. The term good faith was the ILC‘s response to the problem of 
determination of a state‘s intention to create a legal obligation.  To illustrate why this is 
so, it is worth examining what happens when a state does not act in good faith. Please 
return to the example of State A and State B. State A declares that they will stop their 
above ground nuclear testing. Through this act State A manifests the intention to stop 
nuclear testing. They do not stop testing and State B is offended because State A has not 
lived up to its word. State B starts a claim against State A in court. The Court hears the 
case and objectively determines from State A‘s statement that State A has manifested an 
intention to stop nuclear testing. The Court must then determine what, if any, legal 
obligations result from the fact that State A did not live up to their stated intention. 
According to the ILC the determination of State A‘s legal obligation rests on an 
examination of whether or not State A‘s statement was made in good faith. However, in 
order to determine good faith the Court does not only rely on State A‘s interpretation of 
the statement, they also hear evidence from State B as to why they believed State A‘s 
statement created a legal obligation. From the evidence presented by State A and State 
B the Court reaches an assessment as to whether or not it is reasonable to decide that 
State A intended to create a legal obligation. There must be objective evidence before 
the Court that it is reasonable to believe State A is bound in good faith by their act. 
Therefore, the ―objective‖ evidence before the Court is determined by weighing the 
evidence of State A and State B. As such, determining whether a good faith obligation 
was created is always the result of the objective assessment of the views of both the 
acting state and those states that interpret the meaning of the act. The ILC noted that this 
requirement derived from the Nuclear Tests cases.
473
  
 In the Nuclear Tests cases intention was named the primary requirement for a 
unilateral act, although the Court did not establish how to determine intention except in 
the most general terms.
474
 As a result, of this decision the ILC was forced to grapple 
with how to define intention. In this process two problems emerged with the concept of 
intention as the source of authority for a legal obligation. First, intention could not be 
determined without a manifestation of that intention to other states. Second, there had to 
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be a way to determine when a state wished to create a legal obligation as opposed to 
simply a desire to act in a certain way. As a result, the ILC eventually determined that 
intention was only present when there was both an act of will – a manifestation of 
intention – and good faith –a formal indication to other states of an intention to create a 
legal obligation.  
 The two problems faced by the ILC in defining intent and their resolution of these 
issues allow intention to be interpreted in a way that fits in the doctrine of sources. First, 
the requirement of will means that a unilateral act must have a clear manifestation that 
allows third parties to believe the state understood, consented, to the act that was 
undertaken. Second, the requirement of good faith means that there must be evidence 
from which the community of states could reasonably believe an obligation was 
intended – an indication that there was consensus about the creation of a legal 
obligation. However, as demonstrated in the debates and examples above, intention does 
not necessarily require either will or good faith. One can have intentions without acting 
upon them, and acting upon one's intentions does not mean one intended to create a 
legal obligation. The concept of intention is ―interpreted‖ to require both will and good 
faith to make intention meet the requirements of the doctrine of sources. The ILC tried 
to base a definition of unilateral act on intention and ended up reinterpreting intention as 
the will of the state undertaken in good faith. Neither of these two concepts are 
equivalent to intention, which in its most direct meaning is a ―state of mind‖.475 This 
indicates that the concept of intention had to be massaged to provide legal authority for 
unilateral acts. Further, this interpretation was heavily debated at the ILC and only 
resolved provisionally and without any formal agreement. This suggests difficulties in 
defining intention which mean that intention alone cannot create a source of 
international law. 
 
 
4.2 Predictability in the Law and Intention 
In the previous section it was demonstrated that intention cannot create a legal 
obligation unless it is objectively interpreted. This creates a further problem for a 
unilateral act as a source of international law; an objective interpretation of intention 
creates the possibility that a state will not know if its true intention will be respected by 
the ICJ (or any third party in a position to determine objectively intention). The Court‘s 
objective assessment of intention stems from its interpretation of the evidence before it 
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– interpretation of the act in question. However, this interpretation of the act may or 
may not match the acting state‘s actual intention. Consequently, the Court‘s 
interpretation of a unilateral act may differ from the acting state‘s subjective 
understanding of its own intention.
476
 For example, in the Nuclear Tests cases France 
may not have intended their statements to create a legal obligation. France may have 
merely wanted to indicate that they would act to stop nuclear tests.
477
 This demonstrates 
that the Court‘s interpretation of a unilateral may differ from the acting state‘s intention. 
This fact is troubling because it means that a State cannot know, with any predictability, 
how their act will be interpreted prior to adjudication.  
 To support this assertion requires examining the role of predictability in law. To 
be predictable is defined under the term to predict as ―to declare or to indicate in 
advance.‖478 Therefore, predictability requires knowing in advance the law to which one 
will be held. Predictability is an a priori concept underlying legal systems, and it is a 
requirement of the rule of law.
479
 Further, principles of predictability have been given 
application by the ICJ. Cassese notes that the South West Africa case established that ―a 
rule must be construed ‗within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the 
time of the interpretation.‘‖480 This created a general principal of law that a state is 
judged by the law in place at the time of the act. Moreover, predictability was a 
justification for the codification of unilateral acts at the ILC.
481
 
  Applied to intention, predictability would require the certainty to know in 
advance when intention will create a legal obligation. However, a state always 
undertakes a unilateral act without knowing whether its intention is going to be 
respected when interpreted objectively. A state cannot know in advance whether its 
intention will create a legal obligation. To demonstrate this assertion one can examine 
Israel‘s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. This act was promised and the withdrawal 
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occurred. The act was never contested. Consequently, intention to withdraw was never 
determined. Israel would not have known whether its act had created a legal 
obligation.
482
 This was similar to the Nuclear Tests cases. The Court interpreted French 
statements as creating a legal obligation. Intention was the central factor in determining 
a legal unilateral act.
483
  However, France did not participate in most of the litigation. 
The ICJ did not effectively consider evidence of their intention. It was not obvious that 
France intended its statements to create a legal obligation. Additionally, Franck notes 
that Australia and New Zealand never relied on French statements. They did not 
withdraw their lawsuit. Instead, they did not treat French statements as definitive.
484
  It 
was the decision of the Court that established that France intended to create a legal 
obligation by its statements.  Until the decision was rendered, France, Australia and 
New Zealand did not know which standard of intention would be applied. This was 
assuming that they knew that such statements could create a legal obligation. Prior to 
this decision, it was not predictable that this was the case.  
 The lack of predictability of unilateral acts highlights a core problem with the 
legal authority of intention. Intention is a ―state of mind‖ and can only be determined by 
interpretation of the act. The legal nature of the act cannot be determined until intention 
is known. Intention cannot be known until there is interpretation of the act but an 
interpretation of intention can always differ from the actual intention. As a result, 
unilateral acts always violate the principle of predictability. They can never satisfy the 
principle that one should know in advance the law to which one will be held. This 
problem is evident in the Nuclear Tests cases. Prior to the Court decision, the parties did 
not know whether French statements would be considered ―legal.‖  
 This creates a doctrinal dilemma for unilateral acts (as well as for other intention 
based obligations). To paraphrase Koskenniemi, in identifying intention one is trying to 
objectively determine the subjective.
485
 As such, Koskenniemi believes ―[t]he doctrine 
of unilateral acts cannot provide the law with the kind of objectivity which is taken to 
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distinguish it from political argument.‖486 This point is taken up in the next section of 
this chapter. 
 
 
4.3 Intention and Consent or Consensus 
This section outlines the strained relationship between intention and consent and 
consensus. Intention is necessary for a unilateral obligation to create a legal obligation. 
This makes intention key to establishing unilateral acts as a ―source‖ of law within 
sources doctrine. However, intention is a state of mind, and it is not capable of 
observation. This means that on its own intention cannot provide evidence of a legal 
obligation. Consequently, in order for the Court to reach the conclusion it reached in the 
Nuclear Tests cases it had to make intention capable of objective observation. The 
Court had to determine ―the way in which another state could be expected to view 
French statements.‖487 Koskenniemi reiterates this point when he analyses the Nuclear 
Tests cases decision and observes that   
 
 
[t]he strategy in the Nuclear Tests case is to give effect to all three 
considerations: Subjective French intent, subjective reliance by Australia 
and objective justice. Each renders the same solution: France is bound. No 
preference is made. But the argument leaves unexplained how the court 
can maintain that it gives effect to French intent in face of the fact that 
France denied it. It leaves unexplained how it can protect the Applicant‘s 
reliance as they deny having relied. And it leaves unexplained its theory of 
justice, which says that certain statements bind by good faith. Moreover, 
having recourse to the three arguments is contradictory. Each of them 
makes the other two superfluous. If giving effect to French intent is what 
counts, then it must suffice as the sole criterion. Its point is to override 
other State‘s intent or objective justice. And if justice is effectual it must 
override any subjective intent or reliance. 
488
  
 
 
In the Nuclear Tests cases the Court paid lip service to intention as the key requirement 
of a unilateral act. However, it ignored the actual intention of the acting state. This 
occurred because intention is a subjective concept and intention cannot be determined 
without interpretation. Consequently, since this decision, intention is always interpreted; 
most recently at the ILC it is interpreted primarily as an expression of will that indicates 
good faith. The ILC uses the concept of will to indicate that a unilateral act must be 
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interpreted objectively and have an external manifestation. The act creates a legal 
obligation when a third party can objectively identify intention through an expression of 
will. Further, the act must be manifested in such a way that a Court could reasonably 
believe the state is now obligated by its intention in good faith. This latter requirement 
rests not only on objective indications of the will to be obligated, but also on evidence 
that other states would view the act as creating good faith obligations. To rephrase, a 
unilateral act has legal authority when there is evidence to indicate that the state 
consented to give the act legal authority. However, this alone is deemed insufficient as a 
basis for authority of unilateral acts because objective intention is found to have little 
meaning unless it was also accompanied by good faith in the act. Intention was 
interpreted by the ILC to fit within the parameters of sources doctrine. On the one hand, 
it was interpreted as manifestation of the will of the state. This connoted consent. On the 
other hand, unilateral acts were interpreted as a good faith obligation. This connoted a 
consensus of states. Intention must be interpreted in this way order to provide legal 
authority to unilateral acts. Intention itself is ―a state of mind,‖ which means that that 
cannot be ascertained without objectification, including a requirement of good faith. 
Without a requirement of good faith intention will lack the authority to create a legal 
obligation. This semantic trap led the ILC to interpret intention in a very peculiar way: 
Intention created a legal obligation when objective evidence indicates a consensus that 
the act was sufficiently predictable that the state should be obligated in good faith. 
 Consequently, the work of the ILC highlights the difficulty with identifying 
intention and fitting intention into sources doctrine. Rodriguez Cedeño favoured 
analogizing unilateral acts with treaty law. He promoted consent as the basis of 
intention.  However, Members of the ILC did not unanimously accept this analogy. 
Many Members of the ILC preferred a good faith based interpretation of intention. The 
ILC‘s Guiding Principles mediated this debate by accounting for both. As defined by 
the ILC, intention was reinterpreted so that it was given authority by both consent and 
consensus.
489
  
 Arguably, the problem with intention lay in the very nature of the concept. 
Koskenniemi notes that intention theoretically requires an examination of the subjective 
intention behind the act.
490
 This is problematic because subjective intention is internal to 
the state. As such,, it requires neither an expression of will nor a reaction to the act. It 
requires neither consent nor consensus.  Intention alone cannot provide the authority 
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required of a source of international law. Koskenniemi suggests that the law cannot 
account for both the subjective intention of the acting state and objective justice.
491
 This 
raises the problem of predictability in the law. Predictability requires that the state know 
in advance the law to which it will be held. To satisfy this requirement intention must be 
determined. Yet, intention is not known until it is determined. Intention cannot provide 
predictability.   
 Ultimately, the problem that unilateral acts pose for the doctrine of sources is that 
they rest on neither consent nor consensus. The requirement of intention is purely 
internal; it is ―a state of mind‖. As a result, it must be objectified and interpreted in 
order to provide any sort of legal authority. Consequently, intention is always redefined 
to reflect the requirements of consent and consensus. However, when intention is 
defined in this way it may not reflect the intention – the ―state of mind‖ - of the acting 
state. As a result, intention can provide predictability and authority as a source of law 
but it no longer reflects the ―state of mind‖ of the acting state, its defining feature.492  
Intention on its own cannot create a ―source‖ of law. 
 
 
5. Context: Iran and Nuclear Weapons 
 
 
The previous parts of this chapter are abstract and theoretical, and in order to provide 
context to this discussion and help clarify the meaning doctrine of intention, an example 
is instructive. The example chosen is Iran‘s effort to ―go nuclear.‖ This example is 
relevant for three reasons. First, the example of Iran‘s pursuit of nuclear weapons 
illustrates the relationship between intention and authority in international law but 
places this discussion in the context of ongoing events in international relations. Second, 
the example of Iran‘s pursuit of nuclear weapons demonstrates the problems in 
identification of intention noted above, particularly the need for objective evidence of 
both intention to act and intention to create a legal obligation. It also demonstrates the 
problem of predictability. Lastly, the example of Iran is chosen because it represents 
one of the unresolved tensions in current international relations, and the problem of 
unilateral acts may shed some additional light on this problem. To undertake this 
analysis this section of the chapter proceeds in four parts. First, a brief review of the 
facts is presented. Second, the facts are analysed for intention. Third, the facts are 
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analysed for predictability. Fourth, some concluding thoughts and analysis are 
presented. 
 
 
5.1 Facts 
In the summer of 2002, Iranian exiles report that the Government of Iran is building a 
secret infrastructure to enrich uranium.
493
 This threatens stability in the region. It is also 
violates international law; Iran is a party to the NPT.   
 In December 2002, the US media releases intelligence that confirms the existence 
of nuclear enrichment plants at Natanz and Arak.
494
 In response, Iranian President 
Khatami confirms publicly that Iran intends to pursue the ―Nuclear Fuel cycle.‖ This 
leads the IAEA, the UN body that enforces the NPT, to try to inspect these sites.
495
  
These inspections lead the IAEA to report that Iran is not complying with the NPT.
496
 
Iran then declares that it will end enrichment. However, there is no evidence to this 
effect.   
 In December of 2003, Iran signs the additional protocol to the NPT in response to 
diplomatic pressure. This is significant because the protocol allows the IAEA to 
undertake snap inspections of suspected nuclear sites.
497
 Three months later the IAEA 
urges Iran to allow inspection of its entire nuclear program.
498
 Iran blocks these 
inspections and the IAEA accuses Iran of non-cooperation.
499
  
 At this point the organizational track stalls. Hopefully, Iran then enters into 
negotiations with the ―EU 3‖, France, Britain and Germany, over its nuclear program. In 
the course of these negotiations Iran again promises to stop enrichment.
500
 In June, 
however, Iran says it will resume enrichment at the Isfahan plant.
501
 The EU 3 
determines that this is fatal to negotiations. As a result, Iran promises to stop its 
enrichment program until the EU presents it with an offer as part of negotiations.
502
 In 
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August, Iran rejects the EU 3 proposals and it starts up enrichment.
503
 The resumption 
of enrichment is confirmed by the IAEA in September.
504
 At this point a new Iranian 
President, Ahmedinijad, takes power. He continues Iran‘s bellicose rhetoric.505 
Additionally, over the next few months the Russian government tries to negotiate with 
Iran. To resolve the impasse it proposes to peacefully enrich uranium on Iran‘s 
behalf.
506
 
 Iran rejects these negotiations and publicly re-opens the Natanz facility by 
removing the UN seals.
507
  This leads the EU 3 to call off negotiations. The three 
Governments believe that Iran must be brought before the UN Security Council. Iran 
reciprocates by stating that a referral is leading it to end any contact with IAEA.
508
 In 
March 2006 the UN Security Council considers the situation. The Security Council 
gives Iran 30 days to suspend enrichment.
509
  The rhetoric then ratchets up a notch. 
President Ahmedinijad claims that Iran is successfully enriching uranium.  This is 
confirmed by the IAEA.
510
 As a result, the US, Russia, China and the EU 3 make a new 
offer to Iran to induce them to stop enrichment.
511
 They also renew their threats to 
return to the UNSC. This time sanctions are proposed in hopes of provoking an Iranian 
response to the EU 3‘s earlier offer.512 These threats are unsuccessful. However, the EU 
3 has to follow through on their threats and so a new resolution is proposed at the 
UNSC. This resolution imposes a deadline of August 31 to suspend enrichment or face 
sanctions.
513
 
 About ten days before the deadline, Iran‘s Supreme Leader, the head of the 
religious theocracy that governs over Iran in tandem with Parliament, 
514
 announces that 
―The Islamic Republic of Iran has made up its mind based on the experience of the past 
27 years to forcefully pursue its nuclear program and other issues it is faced with, and 
will rely on God…‖515  The Iranian President confirms this stance and shows no signs 
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of complying with the Security Council‘s resolution.516 The US responds to these 
statements in equally robust terms.
517
  
 On August 31, the IAEA confirms that Iran is not in compliance with the deadline 
to stop enrichment. However, instead of sanctions the UN sets a new deadline for Iran 
to stop enrichment, October.
518
 It takes until December for the UNSC to agree, 
unanimously, to new sanctions against Iran. However, these sanctions are relatively 
mild.
519
 They include a ban on sale to Iran of any material that would help them enrich 
uranium, any technical assistance or financial assistance to obtain any material that 
would help Iran enrich uranium and restrictions on 22 Iranian officials and 
organizations involved in the nuclear program, including the freezing of their foreign 
assets.
520
  This resolution has little effect. Iran states their aim to continue to enrich 
uranium. In February 2007, the IAEA confirms that Iran is still pursuing enrichment.
521
  
This leads to further sanctions and more threatening statements by Iran. For example, 
President Ahmedinejad announces that Iran is pursuing an ―industrial scale‖ enrichment 
program.
522
  
 Since 2007 not much has changed in substantive terms. In March of 2008 the 
UNSC extends ―asset restrictions‖ and ―travel bans‖ on Iranian individuals involved in 
the nuclear program and certain companies. It also prevents sale to Iran of ―dual use‖ 
products that could possibly be used either for civilian purposes or the nuclear 
program.
523
 Further, the IAEA Report of February 2009 asserts that Iran has enough 
―basic material from which to make a nuclear device.‖524 However, this material has not 
yet been enriched to a high enough grade. The report also asserts that enrichment rates 
have been slowing.
 525
  This seems to be borne out by the US National Intelligence 
Estimate which asserted that Iran has not had a nuclear weapons program since 2003. 
526
 
Countries including Israel and the UK believe this assessment is inaccurate.
527
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Simultaneously there have been renewed diplomatic efforts to end Iran‘s nuclear 
program, including a concrete offer to Iran by the EU 3, the US, China and Russia to 
start multiparty talks in exchange for ending the enrichment of uranium.
528
 
 Iran‘s pursuit of nuclear weapons is replete with unilateral acts. Iran repeatedly 
states that it will stop its nuclear program. Iran just as often states that it is resuming 
nuclear enrichment. Consequently, these statements are an excellent forum to analyse 
the requirement of intention discussed above. However, Iranian pursuit of nuclear 
weapons is more complex than the situation in the Nuclear Tests cases. The unilateral 
nature of the statements is challenged by the dialogue between the EU 3 and Iran, by the 
promise of multiparty talks, by the tension between the US and Iran and by the 
involvement of the UNSC. In spite of these other multilateral processes, Iran‘s 
statements about their nuclear programs may represent unilateral acts. This assertion is 
warranted because Iran‘s intention is the focus of the analysis of Iranian statements by 
the US, the EU 3 and the UNSC. 
 Further, it is important to note that the presence of multilateral factors does not a 
priori render this scenario multilateral. Acts can be unilateral even if they are 
recognized by several states or even the world at large. This is established in the 
Nuclear Tests cases. The confusion between multilateral and unilateral in this case 
merely reiterates a point that was raised in the context of the invasion of Iraq that 
unilateral acts refer to all acts undertaken outside the multilateral framework whether 
they involve one or many states. Moreover, in accordance with the analysis of intention 
outlined in this chapter, the focus of the analysis is on Iran‘s intention, and only 
tangentially on the recognition of these acts to the extent that they indicate an intention 
to create a legal obligation. To undertake this interpretation, the requirements of 
intention and predictability are the particular focus of this analysis. 
 
 
5.2 Intention 
According to the Nuclear Tests cases,
529
 it is Iran‘s intention to create a legal obligation 
that transforms statements on their nuclear program into unilateral acts. The requirement 
of intention is debated but not clarified in the Guiding Principles of the ILC. In the 
Guiding Principles intention is identified as will.
530
  This interpretation accords with the 
practice in the Nuclear Tests cases. In this case the ICJ is the arbiter of intention when 
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the Court adopts an objective standard of intention. This standard requires that intention 
be determined from the act itself. This decision is interpreted, most recently by the ILC, 
to assert that intention is a ―mental state‖ but is only assessed by its manifestations, 
objectively determined. This is derived from the ILC‘s use of the term ―manifestations 
of will‖. This term requires objective analysis of the act in order to determine if the act 
itself displays intent. Further, if the act provides evidence of objective intent, then the 
state is bound in good faith by its obligations. Consequently, intention is ―legalized‖ by 
objective interpretation that produces a good faith obligation. However, the Iranian 
example demonstrates that it is difficult to derive objective evidence of intent from acts 
themselves. Further, in light of this difficulty it is extremely ambiguous as to whether a 
good faith obligation can result. 
 Iran has made several statements intimating that it will stop pursuing a nuclear 
program. The objective interpretation of Iran‘s statements would indicate that Iran has 
made statements that could create a legal obligation. Further, there is evidence that 
states hearing these statements could believe that an obligation has been undertaken to 
the international community. On first glance it appears that Iran has a good faith 
obligation to end its pursuit of enriched uranium. In a prima facie analysis this example 
seems analogous to the facts of Nuclear Tests cases. However, there is one primary 
difference. In the Nuclear Tests cases France stopped nuclear testing and kept its 
promise. In the Iranian scenario this is not the case. Iran‘s stated intention and its 
actions diverge both through its continued violation of the NPT and its bellicose rhetoric 
regarding its right to pursue uranium enrichment. This makes interpretation of Iran‘s 
intentions more difficult. Which acts are more relevant, statements which create 
obligations, or statements and acts which contradict those obligations? This is not at 
issue in the Nuclear Tests cases nor is it considered in detail by the ILC. However, the 
Nuclear Tests cases do offer some guidance in this situation, as when the Court asserts 
that the objective evidence of intention should be interpreted restrictively.
531
 
Consequently, unlike in the Nuclear Tests cases there is not objective evidence of a 
manifestation of intention, so the need for consent is not met.  
 Further, even if Iranian statements manifest intention, it must be unambiguous 
that this intention was to create a legal obligation in good faith. As noted above good 
faith obligations are determined partially by Iran‘s intentions and partially by how those 
intentions are perceived in the international community. Internal assessments are 
balanced by the interpretation of an objective observer. On this standard, intention to 
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create a legal obligation is not present in Iranian statements. From the facts outlined 
above it is clear that many states do not trust the Iranian statements and they continue to 
ask for verification of Iranian compliance with their statement. This is evident from the 
fact that states pursue negotiations and sanctions at the UN in spite of the statements of 
Iranian officials. These steps make it difficult to assert that Iran intends to create legal 
obligations by its statements. Consequently, states do not believe Iran‘s statements 
create obligations in good faith. In fact the opposite is occurring. The mistrust generated 
by these statements leads to pressure for political action and sanction from the UNSC.  
Iranian statements are either evidence of a violation of international law or political so 
they do not display an intention to create a legal obligation.  
 This example also demonstrates the practical difficulties in identifying intention. 
Iran‘s ―true‖ intentions can never be known. Intention can only be identified by Iranian 
statements, Iranian acts and the assessment of those acts by the community of states.  Its 
statements and acts are contradictory and as a result the international community does 
not treat these statements as creating unilateral obligations. Thus, this example 
illustrates the difficulty of finding intention. When placed in a context of ongoing 
international relations it becomes difficult to identify both stages of analysis of 
intention, the objective ascertainment of intention and the requirement of good faith.  
This example illustrates how unlikely it is, in the context of ongoing international 
relations, to determine which acts provide objective evidence of intention. 
Consequently, the ongoing nature of Iran‘s unilateral acts appears to point to a 
restrictive assessment of these acts, and further attention to the interpretation of these 
acts by the international community. These factors make it difficult to assert an 
intention to create a legal obligation. 
 In concrete terms, this example contextualizes the difficulty in using intention as 
the basis of the obligation in unilateral acts. Iran‘s intentions are obscure. It is 
impossible for any outside observer to know what Iran hopes to achieve through its 
statements and the acts which contradict those statements. Further complicating matters, 
Iranian actions are often opposed to their stated intention which makes intention 
difficult to determine. Therefore, this example demonstrates that Iran is aware of the 
legal implications of undertaking nuclear testing. However, Iran is more interested in 
testing the ―political will‖ of the world community to stop them. Iran‘s intentions might 
be framed in legal terms, but it is probable that they do not have the intention required 
to create a unilateral obligation. This analysis highlights the difficulty of establishing 
legal authority based on intention. Iran‘s intentions can only be identified through its 
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acts. The requirement is not what Iran believes its intention to be, but whether that 
intention is expressed in the act or whether there is evidence of good faith in the act. In 
this case the acts are unclear and so good faith is questioned. This may explain why 
states have not relied on Iranian statements as an expression of intent. 
  
 
5.3 Predictability 
Iranian leaders make statements that might be explained by the requirement of intention. 
These statements are apparently similar to French statements in the Nuclear Tests cases. 
However, these statements are not truly unilateral. Several of these statements are made 
in response to the IAEA‘s investigation of Iran‘s nuclear program. Thus, these 
statements are made in the context of negotiation of the terms under which it will 
continue enrichment with the wider international community. This demonstrates the 
difficulty in de-contextualizing any individual statement made by Iran. Lastly, the 
statements of the Iranian leadership, such as the statement of the Supreme Leader that 
Iran will continue its enrichment, cannot be separated from the political threat of 
sanctions. Nor can statements following the imposition of UN sanctions be separated 
from the need of the Iranian government to reassure its domestic constituency. Thus, 
Iranian statements may appear unilateral but they are not without context.  
 The complex context of the Iranian statements creates a unique problem for the 
predictability of the law. States are not placing good faith in Iran‘s statements. States are 
not attempting to enforce these obligations against Iran. As a result, the legal nature of 
these acts is never determined. Therefore, this scenario demonstrates that without an 
objective determination of good faith the legality of a unilateral act is never known. 
This is problematic because in theory the act creates a legal obligation for the state 
when it is made, and Iran‘s statements illustrate that the reality is different. Until a state 
believes it has relied on the statements, a state‘s intention to create a legal obligation is 
not assessed. As a result, the Court undertakes an assessment of good faith. The Court 
interprets the will of the actor by examining the facts of the case. This demonstrates two 
things. First, there is an interplay between the reaction of other states and will in 
assessment of intention. This corresponds to the opposed parameters of consent and 
consensus in the sources of international law. Second, without interaction with another 
state the obligation of a unilateral act is always indeterminate. Therefore, there is no 
predictability to the act prior to adjudication. This leads to the conclusion that Iran will 
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not be able to predict in advance whether their unilateral statements will create legal 
obligations. 
  
 
5.4 Analysis  
The example of Iran‘s pursuit of nuclear weapons demonstrates two key difficulties in 
applying the requirement of intention in context. First, intention requires an objective 
determination as to whether the act in question manifests the will of the state. However, 
as the Iranian example illustrates, it is rare that such acts are unambiguous – in the sense 
of not being contradicted by other acts or statements – to the extent that intention will be 
present. Therefore this example contextualizes a problem that was alluded to above in 
regard of the Nuclear Tests cases: if France‘s statements manifested its intention, why 
did Australia and New Zealand institute their claim? Further, this demonstrates how rare 
it is that an action will reveal clear evidence of intention, which in turn means that  a 
restrictive interpretation of the act is called for. This implies that objective indications of 
intention will rarely be found. This leads directly to the second difficulty with applying 
intention in context, which is that in order for an individual act to display objective 
indications of intention other states must believe that the intention to create an 
obligation is present. This is the case in the example above. Even if individual Iranian 
statements display intent (and this is by no means clear), it is difficult to assert a good 
faith obligation in the face of the fact that the international community does not take 
Iranian statements as evidence of intention. 
 Consequently, this example presents two conclusions about intention as the source 
of a legal authority: First, objective intention, which is analogous to consent in sources 
doctrine, is rarely unambiguous in context. Second, the fact that objective evidence of 
intention is often ambiguous in context makes it less likely that a consensus will emerge 
in the international community that a good faith obligation has been created by a 
unilateral act.  This analysis is important because it adds context to the analysis 
presented above and complexity to the conclusions to this chapter presented below. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter examines one aspect of the question ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ 
Specifically it focuses on the question ―can unilateral acts be explained by the doctrine 
of sources?‖ After outlining this research question, this chapter then provides an 
overview of the doctrine of sources and establishes that the doctrine of sources mediates 
debates over whether the authority of international law is derived primarily from 
consent or consensus.   
Following on this analysis this chapter proceeds to examine the requirement of a 
unilateral act that establishes the legal authority of a unilateral act, the requirement of 
intention. Intention provides the authority of a unilateral act and so it is the ―source‖ of 
the unilateral act‘s legal obligation. It performs the function of sources doctrine for a 
unilateral act. Further, this analysis reveals that intention is a ―state of mind.‖ As a 
result, in order to assess intention it must be interpreted objectively. This is reflected in 
the most recent formulations of intention in the work of the ILC. The ILC terms this 
objective interpretation the ―will of the state.‖ Moreover, the work of the ILC, as 
supported by the case law, demonstrates that ascertaining this objective interpretation 
requires that a third party is able to find in the act evidence that the state intended to act 
in the manner it did. This conflation of the ―mental state‖ of the actor with the act itself 
is deemed to furnish the evidence that the state acted with intent. This is equivalent to 
consent in sources doctrine as the unilateral act provides evidence of consent to the 
obligation contained in that act.  
However, the will of the state is supplemented in the Guiding Principles of the 
ILC by a further requirement, good faith. This requirement is introduced to resolve a 
doctrinal problem that results from the objectification of intention: if an act is deemed to 
provide objective evidence of intention, then how can the objective observer separate 
the evidence of the intention to perform the act from the evidence that the act intends to 
create a legal obligation? An act may indicate an intention to perform an action without 
unambiguously providing evidence of intention to create a legal obligation. 
Consequently, the ILC adds the requirement of good faith. Good faith requires that there 
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is not only objective evidence of an intention to act, but also that there is objective 
evidence that other states believe that that act creates an obligation. This incorporates an 
element of consensus within the international community.  To summarize: the ILC 
interprets intention so that it incorporates both consent and consensus so that intention 
―fits‖ within sources doctrine. However, as was demonstrated in this section of the 
chapter, neither manifestations of intention, ―will‖, nor ―good faith‖ truly represent 
state‘s intentions. Intention is a state of mind. However, objective interpretations of the 
will of the state can mean that a state is bound by the interpretation of the act regardless 
of their state of mind. Moreover, ―good faith‖ means that a state can be obligated by an 
act because the third party hears evidence that a consensus of states believed the act 
manifested intent. Therefore, it is only through reinterpretation as ―will‖ and ―good 
faith‖ that intention can provide legal authority for a unilateral act. Intention does not fit 
naturally in the doctrine of sources; a state of mind cannot provide authority for a legal 
act.  
In addition to the doctrinal analysis above, the problem of intention is placed in 
the context of Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons. This contextualization reveals that 
intention is extremely ambiguous as a source of authority for a legal obligation.  As 
noted above, the analysis of the example of Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons leads to 
two conclusions: First, objective intention, which is analogous to consent in sources 
doctrine, is rarely unambiguous in context. Second, the fact that objective evidence of 
intention is often ambiguous in context makes it less likely that a consensus will emerge 
in the international community that a good faith obligation has been created by a 
unilateral act.  These conclusions are important, because even if intention can be 
interpreted to provide theoretical authority for a legal obligation, it is extremely difficult 
to apply these criteria in practice.   
 This chapter asks ―can unilateral acts be explained by the doctrine of sources?‖ 
Ultimately, the problem that unilateral acts pose for the doctrine of sources is that they 
rest on neither consent nor consensus. The requirement of intention is purely internal; it 
is ―a state of mind‖. As a result, it must be objectified and interpreted in order to 
provide any sort of legal authority. Consequently, intention is always redefined to 
reflect the requirements of consent and consensus. However, when intention is defined 
in this way it may not reflect the intention – the ―state of mind‖ - of the acting state. 
Intention can provide predictability and authority as a source of law at the expense of 
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the ―state of mind‖ of the acting state, its defining feature.532  Intention on its own 
cannot create a ―source‖ of law. Further, even when it is interpreted to meet the 
requirements of the doctrine of sources, the example of Iranian pursuit of nuclear 
weapons demonstrates that intention is extremely difficult to apply in practice. The 
doctrinal difficulty posed by intention, together with the difficulty in applying intention 
in practice, helps explain the gap between the assertion that a unilateral act is legal and 
the ability to identify its legal obligation in practice.  
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Chapter 5: Substance 
1. Introduction  
 
 
This chapter continues the substantive analysis of the research question ―are unilateral 
acts legal?‖ Specifically, this chapter focuses on one aspect of ―legality‖ defined in 
chapter 3, the doctrine of substance. It asks the question: ―can unilateral acts be 
explained by the doctrine of substance?‖ To answer this question this chapter provides 
an overview of the research question, it outlines the substance of international law and 
the requirement of a unilateral act that provides the ―substance‖ of a unilateral act, 
autonomy. This chapter then compares the requirements of autonomy to the doctrine of 
substance in order to reach conclusions about the ―legality‖ of the substance of 
unilateral acts. Consequently, this chapter examines the substance of international law; 
discusses the requirement of a unilateral act that is the basis of a unilateral act‘s 
substance, autonomy; and compares the two doctrines in order to establish whether 
unilateral acts can be explained by the doctrine of substance. Following on this analysis 
some context for this discussion will be provided through the example of the San Juan 
River dispute and conclusions will be drawn. 
 
 
2. The Research Question 
 
 
This chapter examines one aspect of the question ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ 
Specifically it focuses on the question ―can unilateral acts be explained by the doctrine 
of substance?‖ To explain why this question is necessary to a doctrinal analysis of 
unilateral acts, a brief summary is necessary. As noted in the introductory chapter, 
answering the question ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ requires answering two subsidiary 
questions: ―what are unilateral acts?‖ And ―what is legality?‖  Chapter 2 establishes that 
unilateral acts are defined by three core requirements that separate these type of 
obligations from other legal obligations: intention, autonomy and revocability. Chapter 
3 establishes a method of assessing legality derived from a narrow critical legal studies 
method – a doctrinal analysis of unilateral acts based on the structure of international 
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law. This method clarifies that the doctrinal structure of unilateral acts is derived from 
three primary, interlinked doctrines: sources, substance and process. Consequently, in 
order to be considered ―legal‖ a concept must be explained by the doctrinal structure of 
international law. Applied to unilateral acts, this method explains that in order to be 
considered substantively ―legal,‖ unilateral acts must be defined by the doctrine of 
substance.  
This chapter continues the doctrinal analysis of the legality of unilateral acts 
started in the previous chapter. It focuses on one doctrine of international law, substance 
doctrine, and the requirement of a unilateral act that provides the doctrinal ―substance‖ 
of a unilateral act, autonomy. This analysis is necessary because comparing the 
requirement of autonomy to substance doctrine determines whether unilateral acts can 
be considered, substantively, international law. This leads to the question that guides 
this chapter: Can unilateral acts be explained by the doctrine of substance? If unilateral 
acts cannot be explained by sources doctrine, their place in the structure of international 
law is doctrinally weak, which leads to questions about the legality of obligations 
created by unilateral acts. 
 
 
3. The Substance of International Law 
 
 
Substance is defined as ―the subject matter of a text or work of art.‖533 Applied to the 
doctrine of law, substance refers to the method of determining the proper subject matter 
of a legal ―text.‖ A text can be defined as the ―a source of information or authority.‖534 
The ―texts‖ of international law are the written documents, oral declarations and actions 
from which the sources of international law are determined. Further, the doctrine 
substance mediates debates over which texts ought to have legal authority. Mediation of 
this debate is necessary because the substance of international law is not predetermined; 
it is reflective of concerns of states. Further, these concerns often conflict as states wish 
to pursue their own self-interest. States who pursue their own self interest are asserting 
their right to individualism in the substance of international law. However, whenever 
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these conflicting interests of states occur, there is a competing drive within international 
law to try to bind states (often against their own self-interest) to collective interests of 
all states. Laws that bind all states in the collective interest are designed to mediate 
conflicts between individual interests and a competing vision of international law, one 
that is altruistic in substance. The substance of international law is considered ―legal‖ 
when it is able to mediate the drive for individualism with a need for altruism; if the 
doctrine is not able to achieve this balance, the substance of law is of dubious legality. 
As a result, individualism and altruism shape the doctrine of substance.  
 The doctrine of substance in unilateral acts is established by the requirement of 
autonomy. Autonomy requires that a unilateral act is not performed in exchange for a 
response by another state or a quid pro quo. The requirement of autonomy does not 
predetermine the substance of a unilateral act; any ―subject matter‖ can result in a 
unilateral obligation; however, in order to be considered legal, the act must meet the 
requirement of autonomy, as this requirement explains when a unilateral ―text‖ is legal. 
This chapter examines whether autonomy can meet the requirements of the doctrine of 
substance, individualism and altruism. It first examines the doctrine of substance, it then 
explores the substance of unilateral acts, and finally, it assesses whether ―autonomy,‖ 
the substance of a unilateral act, can be explained by the doctrine of substance. 
However, it is necessary first to clarify further what is meant by the doctrine of 
substance. 
 The doctrine of substance establishes which texts become laws. The parameters of 
this doctrine are established by the relationship between individual states and the 
collective interest.  International law organizes relationships in international relations 
through the substance it regulates. However, the substance of international law is not 
predetermined and its potential applications are unspecified. Therefore, the doctrine of 
substance identifies the conditions in which a specific law is obligatory. States accept 
substance as legal when it is in their interest to bind themselves to that specific law. An 
example of this is a treaty. States willingly enter into treaties on a wide range of 
substances, and treaties are primarily individualistic in substance. Alternatively, states 
also accept substance as legal when states identify a collective interest in the obligation. 
An example of this substantive obligation is custom. Custom is derived from collective 
of state practice and  belief in the legality of the act; it binds all states that do not protest 
the formation of the custom. Consequently, custom creates a legal obligation regardless 
of an individual state‘s interest. Custom is primarily an altruistic obligation. The 
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substance of law must manifest both individualistic and altruistic considerations. These 
considerations determine whether substance is ―legal.‖ 
 Further, the doctrine of substance is concerned with establishing the conditions in 
which states should, do or ought to accept a text as legal. Consequently, the doctrine of 
substance is related to the question of when states treat a text as legal which, in turn, 
determines when they comply with international law. This is often termed the 
―compliance problem,‖ as it explains the paradox of why states obey or comply with 
international law when there is little enforcement of the law.  As is evident the 
―compliance problem‖ is intimately concerned with the conditions in which states 
consider a law obligatory. As Koh notes ―[l]ike most laws, international rules are rarely 
enforced, but usually obeyed.‖535 Therefore, the ―compliance problem‖ can provide a 
starting point for an examination of the doctrine of substance. 
 The ―compliance problem‖ is a recent interpretation of the older question of 
obedience to law. Writing on compliance incorporates interdisciplinary insights drawn 
from international relations. The incorporation of international relations approaches into 
the doctrine has not altered the doctrine‘s core debates which emerged in older 
explanations of obedience. It is merely a semantic shift. The core debate the doctrine of 
substance mediates is still whether the substance of a law is primarily individualistic or 
altruistic. This chapter refers to both obedience and compliance depending on the time 
period under discussion. As a result, examination of the ―compliance problem‖ provides 
the link between the question of obedience/compliance and the doctrine of substance. 
States ―obey‖ international law for individualistic or altruistic reasons. Consequently, 
explanations of obedience describe the conditions in which a text is considered ―legal.‖  
 Individualism and altruism are at the centre of the debate that shapes the doctrine 
of substance; these concepts identify the conditions in which a text is considered legal. 
For example, Kennedy identifies in private law a ―substantive dichotomy of 
individualism and altruism. These are two opposed debates about the content of private 
law rules.‖536 As has been seen, these oppositions also apply to the conditions in which 
a state considers international law obligatory. Consequently, Kennedy‘s definitions of 
individualism and altruism also apply to the doctrine of substance in international law. 
Kennedy notes ―[t]he essence of individualism is the making of sharp distinctions 
between one‘s interests and those of others, combined with a belief that a preference for 
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conduct for one‘s own interests is legitimate….‖537 Individualism indicates a preference 
for private interests. Kennedy argues that individualism is dominant in the doctrine of 
private law. However, there is an opposed view of substance that is ―altruistic‖ 
representing sharing and sacrifice. These are communitarian notions
538
 As altruism 
requires placing the collective interest first. Further, these definitions of substance also 
apply to international law. States obey international law when it is in their interest to do 
so or when it reflects the collective interests of states, but these interests may conflict. 
Therefore, individualism and altruism explain the conditions in which a state accepts a 
text as legal. The doctrinal debate considers which of these two conditions should be 
primary in the substance of law. Consequently, the remainder of this section explores 
how the doctrine of substance mediates between substantive individualism and 
substantive altruism.  
 
3.1 Obedience/Compliance with International Law 
In international law debates over the primary condition for a text to be binding, 
arguments over the substance of law, are defined by debates over obedience to law. 
Initially obedience to international law is justified by classical natural law and then by 
positive law arguments. These approaches will be examined in order to further explore 
the structure of the doctrine of substance. 
 
3.1.1 ―Classical‖ Approaches to Obligation 
Natural law can be traced to ancient Greece and Rome,
539
 and is reintroduced to 
Western philosophy through medieval Christian theology.
540
 Natural law approaches all 
argue that there is a higher objective to law. Law cannot violate natural laws. Shen 
explains,  
 
 
 
Naturalism and its variations, in numerous ramifications, began with the 
assumption that according to its nature, the law is a super-sensibly valid 
order and must therefore also, in the last instance derive its validity from a 
                                                 
537
 Kennedy, ―Form and Substance‖ (n 84) at p 1713. 
538
 Kennedy ―Form and Substance‖ (n 84) at p 1717. 
539
 For example the different views of Aristotle and Cicero; Referred to in AP Rubin, Ethics and Authority 
in International Law (CUP, Cambridge 1997) at pp 7, 9. 
540
 Most prominently by St Thomas Aquinas; see a brief discussion by Rubin, Ethics (n 539) at p 16. 
139  Betina Kuzmarov 
super-sensual source. This super-sensual source has been sought in, for 
example, the will of God, pure reason inherent in man, the idea of justice 
and social solidarity. According to naturalists, the individual has some 
rights which can be deduced directly from nature in general, and, in 
particular, from nature as created by God. The nature from which these 
rights are deduced is mostly considered to be man himself in particular his 
reason.
541
 
 
 
Natural law asserts that the source of a legal obligation is determined by the laws of 
nature. The laws of nature are derived from forces outside human knowledge, although 
these laws are identified through human reason. The extra-human nature of natural law 
is confirmed by Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica. ―The natural law is 
promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by 
him naturally.‖542 Natural law is moral law. Further, this moral law is eternal and 
immutable.  
 The relationship between law‘s origin outside of human knowledge and law‘s 
obligation means that natural law is primarily, although not exclusively, altruistic in 
substance. To explain, in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius writes: ―Natural right is the 
dictate of right reason, shewing the moral turpitude, or moral necessity, of any act from 
its agreement or disagreement with a rational nature, and consequently that such an act 
is either forbidden or commanded by God, the author of nature.‖543 To Grotius right 
reason is equivalent to the command of God. These commands are obligatory because 
of their moral imperative. Grotius does not question the substance of these laws. He 
assumes that natural law applies eternally and immutably. Consequently, natural law is 
equivalent to collective ―morality.‖ This implies altruism, a preference for the collective 
interest. However, natural law also contains elements of individualism as natural law is 
revealed by God to ―man.‖ Collective morality is applied through individual natural 
rights. This is an individualistic explanation of obedience. Natural law is primarily 
altruistic but can be seen as a product of both individualistic and altruistic interests. 
 Classical natural law approaches pose two problems for the doctrine of substance. 
First, natural law approaches establish a predetermined substance to international law. 
Second, natural law approaches assert a moral basis to this substance. Eventually natural 
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law‘s insistence on law‘s predetermined and moral nature becomes the subject of 
criticism. The gist of these criticisms is summarized by Kelsen,
544
 Who notes that 
natural law presupposes a value to certain moral goods. Kelsen argues that this is not 
possible unless one accepts a religious basis to law. This confuses what law is with what 
it ought to be.
545
  Kelsen‘s criticisms are typical of positivism, a response to natural law 
approaches. Classical positivists argue that the law is the command of a sovereign. As 
Austin writes, ―[e]very positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called is set by 
a sovereign person or a sovereign body of persons to a member or members of the 
independent political society wherein that person or body is sovereign or supreme.‖ 546 
The sovereign is the supreme authority in political society. Its law is obeyed out of a 
fear of sanction not because of a perceived moral obligation to obey.
547
 This doctrine is 
difficult to apply in international law. There is no international sovereign. There is 
rarely formal sanction for violations of international law. Thus, many classical 
positivists deny that international law is law "properly so called." 
548
   
 Austinian positivism cannot explain the substance of international law because it 
cannot explain why states feel bound by international obligations. Consequently, 
scholars have to adapt ―classical positivism‖ to international law. As a starting point for 
their analysis positivists assume that states form a community of sovereign equals. 
Sovereign equals are not bound by the will of another sovereign. States are sovereign 
within their own domain as states form the legitimate authority in a territory. As 
legitimate authorities, states have the right to consent to obligations on behalf of their 
populations. Through this consent international law becomes binding, as it manifests the 
will of the state. As a result, the substance of international law is not predetermined but 
it is individualistic.  
 Bentham is one of the first scholars to carve out a niche for positivism in 
international law. Koh notes, ―By breaking the normative link between the international 
and domestic legal systems, Bentham helps initiate the era of dualistic theory, in which 
the bases for compliance in domestic and international law expressly diverged.‖549  
Bentham writes: 
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The end of the conduct which a sovereign ought to observe relative to his 
own subjects, - the end of the internal laws of a society, - ought to be the 
greatest happiness of the society concerned. This is the end which 
individuals will unite in approving, if they approve of any. It is the straight 
line - the shortest line - the most natural of all those by which it is possible 
for a sovereign to direct his course. The end of the conduct he ought to 
observe towards other men, what ought it to be, judging by the same 
principle? Shall it again be said, the greatest happiness of his own 
subjects? Upon this footing, the welfare, the demands of other men, will be 
as nothing in his eyes: with regard to them, he will have no other object 
than that of subjecting them to his wishes by all manner of means.
550
 
  
 
Bentham argues that the obligation of the sovereign, the ultimate authority, is to act for 
the greatest good for the greatest number of its subjects. This implies that the sovereign 
can treat individuals outside its state poorly, provided this aids the welfare of 
individuals within its state. This leads to conflict between sovereigns. Consequently, 
Bentham argues that sovereign equals are bound by the common utility of all nations.
551
 
The common utility means that states obey international law for the greater good of the 
greatest number of nations.
552
 States obey international law because it is in their 
collective interest to do so. This is an altruistic explanation of obedience.  
 Importantly, Bentham‘s approach grants states legal personality. Critics of 
Bentham argue that granting the state legal personality is problematic. The state‘s 
artificial legal status ensures that it can impose obligations on individuals within its state 
without their consent. To respond to this criticism Hegel and Treipel assert the doctrine 
of the will of the state. This doctrine views the state as the embodiment of the will of all 
individuals within the command of the sovereign. As the embodiment of this collective 
will the state is ―sovereign‖ and ―supreme‖ and needs no sovereign over it.553 Similarly, 
Jellinek defines sovereignty as "…the quality of the state by virtue of which it can only 
be legally bound by its own will.‖554 The state‘s sovereignty comes from its authority to 
limit itself. However, this limitation is necessary because of the presence of a collective 
of states. Hegel argues that "the individual belonged to the State because the State 
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contained the wills of all citizens and these wills were transformed into the higher level 
of the State."
555
 Hegel writes,  
 
 
Internal sovereignty is this ideality in so far as the elements 
of spirit, and of the state as the embodiment of spirit, are unfolded in 
their necessity, and subsist as organs of the state. But spirit, involving a 
reference to itself, which is negative and infinitely free, becomes an 
independent existence, which has incorporated the subsistent differences, 
and hence is exclusive. So constituted, the state has an individuality, which 
exists essentially as an individual, and in the sovereign is a real, direct 
individual.
556
 
 
 
Other scholars emphasize that will is the primary form for the state to "express" its 
will.
557
 These approaches stress the individual interest of the state to obey the law. As 
such, classical positivists have radically individualistic visions of the substance of 
international law. 
 Additionally, the doctrine of will is self-limiting. For example, Jellinek argues that 
―[t]he state can release itself of any self-imposed restraint, but only in legal forms and in 
creating new limitations. The restraint, but not the particular limitation, is permanent.‖ 
558
 In this view the principle pacta sunt servanda is an offshoot of the consent of states 
to be bound by international law and international law is obeyed because it reflects the 
individual wills of states. Further, these scholars hold that the natural law principle of 
pacta sunt servanda forms the "basic norm of the whole legal system we call 
international law."
559
  As a result, states are only bound by their consent 
560
 and states 
have the ability to consent to treaties or tacitly consent to customary international law. 
This again indicates a preference for an individualistic doctrine of substance. 
 Individualistic approaches that rely solely on consent-based explanations of 
obedience are often criticized. Guzman notes, 
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The consent-based theories are flawed because they confuse a (possibly) 
necessary condition for states to be bound with a sufficient condition, in 
other words, the consent based theory only observes that states are not 
bound to international agreements unless they consent to them. This initial 
presumption, even if assumed to be correct does not lead to the conclusion 
that is consent enough to bind a state, consent, by itself does not provide 
states with an incentive to obey the law.
561
 
 
 
It seems that positivists cannot escape Bentham‘s dilemma, as obedience cannot be 
explained by individualism alone.  
 Consequently, Bentham‘s approach provokes several additional responses. One 
response is the liberal cosmopolitan explanation of obedience. Cosmopolitans believe 
law is obligating because ubi societas, ibi jus: where there is a society, there is law. The 
relations between states create law. This view is espoused by natural law scholars such 
as Von Wolff 
562
 and is famously related to Kant.  To Von Wolff international law is 
voluntary law,
563
 whereas Kant espouses a voluntary community of states created by 
sovereign equals. Kant writes 
 
 
Each of them [States], may and should for the sake of its own security 
demand that the others enter with it into a constitution similar to the civil 
constitution, for under such a constitution each can be secure in his right. 
This would be a league of nations, but it would not have to be a state 
consisting of nations. That would be contradictory, since a state implies 
the relation of a superior (legislating) to an inferior (obeying), i.e., the 
people, and many nations in one state would then constitute only one 
nation. This contradicts the presupposition, for here we have to weigh the 
rights of nations against each other so far as they are distinct states and not 
amalgamated into one.
564
 
 
 
Similarly, Brierly explains the obligatory force of international law in the following 
cosmopolitan terms: ―In international law the cause of obedience is present on the 
surface. In both the cause is simply the force of opinion, the conviction of the majority 
of individuals in the state and in the international field, the conviction of all states, that 
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obedience to the law is not a matter for individual choice but is obligatory.‖565  In this 
approach, states must interact. This interaction then impels states to create rules for this 
interaction, law. This, in turn, requires that states create to a community of law in which 
the substance of law is determined by states‘ collective interest in stability. Therefore, 
interaction of collective interests creates an altruistic community of law, and obedience 
to law is explained by both individualism and altruism. 
 In conclusion, ―classical‖ approaches explain obedience in domestic legal systems 
and so they are applied imperfectly to the international sphere. Further, each approach is 
best explained by either individualism or altruism, which also explains the unresolved 
debate over the binding authority of each approach. The classical approaches assert that 
there is an obligation to obey one's covenants. Positivists draw an analogy between the 
state and the individual. They favour individualistic explanations of obedience. 
However, individualism is balanced by a need for cooperation with other states. Hence, 
individualism is balanced by altruism. On the other hand, in natural law obedience 
results from moral imperatives. Natural law favours altruism. Lastly, cosmopolitan 
approaches are explained by both individualistic and altruistic parameters of the 
substance of international law. Therefore, the classical explanations of obedience reduce 
the doctrine of substance to explanations of law‘s obligatory nature; and obedience is 
justified by either the individual will of the state or the collective morality of states. The 
ongoing debate between these explanations of obedience establishes the parameters of 
the doctrine of substance until today.  However, the weaknesses in each approach create 
debate over the explanation of obedience in international law. 
 
 
3.1.2 ―Modern‖ Approaches to Obligation 
Koh observes that in the 20
th
 century the classical approaches are refined into four main 
explanations of obedience in international law.
566
 These approaches are termed here 
―modern‖ approaches to obligation. They are defined by their derivation from ―classical 
obligations‖ and their response to developments in 20th century international relations. 
To explain further: the first approach is the ―realist‖ approach. Realism argues that 
international law is not really law because it lacks the ability to command obedience. 
States obey international law only when the law reflects the state‘s rational self 
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interest.
567
 There is no collective interest in international law. As Morgenthau, a leading 
realist writes: 
 
 
 
If an event in the physical world contradicts all scientific forecasts, and 
thus challenges the assumptions on which the forecasts have been based, it 
is the natural reaction of scientific inquiry to reexamine the foundations of 
the specific science and attempt to reconcile scientific findings and 
empirical facts. The social sciences do not react in the same way. They 
have an inveterate tendency to stick to their assumptions and to suffer 
constant defeat from experience rather than to change their assumptions in 
light of contradicting facts. This resistance to change in uppermost in the 
history of international law. All the schemes and devices by which great 
humanitarians and shrewd politicians endeavored to reorganize the 
relations between States on the basis of law have not withstood the trials of 
history.
568
 
 
 
The second ―modern‖ approach is an adaptation of Bentham‘s utilitarian/contractarian 
approach.
569
  Utilitarianism asserts that the rational self interest of states requires rules 
to guide their relations. According to this approach states obey international law 
because it is in their interest to create stability and promote cooperation. For an example 
of this view, Henkin describes international law as ―the law of the international political 
system of States interacting, having relations.‖570 The third approach is liberal 
cosmopolitan in nature, an adaptation of the classical approach seen above.  In this 
approach, states obey international law because it is just to do so. After World War II 
Kantian cosmopolitanism flourishes because ―…democratically organized states do not 
wage war against one another, and that democracy is spreading throughout the world as 
the basis of legitimate government.‖571 The final ―modern‖ explanation of compliance is 
the ―process school,‖ also seen in chapter 3.  The process school asserts that states obey 
the law because it is a self-justifying process.
572
 Lasswell and McDougal explain,  
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The primary concern of the scholar must be, as we have indicated, for 
enlightenment about the aggregate interrelationships of authoritative 
decision and other aspects of community process, while the authoritative 
decision maker and others may be more interested in power, in the making 
of effective choices in conformity with the public order.
573
  
 
 
 
 
As a result, the doctrine of substance is diffuse in the 20
th
 century. However, the main 
outline of the doctrine of substance remains static, as scholars continue many of the 
debates that structured ―classical‖ explanations of obedience.  Therefore, the core of the 
doctrine remains the same. The doctrine of substance still explains obedience in terms 
of either individualism or altruism. 
 ―Modern‖ approaches reframe the classic question of obedience as a question of 
compliance. It is beyond the scope of the current discussion to delve into the reasons for 
this shift. What is known is that in the 20
th
 century scholars explain compliance in two 
ways. They relate compliance to idealism and realism. The four approaches noted above 
– Realism, Utilitarianism, Cosmopolitanism and Process Approaches – are fit into this 
binary conceptual framework. Realism explains compliance as ―rule based‖ and 
idealism explains compliance as process based. For example, positivism is an example 
of realism and process based approaches are representative of idealism.
574
 The shift in 
focus from natural law and positivism to idealism and realism mirrors the shift in 
terminology from obedience to compliance. This shift allows substance doctrine to 
reach outside itself and begin to incorporate interdisciplinary approaches to compliance. 
Recent examinations of substance draw heavily on these interdisciplinary approaches to 
the ―compliance problem.‖ 
 
 
3.1.3 Recent Approaches to Compliance with International Law  
Kingsbury asserts that  
 
 
the concept of "compliance with law does not have, and cannot have any 
shared meaning, except as a function of prior theories of nature and 
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operation of the law to which it pertains." Compliance is, thus, not a 
freestanding concept, "compliance" must depend on a stipulated or shared 
theory of law.
575
 
 
 
 
Recently, in an attempt to overcome the lack of shared meaning about substance, 
doctrine has focused heavily on interdisciplinary explanations of compliance.
576
 
However, this focus on interdisciplinarity does not fundamentally change the debates 
that shaped the ―modern‖ doctrine. During the cold war, doctrine split into rule-based 
and process-based approaches to compliance. Recent doctrine further expands these 
approaches by joining them to interdisciplinary explanations of compliance. These 
approaches still maintain the rule based/process based distinction. However, as 
Kingsbury notes, recent explanations of compliance further subdivide the doctrine of 
substance. Substance further divides into rational actor versus other approaches, and 
directive versus non-directive approaches.
577
 Rational actor approaches explain that 
states comply with the substance of law because it is economically rational. Contrasting 
non-rational actor approaches argue that states comply with the substance of law for a 
variety of reasons. They may comply because the law is law, out of habit, because it 
enriches their self image or out of a wish to ―do good.‖578  Substance doctrine then 
further divides into directive and non-directive approaches. Directive approaches 
explain that states adhere to law when it is oriented towards a specific goal. Non-
directive doctrines argue that states adhere to a law when it is considered just.
579
 
Combining these approaches creates eight possible explanations of compliance. These 
approaches structure the range of the recent doctrinal debates over compliance. To be 
clear, these approaches are based on the combination of the rule-based/process-based 
explanation of compliance, the rational actor/non-rational actor explanation of 
compliance and the directive/non-directive explanation of compliance. For example, an 
approach may provide a rule based, rational actor, directive explanation of compliance. 
This section identifies the doctrinal school or the individual scholar that most closely 
approximates each category, and examines how each approach to compliance is 
explained by the parameters of substance identified in the classic and modern doctrine. 
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3.1.3.1 Rule Based-Rational Actor-Directive Approaches
580
 
This category corresponds with neo-realist explanations of compliance.
581
 The most 
prominent neo-realist is Waltz, who builds on the work of realists such as 
Morgenthau.
582
 As Waltz explains, ―[n]eorealism contends that international politics can 
only be understood if the effects of structure are added to the unit-level explanations of 
realism.‖583 In this view, states are the primary units of international politics. However, 
the structure of the international system also influences compliance. States form the 
international system and the system responds to the powers in place at any given time so 
that the system itself may ―constrain‖ state behaviour.584 Guzman explains that, 
 
 
Neorealist theory, an outgrowth of classical realism, treats states as unitary 
actors and as the relevant unit in international relations. According to 
neorealist theory, international cooperation will exist with respect to a 
particular issue only when it is in the interest of affected states. Neorealists 
posit that states primarily seek power and security and international 
relations are driven primarily by power. 
Some scholars conclude that international law has little or no independent 
impact on the behavior of states. By this view, compliance with 
international law is explained by coincidence between international law - 
whose content anyway is said to be controlled by powerful states - and the 
self-interest of nations. International law is simply an epiphenomenon.
585
 
 
 
Neo-realists maintain that international law has no obligatory force independent of the 
interests of powerful states. The substance of international law is derived directly from 
individual state interests. Consequently, states are rational actors. Further, neorealists 
believe law is directive as the system reflects the interests of powerful states and these 
states set the goals for the international system. Therefore, the neorealist approach is an 
example of a rule-based, rational actor, directive approach. Additionally, the neorealist 
belief that compliance depends on state interests and power indicates an individualistic 
explanation of compliance. 
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3.1.3.2 Process-Based -Rational Actor-Directive Approaches 
Rationalist or institutionalist explanations of compliance "…emphasize the structure of 
interests, actors, power and incentives at play in particular issue."
586
 Keohane, a 
prominent proponent of this approach, explains that  
 
 
[i]t emphasizes international regimes and formal international 
organization. Since this research program is rooted in exchange theory it 
assumes scarcity and competition as well as rationality on the part of the 
actors. It therefore begins from the premise that if there were no potential 
gains from agreements to be captured in world politics – that is, if no 
agreements could be mutually beneficial – there would be no need for 
specific institutions.
587
  
 
 
For rationalists/institutionalists, institutions factor into the cost benefit analysis that 
states undertake to determine compliance, 
588
 so that compliance is likely when states 
calculate that the costs of participating in an institution are low compared to the benefits 
of cooperation.
589
  Rationalists also believe that states are the primary actors in 
international law.
590
 Guzman explains that, 
 
 
…institutionalists believe that international cooperation is possible and 
that international institutions can play a role in facilitating that 
cooperation. Specifically, institutionalists argue that institutions can reduce 
the verification costs in international affairs, reduce the costs of punishing 
cheaters, and increase the repeated nature of interaction all of which make 
cooperation more likely.
591
  
 
 
Guzman notes that game theory helps predict the effect of institutions and rules on state 
behaviour. As Kingsbury observes, 
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[t]he effect of legal rules on behaviour, like the effect of institutions is 
analyzed in functional terms. Rules and institutions help stabilize 
expectations, reduce the transaction costs of bargaining, raise the price of 
defection by lengthening the shadow of the future, increase the available 
information. Facilitation provides monitoring, settled disputes increased 
audience costs of commitment, connect perfomance across different 
issues, increase reputational costs and benefits relating to conformity of 
behavior with rules.
592
 
 
 
To rationalists/institutionalists, interests of states structure institutions and institutions in 
turn affect state interests through repeated interaction among states.  This interaction is 
modelled by game theory, so that over time the institutions become an independent 
reason for compliance with the substance of law. Consequently, 
rationalist/institutionalist approaches explain compliance as a structured process of 
authoritative decision making. Through this process rational actors make decisions 
towards collective goals. Institutionalist explanations of compliance are an example of 
process based, rational actor, directive explanations of compliance. Institutionalist 
approaches use individualistic rationales to explain cooperation by states. 
Institutionalists also believe that state interests necessitate cooperation. This cooperation 
leads states to create institutions in order to structure their interactions. These 
institutions in turn motivate state compliance. Institutionalists favour an individualistic 
doctrine of substance. However, the continued interaction between states leads to the 
creation of collective interests. According this approach compliance results from both 
individualism and altruism; individualistic interests explain why altruism occurs. 
 
 
3.1.3.3 Rule-Based-Rational Actor-Non-Directive Approaches 
Charney provides a universalistic explanation of compliance and universalistic 
approaches exemplify the rule based, rational actor, and non directive arguments. To 
explain, Charney asserts that "…there exists an international legal system with 
standards and procedures for making, applying and enforcing international law."
593
 
However, "[a]s a jurisprudential matter the source of the obligation to abide by 
international law is a source of debate."
594
 The substance of international law is rule 
based and presumably non-directive. There is no predetermined goal for states in 
                                                 
592
 Kingsbury (n 574) at pp 351-2. 
593
 Charney, ―Universal International Law‖ (n 208) at p 532. 
594
 Charney, ―Universal International Law‖ (n 208) at p 532. 
151  Betina Kuzmarov 
complying with international law, so the substance of law is a variable factor in 
compliance. This variability is rational. Charney explains, 
 
 
The international legal system is supported not only by state's interests in 
promoting individual rules, but also by their interests in preserving and 
promoting the system as a whole. Thus, states collectively and severally 
maintain an interest in encouraging law-abiding behavior. There is also an 
effective decentralized system for imposing sanctions of violators of the 
law through individual state and collective acts of disapproval, denial and 
penalties. Fear of sanctions, the desired to be viewed by others as law-
abiding and domestic institutional inclinations to conform to rules 
denominated by law further impel states to comply with international 
law.
595
 
 
 
For Charney the international system is universal and rule based, and states comply with 
the substance of law for rational reasons. However, there is no pre-set substance to 
international law because international law is not directive.  
 To Charney, international law is becoming a universal law that promotes 
collective over individual interests. However, Charney‘s universalism is grounded in a 
rule based and rational actor explanation of compliance. Initially compliance is 
compelled through sanction, and sanctions are individualistic in nature. Although, states 
then begin to comply with the substance of law out of a sense of collective interest.  
Accordingly, Charney argues that the doctrine of substance is transcending the interests 
of individual states. As a result, he uses individualistic explanations to argue that law is 
moving towards an altruistic universal approach to compliance. 
 
 
3.1.3.4 Process Based-Rational Actor-Non-Directive Approaches  
Liberal approaches are rationalist,
596
 and there is substantial accord between liberal 
scholars such as Slaughter and institutionalists such as Keohane. In fact the two often 
collaborate.
597
  However, liberal approaches take institutionalist insights in new 
directions. Guzman explains that "[l]iberal theory begins with the assumption that the 
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key actors in international relations are individuals and groups. The theory is interested 
in the particulars of domestic politics in addition to the interaction of states. "
598
 For 
liberals, states are both individual and complex non-unitary actors. This contrasts with 
the unitary vision of states in rationalist and realist approaches presented above. It also 
means that the domestic politics and the institutions of states help determine why states 
comply with the substance of law. Slaughter explains that ―[f]rom a liberal perspective 
state behaviour is best analyzed as a function of domestic and international behaviour 
patterns for which liberal and non liberal states serve as an excellent proxy.‖599 A state‘s 
international behaviour is a result of its domestic political structure. Therefore, 
liberalism is the theoretical equivalent of the saying ―all politics is local.‖ As Rustiala 
notes, "…indeed strategic interaction is a key component. However, the locus of 
attention is on domestic actors, the institutions that aggregate and shape the interests of 
such actors, and the variation among states in these internal attributes."
600
 States comply 
with international law because of their unique internal attributes. These unique attributes 
include distinct institutions and histories. 
 Liberal approaches view states as rational actors, and assume that state behaviour 
is goal directed.
601
 This makes state behaviour predictable through game theory 
interaction. However, each state is also an individual with interests that cannot be 
generalized to the legal system as a whole. Further, states‘ unique interests are 
determined by their own internal dynamics and institutions. Liberal approaches promote 
process based arguments as state interests are derived from the process of internal 
politics. Liberal approaches also view states as rational actors working towards 
individual interests, but these approaches do not assume collective goals for the legal 
system. Consequently, liberal approaches are not goal directed, since states have 
individual interests and compliance is based on the individual needs of states. However, 
liberal approaches do argue that international cooperation and compliance are possible. 
Thus, there is an altruistic element to the overwhelmingly individualistic liberal 
explanation of compliance. 
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3.1.3.5 Rule-Based - Other than Rational Actor-Directive Approaches 
Franck argues that just law is premised on fairness and he defines fairness as the law‘s 
legitimacy, its "right process," and its distributive justice. Therefore, fairness is the 
substantive element of the law
602
 and legitimacy is the key to understanding when and 
how nations comply with law.
603
  Specifically, he argues that rules exert a "pull" to 
compliance when they are formulated according to legitimate processes. Franck 
expands on this point:
604
   
 
 
 
[t]his essay posits that, in a community organized around rules, 
compliance is secured - to whatever degree it is - at least in part by 
perception of the rule of legitimate by those to whom it is addressed. Their 
perception of legitimacy will vary in degree from rule to rule and time to 
time.
605
 
 
 
Franck's explanation of compliance relies on two interlinked premises. Compliance rests 
on the quality of the rules of international law, whether substantive or procedural, and 
the on the existence of an international community. As Franck explains "[a] teleology 
that makes legitimacy its hypothetical center envisages - for purposes of speculative 
inquiry - the possibility of an orderly community functioning by consent and validated 
obligation, rather than coercion."
606
   
 Franck hypothesizes that within this community rules are given legitimacy when 
they exhibit four "elements".  He calls these elements "the indicators of rule 
legitimacy."
607
 These elements are determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence and 
adherence.  Franck defines determinacy as "the ability of the text to convey a clear 
message, to appear transparent in the sense that one can see through the language to the 
meaning."
608
 Franck defines symbolic validation "as a cue to elicit compliance with a 
command. This cue serves as a surrogate reason for such obedience."
609
 Coherence is 
equated with the consistent application of rules, and if consistency is not possible, then 
differences in application should be based on "general principles that connect with an 
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ascertainable purpose of the rules and with similar distinctions made throughout the rule 
system."
610
 Adherence refers to the pull to a normative hierarchy; it requires a rule 
community that is "…a community of principle", whose purpose is to  
 
 
…validate behavior in accordance with rules that confirm principles' 
coherence and adherence rather than acknowledging only the rule of 
power. A rule community operates in conformity not only with primary 
rules but also with secondary ones - which are generated by valid 
legislative and adjudicative institutions. Finally a community accepts its 
ultimately secondary rules of recognition not consensually, but as an 
inherent concomitant of membership status.
611
 
 
 
Rustiala and Slaughter clarify, "[w]hat distinguishes the legitimacy theory of 
compliance is its focus on rule-making processes and the quality of rules themselves 
rather than on rational strategic action."
612
  
 Particularly, Franck's explanation of law as fairness is directed towards achieving 
just law. He writes, 
 
 
[t]hus the perception that a rule or a system of rules is distributively fair, 
like the perception of its legitimacy, however, distributive justice is rooted 
in the moral values in which the system operates. The law promotes 
distributive justice not merely to secure greater compliance, but primarily 
because most people think it is right to act justly.
613
  
 
 
Franck contends that compliance can be promoted by legitimate process but it is 
primarily promoted by the substantive ―justness,‖ distributive justice of the law in 
question. 
 Therefore, Franck's explanation of compliance is premised on the quality of 
substantive rules of law. This quality separates rule of law from non-legal rules. 
Compliance is promoted by rules that are procedurally legitimate and rules that foster 
distributive justice. States are not merely rational actors but moral actors capable of 
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fairness. Lastly, compliance and law are directed towards the achievement of fairness, 
not only because this aids compliance, but because an international community ought to 
pursue this goal. Consequently, Franck‘s approach is rule based, other than rational 
actor, and non-directive.  Further, his approach blurs arguments for substance and 
process as Franck asserts both the existence of collective interests within the 
international sphere and that process produces a just substance to international law. As 
such, his approach is rooted primarily in altruistic beliefs about compliance. 
Additionally, Franck promotes the belief that states comply with international law when 
the rules that form that system are legitimate and just. From this basis Franck builds on 
Kantian cosmopolitan explanations of compliance with international law and he asserts 
that international law is primarily altruistic. 
 
 
3.1.3.6 Process Based - Other than Rational Actor-Directive Approaches 
Chayes and Chayes create a ―managerial‖ model of compliance. They reject the realist 
contention that states comply only with international law that is in their interest. 
Rustiala and Slaughter note, 
 
 
Managerialism begins with the premise that states have a propensity to 
comply with international commitments. This propensity stems from three 
factors, first because international legal rules are largely endogenous, an 
assumption of rational behavior predicts that states share an interest in 
compliance with rules. Second, compliance is efficient from an internal 
decisional perspective. Once a complex bureaucracy is directed to complex 
explicit calculations of costs and benefits for every decision is itself costly. 
The agreement may also create a domestic bureaucracy with a vested 
interest in compliance. Third, extant norms induce a sense of obligation in 
states to comply with legal undertakings.
614
 
 
 
For Chayes and Chayes compliance is premised on rational and non-rational interests. 
Compliance is fostered by the existence of the regime, rational behaviour and the power 
of the norm itself.  Koh explains that Chayes and Chayes  
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…offer a "management" model, whereby national actors seek to promote 
compliance not through coercion, but rather through a cooperative model 
of compliance, which seeks to induce compliance through interactive 
processes of justification, discourse and persuasion. Sovereignty, they, 
contend, no longer means freedom from external interference, but freedom 
to engage in international relations as members of international regimes.
615
 
 
 
Chayes and Chayes further explain that "[t]he central proposition is that the 
interpretation, elaboration, application, and ultimately enforcement of international rules 
is accomplished through a process of (mostly verbal) interchange among the interested 
parties."
616
 Therefore, Chayes and Chayes believe it is the process of international 
relations that structures the international interaction of states. Process structures these 
interactions through the creation of international regimes. Regimes in turn affect 
compliance.   
 Chayes and Chayes also assert that compliance is related to a second goal of 
adherence, fairness. Chayes and Chayes explain, 
 
 
In the context of norms, this element is even more central because the 
claim of the norm to obedience is based in significant part on its 
legitimacy. The notion of legitimacy or a norm (or norm system or regime) 
invokes characteristics broadly related to "fairness" that enhance prospects 
for compliance.
617
 
 
 
Consequently, for Chayes and Chayes, substantive norms have to be directed towards 
fairness in order to assure compliance.  
 Thus, Chayes and Chayes' explanation of compliance represents a ―process based‖ 
approach. Interaction between states creates regimes. Regimes are sustained by the 
interests of states and considerations of fairness. Interests and fairness promote 
compliance with the regime. As a result, this approach is process based but does not 
assert that states are rational actors. Finally, the managerial approach is directive since 
compliance rests, in part, on the directive goal of fairness.  
 Overall Chayes and Chayes represent an amalgam of approaches to compliance. 
For example, in their work states are individual actors with interests. These interests 
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help shape the legal system through the ongoing process of norm and regime creation. 
Further, when a regime is created, the pull of that regime and individual interests 
promote compliance. Thus, managerialism believes the substance of law is both 
individualistic and altruistic. Interests provide the impetus to enter into a regime. This is 
individualistic. However, the substance of law is also altruistic, because once a regime 
is created collective interests in compliance prevail over individual interests. 
 
 
3.1.3.7  Rule Based - Other than Rational Actor - Non-Directive Approaches 
Koh argues that compliance is a process of norm internalization which is secured 
through the transnational process. As he explains the transnational process 
 
 
…can be viewed as having three phases. One or more transnational actors 
provokes an interaction (or a series of interactions) with another which 
forces an interpretation or enunciation of a global norm applicable to the 
situation. By so doing, the moving party seeks not to coerce the other 
party, but internalize the new interpretation of the international norm into 
the other party's internal normative system. The new aim is to "bind" that 
other party to obey the interpretation as part of its internal value set. Such 
a transnational legal process is normative, dynamic and constitutive. The 
transaction generates a legal rule which will guide future transnational 
interaction between the parties; future transactions will further internalize 
these norms; and, eventually, will help reconstitute the interests and even 
identities of the participants in the process.
618
 
 
 
It first appears that Koh takes a process based approach to compliance as he argues that 
compliance is secured through the interaction of states. However, Koh also argues that 
legal norms have a uniquely legal nature. Koh explains of his approach,  
 
 
…as we move down the scale from coincidence to conformity to 
compliance to obedience, three shifts occur. First, there is the shift from 
the external to the internal, we witness an increase in the degree of norm 
internalization, or the actor's internal acceptance of the rule as a guide for 
behavior…A second shift is from the instrumental to the normative. As we 
move down the scale from coincidence to obedience, we see an increase in 
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normatively driven conduct… a third shift is from the coercive to the 
constitutive.
619
 
 
 
 
Compliance, obedience with law, results from the transnational process. It is premised 
on the quality of the law and it occurs when a law is internalized. This implies that a law 
is more likely to be internalized when it is of high quality. The quality of the law is what 
ultimately ensures a state‘s compliance. 
 Additionally, legal internalization is only one type of internalization. Koh asserts 
that there are three types of internalization, social, political and legal. To Koh, "[s]ocial 
internalization occurs when a norm acquires so much public legitimacy that there is 
widespread adherence to it."
620
 Conversely, "[p]olitical internalization occurs when 
political elites accept an international norm and advocate its adoption as a matter of 
government policy."
621
 Finally, "[l]egal internalization occurs when an international 
norm is incorporated into the domestic legal system and becomes domestic law through 
executive action, legislative action, judicial interpretation or some combination of the 
three."
622
  The three types of internalization interact among themselves. In addition, Koh 
asserts that the domestic structure within a state is not unitary; it can change over time 
in response to internalization.
623
  Consequently, states are not rational actors as they do 
not have fixed responses to problems. Their behavior is swayed by the quality of the 
norm itself.  
 Koh also believes that international law does not have predetermined goals as he 
argues that only the perception of fairness makes a state more likely to obey a given 
norm.
624
  However, he does feel that the goals of the system are influenced by the 
specific norm and the process of norm creation.
625
  As such, fairness is one possible 
explanation of obedience to law. Compliance may also result from "coercion, self-
interest, rule-legitimacy, communitarianism, and internalization of rules through 
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socialization, political action, and legal process."
626
  States comply with a norm for any 
of these reasons and Koh continues to assert that states internalize norms for moral, 
normative and legal reasons.
627
 
 Koh's approach to compliance is ultimately rule based, as compliance is 
predicated on the quality of the rule. As a result, Koh is ambivalent about whether legal 
norms are substantively different from non-legal norms, since compliance occurs 
through the interaction of social, legal and political processes. For Koh, laws are obeyed 
because of their perceived fairness. Consequently, one way to assess the fairness of a 
law is through compliance and compliance is judged by the level of internalization of 
the norm in domestic legal systems. In sum: Koh's approach to compliance is ultimately 
rule-based, not process-based. However, he incorporates process-based ideas into his 
explanations. Further, Koh does not believe states are unitary rational actors, as he 
believes compliance is a result of the transnational process, which privileges rules and 
shapes a state‘s perception of a rule‘s fairness. Moreover, there is no goal for the 
transnational process, as it is the process of norm creation that sets the ever changing 
goals of the system. Therefore, Koh's explanation of compliance is non-directive. 
 Additionally, Koh‘s approach promotes both altruistic and individualistic ideals.  
A state complies with a norm out of fear or self-interest, particularly at the early stages 
of the transnational process. However, over time adherence to the transnational process 
is enhanced by the "fairness" of the rule. This approach promotes individualism through 
its commitment to state interaction into the transnational process. It is the altruistic 
"fairness" of a rule that ultimately secures compliance with the norm. Koh incorporates 
individualism but his approach is ultimately premised on altruism.  Compliance is best 
secured when a rule is fair. 
 
 
3.1.3.8 Process Based - Other than Rational Actor - Non-Directive Approaches 
Constructivism is a normative, process based, approach to compliance.
628
 For 
constructivists the process of interaction among states secures compliance. This process 
of interaction creates the norm. Toope and Brunnée are prominent proponents of 
constructivism.  They explain,  
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The essential constructivist commitments are to the priority of identity 
over interest, to the relevance of nonmaterial explanations of actor 
behavior, to the possibility of "collective intentions" or shared 
understandings, and to the mutual construction of agent and structure. 
None of these commitments reveal any intrinsically idealist bias.
629
 
  
 
Consequently, international relations are premised on the "social construction of 
identities and meanings and actors in the international system."
630
 This means that 
norms structure and constitute the meanings and identities of states
631
 through the 
interaction among states. This interactive process creates meaning, so constructivism is 
a process-based approach.  
 According to constructivist approaches, states comply with international law 
because it is part of their identity and their way of conveying inter-subjective meaning, 
but states are not always rational actors. Accordingly, compliance rests on identity as 
much as interest, since law is both regulative and constitutive.
632
 As a result, of the 
stress on identity, constructivists have a difficult time establishing an independent basis 
for compliance. States respond to interests as part of the constitution of their identity. 
Further, interests are defined broadly so that constructivist approaches are non-directive. 
The substance of law is not predetermined or directive. Therefore, constructivist 
approaches are process based, non rational actor and non-directive.  
 Further, constructivism views the substance of international law as primarily, 
although not exclusively, altruistic as in this approach altruism is premised on the way 
states comply with law. Constructivists assert that states internalize and comply with 
law As a result, of their individual characteristics and interests. This approach‘s 
conceptualization of compliance as a result of individual interests illustrates that 
constructivism incorporates both individualism and altruism. 
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3.1.3.9 Analysis 
The eight approaches to compliance lead to several conclusions. First, approaches that 
believe that states can cooperate are more likely to pursue altruism. In this sense 
altruistic approaches can be contrasted with rational actor approaches which favour 
individualism. Second, competing approaches to compliance all debate the appropriate 
substance for international law. The above survey indicates that recent approaches do 
not agree on whether individualism or altruism determines the substance of law. It also 
indicates that it does not matter whether an approach is incorporated from other 
disciplines or is indigenous to international law as all the approaches examined debate 
whether the substance of a text should reflect individualism and altruism. Consequently, 
recent approaches to compliance fit within the doctrine of substance. This doctrinal 
continuity links these approaches to the modern and classical approaches in terms of 
responding to the ―compliance paradox‖. Importantly, recent approaches continue to 
explain compliance as a function of either state interest or collective interests. The 
continued doctrinal reliance on individualism and altruism ensures that individualism 
and altruism remain central to the debate over the substance of international law. The 
importance of this conclusion to the doctrine is most easily examined in state practice. 
Consequently, in the next section of this chapter UNCLOS will provide an example of 
the debates over the doctrine of substances in state practice.  
 
 
3.2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 
Substance of International Law 
UNCLOS
633
 is an example of the substantive debate outlined above,
634
 as individualism 
and altruism provide a common theme to the literature on the Convention.
635
 These 
opposed explanations of substance are apparent in the areas the Convention actively 
regulates. Specific examples of individualism and altruism in the substance of UNCLOS 
are the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, the continental 
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shelf and the seabed.
636
  Each of these concepts is examined in further detail in order to 
demonstrate the role of individualism and altruism in each. This demonstrates the 
concrete nature of the debate that shapes the doctrine of substance. 
 UNCLOS promotes the concept of the territorial sea. The territorial sea is the 
product of debates about the nature of the sea. These debates began in the seventeenth 
century 
637
  in the attempt to understand the ―anomalous‖ character of the sea; the sea 
was neither the territory of a state nor entirely free to all states.
638
 As Article 2 (1) of 
UNCLOS states, ―[t]he sovereignty of the coastal state extends beyond its land territory 
and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic state, its archipelagic waters, to an 
adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.‖639 This provision extends state 
sovereignty to that part of the sea, set at 12 nautical miles,
640
 designated as the territorial 
sea. This is a property based concept which establishes that the sea can be divided into 
or become part of the territory of the state. It also confirms that states can exercise 
sovereignty over parts of the sea and promotes the idea that individual rights of states 
must be respected. As such, the principle implies that states can exercise their individual 
interests in this territory and it represents an individualistic approach to the law of the 
sea. However, this ―territorial right‖ is limited. For example, Article 2 cannot conflict 
with UNCLOS or the ―rules‖ of international law,641 and as a result the individualism 
inherent in the territorial sea is not absolute, it is limited by the needs of the 
international community and by UNCLOS itself. Thus, the individualism of the 
territorial sea is moderated by the altruistic goal of regulating the sea.  
 The goal of altruism is also found in several other Articles that limit the territorial 
sea. Article 15 deals with the determination of the territorial seas between states with 
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adjacent or opposite coasts. In these cases the states‘ respective territorial seas 
overlap.
642
 Additionally, Articles 17-26 concern the right to innocent passage. Innocent 
passage is passage through territorial sea of the state which ―is not prejudicial to the 
peace, order or security of the coastal State…‖643 Therefore, the territorial sea is limited 
by communal rights of passage as these communal rights result from a collective 
interest in balancing the rights of different states. Consequently, altruism limits 
individualism in regard of the territorial sea. 
 Similarly, the Articles establishing the contiguous zone promote a proprietary 
approach to the sea. The contiguous zone is a zone adjacent to the territorial sea of 12 
miles. In this area a state can enforce its laws.
644
  However, the contiguous zone is 
justified by the need to restrict activity in the sea for the common good. For example, 
the state may regulate the zone for environmental or conservation reasons. Further, the 
right to regulate the contiguous zone is circumscribed by other provisions of 
UNCLOS.
645
 Consequently, individualism and altruism both function as explanations of 
the contiguous zone. 
 On the other hand, the EEZ is an innovation of UNCLOS. It gives states the 
exclusive right to ―exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural 
resources whether living or non-living, of the waters superadjacent to the seabed and its 
subsoil, and with regard to other activities of economic exploitation and exploration of 
the zone…‖ of an additional territory of up to 200 nautical miles.646 Therefore, the EEZ 
is also an example of the property-based model. It is individualistic in substance. 
Moreover, the EEZ and the high seas are entwined. This linking illustrates the 
relationship between individualism and altruism in the law of the sea. As Allott notes,  
 
 
…it is not at first sight clear whether the EEZ is essentially the high seas 
with a special EEZ regime superimposed upon it (the ―high seas minus‖ 
view) or whether the EEZ is a new sui generis zone of the coastal state in 
which the high seas freedoms are the equivalent of the right of innocent 
passage (the ―EEZ minus‖ view). 647 
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Allott asserts that the EEZ is neither territory nor the high seas. He argues that it is an 
example of shared sovereignty manifesting both individualism and altruism.
648
 This 
demonstrates that characterization of the EEZ as individualistic or altruistic is debated 
in the doctrine.
649
 
 Alternatively, Article 76(1) of UNCLOS states 
 
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of 
the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the 
natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental 
margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of 
the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.
650
 
 
 
Therefore, the concept of the continental shelf protects state sovereignty,
651
 and it 
promotes the goal of individualism.  However, these parameters are further troubled by 
the relationship between the continental shelf and the EEZ, and the relationship between 
the EEZ and the high seas.
652
 To explain, the EEZ is not clearly territory of the state. 
Presumably this is not an issue so long as the continental shelf and the EEZ overlap as 
this overlap provides territorial status to the EEZ. Further complicating matters though 
is the fact that these regimes are all limited by a non-exhaustive protection of freedom 
of the seas in Article 87.
653
 On top of this, determining the boundary of the continental 
shelf is problematic
654
 because the outer limit of the continental shelf marks the 
beginning of the deep seabed. The overlap between the two zones creates an area of 
shared sovereignty.
655
 It also creates an opposition between the individualism of the 
shelf and collective interests inherent in the concept of the deep seabed. The deep 
seabed is primarily governed by the principle of common heritage of ―mankind‖ 
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embedded in UNCLOS.
656
 As Cassese notes that these layers of sovereignty create a 
paradox. 
 
 
It is indeed striking that at the very time developing countries appropriated 
the exclusive economic zone, they also declared that the ocean beyond that 
zone was part of the common heritage of mankind. It has been objected 
that the former area might also have been declared part of the same 
heritage. But national self-interest prevailed, no doubt because in the 
exclusive economic zone coastal States, even the poor ones, were able to 
exploit their own resources directly. In the area beyond the zone the ‗have 
nots,‘ being totally unable to engage in highly technical forms of 
exploration and exploitation, urged that the States able to do so should act 
in the interests of everyone.
657
 
 
 
Consequently, these examples all illustrate that UNCLOS‘ ―Gestalt seems to be much 
more that of a public law system than that of a contractual arrangement.‖658 This implies 
that UNCLOS uses traditional notions of sovereignty to create a constitutional regime of 
the seas. As a result, UNCLOS promotes altruism through individualism and it protects 
individualism through altruism. It reflects both collective and individual interests. 
Therefore, UNCLOS is an example of the ways individualism and altruism function as 
parameters of the doctrine of substance. 
 
 
 
3.3 The Substance of International Law and Individualism and Altruism 
Classical, modern and recent doctrines of substance all debate whether a legal text 
should promote individualism or altruism. Kennedy pays particular attention to the 
structure of this debate and so his interpretation is highly relevant here. He begins his 
analysis by explaining the uniqueness of the doctrine of substance in international law: 
 
 
Substantive discourse about public international law seems different from 
the international regime of process because it self-consciously and directly 
addresses issues of sovereign conflict and co-operation, elaborating a 
social order which responds to both sovereign autonomy and sovereign 
equality - balancing or managing national particularism and community 
sharing. However these two dimensions of the substantive problem is 
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labelled, the aspiration of substance is to resolve their differences. On the 
one hand, a fully integrated international order seems impossible, naïve, 
utopian, or quaint. Likewise, an order which is responsive only to state 
interests seems dangerously anarchistic. On the other hand an international 
order which is centralized seems likely to be inefficient and dangerous 
while a fully decentralized regime of sovereign autonomy seems a threat to 
national interests in order and mutual respect. Like the demands for a 
process  which both open and closed, these narrative constraints of the 
good form a contradictory set of interests which can be projected onto 
sovereigns and into communities and from which substance doctrine must 
struggle to elaborate a normative order.
659
 
 
 
Therefore, the doctrine of substance explains that a text is considered legal when it 
reflects either individual state interests or establishes a strong international order.  For 
Kennedy, the doctrine‘s role is to mediate debates over the relationship between law and 
its "other" which he interprets as extreme individualism, anarchy.
660
  Moreover, 
Kennedy links these functions of substance with the structure of law,
661
 when he writes, 
 
 
Robert Keohane's recent book After Hegemony illustrates this hyperbolic 
practice. Keohane considers "co-operation" within international "regimes" 
- which he thinks of as simultaneously political, sociological, 
administrative and psychological structures. "Co-operation," he insists, 
"should not be viewed as the absence of conflict, but rather as a reaction to 
conflict or potential conflict. Without the specter of conflict there is no 
need to co-operate." This analysis suggests that we trace this "specter" in 
the institutional practice and doctrinal life of international law as a 
specter.
662
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Consequently, Kennedy examines the relationship between cooperation and conflict and 
concludes that the doctrine of substance mediates debates over the need to cooperate for 
individualistic or altruistic reasons.
663
   
 In conclusion, the doctrine of substance establishes the conditions in which a text 
is considered legal; that is, the situations in which a substantive obligation contained in 
a legal text is considered obligatory. As established above, a legal text is considered 
obligatory when it reflects either individual state interests or collective interests of 
states. This is reiterated when Koskenniemi notes that international law ―describes 
social life amongst states alternatively in terms of community and autonomy.‖664 
Koskenniemi‘s ―community‖ reflects altruism and ―autonomy‖ reflects individualism. 
Importantly, autonomy is the main requirement of substance of unilateral acts; it reflects 
individualism. Therefore, autonomy and its relationship to individualism will be the 
subject of the next part of this chapter.  
 
 
4. Unilateral Acts and the Substance of International Law 
 
 
Substance is defined as the subject matter of a text. As such, the doctrine of substance 
establishes the circumstances in which a text is considered legal. Applied to unilateral 
acts, a text is considered legal when it meets the requirement of autonomy and 
autonomy calls for an act to produce an obligation without any quid pro quo or response 
on the part of another state. However, autonomy as a requirement of a unilateral act is 
introduced only in the Nuclear Tests cases;
 665
 prior to this ICJ decision there is no 
consensus that a unilateral act creates an autonomous legal obligation.
666
 This evident in 
the earlier case law which does not consider this issue directly; for example, in the 
Eastern Greenland case the issue is Denmark‘s response to the statement of the 
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Norwegian Foreign Minister. This response takes place in the context of ongoing 
negotiations
667
 and the PCIJ does not consider the autonomous nature of the act. Thus, it 
is important that in the Nuclear Tests cases the ICJ states that,  
 
 
An undertaking of this kind [a unilateral declaration], if given publicly, 
and with an intent to be bound, even though not made in the context of 
international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in 
the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the 
declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required 
for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be 
inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which 
the pronouncement by the State was made.
668
 
 
 
As such, the Nuclear Tests cases establish autonomy as the way unilateral acts create a 
legal obligation.  
 Autonomy defines the substance of unilateral acts by determining the conditions 
in which a text of a unilateral act is considered legal. In this regard, autonomy is 
important because the substance of unilateral acts is not predetermined; as a result, 
autonomy acts to establish legality by excluding any rituals or response by other states 
for a unilateral obligation to take effect. Thirlway notes that this makes unilateral acts 
different from contracts as there is neither a requirement of consideration, as in common 
law obligations, nor is there a requirement of cause, as found in civil law obligations. As 
such, intention alone is the source of the obligation, whether or not it is 
―synallagmatic,‖669 reciprocal.  Consequently, in this context autonomy refers to an act 
that creates a legal obligation whether or not there is any response by another state.
670
 
Therefore, a unilateral act creates a legal obligation when it is given legal authority by 
intention and is substantively autonomous. Consequently, the notion of autonomy 
requires further clarification.  
 Autonomy is defined as the ―liberty to follow one‘s will‖671 and, as noted above, 
in international law autonomy is linked to the sovereignty of the state. Sovereignty 
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implies that states are self-governing
672
 and are not subject to interference from any 
other state. The requirement of autonomy promotes sovereignty by allowing the state to 
pursue its interests internationally. The relationship between sovereignty and 
individualism makes plain the link between individualism and autonomy in these acts. 
However, individualism alone cannot sustain a legal obligation since, as noted above, 
the doctrine of substance must mediate between the individual interest of the state and 
the state‘s need to cooperate in international relations. Consequently, without an 
element of altruism, unilateral acts do not achieve this balance and they do not fit within 
the doctrine of substance. As a result, the requirement of autonomy cannot exist without 
cooperation. This will be discussed further in the next part of this chapter. This section 
will examine the relationship between autonomy and cooperation with other states. 
 
 
4.1 Cooperation and Unilateral Acts 
Unilateral acts are autonomous acts that create an obligation that is given legal authority 
by that state‘s intention. Theoretically, unilateral acts are not concerned with the 
reaction of other states to their act
673
  and there is no need for any sort of cooperation 
with other states in order for a unilateral act to be considered binding.  However, in the 
Nuclear Tests cases decision the Court stated that  
 
 
[t]rust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation, in 
particular in an age when this co-operation in many fields is becoming 
increasingly essential. Just as the very rule of pacta sunt servanda in the 
law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of an 
international obligation assumed by unilateral declaration. Thus interested 
states may take cognizance of unilateral declarations and place confidence 
in them, and are entitled to require that the obligation thus created be 
respected.
674
 
 
 
This is contradictory. On the one hand the Court required the autonomy of a unilateral 
declaration. An obligation was created regardless of the response, recognition or even 
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acknowledgement of the act by other states. On the other hand the Court explained the 
need for autonomy by the requirement of good faith in the international arena. Good 
faith promoted cooperation between states by requiring that a state‘s word be kept, 
thereby ensuring that the obligations those words contained were respected.  
 These opposed requirements created a doctrinal paradox. Unilateral acts were 
autonomous in order to ensure that states could place their faith in the obligation the act 
created; this implied that cooperation was an element of the substance of unilateral acts. 
This was an oxymoron: a ―cooperatively autonomous‖ act. Consequently, this paradox 
raised several doctrinal questions: Could an autonomous act ever be undertaken 
cooperatively? If a state acted unilaterally, how could that ever be a ―cooperative‖ act?   
 These contradictions resulted from a conundrum the Court faced, which is best 
termed the ―the tree falls in the forest‖ problem. Consider the following: If a unilateral 
act is truly autonomous then cooperation with the act is not required for the act to be 
considered legal. In this sense a unilateral act is similar to the proverbial tree that falls in 
a forest. If states do not respond to a unilateral act, the act becomes similar to a tree that 
falls in the forest that no one hears. Does it, the act, then make a sound? Does it create a 
legal obligation? As with the proverbial tree, the answer is theoretically yes. However, 
like the proverbial tree, the obligatory force of a unilateral act cannot be determined 
without, at a minimum, cognizance of the act by another state. Therefore, without 
cooperation by another state, it is impossible to know whether a substantive unilateral 
obligation has been created. Unfortunately, autonomy specifically precludes a 
requirement of cooperation on the part of another state. This conundrum is further 
clarified in the following hypothetical example: China makes a statement that it is going 
to allow a referendum on the sovereignty of Tibet. At this point this act has no 
international legal impact as China does not recognize Tibet‘s independence.  This is an 
act of internal law with international implications, and as such it is not known if China 
intends to create an obligation under international law or if China intends to create a 
new political policy. Therefore, the legality of China‘s statement is not yet determined. 
Moreover, if China runs the referendum as promised the legal nature of the act 
continues to have this nebulous legal status. It is only if China decides to cancel the 
referendum that the legality of this act is determined. If the referendum is cancelled 
other states may respond to this act unfavourably and seek to hold China to its word. 
Good faith will then become a priority as states pressure China to comply with its 
obligation. To do this, states may, for example, send a reference question on the issue to 
the ICJ. It is only at this juncture that the legality of the statement is considered. 
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Moreover, it is not until other states ―hear,‖ take cognizance, of China‘s act and seek to 
have it upheld that its legality is determined. However, this requirement of ―hearing‖ 
negates the requirement that the act is autonomous as the unilateral act is considered 
legal only as a result of the cognizance taken of the act by another state. Further, 
without this cooperative element it is impossible to determine whether the act creates a 
legal obligation. Consequently, like the tree that falls in the forest, a unilateral act may 
make a sound but if no one hears that sound the act does not create a legal obligation.
675
 
 The above example demonstrates that cognizance of the act gives rise to claims of 
good faith, which must now be defined. Good faith is understood as the ―trust‖ required 
for international cooperation.
676
 As noted above, unilateral acts are considered binding 
in order to protect this trust. However, there can be no ―trust‖ without cognizance of an 
act as good faith must be demonstrable by the state raising the claim about the legality 
of the unilateral act. Specifically, a state must be able to show that it ―heard‖ and placed 
trust in the act in order to argue that the promise must be upheld. This means that, in 
practice, a state must show that it has changed its position or that it has recognized and 
placed trust in the act in some way in order for the act to be substantively binding. This 
requirement makes it difficult to find an autonomous act, and it also makes unilateral 
acts hard to separate from other obligations based on good faith. 
 In the Nuclear Tests cases the ICJ avoided this logical conundrum. The Court had 
before it a concrete case in which Australia and New Zealand were responding to 
France‘s actions. The Court was able to construct an obligation from France‘s 
statements without having to explicitly consider a response on the part of Australia and 
New Zealand.
677
 As a result, the judgment created an obligation in which a response by 
another state was not a requirement for legality, although the facts indicate that 
responses by states to the act were in fact a precondition for the dispute to exist.
678
 If 
Australia and New Zealand had not taken notice of France's nuclear tests and had not 
been able to claim damages as a result, there would have been no claim for the Court to 
hear. This demonstrates that both cognizance and trust are elements of the substance of 
unilateral acts in practice, if not in theory. 
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 Koskenniemi 
679
 discusses this problem with the Nuclear Tests cases. He asserts 
that  
 
 
[t]he judgment followed the strategy of tacit consent, French intent was 
construed on the basis of the status of the authorities involved, the 
―general nature and characteristic of these statements‖, and the fact that 
they were addressed to the public at large. These same facts also made it 
possible to appeal to the subjective reliance of other States and to non-
subjective considerations about good faith, trust and confidence etc.
680
 
 
 
Therefore, the ICJ implicitly considered the cognizance Australia and New Zealand 
took of the French statements. The Court tried to make the unilateral act meet the needs 
of Australia and New Zealand as well as France. As Franck notes, ―[i]ntentionality, as 
the Court said, must be the test, but intentionality cannot be determined solely by 
reference to the Speaker‘s state of mind, but must also take into account that of the 
listeners.‖681 This is borne out by the fact that the Court gave credence to the other 
states in creating a substantive obligation from a unilateral act. This element of 
cooperation allowed the Court to construct an obligation binding in ―good faith.‖ 
Without this cooperative element the Court had no substance on which to base its 
decision. Practically, France‘s obligations were determined by the good faith placed in 
the act by Australia and New Zealand. France‘s own reasons for adhering to the act, 
whether individualistic or altruistic were never determined.
682
 The Court, in effect, 
made cooperation a primary consideration in the determination of a unilateral 
obligation. 
 Koskenniemi argues that the contradictory requirements of autonomy, good faith 
and objectivity can never be resolved 
683
 so the Court has created a doctrinal trap.  
Franck disagrees. Franck argues that paying attention to the listener‘s understanding of 
intention does not translate into a requirement of mutuality or a need for states to 
respond to the act. He maintains that the Court does not adopt the speaker‘s, France‘s, 
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intent. Nor does it adopt the listener‘s, Australia and New Zealand‘s, intention. It 
constructs its own intention. However, Franck still expresses unease that there can be 
international obligations without the cooperation of both parties even as he asserts that 
such an obligation is acceptable under international law.
684
  Franck‘s approach is 
problematic as he does not directly address the relationship between the need for 
cooperation and the requirement of autonomy. Instead, he merely separates the ICJ‘s 
ability to construct a response to the act from its discussion of intention. Arguably, 
Koskenniemi and Franck are both right. Theoretically it is possible to separate the 
requirement for cooperation from the acting state‘s intention. Practically, however, an 
autonomous obligation cannot exist as a unilateral act‘s legality cannot be ascertained 
without cooperation, at a minimum cognizance, of other states to the act. Koskenniemi 
asserts that the construction of intention always begins with cooperation by another state 
or is constructed by the Court. Thus, the Nuclear Tests cases demonstrate contradictory 
requirements of substance for unilateral acts. Primarily, the decision requires that 
unilateral acts are undertaken autonomously but simultaneously the Court asserts that 
unilateral acts create legal obligations only when undertaken in good faith. Doctrinally 
good faith is linked to the requirement that states take cognizance and place trust in an 
act. Paradoxically, the requirement of cognizance means a unilateral act is always 
interpreted as less than autonomous in order to account for good faith. 
 Consequently, the substance of an obligation cannot be defined solely by 
autonomy. As a result Rubin argues, contra Franck, that the ICJ creates an untenable, 
dangerous and unrealistic precedent in the Nuclear Tests cases. He asserts that an 
obligation must be based on responses by other states. He believes that states are 
unlikely to accept such a fictional basis for an obligation.
685
 Similarly, Thirlway notes 
that in the Nuclear Tests cases the Court tries to distinguish unilateral actions from 
obligations premised on the cognizance of other states, such as estoppels.
686
 This leads 
Thirlway to conclude that the decision creates a ―dangerously wide formulation‖ for an 
obligation. Therefore, he argues that the decision is likely to be ―tempered.‖ 687     
 It was problematic that the ICJ stressed the autonomy of the act. Autonomy is one 
requirement that ostensibly gave unilateral acts their unique substantive force. This was 
evident from the efforts by the ICJ to separate unilateral acts from a quid pro quo or 
other reaction or response to the act. However, this separation was strained because 
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unilateral acts always existed within a context that involves other states. As such, 
unilateral acts also required that states became bound in good faith to their promises. 
This implies a role for other states and effectively precluded autonomy from forming 
the basis of an obligation. Thirlway notes that the decision in the Nuclear Tests cases 
looked to avoid an obligation based on cooperation with other states, such as estoppels. 
However, as noted above, the facts tell a different story. In this case Australia and New 
Zealand did not respond to France‘s statements, but they did recognize and place 
reliance on French actions as is clear in their claim. In consequence, the Court ignored 
this fact and avoided mentioning other states directly. Therefore, the facts illustrate that 
an obligation could not be created without some form of cooperation on the part of other 
states.  
 As a result of the above analysis, it is asserted that unilateral acts pose a problem 
for the doctrine of substance. Either unilateral acts are purely autonomous acts or they 
are good faith obligations. If the first statement is accurate, unilateral acts are 
autonomous acts and they can be explained by individualism. However, an autonomous 
act cannot be ascertained until the act is at least recognized and trusted by other states. 
This contradiction in the doctrine makes it difficult to identify a purely autonomous 
act.
688
 It also creates a conceptual problem for the doctrine as the requirement of 
autonomy tries to separate unilateral acts from the responses of other states to that act. 
This is troubling because the doctrine of substance cannot support an obligation that is 
not balanced by an altruistic parameter such as good faith.  As a result the Nuclear Tests 
cases ends up incorporating the concept of good faith into its requirements for a 
unilateral act.
689
 Problematically, introducing good faith makes the cooperation of other 
states part of the determination of a unilateral act. Further, introducing this requirement 
into unilateral obligations makes it difficult to separate unilateral acts from other 
substantive acts. To support this assertion the relationship between unilateral acts and 
one specific type of response-based act, estoppels is examined. Estoppels are chosen 
because of their basis in the concept of detrimental reliance, which is a good faith based 
requirement. The requirement of good faith reliance links estoppels to unilateral acts. 
Therefore, the following section will explore the relationship of unilateral acts to 
estoppels.  
                                                 
688
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4.2 Estoppels and Unilateral Acts 
This section examines the concept of estoppels and their relationship to unilateral acts. 
It begins with an examination of the concept of estoppels in international law, and then 
compares estoppels with unilateral acts.  
 
 
4.2.1 Estoppels 
International estoppels are derived from municipal law principles which are then 
adapted to the unique circumstances of international law. Therefore, estoppels are a 
general principle of international law 
690
 as they reflect broad principles.
691
 Their 
purpose is to promote ―the requirement that a state ought to be consistent in its attitude 
to a given factual or legal situation.‖692 Estoppels are less fully developed here than in 
the municipal legal systems from which they are derived. Consequently, estoppels are 
not only evidentiary but create a substantive obligation.
693
 In this regard MacGibbon 
cites Judge Spender, who asserts that estoppels are a ―substantive rule of law.‖694   
 Additionally, estoppels in international law have a unique justification. In 
municipal systems estoppels are justified by the need for evidentiary consistency. The 
same is true of international estoppels. However, in international law this is further 
supported by a requirement of good faith which is incorporated to ensure that states 
maintain stable international relations. In other words, in international law the 
justification of estoppels is that a state cannot ―blow hot and cold.‖ A state cannot go 
back on its word.
695
 As MacGibbon summarizes 
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What appears to be the common denominator of the various aspects of 
estoppel which have been discussed is that a State ought to maintain 
towards a given factual or legal situation an attitude consistent with that 
which it was known to have adopted with regard to the same 
circumstances on previous occasions. At its simplest estoppel in 
international law reflects the possible variations in circumstances and 
effects of the underlying principle of consistency which may be summed 
up in the maxim allegans contraria non audiensus est. Linked as it is with 
the device of recognition, it is potentially applicable throughout the whole 
field of international law in a variety of contexts, not primarily as a 
procedural rule but as a substantive principle of law.
696
 
 
 
Further, in all these uses estoppel obligations share characteristics. To be considered an 
estoppel in international law, an act must meet three requirements mentioned below.   
 
 
First the statement creating the estoppel must be clear and unambiguous, 
second the statement must be voluntary, unconditional and authorized; and 
finally there must be good faith reliance upon the representation of one 
party by the other party to the detriment of the other party or to the 
advantage of the party making the representation.
697
 
 
 
The above mentioned requirement of clarity makes the line between a unilateral act and 
an estoppel thin, as it is analogous to the requirement of intention that was discussed in 
Chapter 3. However, more important for present purposes is the fact that a unilateral act 
is also identified by the requirement of good faith. Good faith in a unilateral act requires 
―cooperation‖ by another state that is similar in practice to ―good faith reliance‖ 
required of an estoppel. Consequently unilateral acts are not substantively different from 
estoppels and are difficult to separate doctrinally. This relationship is evident from the 
confused interpretation of the case law in this area. For example Wagner cites the 
Eastern Greenland Case as an instance of an estoppel.
 698
  Certainly before the Nuclear 
Tests Cases the distinction between estoppels and unilateral declarations was not firm.  
 Additionally, recent case law on estoppels falls into two categories. The first is a 
line of cases in which estoppels are used as a substantive principle. In these cases 
estoppels prevent a party from pursuing a claim before the Court. This refers to estoppel 
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or acquiescence. The second is a line of cases in which estoppel acts as a bar to 
continuing litigation before the Court. The first line of cases involves substantive 
arguments of good faith. These arguments are raised in boundary delimitation cases. 
The second line of cases occurs in preliminary arguments before the ICJ. Further, the 
relationship between unilateral acts and estoppels has been considered by the ILC in 
their work on unilateral acts. Therefore, this section will examine the two lines of cases 
at the ICJ. It will then consider the discussion of estoppels at the ILC. From this 
analysis conclusions will be made about the relationship between estoppels and 
unilateral acts. 
 
 
4.2.1.1 Substantive Estoppel 
One of the earliest examples of estoppel in international litigation was in the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Case.
699
  This case was a contest between Norway and the United Kingdom 
over maritime boundaries. In this case the Court alluded to the concept of estoppel 
although it did not refer to it by name. The Court held that the United Kingdom had not 
contested Norway‘s delimitation of the boundary for a long period of time, and the long 
time between the event and the protest precluded the United Kingdom from claiming a 
protest before the Court.
700
 As a result, the United Kingdom could not in good faith 
raise a claim as they had remained silent and Norway had placed reliance on their 
silence.  
 A related case was the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear.
701
 In this 
case Cambodia and Thailand contested sovereignty over the ancient temple of Preah 
Vihear as different boundary lines for the escarpment on which the temple was built 
produced different sovereigns.
702
 Conflict over the temple began in 1904-1908 with  
boundary settlements between the colonial power in Cambodia, France, and Thailand, 
which was then called Siam. A boundary treaty signed between France and Siam in 
1904 established the borders between the two countries.
703
 Further, this treaty 
established a Commission, the Franco-Siamese Mixed Commission, to resolve 
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boundary issues that arose out of the treaty.
704
 This body did not concern itself directly 
with the Temple of Preah Vihear. Additionally, another boundary treaty was signed in 
1907 and another Mixed Commission was established.
705
 This second Commission did 
not intend to deal with the region of the Temple. However, it did join up the boundary 
with an existing eastern boundary. It was not clear how this eastern boundary was 
established and the Court presumed it had been already agreed upon.
706
 At the end of 
the delimitation exercise, mentioned above, maps were to be published, and so the 
Government of Thailand acceded to having France prepare these maps. The French 
Government had the maps, eleven in total, drawn up and delivered to the Thai 
Government. Importantly, one of these maps placed Preah Vihear on the Cambodian 
side of the boundary.
707
 Cambodia claimed sovereignty over the temple based on this 
map, but the Thai government protested this claim, by arguing, alternatively that the 
map in question did not result from the work of the Mixed Commission, that the work 
of the Mixed Commission violated the earlier treaty and the Mixed Commission had 
finished work before the maps were published. Thailand claimed the maps were 
delineated in error.
708
 The Court accepted Thailand‘s argument that this map was not 
legally binding.
709
 Although, the Court held that it was within the power of each 
Government to approve the maps as binding, so that if the maps were approved this 
amounted to acquiescence to the boundary, and acquiescence created a legal obligation. 
Moreover, if acquiescence had occurred it would not have mattered whether the maps 
resulted from inaccurate work by the Mixed Commission or that the Commission had 
changed a treaty obligation. As such, acquiescence was tantamount to acceptance of the 
legal obligation.
710
 As a result, the Court considered whether Thailand‘s passive 
acceptance of the maps amounted to acquiescence. The Court considered that the 
exchange of the maps was formal and many copies of the maps were distributed.
711
 The 
Court also accepted ―[t]hat the Siamese authorities by their conduct acknowledged the 
receipt and accepted the character of these maps…‖712 Therefore, the Court concluded 
that  
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[e]ven if there were any doubt as to Siam‘s acceptance of the map in 1908 
and hence of the frontier indicated thereon, the Court would consider that 
in light of the subsequent course of events that Thailand is precluded by 
her conduct from asserting that she did not accept it. She has, for fifty 
years enjoyed such benefits as the Treaty of 1904 conferred on her, if only 
the benefit of a stable frontier.
713
 
 
 
In a separate opinion Judge Alfaro agreed with the majority judgment. He referred 
explicitly to estoppels, also called preclusion, forclusion, and acquiescence, and noted 
that  
 
 
[w]hatever term or terms be employed to designate this principle such as it 
has been applied in the international sphere, it substance is always the 
same: inconsistency between claims or allegations put forward by a State 
and its previous conduct in connection therewith, is not admissible 
(allegans contraria non audiendus est). Its purpose is always the same: a 
State must not be permitted to benefit by its own inconsistency to the 
prejudice of another state (nemo potest consilum sum in alterius injuriam). 
A fortiori, the state must not be allowed to benefit from its own wrong or 
illegal act that the other party has been deprived of its right or prevented 
from exercising it. (Nullus commodum capere de sua injuria propria.) 
Finally, the party, which by its recognition, its representation, its 
declaration, its conduct or its silence had maintain an attitude manifestly 
contrary to the right it is claiming before an international tribunal is 
precluded from claiming that right (venire contra factum propria non 
valet).
714
 
 
 
Judge Alfaro also argued that the principle of estoppel was a substantive principle of 
good faith.
715
  
 Unlike Judge Alfaro, Judge Fitzmaurice agreed with the ―operative portion‖ of the 
judgment.
716
 However, he also discussed the issue of preclusion/estoppel and its relation 
to acquiescence. He felt that, 
 
 
The principle of preclusion is the nearest equivalent in the field of 
international law to the common-law rule of estoppel, though perhaps not 
applied under such strict limiting condition (and it is certainly applied as a 
rule of substance and not merely as one of evidence or procedure). It is 
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quite distinct theoretically from the notion of acquiescence, but  
acquiescence can operate as a preclusion or estoppel in certain cases, for 
example, where silence, on an occasion where there was a duty or need to 
speak or act, implies agreement, or a waiver of rights, and can be regarded 
as a representation to that effect…On that basis it must be held in the 
present case that Thailand‘s silence meant acquiescence , or acted as a 
representation of acceptance of the map line, operates to preclude or estop 
her from denying such acceptance or operates as a waiver of her original 
right to reject the map line or its direction at Preah Vihear.
717
 
 
 
Consequently, Judge Fitzmaurice argued that estoppel did not apply when an obligation 
had already been formed. As a result estoppel did more than prevent a state from 
―blowing hot and cold.‖  He asserted that the defining characteristic of an estoppel was 
reliance on the act or a benefit secured by the acting party. This required from the 
parties ―a change or alteration in their relative positions.‖ 718 Therefore, for Fitzmaurice, 
estoppels were a substantive principle premised on the maintenance of good faith, and 
good faith had to be preserved in cases of reliance. 
 Not all judges agreed that this was a case of acquiescence and preclusion. In 
contrast to his colleagues, Judge Koo argued that preclusion did not apply in this 
situation. Judge Koo asserted that Thailand never accepted the map in question and that 
Thailand‘s silence was offset by its active attempt to exercise sovereignty in the area. 
As such, there was no evidence of French reliance on Thailand‘s silence.719  
 In this vein, Judge Spender also rejected the approach of the ICJ. He argued that 
Thailand‘s silence had to be weighed against all other ―relevant evidence.‖ He found 
that the evidence did not support a conclusion that Thailand‘s silence was binding.720 
Further, Judge Spender denied that acquiescence was a substantive principle. He argued 
that it was merely an evidentiary principle.  
 
 
[t]here is, however, in my view, no foundation in international law for the 
proposition that an act of recognition by a state of or acquiescence by a 
state in a situation of fact or law is a unilateral juridical act which, 
operating of its own force, has the legal consequence of precluding a party 
giving or making it from thereafter challenging the situation which is the 
subject of acquiescence.
721
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Moreover, Judge Spender adopted a narrow view of preclusion. He argued that 
preclusion was a substantive principle of the Court. This principle  
 
 
…operates to prevent a State contesting before the Court a situation 
contrary to a clear and unequivocal representation previously made by it to 
another State, either expressly or impliedly, on which representation the 
other State was, in the circumstances entitled to rely and in fact did rely, 
and as a result that State has been prejudiced or the State making it has 
secured some benefit or advantage for itself.
722
 
 
 
Consequently, preclusion was a question of fact and on the facts preclusion was not 
established. Judge Spender felt that Thailand did not receive a benefit from its silence. 
Further, like Judge Koo, he felt that France did not rely on Thailand‘s silence.723 
Therefore, as a result of the range of judgments the most that can be concluded is that 
the majority of judges in the Temple of Preah Vihear case accepted estoppels as a 
substantive principle of international law. Consequently, this decision stood for the fact 
that reliance created a legal obligation. 
 Estoppel was revisited by the Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, 1969 
724
 in which Denmark and the Netherlands claimed that the Federal Republic of 
Germany had, through its past conduct, become bound by a convention regarding the 
continental shelf. In their arguments Denmark and the Netherlands cited German actions 
and public statements which led them to believe that Germany was required to adhere to 
the convention.
725
  The Court held that  
 
 
only the existence of a situation of estoppel could suffice to lend substance 
to this contention, - that is to say if the Federal Republic were now 
precluded from denying the applicability of the Conventional regime, by 
reason of past conduct, declarations etc., which not only clearly and 
consistently evinced acceptance of that regime, but also had caused 
Denmark or the Netherlands, in reliance on such conduct, detrimentally to 
change position or suffer some prejudice.
726
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However, the Court felt that evidence of German acceptance of their obligation was 
inconclusive. Consequently, the ICJ held that there was no estoppel on the facts. 
727
 
Further, the Court stressed that finding estoppel on these facts created doctrinal 
―dangers.‖728 In this case the Court did not deny the possibility of substantive estoppels; 
it merely held that a substantive estoppel did not exist on the facts of this case.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 Estoppels were subsequently considered in the Gulf of Maine Case.
729
  In this case 
Canada argued that the US had ―acquiesced‖ to the use of a median to establish the 
maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Maine. Canada argued that the US was estopped 
from going back on this acquiescence.
730
 Canada acknowledged that the doctrine of 
estoppel was not clearly developed. As a result, they maintained that it was not 
established law that estoppels required detrimental reliance. Canada suggested that 
estoppels could be derived from the non-action of the other party,
731
 which was 
traditionally defined as acquiescence. The Court agreed and determined that it was ―able 
to take the two concepts [estoppels and acquiescence] into consideration as different 
aspects of one and the same institution.‖732 
 The facts of this case are as follows: In 1964 Canada began to issue ―long-term 
options (permits) for the exclusive exploitation of hydrocarbons…‖ in its waters 733 
Canada claimed that the US was aware of these permits but the US denied that these 
permits were ―common knowledge.‖  What is known is that in April 1965 the Bureau of 
Land Management of the United States Department of the Interior wrote to the 
Canadian Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources asking about the 
location of two of the permits. The Canadian Government replied with the requested 
information leading to further correspondence. In this correspondence, American 
representatives inquired about the Canadian position on the median line between 
Canada and the US. Canadian representatives replied that they were using the median 
lines established by Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.  This 
position led to further diplomatic correspondence. For example, in a 1966 letter the 
Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs mentioned the accepted median 
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line. The US made no mention of the use of this line until 1969.
734
 Additionally, the US 
asserted in response that the 1965 correspondence was written by officials ―who had no 
authority to define international boundaries or take a position on behalf of their 
Governments on foreign claims in this field.‖735 As a result these claims could not 
create an estoppel/acquiescence.
736
 Moreover, the US claimed that the 1969 
correspondence referred only to the fact that the median line was in question and that 
Canada never officially publicized its claims. In consequence, the US argued that it 
should not have had to infer a claim.
737
 Canada argued in return that the US had never 
challenged the status quo until 1970.
738
 The US responded that the Canadian challenge 
to the median line was insignificant as the permits were minor.
739
   
 The Court eventually sided with the US, and held that there was no acquiescence 
by the US to the median line. The Court wrote, 
 
 
In the view of the Chamber, it may be correct that the attitude of the 
United States on maritime boundaries with its Canadian neighbour, until 
the end of the 1960s revealed uncertainties and a fair degree of 
inconsistency. Notwithstanding this the facts advanced by Canada do not 
warrant the conclusion that the United States government recognized the 
median line once and for all as the boundary between the respective 
jurisdictions over the continental shelf; nor do they warrant the conclusion 
that mere failure to react to the issue of Canadian exploration permits, 
from 1964 until  the aide-memoire of 5 November 1969, legally debarred 
the United States from continuing to claim a boundary following the 
Northeast Channel, or even including all the areas southwest  of the 
adjudged perpendicular.
740
 
 
 
The Court also determined that the technical correspondence was not authorized as the 
author had not realised the implications of his letter. As a result, it was not binding on 
the US Government.
741
 Further, the US‘ silence was not tantamount to acquiescence. 742  
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Lastly, the Court denied the significance of the US‘ issuing its own permits as it held 
that this was not evidence of acquiescence.
743
 
 However, the Court did give credence to the diplomatic correspondence between 
Canada and the US. It was especially concerned by the 1966 letter in which Canada 
stated its preference for the median line.  The Court wrote about this letter that 
 
 
…it might admittedly have expected a reaction on the part of the United 
States Department of State. The United States concedes that it was 
officially informed of Canada‘s views on the problem of delimitation…. In 
waiting until 10 May 1968 before suggesting, through diplomatic channels 
the opening of discussions, while the question remained pending, and then 
waiting a further year and half, until November 1969, before stating 
clearly that no Canadian permit for the exploration or exploitation of the 
natural resources of the Georges Bank could be recognized, the United 
States cannot be regarded as having endeavoured to keep Canada 
sufficiently informed of its policy. It is even possible that Canada was 
reasonably justified in hoping that the United States would ultimately 
come around to its view. To conclude from this, however, in legal terms, 
that by its delay the United States had tacitly consented to the Canadian 
contention, or had the forfeited its rights  is, in the Chamber‘s opinion, 
overstepping the conditions required for invoking acquiescence or 
estoppel.
744
 
 
 
From this analysis the Court then reviewed the case law on estoppel and acquiescence 
presented by Canada but held that on the facts the US had not acquiesced to the median. 
There were no estoppels here but the Court did affirm the possibility of estoppels based 
on reliance. 
 This line of cases suggests that the ICJ has consistently accepted estoppels as a 
substantive principle of international law. Consequently, estoppels form a category of 
substantive obligation in the doctrine. However, the Court has been reluctant to find 
substantive estoppels on the facts of the cases. To understand why this is the case the 
second category of estoppels, estoppels as a bar to proceeding before the ICJ, will now 
be examined. 
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4.2.1.2 Estoppels as a Bar to Proceeding before the ICJ 
Through the 1960s the ICJ was reluctant to embrace estoppels as a bar to jurisdiction. 
For example, in 1964 it rejected this possibility out of hand in the preliminary 
proceedings of the Barcelona Traction case.
745
 In this case the Court refused to consider 
an argument of estoppel made by Spain,
746
 in which the Spanish Government argued 
that Belgium had withdrawn a similar case from the Court in 1961. Their position was 
that discontinuance of the earlier proceedings precluded any further action on this 
matter before the Court. 
747
 Spain argued that Belgium should be precluded from 
starting a claim, as its actions had ―misled‖ Spain about the seriousness of the 
discontinuance.
748
  The Court held that Belgian statements could not have induced 
reliance and that Spain was not negatively affected by agreeing to the discontinuance. 
The discontinuance had in fact promoted out of Court negotiations and the new 
submissions may have resulted from these negotiations. Therefore, the Court found that 
Spanish reliance was not sufficient to reach the level of an estoppel.
749
 However, this 
finding demonstrated that estoppels were a reliance based obligation. 
 The reluctance of the Court to find an estoppel as a bar to jurisdiction continues 
until today. For example, in 1990 the Court denied the possibility of equitable estoppel 
to Nicaragua, in Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute.
750
 
In this case Nicaragua applied to the ICJ to be recognized as an intervener in a dispute 
between El Salvador and Honduras. Nicaragua argued that it should be allowed to 
intervene because the dispute between the parties affected Nicaraguan interests.
751
 The 
Court interpreted this claim as a request for equitable estoppel or recognition. They held 
that this request was unwarranted because Nicaragua had provided no evidence that they 
had met the requirements of estoppels. The Court viewed estoppels as ―a statement or 
representation made by one party to another and reliance upon it by that other party to 
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his detriment or to the advantage of the party making it.‖752 The Court saw no evidence 
that representations had been made or that reliance was present in this case. 
753
 
 Similarly, in the Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between 
Cameroon and Nigeria 
754
 estoppels arose in the context of a boundary dispute over 
Lake Chad. Nigeria occupied an area of the Lake and shore. Nigeria asserted that the 
parties had implicitly accepted a bilateral mechanism for resolving boundary disputes. 
These mechanisms created an estoppel against a suit at the ICJ.
755
 Cameroon argued that 
the bilateral mechanisms were temporary solutions so that estoppels barred litigation.
756
 
The Court held that 
 
 
An estoppel would only arise if by its acts or declaration Cameroon had 
consistently made it fully clear that it had agreed to settle the boundary 
dispute submitted to the Court by bilateral avenues alone. It would further 
be necessary that, by relying on such an attitude Nigeria had changed 
position to its own detriment or suffered some prejudice… 757 
 
 
In this case the Court accepted a traditional interpretation of estoppel. The ICJ held that 
Nigeria did not change its position or face prejudice by Cameroon‘s choice to bring a 
claim to the Court.
758
  
 Estoppels were again an issue in the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 
759
 in 
which India disputed the ICJ‘s jurisdiction to hear a claim initiated by Pakistan for 
damages against India. India argued that the Court was estopped from jurisdiction as a 
result of reservations India had made to the Statute of the ICJ.
760
 Particularly, India had 
reserved jurisdiction from disputes with other current or former Commonwealth states 
such as Pakistan. Pakistan in turn argued that this reservation was invalid on the basis 
that it violated various provisions of international law.
761
 Alternatively, Pakistan argued 
that even if the reservation was valid it would not be operable in this case by virtue of 
Article 1 of the Simla Accord. In the Simla Accord India and Pakistan agreed to resolve 
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their disputes by peaceful means. India rejected this argument on the basis that the 
Simla Accord did not contain a compromisory clause. The Court held that obligation in 
Article 1 of the Simla Accord was general, and as such it was not affected by India‘s 
reservation to the Statute of the Court. As a result, the Court was not estopped from 
hearing this case.
762
 Therefore, this case did not attack the general principle of estoppel 
on substantive grounds, instead the Court simply refused to find an estoppel on the 
facts. 
 Another recent example of estoppel occurred in 2004. The ICJ heard claims about 
the legality of use of force by eight NATO countries against the former Yugoslavia. 
Serbia and Montenegro initiated separate cases against each country that had 
participated in the NATO action. One claim was started against Canada.
763
 As such, 
Canada challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the dispute on both procedural 
and substantive grounds. Procedurally, Canada contested Serbia and Montenegro‘s 
standing before the Court. Substantively Canada argued that the cause of the dispute had 
―disappeared‖.764 Canada argued that the unascertained status of Serbia and Montenegro 
before the Court meant that Serbia and Montenegro was estopped from continuing 
proceedings. Eventually, the Court rejected this position and did not remove the case 
from the list.
765
 Consequently, from this line of cases it can be concluded that the ICJ 
has never denied the possibility of estoppel as an evidentiary principle although, it has 
been reluctant to apply estoppels as a bar to proceeding before the Court. 
 Therefore, this section demonstrates that estoppels are both a substantive and 
evidentiary principle of international law, depending on the interpretation. In both its 
forms estoppel requires detrimental reliance, and it is a determination of fact as to 
whether there has been detrimental reliance. Importantly, the jurisprudence illustrates 
that the Court is often reluctant to find reliance on the facts. Further, it is worth noting 
here that detrimental reliance requires the cooperation of other states; this links 
unilateral acts with estoppels because both detrimental reliance and cooperation connote 
good faith. This relationship will be examined in greater detail in the following section. 
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4.2.1.3 Unilateral Acts and Estoppel at the ILC 
In his introduction to his first report the Special Rapporteur for unilateral acts, 
Rodriguez Cedeño, observed that 
 
 
…estoppel was a rule of evidence which had its origins in common law 
legal systems, but which had now found a place in the doctrine and 
jurisprudence of international law. However, while international courts had 
on a number of occasions considered the doctrine of estoppel they had 
rarely relied upon it as a basis for their decisions…766 
 
 
He noted that 
 
 
…estoppel did not constitute a phenomenon which was of direct concern 
to the study of unilateral acts. An estoppel involved acts or conduct by one 
State which gave rise to certain expectations  on the part of another State, 
on the basis of which that other State had proceeded to adopt a course of 
action which was to its own detriment. Although the conduct of the State 
which was responsible for the representation might appear at first blush to 
have some similarity to a unilateral legal act, it was in fact of a quite 
different character.  The conduct which gave rise to an estoppel could 
involve either a positive act or a passive attitude, such as silence. There 
was furthermore no necessity that the conduct should be performed with 
any intention to create legal effects. A true unilateral legal act, on the other 
hand was a positive and formal legal act, such as a promise, the State 
which made it under a legal obligation immediately that act was 
performed, in contrast, the most important element of estoppel was the 
conduct of the State to which the representation was made, that is the 
conduct in which that other State engaged in reliance upon the 
representation by the first State. In the case of estoppel then, the legal 
effect flowed not from the will of the State which made the representation, 
but from the reliance which was placed on that representation by the State 
to which it was made. The conduct of that other State was of fundamental 
importance. In the case of a unilateral legal act, on the other hand, such as 
a promise, the conduct of the beneficiary was, analytically speaking not of 
any importance in determining its binding character…767 
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As a result, Rodriguez Cedeño proposed excluding acts of estoppel from the study of 
unilateral acts. In a short analysis he described the ―analytical‖ differences between 
unilateral acts and estoppels. However, he did not provide guidance for telling the 
difference between the two types of acts.  
 Members of the ILC questioned Rodriguez Cedeño‘s choice to exclude estoppels 
from the study. This may have been because these Members could not clearly 
differentiate between the two concepts. However, other Members  distinguished 
between the two concepts; these Members considered estoppels separate from the study 
of unilateral acts on the basis that estoppels did not require intention to create a legal 
obligation whereas unilateral acts did.  Conversely, it was also noted that reliance was 
not a requirement of unilateral acts but was a requirement of estoppels. Members who 
took this position reiterated the theoretical distinction between the two concepts. 
However, other members argued that for practical reasons estoppels should be included 
in the study.
768
 A Mr. Lukashuk noted in debates at the ILC that―[o]ne minor criticism 
was that the report emphasized the unilateral nature of acts of States, but the legal 
consequences of such acts usually arose when other States reacted to them. The effect of 
reactions of States must therefore be duly taken into account.‖769 
 In the following year, Rodriguez Cedeño reiterated that 
 
 
…although acts relating to estoppel could be categorized as unilateral acts 
in formal terms, they did not of themselves produce effects. They 
depended on the reaction of other States and the damage caused by the 
primary act. There was certainly a close connection between the 
two…[y]et it was a different kind of act because, unlike a non-treaty-based 
promise, a waiver, a protest, a recognition, it did not of itself produce 
effects…770 
 
 
A working group was constituted at the 1997 meeting of the ILC. The working group 
recommended that ―the question of estoppel and the question of silence should be 
examined by the Special Rapporteur, at the appropriate time, with a view to determining 
what rules, if any, could be formulated in this respect in the context of unilateral acts of 
States.‖771 However, Members became preoccupied with discussing the draft Articles 
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proposed by Rodriguez Cedeño and did not discuss this recommendation.
772
 The 
relationship between estoppels and unilateral acts was not  pursued further at the ILC.
773
  
 This section demonstrates that the ILC did not always differentiate between 
estoppels and unilateral acts. It wavered between reiterating the theoretical differences 
between the two concepts and acknowledging their practical similarity. This section 
highlights the fact that, in spite of their asserted differences, unilateral acts and 
estoppels are often indistinguishable in practice. 
 
 
4.2.2 Unilateral Acts and Estoppel 
The jurisprudence and the work of the ILC indicate that the line between unilateral acts 
and estoppels is thin. The case law does not often state whether a case is an instance of a 
unilateral act or an estoppel, and writers are often divided on the interpretation of a 
given case. As an example, Wagner classifies unilateral declarations as a form of an 
estoppel.
774
  Further, she cites the Eastern Greenland case as an example of estoppel.
775
 
Similarly, MacGibbon, writing before the Nuclear Tests cases, also classifies the 
Eastern Greenland case as an example of estoppel.
776
 On the other hand, Thirlway 
separates the Nuclear Tests cases from other cases of good faith obligations in 
international law
777
 and Franck and Rubin take the opposite approach and incorporate 
the Eastern Greenland case in their comments on the Nuclear Tests cases.
778
 As noted 
above, Rodriguez Cedeño asserts that the two obligations are not related. 
779
 
 Therefore, the ICJ, the ILC and authors do not always differentiate between 
unilateral acts and estoppels. As Koskenniemi explains, ―[t]here is considerable 
difficulty to carve out an independent area for each of the three doctrines of unilateral 
declaration, acquiescence and estoppel.‖780 In theory estoppel and unilateral acts are 
substantively different obligations. Unilateral acts are premised on the good faith 
requirement that a state abide by its intention to be bound whereas estoppels require not 
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only a statement but detrimental reliance or a change of position by the party to whom 
the statement was directed. Further, a unilateral act‘s substance is derived from the 
autonomy of the acting state but estoppels arise out the reliance of another state on the 
unilateral act. However, these differences are merely cosmetic as it has already been 
seen that unilateral acts cannot create a legal obligation without good faith in the act by 
another state. In order to claim that a unilateral act has not been observed, a state must 
both take cognizance of the act and be able to show how a Court how the act affected 
them. Ascertaining the effect of a unilateral act is, in  practice,  identical to finding the 
detrimental reliance required of estoppels. Therefore, Koskenniemi notes of this 
relationship that:  
  
 
Initially each of the three concepts [unilateral declarations, acquiescence, 
estoppel] contains a description of how a state may become bound by an 
obligation through adopting a form of behaviour. Broadly speaking, the 
doctrine of unilateral declarations seems initially to bear a closer contact to 
intent-based justification of obligations than do acquiescence or estoppel. 
Basing obligation on non-verbal behaviour seems to have a closer 
relationship with considerations of reliance, reciprocity and justice. 
Whatever merit there is to prima facie impressions, it seems clear that just 
as the binding character of unilateral declarations could not be justified in 
a purely subjective way, neither can acquiescence or estoppel be held 
purely objective doctrines. In some way they need to be understood from 
both perspectives.
781
 
 
 
In this passage Koskenniemi distinguishes acquiescence from estoppel. He argues that 
they are the substantive and procedural aspects of the same concept.
782
 However, he 
considers this to be a very ―fluid‖ difference783 so that ―[w]ithin argument acquiescence 
and estoppel become indistinguishable.‖784 This confusion allows Koskenniemi to 
conclude that estoppels have a subjective element similar to unilateral acts. The 
doctrines of both estoppels and unilateral acts contain requirements of intention. 
However, intention can only be inferred from behaviour. The Court establishes these 
behaviours as ―good faith, reasonableness or legitimate expectations.‖ Consequently, 
this does not provide the Court with justification for reliance.
785
 This is problematic as 
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―such behaviour is relevant which manifests itself in ―a clear and unambiguous way.‖786 
Thus, Koskenniemi asserts that the ICJ has to explain how behaviour was clear and 
unambiguous when a state argues that it has no intention to create an obligation, and as 
a result, the Court takes a factual determination of intention. This leads the Court back 
to step one as the intention of the state undertaking the act has to be determined. This 
intention is subjective.
787
 
 The circular nature of intention observed in cases of estoppel helps explain the 
confusion between estoppels and unilateral acts. Estoppels and unilateral acts both rely 
on a substantive determination of autonomy. However, unilateral acts are not binding 
unless there is de facto (and de jure) good faith placed in them by other states that 
amounts to reliance. Conversely, estoppels are not invoked unless there is a formal 
determination of intention. Consequently, Koskenniemi asserts that estoppel and 
unilateral acts are two sides of the same coin. Unilateral acts require trust and good faith 
that in practice are similar to reliance, the basis of estoppels. Similarly, estoppels require 
a formal determination of intention, the basis of a unilateral act. Therefore, estoppels, in 
theory, require reliance but practically they also require intention. On the other hand, 
unilateral acts theoretically are autonomous but practically they also require reliance. 
So, while theoretically the concepts of unilateral acts and estoppels are distinct, further 
analysis reveals that practically they are indistinguishable. 
 
 
4.3 Unilateral Acts and the Substance of International Law 
The previous section illustrates that there is no practical difference between estoppels 
and unilateral acts. This is important because it raises questions about the legality of 
unilateral acts as a category of obligation. As noted above, substantively unilateral acts 
are individualistic, but practically they cannot exist without the cooperation, reliance or 
good faith of other states. Moreover, incorporating this requirement of good faith makes 
unilateral acts practically impossible to separate from estoppels, as estoppels are also 
based on good faith and the response of other states to the act. 
 Therefore, doctrinally unilateral acts require individual autonomy. However, 
autonomy cannot be ascertained without an element of good faith, and ascertaining 
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good faith directly contradicts the autonomy of the act. Additionally, incorporating good 
faith as a requirement of a unilateral act makes these acts indistinguishable from 
estoppels. Estoppels are a substantive principle of international law. They require 
detrimental reliance or a change of position by the state relying on the act in question. 
Estoppels also require intention. This leads to the conclusion that doctrinally estoppels 
and unilateral acts are inseparable as unilateral acts require both autonomy and a 
response by other states (a response that amounts to a change of position) in order to 
create legal obligations and so do estoppels. This points to two conclusions. The first 
conclusion is that an autonomous act cannot be ascertained without good faith by other 
states. However, the incorporation of this requirement means the act is no longer 
autonomous. The second conclusion is that the doctrine of estoppels and the doctrine of 
unilateral acts are joined in practice. The doctrine does not support a separate category 
of unilateral acts.  
 The above analysis illustrates that autonomous legal acts cannot produce a 
substantive obligation. This is evident because truly individual acts, such as unilateral 
acts, do not fit within the doctrine of substance. They cannot create the cooperation 
necessary to produce an independent obligation. Consequently, to achieve cooperation 
good faith is introduced but once good faith is introduced unilateral acts become 
impossible to separate from estoppels. This creates a paradox: without altruism 
individual obligations have no meaning. However, once altruism is pursued the 
individual acts lose their justification. This paradox ensures that unilateral acts are 
problematic for the doctrine of substance as they are difficult to justify as a separate 
category of legal obligation. These difficulties will be examined in the example of the 
San Juan River dispute. 
 
 
5. Context: The San Juan River Dispute 
 
 
The previous parts of this chapter provide a methodological examination of the doctrine 
of substance as it applies to unilateral acts. The discussion is abstract and theoretical. To 
provide context to this discussion and help clarify its meaning, an example is 
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instructive. A relevant example is the San Juan River dispute. This example is 
applicable for three reasons. First, it illustrates the relationship between autonomy and 
the doctrine of substance but, unlike the analysis above, it places this discussion in the 
context of ongoing events in international relations. Second, the example of the San 
Juan River dispute demonstrates the problems of autonomy noted above, particularly the 
difficulty in maintaining autonomy. It also highlights the difficulty in separating 
unilateral acts from other good faith obligations. Lastly, the example of the San Juan 
River dispute is chosen because it represents an ongoing dispute in international 
relations, and connecting this example to the problem of unilateral acts may shed some 
additional light on this problem. To undertake this analysis this section of the chapter 
will proceed in four parts. First, a brief review of the facts will be presented. Second, the 
facts will be analysed for autonomy. Third, the facts will be analysed for cooperation 
and fourth some concluding thoughts and analysis will be presented. 
 
 
5.1 Facts 
On 29 September 2005 the government of Costa Rica instituted proceedings against 
Nicaragua at the ICJ.
788
 At issue in the dispute were navigation rights on the San Juan 
River.
789
 The dispute concerned Nicaraguan restriction of Costa Rican navigation rights 
that had been guaranteed by treaties and arbitration. Costa Rica contended that 
restrictions on the river began in the 1990s. Restrictions included charging fees for 
Costa Rican boats, stopping boats at military outposts, restricting supply ships, 
restricting free movement of ships and the right to stop on the banks and other 
limitations.
790
 Costa Rica argued that these limitations violated their guaranteed rights. 
These rights included rights of navigation for commercial purposes, rights to ―touch‖ 
the banks without paying dues unless agreed upon in advance, rights established by the 
second Article of the Cleveland Award to navigate the river, rights to navigate the river 
for specific official purposes such as staffing border posts, supplying posts or protection 
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and the right not to have the river obstructed in violation of these rights.
791
 There was 
also a treaty obligation on Nicaragua to abide by all agreements on the San Juan and to 
work together to supervise the common border.
792
 Further, Costa Rica claimed that the 
dispute was governed by the Treaty of Limits between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, San 
Jose 1858; an arbitral award of President Grover Cleveland (the Cleveland Award), 
United States, 22 March 1858; judgment of the Central American Court of Justice in 
Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, 13 September 1916; and an Agreement Supplementary to 
Article IV of the Pact of Amity, Washington, 9 January 1956.
793
 Costa Rica also 
asserted that the dispute was governed by general international law.
794
 As a result this 
dispute was substantively legal.    
 Jurisdiction of the ICJ was contested but Costa Rica argued that the Court had 
jurisdiction to hear this dispute. Costa Rica insisted that both parties had declared 
acceptance of jurisdiction and that jurisdiction was granted in treaties between the 
parties. For example it claimed that jurisdiction of the ICJ was reiterated in the Tovar-
Caldera Agreement, Alajuela, September 2002.
795
  The Tovar-Caldera Agreement was a 
treaty between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. In this agreement Nicaragua agreed not to 
withdraw from the jurisdiction of the ICJ and in exchange Costa Rica agreed not to start 
a Court action or any other dispute resolution process for three years.
796
 However, 
Nicaragua initially rejected the jurisdiction of the Court on the basis of treaties 
concluded prior to 1901. In spite of this assertion, President Bolaños of Nicaragua 
acknowledged the jurisdiction of the Court in a newspaper article where he stated that 
he was certain that ―Nicaragua and Costa Rica will not need to have recourse to any 
court.‖797  
 Since starting the dispute memorials and counter memorials were filed, oral 
hearings were completed, and the judgement was released.
798
 President Bolaños‘ 
statement was indeed mentioned in Costa Rica‘s memorial as part of its arguments 
                                                 
791
 San Juan River case (n 788) at par 6. 
792
 San Juan River case (n 788) at par 7. 
793
 San Juan River case (n 788) at par 1. 
794
 San Juan River case (n 788) at par 1. 
795
 San Juan River case (n 788) at par 2-3. 
796
 San Juan River case (n 788) at par 4-5. 
797
 C Sandoval, ―The San Juan Frozen‖ La Prensa (27 September 2002) trans. Caroline Pardo as quoted in 
San Juan River case (788) at Attachment 6. 
798
 See Dispute Regarding Navigational Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) available online at <www.icj-
cij.org> accessed on (5 May 2009); See particularly Case Concerning the Dispute Regarding 
Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) Judgment ICJ General List No. 133 [2009]. 
196  Betina Kuzmarov 
regarding the Court‘s jurisdiction.799 Nicaragua for its part tried to sidestep this 
statement by stipulating that it accepted jurisdiction of the Court, but this did not 
preclude the fact that the issues in dispute had already been decided by previous 
agreements.
800
 This claim ensured that jurisdiction was not at issue in either additional 
pleadings or the oral argument before the Court and it did not affect the Court‘s 
judgment on the merits. Arguably, this was because Nicaragua tacitly acknowledged it 
was  bound by the statement of its President. If this was in fact the case, the legality of 
this statement was highly relevant to the current analysis, as Nicaragua tacitly 
acknowledged the substantive obligation contained in its Presidential statement.  
 
 
5.2 Autonomy 
The statement of President Bolaños was undertaken without any exchange or quid pro 
quo. It went beyond the requirements of the Tovar-Caldera Agreement. Nicaragua 
agreed that for three years they would not withdraw from the jurisdiction of the Court 
and that all rights under international law were maintained.
801
 Further, President 
Bolaños acknowledged the jurisdiction of the Court. He agreed to good faith efforts to 
resolve the dispute with Costa Rica. Consequently, this statement was autonomous; it 
represented the individual interests of Nicaragua. 
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5.3 Cooperation 
The statement of President Bolaños was autonomous. However, its legality was not 
determined. For the duration of the Tovar-Caldera Agreement its legality was moot but 
the statement gained legal significance because Costa Rica included it as part of its 
application to the ICJ. Including this statement illustrated the ―reliance‖ Costa Rica 
placed in the legal obligation of President Bolaños‘ statement. However, this reliance 
illustrated the difficulty in meeting the requirements for the determination of substance.  
 President Bolaños‘ statement was problematic for the doctrine of substance 
although it was autonomous. To explain, even though President Bolaños‘ statement was 
autonomous and it was not undertaken in exchange for a response on the part of Costa 
Rica. It was Costa Rica‘s attempt to uphold this statement at the ICJ that made the 
statement legally binding. In other words, it was Costa Rica‘s reliance on President 
Bolaños‘ statement, not its autonomous nature, that made it legally relevant. This 
tension demonstrated that the requirements of autonomy and good faith were in 
opposition to each other. As a result, the uneasiness between autonomy and good faith 
became apparent in the fact that Nicaragua stipulated that they would not contest the 
jurisdiction of the Court.
802
  Further, it was unclear from the pleadings whether 
President Bolaños‘ made his statement because Nicaragua acknowledged Costa Rica‘s 
good faith in the act, or vice versa, whether Costa Rica placed reliance President 
Bolaños‘ words because he made his statement. The former would have made this 
statement a unilateral act, the latter an estoppel.  Therefore, the lack of clarity in the 
pleadings also demonstrated that the good faith Costa Rica tacitly claimed in President 
Bolaños‘ statement was impossible to distinguish from the reliance required of an 
estoppel. Although the act was autonomous, the fact that Costa Rica included the 
statement in its pleadings represented a claim of good faith in President Bolaños‘ 
statement. Costa Rica was in effect claiming good faith and, potentially, reliance on this 
statement. It was this response that forced Nicaragua to consider the statement‘s legality 
and ultimately accept the jurisdiction of the Court.  To summarize: By introducing 
President Bolaños‘ statement, Costa Rica made the claim that Nicaragua was bound by 
good faith and as such could not deny the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Once good faith was 
introduced, Nicaragua could not go back on its word. Therefore, it was irrelevant 
whether this good faith created a unilateral act or an estoppel. In fact, the good faith 
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Costa Rica placed in the act made the obligation indistinguishable from an estoppel. As 
a result the San Juan River case was an example of the difficulty in determining the 
substance of unilateral acts. The doctrine of unilateral acts required autonomy of 
substance. However, this requirement was meaningless without Costa Rica placing good 
faith placed in the act itself, but if good faith was placed in the act it was no longer 
autonomous.  This made it difficult to determine the substantive legality of President 
Bolaños‘ statement and it made the act indistinguishable from an estoppel.  
 
 
5.4 Analysis 
The San Juan River dispute demonstrates two key difficulties in applying the 
requirement of autonomy in context. First, autonomy ensures that an act is not 
undertaken in exchange for any quid pro quo or response to the act. However, as the 
San Juan River dispute illustrates, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which this 
could practically occur, as it is only when Costa Rica chooses to include President 
Bolaños‘ statement that its legal substance is assessed. Therefore, this example 
contextualizes a problem alluded to in regard of the Nuclear Tests cases, that a 
statement must produce good faith in order to acquire substantive legality. This leads 
directly to the second difficulty in establishing the substance of a unilateral act, the 
problem of autonomy. This problem arises because even if an individual act displays 
autonomy, it will not be considered legal without good faith in the act. However, once 
good faith is established the act is no longer autonomous. Moreover, once the act is no 
longer autonomous the trust placed in the act becomes indistinguishable from the 
reliance required of estoppel. 
 Consequently, this example leads to two conclusions about autonomy as the 
substantive requirement of a unilateral act. First, an act can either be autonomous or it 
can create a substantive legal obligation. Second, the fact that a unilateral act requires 
good faith in order to produce a substantive obligation makes these acts 
indistinguishable in practice from estoppels.  This analysis is important because it adds 
context to the analysis presented above and complexity to the conclusions to this 
chapter presented below.  
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6. Conclusion 
This chapter examines one aspect of the question ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ 
Specifically it focuses on the question ―can unilateral acts be explained by the doctrine 
of substance?‖ After outlining this research question, this chapter provides an overview 
of the doctrine of substance and establishes that the doctrine of substance mediates 
debates over whether the subject matter of international law is derived primarily from 
individualism or altruism.   
 Following on this analysis this chapter proceeds to examine the requirement of a 
unilateral act that establishes the substantive legality of an act, the requirement of 
autonomy. Autonomy establishes that a unilateral act has legal substance when it 
reflects the interests of the state undertaking the act. However, analysis of this 
requirement demonstrates that autonomy alone cannot create a legal obligation. As the 
example of the tree that falls in the forest illustrates, it is only when cognizance is taken 
of an act that autonomy can be exercised. Confusingly, requiring cognizance of the act 
makes the act less than autonomous because another state must recognize the act. It is 
for this reason that the ICJ introduces a requirement of good faith which, in effect, 
contradicts the requirement of autonomy. Moreover, introducing the requirement of 
good faith makes unilateral acts difficult to separate from acts of estoppel. Unilateral 
acts and estoppels both rely on good faith as a determinant of their substantive legal 
obligation and in practice they both rely on an element of autonomy. Therefore, 
unilateral acts are substantively indistinguishable from estoppels.  
In addition to the doctrinal analysis above, the problem of autonomy is placed in 
the context of the San Juan River dispute. This contextualization reveals that autonomy 
is functionally indeterminate unless good faith is introduced, and once good faith is 
introduced, the act is no longer autonomous. It is Costa Rica‘s good-faith in Nicaragua's 
statements that makes them legally relevant. However, once Costa Rica‘s good faith in 
the statement becomes legally significant, Nicaragua is no longer able to act 
autonomously. Further, the San Juan River dispute demonstrates that it is practically 
impossible to distinguish between the good faith required of a unilateral act and the 
good faith that produces the detrimental reliance required of an estoppel. These 
observations are important because even if the requirement of autonomy can be 
interpreted to provide the substantive requirements for a legal obligation, in practice 
these obligations will always be indistinguishable from estoppels. 
 This chapter asks ―can unilateral acts be explained by the doctrine of substance?‖ 
The problem that unilateral acts pose for the doctrine of substance is that they rest 
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entirely on autonomy, the interest of a single acting state. The requirement of autonomy 
is unable to produce a legal obligation without some form of cooperation by other 
states. As a result, it must be balanced by a requirement of good faith in order to 
provide legal authority. However, introducing good faith makes the act less than 
autonomous. Consequently, a unilateral act can be autonomous or it can produce a 
substantive legal obligation. This produces a second difficulty for the doctrine: when 
autonomy is defined to include good faith, it becomes practically indistinguishable 
from an estoppel, and autonomy is no longer its defining feature. This is evidence of 
the fact that autonomy on its own cannot create a substantive legal obligation. Further, 
even when an act interpreted to meet the requirements of the doctrine of substance, as 
the example of the San Juan River dispute demonstrates, the autonomous obligations 
are functionally indistinguishable from estoppels. The doctrinal difficulty posed by 
autonomy, together with the difficulty in applying autonomy in practice, helps explain 
the gap between the assertion that a unilateral act is legal and the ability to identify its 
legal obligation in practice. 
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Chapter 6: The Process of International Law 
1.  Introduction 
 
 
This chapter completes the analysis of the research question ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ 
Specifically, this chapter focuses on one aspect of ―legality‖ defined in Chapter 3, the 
doctrine of process. It asks the question: can unilateral acts be explained by the doctrine 
of process? To answer this question this chapter provides an overview of the research 
question, it outlines the processes of international law, and it examines the requirements 
of unilateral acts that establish the processes of a unilateral act, revocation. This chapter 
then compares the doctrine of process to the process of a unilateral act in order to reach 
conclusions about the ―legality‖ of the process of unilateral acts. Consequently, this 
chapter examines the processes of international law, discusses the requirement of a 
unilateral act that establishes the ―process‖ of a unilateral act, revocation, and compares 
the two doctrines in order to evaluate whether unilateral acts can be explained by the 
doctrine of process. Finally, conclusions will be reached from the analysis. 
 
 
 
2. The Research Question 
 
 
 
This chapter examines one aspect of the question ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ 
Specifically it focuses on the question ―can unilateral acts be explained by the doctrine 
of process?‖ To explain why this question is necessary to the analysis of the legality of 
doctrinal analysis of unilateral acts, a summary of the basic outline of this work is 
helpful. As noted in the introductory chapter, answering the question ―are unilateral acts 
legal?‖ requires answering two subsidiary questions: ―what are unilateral acts? And 
―what is legality?‖  Chapter 2 establishes that unilateral acts are defined by three core 
requirements that separate these type of obligations from other legal obligations: 
intention, autonomy and revocability. Chapter 3 establishes a method of assessing 
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legality derived from a narrow critical legal studies method – a doctrinal analysis of 
unilateral acts based on the structure of international law. This method clarifies that the 
doctrinal structure of unilateral acts is derived from three primary, interlinked doctrines: 
sources, substance and process.  Consequently, any analysis of the ―legality‖ of 
unilateral acts requires a comparison of the requirement of a unilateral act in relation to 
the doctrine of international law. If unilateral acts can be explained within the doctrinal 
structure they will be considered legal; otherwise unilateral acts pose a problem for the 
doctrine of international law. 
This chapter concludes the analysis of the legality of unilateral acts by examining 
one doctrine of international law, process doctrine, and the requirement of a unilateral 
act that establishes the legal process of a unilateral act, revocation. This analysis is 
instructive because comparing the requirement of revocation to process doctrine 
determines whether unilateral acts can provide procedural authority in international law. 
This leads to the question that guides this chapter: ―can unilateral acts be explained by 
the doctrine of process?‖ If unilateral acts cannot be explained by process doctrine this 
makes their place in the structure of international law doctrinally weak, and leads to 
questions about the legality of obligations created by unilateral acts. 
 
 
3. The Process of International Law 
 
 
 
Process refers to the rules by which ―the game‖ of international law is to be played.  
Therefore, the process of international law is the method by which laws among states 
are created. As such process doctrine establishes the methods by which a state enters 
into, maintains, alters or ends its legal obligations. This implies that purpose of the 
doctrine of process is to provide a link between the doctrine of sources and the doctrine 
of substance; that is to explain the methods by which a specific text is given legal 
authority. To act as this link the doctrine of process must explain how obligations are 
entered into and maintained while simultaneously explaining how obligations can be 
altered or ended. To rephrase this in terms of the  structure of international law, the 
doctrine of process must provide stability in the creation of legal obligations while at the 
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same time permitting these obligations to change. Consequently, process doctrine 
mediates the debates within the doctrine over the need to balance stability and change.  
 The relationship between stability and change is illustrated by comparing the 
concepts of ―soft‖ law and ―hard ―law. The term soft law describes obligations that do 
not take a legal form. Soft law is identified with change and flexibility.  Hard law 
describes obligations that take a legal form.  The process of ―hardening‖ of an 
obligation is termed legalization. Although hard law provides stability, some obligations 
never legalize; they never gain the authority of  a source of law. Unilateral acts are one 
of these obligations. Unilateral acts promote change, but lack stable processes. 
Examining the indicators of legalization illustrates the difficulty unilateral acts have 
performing the functions required of the doctrine of process.  
 This section examines three processes of international law: the processes of treaty 
law, the processes of custom and the processes of the general principle of equity. These 
examples represent the processes of the primary sources of international law and are 
relevant for two reasons. First, process in international law is not uniform. It depends on 
the legal authority, the source, of the act being examined. Second, the diverse processes 
of law have similar parameters. All the processes examined establish stable methods by 
which substance is given legal authority. These processes also allow for change when 
required.  They explain how sovereign states become bound by law and they formalize 
substance.  Consequently, the doctrinal functions of these processes are examined 
followed by an analysis of one example of these procedures, the processes of UNCLOS.  
 
 
3.1 Treaties 
Treaties are agreements between states, a source of law. Treaties can represent 
agreement to any substantive obligation other than a violation of a jus cogens. The 
doctrine of process ensures that a substantive agreement between states is recognized as 
a treaty. It establishes the methods for determining when a treaty is concluded. These 
methods also create processes for changing these relationships. Two principles structure 
this process, pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus. This section examines these 
principles in detail and it explains how treaty law mediates doctrinal debates between 
stability and change.
803
 
                                                 
803
 This entire section owes much of its shape to Bederman; See generally, DJ Bederman, ―The 1871 
London Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus and a Primitivist View of the Law of Nations‖ (1988) 82 AJIL 
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3.1.1 Pacta Sunt Servanda 
The principle of pacta sunt servanda is mentioned in previous chapters. This principle 
forms the basis for the doctrine of treaty law. In the VCLT the substantive principle of 
pacta sunt servanda is codified. Through codification this substantive principle shapes 
the process of international law. Therefore, it is the procedural aspect of the principle 
that is the focus of this section.  
 Pacta sunt servanda is codified in Article 26 of the VCLT.
804
  This Article 
appears in the part of the Convention dealing with observance, application and 
interpretation of treaties. It is part of the section on observance of treaties. This Article 
states: ―[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by 
them in good faith.‖805 This provision declares the basic principle of treaty law. Once a 
treaty is signed its obligations must be obeyed.
806
  This is the minimal procedural 
requirement of treaty law. This principle ensures that the substance of a treaty takes on 
the treaty form. Consequently pacta sunt servanda establishes the basic process of a 
treaty. Further, any departure from the principle of pacta sunt servanda must be 
justified by a process of law as well.
807
 One example of an authorized departure from 
pacta sunt servanda is the situation of fundamental change of circumstances. This 
principle is examined below. 
 
 
3.1.2 Rebus Sic Stantibus 
An accepted derogation from the rule of pacta sunt servanda is the principle that a 
fundamental change in circumstances may permit the termination of a treaty.
808
  
Jennings and Watts note that this principle is derived from the ―conventio omnis 
itelligitur rebus sic stantibus, with the consequence that all treaties are concluded 
                                                                                                                                               
1; However, Bederman denies that the opposition between stability and change is really a ―problem‖ 
Bederman, ―Rebus‖ (n 803) at p 37. 
804
 VCLT (n 303) at Art 26. 
805
 VCLT (n 303) at Art 26. 
806
 See generally, Jennings &Watts (n 47) at 1296 n4. 
807
 See generally, Jennings &Watts (n 47) at p 1296. 
808
 See generally, Jennings &Watts (n 47) at p 1304 ff; See also, Cassese, International Law (n 49) at p 
180 ff. 
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subject to an implied condition rebus sic stantibus…‖ 809 This principle asserts that ―a 
change in the basic circumstances underlying the making of a treaty could terminate 
it.‖810 In order to terminate a treaty, the change in circumstances must be fundamental to 
the treaty and must limit a state‘s ability to perform the obligations outstanding under 
the treaty.
811
 Further, in cases of fundamental change of circumstances a state may 
choose to suspend its obligations under a treaty short of terminating the treaty.
812
 
 Rebus sic stantibus has a long history in international law.
813
 Prior to the 19
th
 
century the principle was not considered legal doctrine.
814
 Vagts cites several examples 
of rebus sic stantibus from this period. These were the 1585 Anglo-Dutch Convention 
of Military Assistance and Subsidy, the 1871 London Declaration, and the Treaty of 
Berlin, 1878. Vagts also raises the example of the Panama Canal.
815
 Each of these 
examples will now be examined in more detail. 
 Vagts‘ first example is the Anglo-Dutch Convention of Military Assistance and 
Subsidy in 1585. He notes that England and the Netherlands signed the treaty, but 
Queen Elizabeth I reneged on this agreement.
816
 She justified this action on the basis 
that ―‗conventions must be understood to hold only while things remain in the same 
state.‘‖817 This statement asserted the right to terminate a treaty on the grounds of a 
fundamental change of circumstances. The second episode that Vagts identifies is the 
London Declaration of 1871. This event is examined in detail by Bederman.
818
 The 
episode began with Russia‘s defeat in the Crimean War.  After this loss Russia was 
―isolated‖ by the other European powers. Russia was forced to sign the Treaty of Paris 
which was designed to limit Russian ―aggression.‖819 The clauses pertaining to the 
Black Sea restricted Russian powers. Russia was unable to deter either British or 
Ottoman activities in an area that had traditionally been within Russia‘s sphere of 
influence.
820
 Consequently, Russia terminated the provisions of the Treaty that affected 
the Black Sea.  Russia informed the other parties of this termination in two notes to the 
British Foreign Minister. In these notes Russia asserted changed circumstances and 
                                                 
809
  Jennings & Watts (n 47) at p 1305-06.  
810
 Cassese, International Law (n 49) at p 181. 
811
 VCLT (n 303) at Art 62(1). 
812
 VCLT (n 303) at Art 62 (3). 
813
 D Vagts, ―Rebus Revisited: Changed Circumstances in Treaty Law‖ (2005) 43 Colum J Trans L, 459 
at p 459. 
814
 See generally, the history of this concept provided by Bederman, ―Rebus‖ (n 803) at p 8. 
815
 Vagts (n 813) at pp 466-8. 
816
 Vagts (n 813) at p 466. 
817
 Queen Elizabeth I, as quoted in G Schwarzenberger, ―Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus‖ 1 Encyclopaedia 
of Public International Law 611, at 612-613 as quoted in Vagts (n 763) at p 466.  
818
 See generally, Bederman, ―Rebus‖ (n 803). 
819
 Bederman, ―Rebus‖ (n 803) at pp 8-9; See also Vagts (n 813) at pp 466-7. 
820
 Bederman, ―Rebus‖ (n 803) at p 9; Vagts (n 813) at pp 466-7. 
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fundamental breaches by other parties to the treaty.
821
 Bederman notes that by 
―December 1870… the rhetoric in the Communications between Russia, Britain and 
Turkey took on an edge of ill disguised hostility and the mood of impending 
conflict.‖822  Only Britain and Turkey were interested in Russia‘s actions. The other 
European powers did not get involved for various reasons.
823
 Bederman observes that 
Britain particularly chose to avoid aggression. Consequently, a conference was arranged 
in London.
824
 Vagts notes that at this conference 
 
 
… a declaration was signed by Britain, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, 
Turkey, and North Germany. Its text read as follows: ―[i]t is an essential 
principle of the Law of Nations that no Power can liberate itself from the 
engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with 
the consent of the Contracting Parties by means of an amicable 
arrangement.‖825 
 
 
This conference was known as the London Conference and the Declaration it produced 
was known as the London Declaration. English officials held that this statement was the 
―statement‖ of the law in this area.826 The London Declaration was a ―legal‖ response to 
Russia‘s claim.  
 The third example Vagts cites is The Treaty of Berlin, 1878.
827
  Article XXV of 
the treaty stated:  
 
 
The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be occupied and 
administered by Austria-Hungary. The government of Austria-Hungary, 
not desiring to undertake the administration of the Sanjak of Novi-Pazar 
[modern Kosovo Province], which extends between Serbia and 
Montenegro in a South-Easterly direction to the other side of Mitrovitza, 
the Ottoman administration will continue to exercise its functions there. 
Nevertheless, in order to assure the maintenance of the new political state 
                                                 
821
 Bederman, ―Rebus‖ (n 803) at p 9; Vagts (n 813) at p 467.  
822
 Bederman, ―Rebus‖ (n 803) at pp 11-12. 
823
 Bederman, ―Rebus‖ (n 803) at p 11.  
824
 See Bederman, ―Rebus‖ (n 803) at pp 14-15. 
825
 The London Declaration, 1871, as quoted in Vagts (n 813) at p 467. 
826
 See, for example, the statement of Gathorne Hardy, British Secretary of State for India in 1878. As the 
New York Times reported: ―Mr. Gathorne Hardy, Secretary for India, presiding at a banquet in Bradford 
to-night said the Government took its stand upon public faith and honesty, and upon the Declaration of 
1871, that one party to an arrangement could not withdraw from it without the consent of the rest.‖ 
―England‘s Eastern Policy‖ New York Times (April 30, 1878) available online at 
<www.newyorktimes.com> accessed on 7 April 2008.  
827
 Vagts (n 813) at p 467. 
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of affairs, as well as freedom and security of communications, Austria-
Hungary reserves the right of keeping garrisons and having military and 
commercial roads in the whole of this part of the ancient vilayet of Bosnia. 
To this end the governments of Austria-Hungary and Turkey reserve to 
themselves to come to an understanding on the details.
828
 
 
 
Austria annexed these territories and in time Turkey acquiesced to this annexation.
829
 
This was an example of acquiescence to a claim of rebus sic stantibus. This is important 
because Turkish acquiescence was seen by some commentators as a prelude to World 
War I.
830
 Vagts also mentions a fourth example, the Clayton Bulwer Treaty of 1850.  In 
this treaty the US and Great Britain both waived their claims to exclusive control over 
the Panama Canal.
831
 Article 1 of the Treaty stated ―[t]he governments of the United 
States and Great Britain hereby declare, that neither the one nor the other will ever 
obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship canal…‖832 
However, between 1858 and 1882 the US claimed that ―given changes in the economics 
of a canal, rebus sic stantibus allowed it to escape from its obligations.‖833 Great Britain 
disputed this claim.
834
 
 These examples illustrate that through the 19
th
 century the legality of the principle 
of rebus sic stantibus was denied in order to promote stability in international 
obligations. However, the preference for procedural stability was altered by World War 
I. Bederman observes that, ―World War I was the decisive moment in reshaping 
thinking about the role of law in international politics.‖835 This shift resulted in the fact 
that ―[f]rom 1919 to 1939 there were more claims of the right to resort to rebus sic 
stantibus than over all the prior history of the claim.‖836 The increased uses of the 
principle of rebus sic stantibus produced feeble attempts to limit the right of states to 
claim a fundamental change of circumstances.  One attempt to limit this principle was in 
Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. This Article gave the League the 
power to decide when a treaty would no longer be in force.
837
 It stated that ―[t]he 
                                                 
828
 ―Excerpts on the Balkans‖ The Treaty of Berlin, 1878 at Art XXV in the Modern History Sourcebook 
online at <www.fordham.edu> accessed on 8 April 2008 [text in brackets in original]; See also Vagts (n 
813) at p 467. 
829
 Vagts (n 813) at p 467. 
830
 Bederman, ―Rebus‖ (n 803) at p 23. 
831
 Vagts (n 813) at p 467. 
832
 Convention Between the United States of America and Her Britannic Majesty (1850) available online 
at <www.academic.brookly.cuny.edu/history/johnson/cb.htm> accessed on 8 April 2008. 
833
 Vagts (n 813) at pp 467-8. 
834
 Vagts (n 813) at p 468. 
835
 Bederman, ―Rebus‖ (n 803) at p 24. 
836
 Vagts (n 803) at p 468. 
837
 See generally, Vagts (n 803) at p 468.  
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Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League 
of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international 
conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.‖838 Therefore, 
rebus sic stantibus was permitted but only with the consent of the League itself. This 
was an attempt to limit the use of this claim. Further, Vagts notes that in this period the 
PCIJ heard two cases involving rebus sic stantibus. The first of these cases was the 
Nationality Decrees of Tunis and Morocco. In this case the PCIJ considered whether or 
not France was entitled to enact nationality decrees affecting British citizens in Tunisia 
and Morocco. France argued that previous treaties governing this question were 
invalidated by the principle of rebus sic stantibus.
839
 However, the relevance of this 
example is limited as the parties agreed on the merits, preventing a final decision on the 
issue by the Court.
840
 The second case was the Case of Free Zones of Upper Savoy and 
Gex.
841
 In this case the PCIJ considered a dispute between Switzerland and France. At 
issue in this case was the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles in which Switzerland‘s 
neutrality was recognized in exchange for giving up sovereignty of upper Savoy. This 
led to negotiations over the effect of earlier treaties that created ―free zones‖ to protect 
Geneva.
842
 Switzerland was not a party to the Treaty of Versailles. France argued that 
this Treaty superseded the earlier treaties on the basis of rebus sic stantibus. In the end 
the PCIJ held that the Treaty of Versailles could not be applied against Switzerland 
since it was not a party to the treaty.
843
 
 Confusion about this principle continued after World War II, as states were 
concerned that Germany had invoked rebus sic stantibus in the run up to the war. 
844
  
However, worries about the misuse of rebus sic stantibus never translated into a 
challenge to the principle itself.
845
 Bederman notes that in both the interwar and post 
war periods, attempts to reconcile claims of rebus sic stantibus with a staunch 
interpretation of the London Declaration resulted in reduced reliance on this 
principle.
846
   
                                                 
838
 The Covenant of the League of Nations at Art 19 available online at 
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leagcov.htm#art19> accessed on 8 April 2008. 
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, 1921 (Advisory 
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 Following the creation of the United Nations, the application of rebus sic 
stantibus changed. This change occurred because the UN Charter contained the ―modest 
and realistic notion that states should behave properly in their international relations.‖847 
Elaboration of what constituted ―proper behaviour‖ included establishing circumstances 
in which a treaty could be modified. The situations when a treaty could be modified 
were negotiated leading up to the VCLT. For example, in 1935 the Harvard Research 
project wrote a Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties. This draft convention included 
a clause allowing for a treaty to be terminated in cases of changed circumstances.
848
 
However, to terminate a treaty on these grounds, a party had to obtain a declaration 
from an international tribunal that confirmed the changed circumstances.
849
 This was a 
method of limiting recourse to this process. 
 This limitation was not adopted by states‘ parties in the final text of the VCLT.850 
Article 62 of the VCLT reads, 
 
 
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard 
to those existing at the time of conclusion of a treaty, and which was not 
foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or 
withdrawing from the treaty unless: 
(a)  the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of 
the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and 
(b) the effect of the change is to radically transform the extent of 
obligations still to be performed under the treaty. 
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground 
for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty: 
(a) if the treaty established a boundary; or 
(b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party 
invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other 
international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty. 
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental 
change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from 
a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending the 
operation of a treaty.
851
 
 
 
                                                 
847
 Bederman, ―Rebus‖ (n 803) 29. 
848
 Vagts (n 813) 469. 
849
 Article 28, Research in International Law: III. Law of Treaties, 29 Am J. of Int‘l L. Supp. 657, 1119-
1120, as quoted in Vagts (n 813). 
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 VCLT (n 303); See also A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (CUP, Cambridge 2000) 361; See 
also Vagts (n 813) 470. 
851
 VCLT (n 303) at Art 62. 
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Article 62 has been considered several times by the ICJ. It was considered in the 
Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland) and the 
Gabickovo-Nagymoros case.
852
 In the first of these cases, Fisheries Jurisdiction 
(Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Iceland sought to unilaterally extend its 
fishing jurisdiction to 12 miles. It did so in accordance with its domestic policy. This 
policy change led to an ―exchange of notes‖ with Germany in 1961. Germany agreed in 
these notes to respect the new boundaries and to phase out its ships from Icelandic 
waters.
853
 These notes required Iceland to provide six months‘ notice to Germany of any 
further extension of its fishing zone. Iceland provided this notice in 1971.
854
 Germany 
wished to challenge this extension. Germany argued that these notes were intended to 
confer jurisdiction on the ICJ and the Court agreed
855
 but Iceland did not participate in 
the hearing. However, the Icelandic Althing (parliament) passed a resolution stating that 
these compromisory clauses were no longer of effect.
856
 One reason for this was 
provided in communications to the Court by the Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
The Minister asserted that there were ―…changed circumstances resulting from the 
ever-increasing exploitation of the fishery resources in the seas surrounding Iceland.‖ 857 
In response the ICJ observed that  
 
 
International law admits a fundamental change in the circumstances which 
determined the parties to accept a treaty, if it has resulted in a radical 
transformation of the extent of the obligations imposed by it, it may, under 
certain conditions, afford the party affected a ground for invoking the 
termination or suspension of the treaty. This principle, and the conditions 
and exceptions to which it is subject, have been embodied in Article 62 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which may, in many 
respects be considered as a codification of existing customary law on the 
subject of the termination of a treaty relationship on account of change of 
circumstances.
858
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The ICJ held that Article 62 was a custom that had been codified by treaty law. The 
Court also held that a claim of changed circumstance under the VCLT must be 
―fundamental‖ in nature.859 Further, the Court concluded that even if a change was 
fundamental and caused a treaty to lapse, this lapse would never affect the 
compromisory clause that established the Court‘s jurisdiction.860 The Court considered 
that ―…in order that a change of circumstances may give rise to a ground for invoking 
the termination of a treaty it is also necessary that it should have resulted from a radical 
transformation of the extent of obligations still to be performed.‖861 The obligations 
must have become such a ―burden‖ that they fundamentally altered the original 
obligation. The Court did not find a radical change on the facts of this case.
862
 Finally, 
the Court agreed with Germany‘s contention that a claim of changed circumstances did 
not automatically release a state from its obligations. Changed circumstances existed by 
mutual agreement of the signatories or by judicial ―settlement‖ that the circumstances 
had changed.
863
 
 Rebus sic stantibus was also considered in the Case Concerning Gabcikovo-
Nagymoros Project.
864
 In this case Hungary wished to terminate a 1977 treaty with 
Czechoslovakia. Hungary asserted ―that it was entitled to invoke a number of events 
which, cumulatively, would have constituted a fundamental change of 
circumstances.‖865 Hungary referred to political changes that had occurred as well as 
economic viability and environmental concerns and norms.
866
 On the facts of this case 
the Court held that the changed political situation did not affect the original 
circumstances of the treaty. Similarly, the ICJ did not consider economic shifts to be 
fundamental.
867
 The Court also held that the environmental changes claimed by 
Hungary were in fact anticipated in the treaty.
868
 Consequently, Hungary‘s claim of 
fundamental change of circumstances was unsuccessful on all these grounds.
869
 
 In these two cases the Court held that a fundamental change of circumstances 
justified termination of a treaty and that a fundamental change of circumstances was a 
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custom of international law. However, in both these cases the Court refused to find on 
the facts a change in circumstances. As Vagts notes, ―[w]hat can be said is that rebus sic 
stantibus will not avail unless the change in circumstances is clearly a drastic change 
from the circumstances anticipated by the parties.‖ 870  Vagts indicates that Court 
interpreted rebus sic stantibus narrowly; the claim of changed circumstances was 
limited to instances of radical change. Through this approach the ICJ preserved the 
stability of law, but only by narrowing interpretations of changed circumstances, which 
was a concept that had been designed to promote change in the law. 
 
 
3.1.3 The Opposition Between Pacta Sunt Servanda and Rebus Sic Stantibus 
Bederman traces the genealogy of the 1871 London Declaration. Through this history 
he explores the relationship between the principle of pacta sunt servanda and the 
principle of rebus sic stantibus.
871
  He notes that ―[p]acta sunt servanda and rebus sic 
stantibus express different visions of international law. One is harmonious and stable; 
the other is dynamic dangerous and uncertain.‖872 Bederman is not the only 
commentator to note the opposition of stability and change in these principles. 
Lauterpacht notes of rebus sic stantibus that  
 
 
[t]here are only few problems of international law that have caused more 
embarrassment to international publicists, or which are more unsettled then 
the doctrine in question [clausula rebus sic stantibus]. The clausula is, on 
the one hand, commonly styled as ‗mischievous‘ and ‗notorious‘ and as 
revealing in a striking manner the absence of law within the international 
community. It is, on the other hand, almost universally conceded that some 
aspects of the doctrine are just and necessary, and that it would be 
unreasonable to reject it lock, stock, and barrel. These two opposing 
opinions are, as a rule, held by the same writers who try to bridge the gulf 
between the two points of view by advising the utmost caution and 
conscientious self-restraint in the resort to be had to the clausula. 
873
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In this quotation Lauterpacht identifies the core debate mediated by the doctrine of 
process. He acknowledges that processes of law try to create stability and that as a result 
recourse to the clausula rebus sic stantibus is limited. However, he also notes that the 
limitation of rebus sic stantibus hampers the ability of states to respond to changes in 
their circumstances. Vagts agrees with Lauterpacht. Vagts writes that, ―[p]erhaps the 
major effect of the doctrine is the way in which it lightens the load of the state seeking 
to escape its treaty obligation. Some observers would say that it provides a needed 
elasticity in the law of treaties so that countries that would otherwise simply violate 
their obligations can escape respectably.‖874   
 The process of treaty law mediates between stability and change. States are 
reluctant to enter into obligations that can never be changed. However, states require the 
stability that absent extraordinary circumstances promises will be kept. For this reason 
the ICJ has interpreted Article 62 of the VCLT restrictively. Therefore, processes of 
treaty law provide stability by limiting the circumstances in which a treaty can be 
terminated. It appears that stability is preferred but change is permitted. This balancing 
of procedural parameters is also present in the doctrine of custom formation and in the 
principle of equity. 
 
 
3.2 Custom 
Guzman and Meyer claim that custom does not have an established process.
875
 They 
note that custom has ―…struggled with the vexing question of how to promote stability 
and reliance on customary law, while preserving the voluntary support of customary law 
in the fluid environment of international relations.‖876   This claim results from the fact 
that the processes that guide custom are customary in nature.
877
 However, the mere fact 
that these processes are customary does not mean that they do not exist. Arguably, in 
custom the process of custom formation mediates the debates between stability and 
change in a manner that the doctrine recognizes. Consequently, the relationship between 
                                                 
874
 Vagts (n 813) at p 476. 
875
 AT Guzman & TL Meyer, ―Customary International Law in the 21st Century‖ UC Berkeley Public 
Law Research Paper No. 984581, available online at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=984581> accessed on 3 May 2008. 
876
 V Fon & F Parisi, ―Stability and Change in International Customary Law‖ (April 2004) American Law 
& Economics Association Annual Meetings. American Law & Economics Association 14th Annual 
Meeting Working Paper 21 available online at <http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art21> accessed on 3 
May 2008. 
877
 Fon & Parisi (n 876) 
214  Betina Kuzmarov 
stability and change in custom can be examined through the principles of custom 
formation and the doctrine of the persistent objector. 
 
 
3.2.1 The Elements of Custom Formation 
The requirements of custom formation are derived from the definition of custom. 
Custom is commonly defined as state practice adhered to out of the subjective belief 
that the custom is legal.
878
 When the conditions of state practice and subjective belief 
are met, custom creates a legal obligation. Therefore, these requirements provide a 
mechanism by which actions of states, over time, create legal obligations. Also, once a 
custom is established it is effective against states as general international law. The 
general nature of customary obligations indicates that stability is fostered when the two 
elements of custom formation are present.
879
 However, there is widespread debate over 
the amount of state practice necessary for a custom to develop.  There is also a debate 
over how long that practice must be sustained to create consensus. Additionally, the 
meaning of the subjective requirement of belief is not settled.
880
 As a result, there are 
two circumstances in which this belief is determined. First, an international tribunal may 
declare that a custom exists and it creates a legal obligation.
881
 Second, states may 
collectively declare a custom legal. Although, as a collective unilateral act this 
declaration must satisfy the requirements of intention and autonomy, requirements 
already proven to raise questions of legality.
882
  
 As such, the rules of custom formation establish methods of turning state action 
into a legal custom, but the methods adopted are broad and imprecise. The methods 
provide a stable form but are ambiguous enough to account for change. In sum, the 
process of custom formation can be explained as promoting stability and permitting 
change. This indicates that custom formation mediates the debates as required of the 
doctrine of process. Further, the relationship between stability and change in custom 
formation is particularly evident in one rule of custom formation, the persistent objector 
principle. This rule will now be examined more thoroughly. 
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3.2.2 The Persistent Objector: The Exception to the Principle of Custom Formation 
The persistent objector principle is an exception to the process of custom formation.
883
 
This principle was affirmed by the ICJ in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (UK v. 
Iceland).
884
 In its present shape the persistent objector principle permits a state to object 
to a custom and to refuse to be obligated by it. Consequently, in order to qualify as a 
persistent objector a state must object to the custom during its formative period and 
consistently thereafter;
885
 and once this custom has been objected to the custom cannot 
be applied to the state. One problem with the doctrine is that this doctrine may be 
invoked out of political interest so that it does not always represent a principled 
objection to a custom.
886
 This is particularly problematic since persistent objector status 
is determined by state consent.
887
 Therefore, the persistent objector doctrine is a 
departure from general methods of custom formation, as it is a rule which recognizes 
that states can legitimately opt out of a custom. This results in a situation in which 
custom is applied against some states but not all states. As a result this principle limits 
application of custom by providing a stable process for states to object to a customary 
obligation, since a state can always object to a custom as it is formed. To conclude, the 
persistent objector doctrine provides stability by limiting processes of change in custom 
formation. 
 An additional difficulty is that the doctrine of the persistent objector is not 
universally accepted as a process of international law. For example, Danilenko notes 
that this rule has been opposed in opinions of the ICJ.
888
 Further, Stein notes that the 
persistent objector doctrine is rarely used in practice.
889
 Consequently, the existence of 
the rule of the persistent objector is debatable,
890
 although its existence is regularly 
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asserted.
891
 Consequently, what can be concluded about this doctrine is that it likely 
exists in theory but it lacks the state practice to establish doctrine in this area. This in 
turn demonstrates the doctrinal preference for processes of stability over those that 
promote change.  
  
 
3.2.3 Stability and Change in Custom Formation 
Custom formation establishes processes for state practice to create custom.  These 
processes promote both stability and change, and are broad enough to allow states to 
change general obligations which affect their vital interests. Custom achieves this 
balance between the need for stability and the need for change by recognizing the 
persistent objector. This principle permits states to maintain an objection to a custom 
provided they have objected to the custom persistently and publicly since it was formed. 
However, this principle also promotes stability by limiting opportunities to change 
custom once it is formed. As such custom formation is explained by both stability and 
change. Custom ―fits‖ within the doctrine of process as it mediates debates between 
stability and change that is necessary to provide structure to international law. 
 
 
3.3 Equity 
Equity in international law is not well defined or well understood.
892
 In fact, doctrine 
uses the term equity in three distinct ways. Equity can refer to: a substantive principle of 
justice; a general principle of law; or a specific process to achieve equity. To illustrate, 
Lowe defines equity as ―general principles of justice as distinguished from any 
particular system of jurisprudence or the municipal law of any state.‖ He wants to 
―…use the term to signify equity as distinct from law.‖893 He defines equity as a 
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substantive principle. This is the first use of equity. The second use of equity is as a 
source of law. While equity is not listed in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ,
894
  it is 
formally incorporated into decisions of the ICJ in two ways. First, equity is considered a 
general principle of law. As a principle of law it is a source of legal obligation. Second, 
equity is introduced in Article 38 (2) of the Statute of the ICJ. This provision states that 
―This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et 
bono, if the parties agree thereto.‖895 This Article established that equity is a source of 
international law. Third, equity also refers to the ability of the ICJ to choose the law 
applicable to the dispute before it.
896
 As a result, equity operates in many ways at the 
Court,
897
 including the use of equitable processes, reaching equitable decisions and 
determining equitable results.
898
 Consequently, equity is also described as a ―lawmaking 
process‖899 insofar as it establishes methods of achieving equitable processes, equitable 
decisions or equitable results. It is the third sense of equity,, equity as a process, that is 
the focus here. Therefore, in this section equity refers to the processes by which 
principles of justice are incorporated into decisions of the ICJ.   
    
 
3.3.1 The Substance and Form of Equity 
It is necessary to explain the substance and form of equity in order to understand the 
processes of equity that are applied by the ICJ. Equity refers to a substantive principle 
of justice. Another way of describing this is ―equity-as-fairness.‖900 The substance of 
equity is applied by the Court in three circumstances. Equity is used when formal 
doctrine would lead to unfairness;  it is used to prevent misapplication of the substance 
of law; and it is also used to fill gaps in the law.
901
 The substantive use of equity is 
demonstrated by the doctrinal debate as to whether Courts can refuse to apply a law 
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because they consider it unjust.
902
 As a substantive principle equity is given legal form 
by incorporation into the framework of existing law. Shaw explains that ―what is really 
in question here is the use of equitable principles in the context of a rule requiring such 
an approach. The relevant courts are not applying abstract principles of justice, but 
rather deriving equitable principles and solutions from applicable law.‖903 There are two 
―rules‖ that require an equitable approach. First, equity is considered a general principle 
of law.
904
 Second, equity can be applied by the Court when the parties agree a case may 
be decided ex aequo et bono.
905
  
 Equity was first interpreted as a general principle of law by the PCIJ in the 
Diversion of Water from the River Meuse case. In this case Judge Hudson held that 
equity was an independent principle of international law.
906
  He asserted that ―[w]hat are 
widely known as principles of equity have long been considered to constitute part of 
international law, and as such they have often been applied by international 
tribunals.‖907 He argued that, ―[i]t must be concluded, therefore that Article 38 of the 
Statute, if not independently of that Article, the Court has some freedom to consider 
principles of equity as part of the international law which it must apply.‖908 This 
contention was affirmed in the Rann of Kutch Arbitration. This was an arbitration heard 
at the Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal.
909
 In this decision the panel 
denied a motion by Pakistan to decide the case ex aequo.
910
 However, the panel did 
assert that equity was a general principle of law.
911
  Equity was also considered in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf case.  This case held that maritime delimitation was 
determined by principles of equity; the equidistance principle of maritime delimitation 
could not be applied if it would lead to an inequitable result. Further, the ICJ held that 
equity formed a rule of law. 
912
 Similarly, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case the ICJ 
directed the United Kingdom and Iceland to resolve their dispute using equitable 
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principles.
913
  In this case the Court held by 10 votes to 4 that ―…the government of 
Iceland and the Government of the United Kingdom are under mutual obligations to 
undertake negotiations in good faith for the equitable solution of their differences 
concerning their fishery rights…‖914  Additionally, the scope of the principles of equity 
was clarified by the Libya/Malta case. In this case it was determined that equity 
required consistency in its application.
915
 Finally, the Mali v. Burkina Faso case 
considered the meaning of equity, but felt equity did not apply in cases of established 
boundaries.
916
 
 The second type of equity is equity ex aequo et bono. Equity ex aequo is a source 
of international law as it gives formal effect to principles of fairness.  This type of 
equity is confined to tribunals and it is only available when permitted by a tribunal‘s 
statute.
917
 The main example of this type of equity is Article 38 (2) of the Statute of the 
ICJ. This Article states that: ―[t]his provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court 
to decide a case ex aequo et bono if the parties agree thereto.‖918  This form of equity is 
often dismissed as a product of the statute of the Court because state consent is 
necessary for the ICJ to decide a matter ex aequo.
919
 This consent has never been 
given.
920
 However, as Cassese notes, ―[w]henever an international court or tribunal 
applies equity, it creates law between the parties to a dispute.‖921  It is this application of 
equity that turns the substantive principle of fairness into a general principle of law. 
This is the procedural function of equity and it is this function that will now be 
examined in further detail. 
  
 
3.3.2 The Processes of Equity 
Equity describes the processes by which principles of justice/fairness are applied at the 
ICJ. It refers to the methods the Court uses to achieve equitable proceedings, equitable 
decisions or equitable results. Equitable processes are required because the substance of 
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fairness is not predetermined; this produces a situation where the substance of equity is 
formed only by the methods used to achieve fairness as a general principle of law. 
Therefore, equity functions as a process. Three examples of equitable principles that 
have been applied by international tribunals are compensation, estoppels and the 
equidistance/special circumstances rule.
922
 These examples demonstrate the range of 
processes of equity.  
 The first example of an equitable process is compensation. Compensation is 
awarded according to equitable principles. For example, at the end of the Mexican 
revolution Mexico and the United Kingdom established the British-Mexican Claims 
Commission.
923
 The Commission heard 110 claims.
924
 One claim heard by this the 
Commission was Dennis J. and Daniel Spillane (Great Britain) v. United Mexican 
States.
925
 In this claim the Commission found that the Spillane‘s claims for 
compensation were ―exaggerated.‖ Consequently, it was in the interest of the 
―principles of justice and equity‖ to award only part of the claim.926 This arbitration was 
one example of the ability of a tribunal to award compensation on an equitable basis.
927
 
In this case equity acted as a legal process for determination of fair compensation. It 
allowed the ICJ to depart from the compensation claimed. As a result of this decision, 
the substantive principle of fairness was turned into a general principle of law through 
the outcome it produced, equitable compensation. As such, equity was a method of 
calculating damages. As a result, equity provided justification for variations in 
compensation. Therefore, equitable principles provided limited stability for variations in 
tribunal awards. 
 The second example of an equitable process is estoppels. In the previous chapter it 
was noted that estoppels can act as a bar to proceeding before an international tribunal. 
When used this way equity constitutes a substantive principle that acts as a procedural 
restraint in international law.
928
 One illustration of this type of estoppels was the 
Eastern Greenland case. This case considered the force of the Ihlen Declaration, 
specifically whether this declaration barred Norway from pursuing a claim to territories 
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in Greenland.
929
 In this case the Ihlen Declaration acted as a procedural restraint, when 
the Court barred Norway from denying the statements of their government official. One 
outcome of this decision is that this case is often classified as an estoppel. Further, this 
case demonstrated that estoppels act as more than a substantive principle,  in this case 
they also provided a method for the court to enforce a promise in the case of good faith. 
Therefore, in this case estoppels protected good faith through process, and in doing so 
ensured that the ICJ introduced procedural stability.  
 The third example of an equitable process is the equidistance/special 
circumstances rule of maritime delimitation. This type of equitable process was 
prominently considered in the North Sea Continental Shelf case. This case held that that 
the equidistance principle of maritime delimitation could not be applied if it would lead 
to an inequitable result. 
930
 However, as Evans notes, 
 
 
Many in the international legal community – judges, advocates, and 
academics – have now spent much of the last 35 years attempting to make 
this [case] mean more or less the opposite of what it says and today there 
is an imperative rule, and that is the equidistance/special circumstances 
rule.
931
 
 
 
To illustrate this point he cites the Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening) where the court stated
932
  
 
 
The Court has on various occasions made it clear what the applicable 
criteria, principles and rules of delimitation are when a line covering 
several zones of coincident jurisdiction is to be determined. They are 
expressed in the so-called equitable principles/relevant circumstances 
method. This method, which is very similar to the equidistance/special 
circumstances method applicable in delimitation of the territorial sea, 
involves first drawing an equidistance line, then considering whether there 
are factors calling for the adjustment or shifting of that line in order to 
achieve an ‗equitable result‘.933 
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Evans argues that the Court has de facto always applied the equidistance/special 
circumstances rule to achieve an equitable delimitation in maritime boundary 
disputes.
934
 This supports the view that equitable principles act as a process, and that 
that process is the equidistance/special principles rule. This is demonstrated by the fact 
that this rule produces equitable results.
935
 Further, through this method of maritime 
delimitation, equity is given legal form. Consequently, the equidistance/special 
principles rule performs the functions of process in the area of maritime delimitation.   
 Therefore, the processes of compensation, estoppels and the equidistance/special 
circumstances rule are all methods of applying equity. These examples demonstrate that 
equity is applied as a process of international law and, moreover, that equity performs 
the functions of doctrine of process of international law 
 
 
3.3.3 Analysis 
Equity arises when the ICJ applies substantive principles of justice as general principles 
of law.
936
 To explain why this occurs, recall that equity mediates between sources and 
substance. Consequently, the methods of applying equity can be explained in terms of 
the doctrine of process, and its requirements of stability and change. One example of 
this  use of equity arises when courts apply these principles to determine compensation. 
As discussed above, compensation is decided on facts, not the law, which makes levels 
of compensation vary widely. Consequently, methods of compensation promote change 
and provide an explanation for variations in tribunal awards, providing stability to 
processes that might otherwise be seen as arbitrary. Similarly, equitable principles such 
as estoppels ensure that good faith is protected. Moreover, estoppels also establish 
processes that create ordered defection from a promise, as was seen in the example of 
the principle of equity in maritime delimitation. This principle is interpreted as the 
outcome of application of a proper method, the equidistance/special circumstances rule. 
This rule provides form to the substantive principle of equity in maritime delimitation, 
therefore it acts as a process.  
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 Alternatively, equity promotes change in international law, as ―…on the broadest 
level it is possible to see equity (in an analogy with domestic law) as constituting a 
creative charge in legal development, producing the dynamic changes in the system 
rendered inflexible by the strict application of rules.‖937 However, this change is often 
limited in practice through process. This is borne out by the examples of estoppels and 
the equidistance/special circumstances rule. These rules require a consistent practice in 
interpreting equitable principles. Even in the case of compensation, which promotes 
change, processes provide more stability than if equity had not been applied.
938
 These 
examples confirm that overall doctrine prefers stability over potential for change but 
must account for both. This explains why estoppels and decisions in maritime 
delimitation cases are considered to have more doctrinal legitimacy than abstract 
principles of compensation. The doctrinal preference for stability is also evident in the 
example of UNCLOS. 
 
 
3.4 Example: UNCLOS 
UNCLOS is a comprehensive agreement that governs the law of the sea.
939
 It is an 
example of how the processes of international law promote stability and limit change. 
Boyle notes that UNCLOS is an 
 
 
…interlocking package deal, its provisions form an integrated whole, 
protected from derogation by compulsory third-party settlement of 
disputes, a prohibition on reservations, and a ban on incompatible inter se 
agreements.  Within these limits, it was intended to be capable of further 
evolution through amendment, the incorporation by reference of other 
generally accepted international agreements and standards, and the 
adoption of additional global and regional agreements and soft law.
940
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Thus, UNCLOS has a unique framework. It promotes stability by limiting states‘ ability 
to defect from the treaty‘s obligations and it further limits change by providing 
mechanisms for review of the treaty obligations. Consequently, UNCLOS establishes 
the processes used in the area of the law of sea.  
 
3.4.1 UNCLOS Processes that Promote Stability 
Boyle observes that UNCLOS is intended to be a ―comprehensive‖ agreement.941 It has 
unique processes that prohibit reservations to the agreement and incompatible side 
agreements.
942
 These requirements promote adherence to the treaty‘s substantive 
obligations. These requirements are procedural. They also link the substance of the 
treaty to the way the obligation is implemented. As such, UNCLOS strives for 
procedural stability in the law of the sea. 
 To illustrate this point Article 300 of UNCLOS states that ―States Parties shall 
fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the 
rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner which 
would not constitute an abuse of right.‖943 This statement affirms the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda. It also underpins the assertion that UNCLOS is a comprehensive regime 
for the law of the sea. It establishes stable processes to ensure the ability to regulate the 
law of the sea. This preference for stability is expanded on in the Articles that prohibit 
derogation from the treaty. 
 Additionally, Article 309 of UNCLOS prohibits reservations to the treaty. This 
provision states that ―[n]o reservations or exceptions may be made to this Convention 
unless expressly permitted by other articles of this Convention.‖944 This provision limits 
the ability to change substantive obligations in the treaty. As a result it promotes 
stability. However, the rigid requirement of stability is softened by the exceptions to 
this rule. An example of an exception is found in the declarations permitted by Article 
310. Article 310 establishes that  
 
 
Article 309 does not preclude a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding 
to this Convention, from making declarations or statements, however 
phrased or named, with a view, inter alia, to the harmonization of its laws 
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and regulations with the provisions of this Convention, provided that such 
declarations or statements do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal 
effect of the provisions of this Convention in their application to that 
State.
945
 
 
 
Thus, Article 310 actually limits a state party‘s ability to change the meaning of 
UNCLOS through its statements. According to this Article, a state can only use 
unilateral statements to harmonise, but not modify, its obligations.  
 Continuing in this vein, Articles 311 (3)-(6) restrict states‘ ability to enter into 
agreements that subvert the object and purpose of UNCLOS or impede a state party‘s 
ability to perform its obligations or exercise its rights under the treaty. States cannot 
derogate from the provisions affecting the ―common heritage of mankind‖. These 
provisions establish that 
 
 
 
3. Two or more States Parties may conclude agreements modifying or 
suspending the operation of provisions of this Convention, applicable 
solely to the relations between them, provided that such agreements do 
not relate to a provision derogation from which is incompatible with the 
effective execution of the object and purpose of this Convention, and 
provided further that such agreements shall not affect the application of 
the basic principles embodied herein, and that the provisions of such 
agreements do not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their 
rights or the performance of their obligations under this Convention. 
4. States Parties intending to conclude an agreement referred to in 
paragraph 3 shall notify the other States Parties through the depositary of 
this Convention of their intention to conclude the agreement and of the 
modification or suspension for which it provides.  
5. This article does not affect international agreements expressly 
permitted or preserved by other articles of this Convention. 
6. States Parties agree that there shall be no amendments to the basic 
principle relating to the common heritage of mankind set forth in 
article 136 and that they shall not be party to any agreement in 
derogation thereof.
 946
 
 
 
 
Therefore, Article 311 provides stability in the law of the sea by limiting the ability of 
states to conclude side agreements that affect the performance of obligations under 
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UNCLOS. These agreements would weaken the normativity of the treaty. As a result 
they must be limited so that stability is achieved. 
 Stability is further ensured by the mandatory dispute resolution provisions. 
Article 279 requires that states peacefully resolve disputes that arise under the 
convention.
947
 Parties are entitled to choose the means by which their dispute is 
resolved.
948
 This includes non-binding methods such as conciliation
949
 as well as 
binding dispute resolution processes.
950
 If states are unable to resolve their dispute 
through non-binding means they must choose to resolve their dispute at one of three 
binding forums: the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the ICJ, or a specially 
constituted arbitral tribunal. States may elect which body they choose to resolve their 
disputes through a written declaration. If they do not choose a forum for their dispute a 
state is deemed to pick arbitration. If both parties to a dispute declare the same process 
this process automatically becomes the forum for the dispute. If they do not agree to the 
same forum then the dispute is resolved by arbitration.
951
 The bodies are entitled to 
resolve any dispute which comes before them. To resolve disputes UNCLOS and 
general international law are applied. A body may also decide a dispute ex aequo et 
bono at the request of the parties.
952
 The exceptions to these rules are enumerated in 
Articles 297 and 298.
953
 
 In conclusion, states must abide by their obligations in UNCLOS in good faith. 
Consequently, the processes to derogate from these obligations are limited and any 
disputes that arise must be peacefully resolved. As such, these processes promote 
adherence to the UNCLOS regime and they promote a level of stability. Further, 
stability requires limiting the circumstances of change. Processes that permit change 
will now be examined. 
 
 
3.4.2 UNCLOS Processes Which Promote Change 
UNCLOS also permits change in limited circumstances: it allows for amendment by 
consensus, and it also permits expansion through incorporation of other international 
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laws and standards such as soft law.
954
  These two methods of change are examined 
because, generally speaking, UNCLOS does not permit derogation from its obligations; 
reservations to UNCLOS are prohibited. However, after 10 years in force amendments 
are permitted. This is established in Article 312, which reads 
 
 
 
1. After the expiry of a period of 10 years from the date of entry into 
force of this Convention, a State Party may, by written communication 
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, propose 
specific amendments to this Convention, other than those relating to 
activities in the Area, and request the convening of a conference to 
consider such proposed amendments. The Secretary-General shall 
circulate such communication to all States Parties. If, within 12 months 
from the date of the circulation of the communication, not less than one 
half of the States Parties reply favourably to the request, the Secretary-
General shall convene the conference. 
2. The decision-making procedure applicable at the amendment 
conference shall be the same as that applicable at the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea unless otherwise decided by 
the conference. The conference should make every effort to reach 
agreement on any amendments by way of consensus and there should be 
no voting on them until all efforts at consensus have been exhausted.
955
 
 
 
There is also a simplified process for amendment of obligations. In this process a state 
provides an amendment to the Secretary General of the United Nations. This 
amendment is then passed on to the other state parties. If no parties object within 12 
months the amendment enters into force. If any state party objects to the proposed 
amendment then the amendment does not come into force.
956
 The only exception to this 
rule is an amendment to the amendment process which is limited even further.
957
 
Moreover, it must be noted that there is a distinction between this amendment process, 
which is limited, and modifications to UNCLOS. Freestone and Elferink argue that a 
modification is not an amendment, so modifications are permitted under UNCLOS. 
This difference is highlighted by the two implementation agreements that have been 
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entered into since UNCLOS came into force.
958
 These are modifications that are 
permitted without requiring the formal amendment process.  
 All the processes just noted permit change to UNCLOS. However, it is argued 
that these provisions are so difficult to implement as to be practically impossible to 
operate.
959
 Consequently, the processes of amendment are a method of permitting and 
yet limiting change. 
 Other aspects of UNCLOS also permit limited change. For example, Article 211 
concerns pollution of the marine environment by vessels. This article states: 
 
 
1. States, acting through the competent international organization or 
general diplomatic conference, shall establish international rules and 
standards to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine 
environment from vessels and promote the adoption, in the same manner, 
wherever appropriate, of routeing systems designed to minimize the threat 
of accidents which might cause pollution of the marine environment, 
including the coastline, and pollution damage to the related interests of 
coastal States. Such rules and standards shall, in the same manner, be re-
examined from time to time as necessary.
960
 
 
 
Article 211 does not specify the process required to prevent pollution of the marine 
environment. These rules can take either the form of a rule or the form of a ―standard.‖ 
The process required for states to prevent marine pollution is not fixed nor is it clearly 
legal in form. This instability means that this provision will not necessarily turn the 
substance of the provision into a legal obligation. Therefore, Article 211 fosters 
processes of change. Further, the language of ―rules and standards‖ is not used in other 
Articles of UNCLOS which require states to pass ―laws‖ and ―regulations‖.961 The 
terms ―laws‖ and ―regulations‖ require states to establish legal processes. Therefore, 
there are times were UNCLOS purposely does not require a stable legal process as a 
way of permitting change.  
 Additionally, provisions of UNCLOS incorporate other international agreements 
or standards. Boyle notes the specific provisions of UNCLOS which introduce these 
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principles.
962
 Additionally, Article 293 permits disputes under UNCLOS to be resolved 
by general international law or, if the parties elect, ex aequo et bono. These provisions 
introduce instability into international law by allowing states to interpret their 
obligations by reference to wider obligations of law. Through interpretation the 
obligations of UNCLOS are modified or expanded. Therefore, UNCLOS implicitly 
introduces processes by which obligations can change. However, these processes are 
limited in terms of substance and scope. For example, general law is introduced 
specifically to resolve disputes and its application is limited to these provisions of the 
treaty.  The provisions on dispute resolution incorporate general international law and 
equity. In other areas of UNCLOS incorporation is more limited. Consequently, 
processes of UNCLOS permit change. However, change is limited and strictly 
controlled. 
 
 
3.4.3 Analysis 
UNCLOS is a strong example of the doctrine of process. UNCLOS establishes a 
complete regime for the law of the seas. This includes processes to implement its 
substantive obligations and it includes mechanisms such as prohibitions on reservations 
that prevent derogation from the treaty. These processes provide a link between the 
treaty form and the substance of the law and secure stability in the regime. UNCLOS 
further ensures stability by limiting the circumstances in which treaty obligations can be 
changed. However, it also establishes the way in which obligations are modified and 
when its obligations can be expanded. As a result UNCLOS circumscribes change and 
ensures the stability of the system. Therefore, UNCLOS provides a concrete example of 
the way the doctrine of process mediates debates over the goals of processes of 
international law; it promotes stability and allows change. However, UNCLOS also 
demonstrates that stability processes are preferred by the doctrine so that opportunities 
for change to legal obligations are limited.   
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4. Stability and Change in International Law 
 
 
 
The doctrine of process allows international law to promote stability while permitting 
change. This is illustrated by the examples presented above. In treaty law rebus sic 
stantibus is derogation from the principle of pacta sunt servanda. As such, change is 
permitted as an exception to procedural stability. In customary law processes are less 
stable; however, custom formation and the doctrine of the persistent objector both 
function to provide stability and permit limited change. Similarly, equity acts as a 
method by which doctrine regulates change in general principles of law. Lastly, 
UNCLOS is an example of a specific treaty regime that creates procedural stability, but 
encourages change through amendments, its incorporation of rules and standards, and 
its incorporation of general international law. UNCLOS demonstrates that the doctrine 
of process promotes stability and limits change. To understand further how doctrine 
mediates between the requirements of stability and change, two legal concepts are 
instructive: stability and change are related to the concepts of hard law and soft law. 
These concepts help clarify the debates within the doctrine of process and explain its 
preference for stability, and so they will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
4.1 Hard Law and Soft Law in the Doctrine 
Weil identifies the ―blurring of the normativity threshold‖ as a key weakness of the 
international system.
963
 To Weil, ―the international norm is becoming a singularly 
evasive quarry…‖964 He asserts that doctrinal confusion is leading international law 
towards a system of graduated normativity.
965
 One way of conceptualizing this shift is 
through the concept of hard law as opposed to soft law. 
 Doctrine contrasts the notion of hard law with that of soft law. Abbott and Snidal 
define ―hard law‖ as ―legal obligations that are precise (or can be made precise through 
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adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulations).‖966 Hard law refers to a norm that 
creates a legal obligation.
967
 To rephrase this point: hard law refers to processes which 
ensure that substance is given legal authority. In contrast, soft law does not create a 
legal obligation. It is comprised of broad principles that have not been solidified into 
―rules,‖ and also soft law does not establish dispute resolution mechanisms.968 Boyle 
notes that these characteristics are not always dependent on the source of the obligation, 
as a treaty may contain both ―hard‖ and ―soft‖ obligations.969 This is seen in the 
example of Article 211 of UNCLOS.
970
 Moreover the ―softness‖ of an obligation is not 
predetermined. A given subject matter is not automatically hard or soft.
971
 
Consequently, the ―hardness‖ of the obligation is determined by the process used to 
implement the obligation.  
 Shelton notes that ―[a]n examination of practice demonstrates that the mode of 
adoption does matter and that states consciously choose the form of texts to distinguish 
those that are legally binding from those that are not.‖972 As such, Shelton demonstrates 
that process matters as the process chosen indicates whether states have a substantive 
interest in a substantive obligation taking formal effect as a source of law. Adopting a 
process that results in a formal obligation indicates that states‘ interests, whether 
individual or collective, are capable of establishing stable expectations of behaviour so 
that they have legal authority. Alternatively, the choice to adopt a ―soft‖ process results 
in a less formal obligation but allows for greater elasticity. This elasticity means that the 
obligation does not fit within the requirements of the doctrine of process because it does 
not provide substance with a stable legal source. Consequently, the relationship between 
―hard‖ law and ―soft‖ law demonstrates the role that the doctrine of process plays within 
the structure of international law. The reason why some processes harden is further 
developed in section 6.3.1 in the discussion of legalization. For present purposes it is 
sufficient to observe that the doctrine of process establishes methods to mediate the 
doctrinal debate by requiring processes that establish stability while limiting change. 
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Soft law promotes the opposite. A strong example of this point will be discussed below 
in the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty.  
 
 
4.2 Example: Treaty of Peace (Israel-Jordan) 
Bell notes that international peace agreements tend to go through several phases before 
leading up to a final text.
973
 The first phase is the ―prenegotiation‖ agreement. Bell 
describes these agreements as ―talks about talks.‖ They are less formal and political then 
treaty negotiations and they tend to result in ―soft‖ obligations974 that are not legal 
obligations on the parties. The next phase is the substantive or framework agreement 
that is often aimed at ending the conflict and creating peace. These agreements establish 
a ―framework‖ within which the conflict can end peacefully and as a result these 
agreements often include provisions regarding demilitarization and governance 
reforms.
975
 These agreements create legal obligations, though they often do not take the 
―treaty‖ form.976 Moreover, these agreements often involve non-state parties.977 Lastly, 
the final phase is the implementation or renegotiation agreement. These agreements 
expand and reconsider the earlier commitments. These agreements take varying ―forms‖ 
and use a variety of processes.
978
 As Bell notes, it is only the second category of 
substantive agreements that contain ―hard‖ treaties.  
 One example of a ―hard‖ peace treaty is the Treaty of Peace Between the State of 
Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
979
 This treaty was entered into in 1994 
980
 
as the culmination of back channel contacts that dated from the 1920s. Irrespective of 
wars and boundary changes these contacts produced highly functional informal 
regulation of issues of mutual interest.
981
 In the late 1980s efforts were made to 
formalize this arrangement; however, internal Israeli politics, the first intifada and a 
lack of US support led this initiative to fail. The first Gulf War changed the political and 
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economic conditions in Jordan and ensured that negotiations were restarted; Jordan had 
sided with Iraq in the war and had suffered economically, and so it needed US debt 
forgiveness and aid. These pressures led Jordan to seek US approval through 
negotiation with Israel.
982
 Additionally, the progress of Israeli-PLO negotiations led 
King Hussein of Jordan to try to protect his interests in the West Bank and Jerusalem.
983
 
As a result negotiations took place under US auspices in Madrid and then in 
Washington.
984
 
 The final treaty was preceded by the ―Washington Declaration.‖ This declaration 
was signed by Israel and Jordan on 25 July 1994.
985
 It outlined five ―underlying 
principles of their understanding‖ including: the negotiation of a final fair and durable 
peace, negotiating peace on the basis of existing UNSC resolutions, respect for the role 
of Jordan in maintaining holy sites in Jerusalem, the recognition of the need for secure 
boundaries and respect for sovereignty and the development of cooperation and an end 
of threats between the two states.
986
 Lastly, it formally ended the state of war between 
Israel and Jordan.
987
 Concrete cooperation measures adopted between the two states 
included creating phone links, joining electric grids, opening border crossings and 
ending economic boycotts.
988
 These steps created an atmosphere for negotiations and a 
framework for further negotiations to occur, but it is of nebulous legal status. The 
declaration contains aspirational commitments to peace, as well as limited unilateral 
action to foster peace, but it falls under Bell‘s ―prenegotiation‖ phase. It produces a soft-
law obligation and not a binding treaty. 
 In contrast the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty meets the formal requirements of the 
VCLT.
989
 It is a ―hard‖ legal obligation that follows processes for treaty formation. 
Following the Washington Declaration, bilateral negotiations on a treaty occur. During 
this period the parties hold talks and a text is agreed upon which results in a treaty that 
is signed and ratified.
990
 The treaty is given legal authority by this process and it 
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establishes substantive obligations for peace between Israel and Jordan.
991
 The treaty 
achieves this by delimiting the boundary between the two states,
992
 and it contains 
provisions on security and diplomatic relations.
993
 It also discusses issues such as water 
allocation,
994
 Jordan Rift Valley Development, cooperation on crime,
995
 freedom of 
navigation 
996
and places of religious significance.
997
 It establishes economic ties 
between Israel and Jordan
998
 and enshrines a requirement of good neighbourly 
relations.
999
 Lastly, the treaty establishes a claims commission to resolve financial 
disputes between the parties.
1000
 On the other hand, some of the obligations it 
establishes are aspirational. For example, the provision on refugees established 
negotiations that are to run parallel to permanent status talks with the PLO.
1001
  In spite 
of these aspirational obligations the treaty is not a ―soft‖ obligation1002 as it meets the 
procedural requirements of a treaty. Further, unlike soft law obligation the Israel-Jordan 
Peace Treaty contains rules for the parties to follow
1003
 and contains processes for 
dispute resolution. This also indicates the ―hard‖ nature of the obligation.  
 It is the process that makes the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty obligatory; carrying out 
the processes required to adopt a treaty and establishing a dispute resolution process 
ensures that the treaty becomes a ―source‖ of law. This process creates stability in the 
relationship between Jordan and Israel. It also limits opportunities for the parties to 
defect from the legal obligation by limiting the ability to change obligations outside the 
treaty. It achieves this by establishing dispute resolution mechanisms. Lastly, following 
Bell‘s three phase schema it also produces further agreements to implement this initial 
arrangement.
1004
 These agreements limit further opportunities for the parties to change 
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their obligations. Therefore the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty is an example of a hard law 
obligation that promotes stability in inter-state relations. 
 
 
4.3 Hard Law, Soft Law and the Processes of International Law 
The doctrine of process provides a way for substance to be given legal authority. It 
establishes the way that obligations can come into effect, remain in effect or ―die.‖ One 
useful way of understanding what process achieves in the doctrine is to juxtapose 
processes of law with non-legal processes; to achieve this, the doctrine of hard law is 
contrasted with the less formal soft law. These concepts are not differentiated by the 
substantive obligations they contain, or necessarily the form they take.
1005
 They are 
differentiated by the processes they follow that result in an obligation that has legal 
authority. In this sense, processes act signal the legal nature of their obligation. This is 
illustrated by the procedural differences between the Washington Declaration, the 
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty and subsequent implementing agreements. These processes 
indicate various levels of obligation that promote stability. This example shows how 
process turns a political obligation into a legally authoritative agreement. It turns a soft 
declaration in a hard treaty. Consequently, the concepts of hard and soft law help 
explain the role of process in international law. Doctrinally, process produces stability 
by providing a way for soft obligations to harden. Additionally, this explains the 
doctrinal preference for stability as the role of this process is to provide stability and 
limit opportunities for change. These observations about the doctrine of process will 
now be applied to the requirements for unilateral acts. 
 
 
5. Unilateral Acts and the Process of International Law 
 
 
 
The processes of international law mediate between the need to promote stability and 
permit change. However, process doctrine favours stability over change as generally 
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change is limited in order to establish stability in the law. This can be described as the 
way process hardens legal obligations; process doctrine explains that process provides 
stability by establishing the method by which one can discern the legal authority of 
substantive legal obligations.  Therefore, to be considered legal unilateral acts must be 
explained in reference to this doctrine. If unilateral acts cannot be explained by stability 
and change then they cannot be explained by the doctrine of process. In this case 
unilateral acts do not fit within the doctrine and cannot be considered legal.  
 There are few procedural requirements placed on unilateral acts by the doctrine. 
As a result, each type of unilateral act has specific processes. For example, notification 
requires an act of notification. Declarations require a declaration.
1006
 Therefore, one of 
the few general processes that has received attention at ILC was the method of revoking 
a unilateral act. However, revocability proves to be doctrinally problematic. This is 
because the revocability of unilateral acts means that these acts can always be 
withdrawn or modified according to the intention of the acting state. Further, the ability 
to unilaterally modify an obligation promotes change and not stability. Consequently, 
the ability to modify unilateral acts must be limited so that there are processes in place 
which promote doctrinal stability. As such, revocability provides a useful reference 
point for the process of unilateral acts.    
 The doctrinal consequences of revocation for the stability of unilateral acts will be 
the subject of this section of the chapter. This discussion will proceed in three parts: 
first, the concept of revocation will be discussed; second, the revocability of unilateral 
acts will be explored; and third, the consequences of revocation for the procedural 
stability of unilateral acts will be examined. 
 
 
5.1 Revocation in International Law 
Revocation is considered in the context of individual sources of law,
1007
 and is 
particularly important in the context of treaty law
1008
 where revocation is most closely 
associated with the withdrawal, denunciation and termination of treaties. Withdrawal, 
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denunciation and termination are different in context but not in substance. In 
multilateral treaties obligations do not end when one party decides the treaty is no 
longer legally obligatory but if one party wishes to end its obligations this party 
withdraws from the treaty. This means that the treaty no longer applies to the 
withdrawing party; however, it remains in effect for all other parties to the treaty. 
Alternatively, in a bilateral treaty when one party decides to end its obligation, this leads 
to the denunciation of the treaty, and denunciation can effect termination of the 
treaty.
1009
 In spite of this difference of terminology, acts of withdrawal and denunciation 
are collectively referred to as termination, which is the term for the process of revoking 
a treaty. Therefore, this section of the chapter examines the doctrine of termination. 
First, customary international law regarding termination is examined. Then the right to 
terminate a treaty in the VCLT is discussed. 
 
5.1.1 Termination of Treaties in Customary International Law 
Prior to the VCLT, processes for treaty termination were customary. A leading treatise 
of the pre-VCLT era observed that there was a ―…general presumption against the 
existence of any right of unilateral termination of a treaty.‖1010 This was related to the 
duration of a treaty; if a treaty did not implicitly or explicitly establish the duration of its 
obligations then the parties intended it to be ―of perpetual duration‖ and perpetual 
duration prevented unilateral termination.
1011
 Without a fixed time limit a treaty always 
contained obligations that had not been performed and so a party could never terminate 
the treaty without breaching its obligations under the treaty.
1012
 However, the converse 
was also true; parties to a treaty could always agree to terminate the treaty. The only 
exception was if the treaty affected third parties or contained general obligations, such 
as obligations erga omnes.
1013
 States could also tacitly agree to terminate a treaty as 
agreement to terminate was derived from the actions of the parties.
1014
 Additionally, 
parties could unilaterally denounce a bilateral treaty when there was an express or 
implied term of the agreement that authorized this unilateral act.
1015
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 According to customary international law treaties could also be terminated when 
general rules of international law permitted dissolution of the agreement. A general rule 
that permitted termination was desuetude. Desuetude refers to termination of a treaty 
when there is ―discontinuance of use‖ of the treaty. To assert termination on the grounds 
of desuetude, other parties had to acquiesce to the fact that the treaty had fallen into 
disuse.
1016
 Other general grounds for termination of treaties were rebus sic stantibus 
1017
and changes nullifying the purpose of the treaty.
1018
 
 Once a treaty was properly terminated by agreement the parties had to determine 
the status of the treaty. They had two options: first, the parties could be returned to the 
position they were in prior to the treaty agreement or second, the treaty could be 
terminated from a date after the treaty was in force. The latter option meant the parties 
were in a different position than they had been upon entering into the treaty.
1019
 In 
practice, however, the date of termination often depended on the nature of the 
agreement. Rights gained through the obligations of a treaty that had already been 
executed could not be undone so in these situations only the continuing obligations of 
the treaty ceased.
1020
 Further, the revision of treaties was not considered a legal question 
and was not discussed as part of the process of termination of treaties.
1021
  From the 
above examination of customary international law it is clear that prior to the VCLT 
termination was limited to two situations, mutual agreement between the parties and 
termination under general rules of international law. 
 
   
5.1.2 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
The ILC produced a draft Convention on the Law of Treaties that formed the basis of 
the VCLT. However, this draft did not settle the doctrine of revocation, 
1022
 as it only 
provided general guidance in this area when it stated that treaties could be altered by 
notification or by the duty of good faith negotiation to resolve disputes. To counteract 
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this generality the ILC Rapporteurs proposed a rigid process of dispute resolution in 
Article 62 bis.
1023
  As Rosenne explains, 
 
 
Here it may be observed that the International Law Commission itself, in 
1966, did not accept the view which had been urged upon it by two of its 
special rapporteurs, Lauterpacht and Fitzmaurice, but not by Waldock, that 
the good faith of a party claiming a ground for invoking the invalidity of a 
treaty or its termination should be tested by the willingness of that party to 
submit its claim to impartial third-party examination and decision. The 
most that the Commission was prepared to do in 1966 was to link this part 
of the codified law of treaties to the Charter of the United Nations, and to 
overcome possible limitations that could flow from the Charter which, in 
its dispute-settlement provisions, always places emphasis on disputes of 
the kind likely to endanger international peace and security.
1024
 
 
 
 
In response, Reisman predicted that the Draft‘s rigid processes governing unilateral 
termination or change of a treaty would be rejected by states in the final version of the 
text.
1025
 Reisman was proved partially correct.
1026
  
 The VCLT was completed in 1969 and has been in force since 1980.
1027
 It has an 
entire part, Part V, devoted to the ―Invalidity, Termination and Suspension of the 
Operation of Treaties.‖1028 In this part Article 54 lists the circumstances when 
termination of a treaty can occur. 
 
 
The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may take place: 
(a) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty; or 
(b) at any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with the 
other contracting parties.
1029
 
 
 
                                                 
1023
 Reisman, ‖Procedures‖ (n 1022) at p 545.  
1024
 S Rosenne, Developments in the Law of Treaties 1945-1986 (CUP, Cambridge 1989) at p 352. 
1025
 Reisman, ‖Procedures‖ (n 1022) at p 545.  
1026
 See VCLT (n 303) at Art 65.  
1027
 See generally, VCLT (n 303) at Art 65 
1028
 VCLT (n 303) at Arts 42-72.  
1029
 VCLT (n 303) at Art 54. 
240  Betina Kuzmarov 
Consequently, the VCLT codifies the customary law on termination. Moreover, if a 
treaty does not contain provisions for withdrawal or termination, Article 56 establishes 
that 
 
 
1. A Treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and 
which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to 
denunciation or withdrawal unless: 
(a) it is established that the parties intend to admit the possibility of 
denunciation or withdrawal; or 
(b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal can be implied by the nature of 
the treaty. 
2. A party shall give not less than twelve months‘ notice of its intention to 
denounce or withdraw from a treaty under paragraph 1.
1030
 
 
 
This provision requires that the right to terminate is expressly or impliedly derived from 
the treaty. However, Article 56 departs from customary law when it requires a notice 
period for denunciation or withdrawal from a treaty. Additionally, a treaty can be 
terminated by a later treaty. Article 59 states: 
 
 
 
1. A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude 
a later treaty relating to the same subject matter and: 
(a) it appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that the 
parties intended that the matter should be governed by that treaty; or 
(b) the provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those of 
the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at the 
same time. 
2. The earlier treaty shall be considered as only suspended in operation if it 
appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that such was the 
intention of the parties.
1031
 
 
 
Further, material breaches of bilateral treaties allow the harmed party to either terminate 
or suspend the treaty.  In these situations a material breach is defined as any 
―repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or‖1032 a breach of 
a term that is necessary to satisfy the ―object and purpose of the treaty‖.1033  On the 
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other hand in multilateral treaties non-breaching parties are allowed to suspend or 
terminate the treaty either in its entirety or between themselves and the breaching 
party.
1034
 In addition, the VCLT establishes specific grounds for termination or 
withdrawal from a treaty. These include supervening impossibility of performance,
1035
 
fundamental change of circumstances
1036
  and a violation of an emerging jus cogens 
norm.
1037
 
 Article 65 of the VCLT establishes the process for parties to invalidate, terminate, 
withdraw from or suspend a treaty. Article 65 says, 
 
 
1. A party which, under the provisions of the present convention invokes 
either a defect in its consent to be bound by a treaty or a ground for 
impeaching the validity of a treaty terminating it, withdrawing from it or 
suspending its operation, must notify the other parties of its claim. The 
notification shall indicate the measure proposed to be taken with respect to 
the treaty and the reasons therefore. 
2. If, after the expiry of a period which, except in cases of special urgency, 
shall not be less than three months after the receipt of the notification, no 
party has raised any objection, the party making the notification may carry 
out in the manner provided in article 67 the measure which it has proposed. 
3. If, however, objection has been raised by any other party, the parties 
shall seek a solution through the means indicated in article 33 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
4. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall affect the rights or obligations 
of the parties under any provisions in force binding the parties with regard 
to the settlement of disputes. 
5. Without prejudice to article 45, the fact that a State has not previously 
made the notification prescribed in paragraph 1 shall not prevent it from 
making such notification in answer to another party claiming performance 
of the treaty or alleging its violation.
1038
 
 
 
The quotation above refers to Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, which requires 
states to peacefully settle their disputes, by negotiation, mediation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement or any other ―peaceful means‖, when the dispute would ―endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security.‖1039  As well, Article 45 of the VCLT 
prevents a state from going back on its agreement or acquiescence not to terminate a 
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treaty once grounds for invalidation are brought to their attention.
1040
 Consequently, 
Article 65 requires a state to notify other parties of a termination, at which point other 
parties to the treaty can then accept or protest the termination. If states protest and the 
dispute may lead to conflict there is a requirement to negotiate. Moreover, without 
contradicting Article 45, a state may always respond to a notification of termination by 
terminating the treaty. Finally, the notification required by Article 65 must be in writing 
and communicated to the other parties.
1041
  However, notification of termination under 
this Article can be revoked as long as it has not come into effect.
1042
 
 To implement the requirements of Article 65, Article 66 establishes a 12 month 
period of negotiation for disputes about termination. After 12 months, if the dispute has 
not been resolved, it can be submitted to the International Court of Justice or to 
conciliation under the auspices of the Secretary General.
1043
 Lastly, Article 70 lists 
―consequences‖ for termination of a treaty. Termination ―(a) releases the parties from 
any further obligation to perform the treaty; (b) does not affect any right, obligation or 
legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its 
termination.‖1044 In multilateral treaties the relationship between the terminating state 
and all other parties ends.
1045
  However, Rosenne notes that the ICJ has not generally 
implemented mandatory negotiation in termination disputes. This results from a gap in 
the law. The text of the Charter requires a dispute to reach the level of a threat before 
the UN will force a negotiation,
1046
 And so the ICJ has been reluctant to enforce these 
provisions. Consequently, Rosenne argues that ―[w]ith the exception of the Namibia 
case, none of those so far examined by the Court are seen as likely to come within that 
category and the viability of Article 65, with its reference to the ‗means‘ of dispute 
settlement indicated in Article 33 of the Charter, has not yet been tested.‖1047  
 In conclusion, the VCLT limits the right of a party to revoke a treaty obligation 
unilaterally. For example, Article 54 circumscribes the right to terminate a treaty by 
limiting termination to two situations. The first situation arises where the parties have 
included a clause on termination. The second situation occurs when the parties to the 
treaty consent to termination. Consequently, Article 56 creates an implied right to 
terminate. This right is invoked when it can be determined from the agreement itself or 
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from an understanding of the parties that termination is permitted. Thus, Article 54 and 
Article 56 are designed to prevent a unilateral withdrawal, denunciation or termination 
of a treaty and these rights are restricted further by Article 65 of the VCLT, which 
requires notice of revocation. The VCLT also implements dispute resolution processes 
to resolve disputes over the termination of a treaty. Therefore, revocation is limited in 
two ways; it is limited by the requirement that parties consent to revocation, and it is 
limited by the processes established by the VCLT. Doctrinally these processes limit 
change and promote stability by establishing limits to a state‘s right to terminate its 
treaty obligations. In the next section the requirements for revocation will be applied to 
unilateral acts. 
 
 
 
6. Revocation of Unilateral Acts 
 
 
Unilateral acts are theoretically revocable by the acting state. Jennings and Watts 
observe that  
 
 
[a] question which arises in relation to all unilateral acts is whether, once 
made, they can be later amended or revoked. While no general answer can 
be given applicable to all cases, it would seem that such acts are in 
principle revocable except where some rule of international law stipulates 
to the contrary.
1048
 
 
 
In this quotation, Jennings and Watts assert that unilateral acts are revocable but this 
right is limited by rules of general international law. The consequences of the theoretical 
right to revoke a unilateral act are considered in both the case law of the ICJ and in the 
recent work of the ILC. These discussions reveal that the relationship between general 
rules of international law that limit revocation, such as estoppels, and revocation of 
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unilateral acts means that the processes of unilateral acts never harden. The difficulty 
this softness poses for the doctrine of process can be explained in terms of the 
―legalization‖ of the process of unilateral acts. Therefore, the case law, the work of the 
ILC and the concept of legalization will all be explored in this section of the chapter. 
 
 
6.1 Case Law on the Revocability of Unilateral Acts 
The Nuclear Tests cases stated that the ―unilateral undertaking resulting from [the 
French] statements cannot be interpreted as having been made in an implicit reliance on 
arbitrary power of reconsideration.‖ 1049 This case established that unilateral acts were 
not automatically revocable. The ILC explained that ―[t]his does not, however, exclude 
any power to terminate a unilateral act, only its arbitrary withdrawal or amendment.‖1050 
Here the principle of revocability was limited, but what constitutes arbitrary withdrawal 
as opposed to legitimate termination was never clarified.  
 The limit on arbitrary revocation of unilateral acts derived from the Nuclear Tests 
cases has subsequently been applied by the ICJ. Revocation was an issue in the Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua. 
1051
  In this 
case the Court considered whether the ―modification‖ by the US of its declaration of 
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36(2) of the Statute of ICJ was 
valid.
1052
 The Court held that it was not. 
 
  
Although the United States retained the right to modify the contents of the 
1946 Declaration or to terminate it, a power which is inherent in any 
unilateral act of State, it has, nevertheless assumed an inescapable 
obligation towards other States accepting the Optional Clause, by stating 
formally and solemnly that any such change should take effect only six 
months have elapsed from the date of notice.
1053
 
 
 
In this quotation the Court acknowledged that the US had the right to modify its 
obligation and the Court further asserted that this right was inherent in any unilateral 
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act.
1054
 However, good faith required that the US uphold its commitments regarding the 
jurisdiction of the Court.
1055
 In this case the Court interpreted arbitrariness to mean that 
was a general right to revoke a unilateral undertaking, but this right was subject to the 
requirement that it was not opposed to any other principle of law such as good faith. 
 Revocation was also considered in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case.
1056
 In this case 
the Court was asked to interpret Canada‘s reservation to its declaration accepting the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 36(2).
1057
  In this case the Court held that  
 
 
A declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, 
whether there are specified limits set to that acceptance or not, is a 
unilateral act of State sovereignty. At the same time, it establishes a 
consensual bond and the potential for a jurisdictional link with the other 
States which have made declarations pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2, 
of the Statute, and ―makes a standing offer to the other States party to the 
Statute which have not yet deposited a declaration of acceptance (Land and 
Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. 
Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1998, para.25).
1058
 
 
 
In this case the Court confirmed that acceptance of the ICJ‘s jurisdiction was a 
unilateral act. However this act created a relationship with other depository states and as 
a result of the trust this created it could not be unilaterally revoked or changed. 
 The case law of the ICJ established a general rule that unilateral acts were 
revocable unless they were limited by good faith. Consequently, states had a duty to live 
up to their obligation which precluded the arbitrary revocation of unilateral acts. 
However, this limitation applied only when there was trust placed in a unilateral act that 
produces good faith. These principles helped shaped the work of the ILC on this topic, 
which will be the subject of the next section of this chapter. 
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6.2 The International Law Commission 
The ILC‘s outline for its work considered the duration, amendment and termination of 
unilateral acts.
1059
  Consequently, revocation was raised early in the ILC‘s consideration 
of unilateral acts and Members even argued over the revocability of unilateral acts.
1060
 
First, 
 
 
Some remarked that the ability of a State to revoke a unilateral promise 
which it had made should depend, at least in part, upon its intention when 
it performed that act. Thus, if it had intended that its promise be revocable, 
then it should be susceptible of revocation, subject to whatever conditions 
or restrictions the State might have imposed upon itself in this regard. 
Reference was made in support of this conclusion to the decision of the 
International Court of Justice in the jurisdictional phase of the case 
concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua. 
Conversely if the State which had made the promise had intended that it be 
irrevocable, then it should not, in principle, be subject to revocation.
1061
 
 
 
Certain Members of the ILC felt that unilateral acts were revocable when this had 
always been the intention of the state. Moreover, to limit revocation, a contrary 
intention on the part of the acting state had to be established. Other Members argued 
that a wide ranging right to revoke unilateral acts ensured that such acts would not have 
more than an ―illusory‖ power to bind states.1062 However, if revocation was not 
permitted then Members were concerned that ―States would be reluctant to ever make 
such promises.‖1063 Consequently, revocation must not be ―unlimited‖1064 and an 
analogy to treaty law provided a valid way to establish these limits.
1065
 
 As a result of these varied approaches to revocation, the ILC Working Group on 
unilateral acts circulated a questionnaire to states to determine their practice of 
unilateral acts.
1066
 Question 9 asked directly about the revocability of unilateral acts.
1067
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The reactions of states varied. For example, Argentina presented a complex response 
when it asserted that once a unilateral act had an external manifestation it could not be 
arbitrarily revoked but the state could always limit the act. This limitation meant that 
acts could be revoked in various circumstances such as situations of ―force majeure.‖ 
Further, Argentina suggested that protests were always revocable.
1068
 However, 
Argentina‘s approach contrasted with the view that unilateral acts could not be revoked 
if good faith was at issue. Further, unlike Argentina, El Salvador felt that unilateral acts 
were revocable only with appropriate notice
1069
 and both Finland and Italy felt 
revocation was possible according to the terms set out in the Nuclear Tests cases.
1070
 
Georgia felt that unilateral acts could be revoked only in specific situations including 
cases of error, fraud, conflict with a rule of international law or other obligation of the 
state.
1071
 Israel felt that revocation was available but it was not unlimited. Further, it 
suggested that good faith would require notice of any revocation.
1072
  Similarly, the 
Netherlands asserted that revocation was available in the same situations as in treaty 
law.
1073
 Sweden felt no general rules existed in regards to revocation of unilateral acts; 
however, it suggested that the ILC might look to some provisions of the VCLT for 
guidance.
1074
  In the following year the Working Group on this topic was reconvened 
and raised two points about the answers to Question 9. First, it was noted that only 12 
states had responded to the questionnaire. Second, it was observed that the states that 
had responded to the Questionnaire had provided few concrete examples of state 
practice.
1075
  As a result the Questionnaire was inconclusive, and highlighted a lack of 
agreement over the revocability of unilateral acts. 
 The wide range of views recorded led Rodriguez Cedeño to propose a draft 
provision on the invalidity of unilateral acts. Draft Article 5 read 
 
 
Article 5 
Invalidity of unilateral acts 
A State may invoke the invalidity of a unilateral act: 
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1. If the act was formulated on the basis of an error of fact or a situation 
which was assumed by that State to exist at the time when the act was 
formulated and formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound by the 
act. The foregoing shall not apply if the State contributed to its own 
conduct to the error or if the circumstances were such as to put that State 
on notice of a possible error; 
2. If a state has been induced to formulate an act by the fraudulent conduct 
of another State; 
3. If the act has been formulated as a result of the corruption of the person 
formulating it, through direct or indirect action by another State; 
4. If the act has been formulated as a result of coercion of the person 
formulating it, through acts or threats against him; 
5. If the formulation of the act has been procured by the threat or use of 
force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations; 
6. If, at the time of its formulation, the unilateral act conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of international law; 
7. If, at the time of its formulation, the unilateral act conflicts with a 
decision of the Security Council; 
8. If the unilateral act as formulated conflicts with a norm of fundamental 
importance to the domestic law of the State formulating it.
1076
 
 
 
Members criticised this draft Article. A group of Members argued that unilateral acts 
were revocable, that revocation was preferable to declaring a unilateral act invalid as 
invalidity had to be procedurally constructed. Therefore, invalidity was limited to 
situations where revocation was not available.
1077
  As a result of these criticisms the 
ILC eventually approved separate guiding principles on revocation and invalidity. 
 Revocation was also considered in Rodriguez Cedeño‘s Sixth Report on 
Unilateral Acts of States. The focus of this report was on the specific unilateral act of 
recognition.  In this context Rodriguez Cedeño wrote: 
 
 
We note first of all that in relation to unilateral acts in general, the view of 
most legal writers is that the author State does not, generally, speaking, 
have the power to modify a legal relationship unilaterally. For some, the 
State which is the author of the act does not have the power to create 
arbitrarily, by means of another unilateral, a rule constituting an exception 
to the one which had created by means of the first act. For others such 
capacity can be limited or even nonexistent. In the specific case of 
revocation, and in relation to unilateral acts in general, it is admissible...
1078
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Additionally, Rodriguez Cedeño considered that revocation was available when it was 
accounted for in the act itself.
1079
 As such, Rodriguez Cedeño was in favour of a very 
limited right of revocation, but the narrowness of his approach was questioned by 
several Members of the ILC in their discussion of his Report.  As the Report noted, 
―[d]oubts were expressed over the assertion in the report that the modification, 
suspension or revocation of an act of recognition was feasible only if specific 
conditions were met.‖1080 This point was reiterated by the Membership of the ILC the 
following year. Members proposed that ―[t]he revocability of a unilateral act should 
also be examined in detail. By its very nature, a unilateral act was said to be freely 
revocable unless it explicitly excluded revocation or, before the act was revoked, it 
became a treaty commitment following its acceptance by the beneficiary of the initial 
act.‖1081 This demonstrates that Rodriguez Cedeño‘s approach to revocation was not 
universally accepted. However, the wider notion of revocation favoured by the 
Membership was also unsubstantiated. Unrestricted revocation was not promoted by the 
ICJ. The ICJ established restrictions on revocability, primarily good faith. 
Consequently, the ILC membership was developing the law in this area.  
 The ILC‘s debates revealed three different approaches to revocation. First, 
Rodriguez Cedeño proposed a narrow approach to revocation. Second, several 
Members proposed restricting revocation to the circumstances approved by the ICJ.  
Third, other Members put forward a wide formulation of revocation. Consequently, the 
ILC‘s approach to revocation was not uniform; as a result they attempted to remedy this 
instability in their Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States 
Capable of Creating Legal Obligations. These principles were adopted by the 
International Law Commission in 2006. Principle 10 dealt directly with the revocability 
of unilateral acts. This principle stated 
 
 
10. A unilateral declaration that has created legal obligations for the State 
making the declaration cannot be revoked arbitrarily. In assessing whether 
such a revocation would be arbitrary, consideration should be given to: 
(i) Any specific terms of the declaration relating to revocation; 
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(ii)The extent to which those to whom the obligations are owed have relied 
on such obligations; 
(iii) The extent to which there has been a fundamental change in 
circumstances.
1082
 
 
 
 
Principle 10 reflected the case law of the ICJ. As the commentary to this principle 
observed there was a difference between termination of a unilateral act and arbitrary 
withdrawal of the act. Termination would be permitted; arbitrary withdrawal would not 
be permitted. Presumably arbitrary withdrawal was prohibited because it violated good 
faith.
1083
 As a result, the ILC noted that ―[t]here can be no doubt that unilateral acts may 
be withdrawn or amended in certain specific circumstances. The Commission drew up 
an open-ended list of criterion to take into consideration when determining whether or 
not a withdrawal is arbitrary.‖1084 These criteria considered whether the declaration 
included the possibility of termination. They also took into account whether a state had 
placed good faith in the unilateral act.  However, revocation was also permitted in 
enumerated situations, including a fundamental change of circumstances. The ILC 
defined a fundamental change of circumstances as having the same scope as Article 62 
of the VCLT.  Consequently, the ILC did not undermine the basic principle that 
unilateral acts were prima facie capable of revocation. They merely narrowed this 
principle in a manner consistent with the decisions of the ICJ. Revocation was 
circumscribed by arbitrariness, and arbitrariness was defined as commensurate with 
good faith.  This ensured that revocation was permitted and would not be considered 
arbitrary if a state acted in good faith. 
 The ILC reached this conclusion by analogizing the requirements of arbitrariness 
to treaty law.  However, one can question this assumption. To explain: Treaty law 
begins from the assumption of pacta sunt servanda. Similarly, unilateral acts that create 
legal obligations cannot be arbitrarily revoked but unlike in treaty law there is no 
underlying procedural principle to limit revocability; there is no principle of acta sunt 
servanda. This is problematic because it means the limits on revocation set by the ILC 
lack doctrinal foundations. The consequences of these assumptions will be explored 
further in the next section. 
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6.3 The Consequences of Revocability of Unilateral Acts 
Unilateral acts are revocable but revocability is limited by arbitrariness. This means that 
a unilateral act cannot be revoked without reason. This limitation on revocability is 
justified by the need to protect good faith, the trust that other states place in the act. 
Placing trust in an act implies that states are both cognizant of the unilateral act and are 
responding to the act with indications that they are placing trust in the acting state that 
the act will be carried out. As noted in the previous chapter the requirement of good 
faith equates to placing reliance in the act and reliance is a defining characteristic of 
estoppels. Therefore, in practice a state is estopped from revoking a unilateral act when 
it would be arbitrary to do so. To explain further: a unilateral act is intention based and 
thus inherently revocable. It is not based on a principle of acta sunt servanda, a general 
rule that promises must be kept. This rule has been suggested; however, it is 
problematic as the rule acta sunt servanda implies that it is the act itself, and not the 
state‘s intention, that is the basis of authority of a unilateral obligation. This is a purely 
objective interpretation of intention the problems with which have been discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4. As has been demonstrated, there is a doctrinal problem with 
interpreting intention solely from the act itself, as this interpretation of intention may 
violate a state's actual intention. Consequently, there is no agreement on a general 
principle of obligation that corresponds with pacta sunt servanda in treaty law.  
However, the fact that there is no such principle for unilateral acts produces instability 
in the requirements of revocation. The right to revocation is limited by good faith and 
good faith means that requirement of revocation collapses into estoppels. This 
relationship must now be expanded upon. 
 Estoppels are considered a procedural limitation on revocation because estoppels 
provide a process to prevent revocation when a state relies on a unilateral act. However, 
estoppels are problematic for the process of unilateral acts because they break the link 
between the source of the unilateral act and its substance. The source of authority of a 
unilateral act is its intention but, as noted in Chapter 4, intention is a mental state and as 
a ―mental state‖ it is always capable of change. This means that as intention changes so 
should the obligation required by the unilateral act. Revocation provides a process for 
the state to change its intention. However, good faith limits the right to revocation; 
good faith limits intention. For example, a unilateral act cannot be revoked where there 
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has been good faith placed in the act. The actor is prevented, effectively estopped, from 
going back on its word regardless of its intention. This confuses a state‘s intention with 
the reliance, the cognizance and trust, that an act creates. In these cases the act is no 
longer ―unilateral‖ as its legal authority is contingent on good faith. To illustrate this 
point, consider French statements in the Nuclear Tests cases. Assume France intended 
their statements to be legally binding. If these statements were truly unilateral then 
France should have been allowed to change its intention and resume nuclear testing. 
However, the ICJ precluded such a possibility. It argued that France was prevented 
from changing its intention because of good faith - Australia and New Zealand‘s 
cognizance and trust in France‘s erga omnes promises. This good faith ensured that all 
states could hold France to its word. This in turn implied that states were concerned that 
French intentions would change. They responded to and had trust in the promise, and 
they had an interest in its performance. Through this trust there became two parties to 
the act: there was the state that made the promise to stop nuclear testing, France, and 
the state or states that sought to uphold the promise, Australia and New Zealand. The 
act was not unilateral. This example demonstrates that a unilateral act is either unilateral 
and revocable or not unilateral and limited by good faith. This is not the case in treaty 
law where there the obligation rests on reciprocal obligations. The doctrinal limits on 
revocation confuse these issues.  As a result revocation does not provide a method for a 
substantive act to gain legal authority. An obligation can either have a unilateral source, 
intention, or it can provide procedural stability. Doctrine requires that it do both, but 
unilateral acts cannot do both and remain unilateral. Revocation highlights the difficulty 
that unilateral acts have fitting within the doctrine of process. 
 Revocation underscores the instability of the requirements of unilateral acts and 
highlights the inability of process doctrine to separate unilateral acts from estoppels. 
This confusion leads the ILC to conclude that unilateral acts can be withdrawn provided 
the revocation is not arbitrary. This is based on two principles, good faith and analogy 
to treaty law. The analogy to treaty law rests on an assumption of a principle of acta 
sunt servanda. This assumption is false as it conflates the unilateral nature of the act 
with the responses to the act. This conflation is reinforced by the requirement of good 
faith. If revocation is limited by good faith then revocation is estopped by good faith. 
As a result the process of revocation and the process of estoppels become identical. 
This point is underscored by Major Bulman in his discussion of the Nuclear Tests 
cases, ―[f]irst, and most importantly, the court underscored the potential legal dangers 
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for states that issue unilateral declarations and then subsequently repudiate them.‖1085 
These problems are often glossed over in an attempt to project legality. As a result, 
unilateral acts do not fit in the doctrine of process.  
 The role of process is to ensure that states know when a legal obligation is created 
or ended. To turn substance into form requires stable process. Consequently, doctrine 
promotes stability and limits change, but revocability of unilateral acts does not perform 
these functions. Unilateral acts can either be revocable or procedurally stable; therefore, 
unilateral acts do not provide the legality necessary for an obligation to ―harden.‖ This 
point will be clarified further in the following section. 
 
 
6.3.1 The Process of Unilateral Acts and Legalization 
The process of unilateral acts does not mediate between stability and change in the 
manner required by the doctrine of international law. Unilateral acts are inherently 
revocable. This produces instability in the obligation of a unilateral act, which means 
that the requirements of the doctrine are not met. The instability of revocation as a 
requirement of unilateral acts in turn creates a problem of legalization that is linked to 
the concepts of hard law and soft law. Legalization is the attempt to explain why some 
law hardens into legal forms. Exploring this process of legalization helps explain the 
doctrine of process.  
 Legalization does not try to explain why states inter-relate. Consequently, it does 
not explain the substance of international law. Also, legalization does not explain how 
states interact, so it does not explain the sources of international law. It seeks to 
understand how states operate within structures. Legalization helps to analyse ―the 
decision in different issue-areas to impose international legal restraints on 
governments.‖1086 As such, legalization explains why substance achieves the procedural 
stability necessary to take formal effect. It also explains why in less ―legalized‖ areas 
substance is not given legal authority. Thus, it explains the process of international law.  
 Legalization studies law as an institution of international relations.
1087
 
Consequently, Goldstein et al define international institutions as ―…enduring sets of 
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rules, norms, and decision making processes….‖1088  It explains why law becomes 
institutionalized or ―hardened‖ through process. It also accounts for the different 
processes of revocation in treaty law and in unilateral acts. For Abbott, Keohane, 
Moravcsik, Slaughter and Snidal,  
 
 
―Legalization‖ refers to a particular set of characteristics that institutions 
may (or may not) possess. These characteristics are defined along three 
dimensions, obligation, precision and delegation. Obligation means that 
states or other actors are bound by a rule or commitment or by a set of 
rules of commitments. Specifically, it means that they are legally bound by 
a rule or commitment in the sense that their behaviour thereunder is subject 
to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures and discourse of 
international law and often domestic law as well. Precision means that 
rules unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize or 
prescribe. Delegation means that third parties have been granted the 
authority to implement, interpret and apply the rules; to resolve disputes 
and (possibly) to make further rules.
1089
  
 
 
They also note that the elements of legalization are ideals, ideals that are met to a 
greater or lesser degree.
1090
 Further, the requirement of obligation corresponds with the 
substance of law, as it corresponds to the ―compliance problem‖ discussed in chapter 5. 
Consequently, it is not considered further here, other than to say that it is an example of 
overreach by this theory to try to encompass substance as part of the debate over 
legalization. However, precision and delegation relate directly to the doctrine of 
process.
1091
 The interplay between precision and delegation are the focus of this 
analysis.  
 Abbott et al note that ―[a] precise rule specifies clearly and unambiguously what 
is expected of a state or other act (in terms of both the intended objective and the means 
of achieving it) in a particular set of circumstances.‖1092  This requires  
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…not just that each rule in the set is unambiguous, but the rules are related 
to one another in a noncontradictory way, creating a framework within 
which case-by-case interpretation can be coherently carried out. Precise 
sets of rules are often, though by no means always, highly elaborated or 
dense, detailing conditions of application, spelling out the required or 
proscribed behaviour in numerous situations, and so on.
1093
 
 
 
The precision of a rule establishes the degree to which the rule promotes stability. A 
stable rule requires that future conduct is predicted on the basis of past process. If a rule 
is not precise it will create unpredictable processes. To explain, Abbot et al note that 
―[p]recision is an important characteristic of many theories of law.‖1094 They cite Fuller, 
who considers certainty and predictability core requirements of law.
1095
 
 Moreover, the relationship between precision and delegation in domestic systems 
is converse. The more precise a rule is the less delegation there is to decision making 
bodies. Most of the decisions about what is restricted are taken before the rule is made 
into law. The opposite is true of imprecise rules.
1096
  However, 
 
   
[i]n most areas of international relations, judicial quasi-judicial, and 
administrative authorities are less highly developed and infrequently used. 
In this thin institutional context, imprecise norms are, in practice, most 
often interpreted and applied by the very actors whose conduct they are 
intended to govern. In addition, since most international norms are created 
through the direct consent or practice of states, there is no centralized 
legislature to overturn inappropriate self-serving interpretations. Thus 
precision and elaboration are especially significant hallmarks of 
legalization at the international level.
1097
 
 
 
 
Abbot et al believe that ―much of international law is in fact quite precise‖ and that 
precision is becoming increasingly common in international law.
1098
  The indicators of 
precision are ―determinate‖ rules, ―standards‖ and situations where it is ―impossible to 
determine whether conduct complies.‖ 1099 To provide an example, the processes of the 
VCLT are highly precise. Using the example of revocation, the Convention establishes 
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rules of conduct regarding termination of treaties. These rules limit the freedom of 
states to act and guide state conduct in this area. Additionally, processes for resolving 
disputes are established.
1100
 Therefore, precision considers the ―hard‖ nature of the 
obligation and unilateral acts have very low indicators of precision. One area of 
particular imprecision is the revocation of unilateral acts. The circumstances in which 
revocation is permitted or prohibited are indeterminate.  As such, unilateral acts are 
considered revocable unless the revocation is arbitrary, not in good faith, or is a result 
of changed circumstances but these are  broad limitations; they cannot be used to 
determine in advance the specific circumstances in which a unilateral act can be 
withdrawn. Further, good faith rests on the trust other states place in the act. Revocation 
is permitted unless trust in the act must be preserved. Assessing trust requires an 
evaluation of how other states respond to the unilateral act. However, these responses 
are problematic for the doctrine. An example illustrates this point: State A promises to 
provide aid to State B. State A suffers an economic downturn and revokes its promise 
of aid. Has this revocation been in bad faith? Two opposed principles emerge. State A 
argues the revocation is legitimate because its circumstances have changed. This is 
acceptable grounds for revocation according to the ILC. On the other hand, State B 
argues that it has placed trust in the promise in good faith and is now without aid and 
further, that state A is now acting in bad faith in its revocation of its promise. It is 
impossible to know which one of these principles will prevail before adjudication takes 
place. Therefore, the process of revocation lacks the precision necessary to determine 
this dispute. 
 Abbot et al argue also argue that precision is not always necessary for legalization 
to occur. Lack of precision is compensated for by delegation to an appropriate 
international body.
1101
  Consequently, Abbot et al assert that 
 
 
[d]ispute settlement mechanisms are most highly legalized when the 
parties agree to binding third-party decisions  on the basis of clear and 
generally applicable rules; they are least legalized when the process 
involves political bargaining between parties who can accept or reject 
proposals without legal justification.
1102
 
 
 
                                                 
1100
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The indicators of delegation range from ―Courts, binding third-party decisions; general 
jurisdiction; direct private access; can interpret and supplement rules; domestic courts 
have jurisdiction; Courts jurisdiction, access or normative authority, limited or 
consensual; Binding arbitration; Nonbinding arbitration; Conciliation, mediation; 
Institutionalized bargaining; pure political bargaining.‖1103  To provide an example, the 
processes set out in Article 65 of the VCLT include high and low indicators of dispute 
resolution.
 1104
 To revoke a treaty requires negotiation, and it is only if negotiation fails 
that mandatory dispute resolution processes and adjudication may be used. In contrast, 
unilateral acts only have low indicators of delegation. There are no mechanisms for 
resolving disputes over revocation. There is always the option of dispute resolution by 
the ICJ. However, recourse to the Court is not formalized as a process for unilateral 
acts.  
 Legalization also considers the delegation of rule making and implementation. 
The indicators of this type of delegation, from high to low, are: binding regulations with 
centralized enforcement; binding regulations with consent or opt-out; binding internal 
policies; legitimation of decentralized enforcement, coordination standards, draft 
conventions; monitoring and publicity; recommendations and confidential monitoring; 
normative statements; forum for negotiations.‖1105 As a baseline the law of treaties 
contains binding regulations with consent or opt-out.  In contrast unilateral acts display 
only low indicators of delegation. The processes of unilateral acts are contained in 
nonbinding recommendations of the ILC and judgments of the ICJ. Further, the leading 
case in this area, the Nuclear Tests cases, never proceeded to a judgment on the merits. 
The VCLT indicates high levels of delegation in process; in contrast, unilateral acts 
have low indicators of delegation in the area of revocation. 
 Finnemore and Toope argue that low instances of delegation are often attributable 
to a narrow definition of law. This definition of law does not accept as law rules that do 
not rely on delegation.
1106
 This is a cogent critique but it ignores the relationship 
between legalization and the concept of hard law. Finnemore and Toope argue for a 
wider definition of law. This is not merited by the doctrine as the division between hard 
law and soft law is central to the doctrine. It accords with the concept of legalization 
and the doctrine of process.  
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 A greater problem for Abbot et al is that they maintain that legalization is an all 
encompassing explanation of law, but in fact legalization serves a narrow function in 
doctrine; it provides a schematic explanation of the processes of law. The wide 
application of legalization explains many of its weaknesses. The schema of obligation, 
precision and delegation confuses the process of law and its substance.
1107
  Obligation 
explains the compliance with obligations. This is more properly considered the doctrine 
of substance. Precision and delegation explain how legal obligations are created; this is 
properly part of the doctrine of process. Focusing on the elements of legalization that 
concern legal process narrows its scope but it also increases its utility. A narrower 
version of legalization explains the doctrine of process. Consequently, the indicators of 
obligation can be high or low, independent of the processes of law.  
 Precision and delegation indicate opposite trends in legalization. For example, the 
processes of custom are imprecise but are delegated to the ICJ.
1108
 However, the higher 
the indicators of precision and delegation the more procedurally stable the area of law. 
Low indicators of precision and delegation highlight areas of law that have not 
developed legalized processes. The processes for terminating a treaty are representative 
of a process that is highly legalized. In contrast, unilateral acts are revocable unless a 
rule of law indicates otherwise. Unilateral acts have low indicators of precision and 
delegation; consequently, it can be concluded that unilateral acts are not procedurally 
legalized. 
 The revocability of unilateral acts indicates a low level of development of 
process. The processes that do exist provide little stability for state actors. This 
contrasts with the highly legalized processes for termination of treaties. As a result the 
softness of unilateral acts impacts on their stability; they do not have the procedural 
stability necessary to be considered a hard legal obligation. 
 
 
6.4 Stability, Change and Unilateral Acts 
The processes of international law link sources to substance by providing a way for a 
substantive area to gain the authority of law. As a result process doctrine tries to 
                                                 
1107
 See for example, Finnemore & Toope  (n 1106) at p 747 
1108
 Finnemore and Toope identify the lack of concern for custom as a weakness in approaches to 
legalization in the special issue of IO edited by Goldstein et al. The article by Goldstein et al noted above 
is the introduction to this volume; Finnemore & Toope (n 1106) at p 746.  
259  Betina Kuzmarov 
provide for stable methods of limiting change in order to ensure doctrine acts as the link 
between source and substance. Consequently, the doctrine of processes must mediate 
between the desire for stability in obligations that are created and the need to permit 
change to these obligations when it is required. The law of treaties, custom and the 
principles of equity illustrate the doctrinal balance between stability and change. 
UNCLOS also provides an example of this doctrine in practice. The discussion of 
treaty, custom, equity and state practice illustrate that the preference of the doctrine is 
for stability. This preference is justified by reference to the concepts of hard and soft 
law. Process establishes when an obligation has hardened  and it also promotes stability 
to allow legalization to occur. 
 This chapter illustrates that unilateral acts do not fit within the doctrine of 
process. They do not promote the stability required for ―hardening‖ of a legal 
obligation. This problem is illustrated by the requirement of revocation in unilateral 
acts. In treaty law termination is highly regulated, as the rules for termination are 
codified in the VCLT. In contrast, processes for revoking unilateral acts are not well 
developed. Revocation is generally permitted, and the only exception to this is that 
revocation must be in good faith. This creates doctrinal confusion between unilateral 
acts and estoppels. The problem is as follows: if an act is unilateral it must always be 
revocable but good faith limits this ability. Good faith limits revocation by prohibiting 
revocation when there has been ―trust‖ or confidence in that act. This implies that 
another state has taken cognizance of the act; some entity must place trust or confidence 
in the act for good faith to arise. However, once this occurs the act is now no longer 
unilateral; revocation is prohibited because of the trust of other states in the unilateral 
act. This effectively collapses the process for unilateral acts into the process for 
estoppels.  
 The relationship between revocation and good faith prevents unilateral acts from 
developing independent processes. Recall that process must link form to substance. 
Additionally, a unilateral act must be unilateral and if it is not unilateral it is no longer 
formally a unilateral act; instead it creates an estoppel. Consequently, the examination 
of revocation uncovers a key problem in the process of unilateral acts.  For a unilateral 
act to create a legal obligation, its substance must be given proper legal authority. This 
is the job of process doctrine in the structure of international law, and in the case of 
unilateral acts this job is confused. In order to fit the requirements of unilateral acts 
revocation must be permitted. This fits the doctrinal need for change. However, this 
ability to change must be limited to promote stability. Therefore, revocation is limited 
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when it would be arbitrary, or in bad faith, to revoke the act. This is a limitation of good 
faith. This fits the doctrinal requirement of stability, but it introduces the cognizance of 
other states as a requirement of process. This makes the process of unilateral acts akin 
to an estoppel. Unilateral acts can retain their status as an independent category of legal 
obligation but then they do not fit the requirements of the doctrine of process. 
Conversely, they can fit within the doctrine of process but the act is no longer 
unilateral, it is an estoppel. 
 Unilateral acts have not legalized to the point at which their principles of process 
have sufficient hardness to predict stability over change. Consequently, unilateral acts 
cannot be explained by the doctrine of process.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
 
 
This chapter examines one aspect of the question ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ 
Specifically it focuses on the question ―can unilateral acts be explained by the doctrine 
of process?‖ After outlining this research question, this chapter then provides an 
overview of the doctrine of process and establishes that process doctrine mediates 
between a need for processes that create stable legal obligations and the need to allow 
for change to those processes when appropriate.  This doctrinal tension is exemplified 
by the difference between hard and soft obligations.  Hard obligations are those 
obligations that have stable processes to allow substantive obligations to gain legal 
authority, whereas soft obligations lack these stable processes. 
 Following on this analysis, this chapter proceeds to examine the requirement of 
revocation which is one of the few processes of a unilateral act. Revocation establishes 
that a unilateral act may be changed or terminated. However, unilateral acts cannot be 
revocable solely at the will of the state.  As a result the ability to revoke a unilateral act 
is limited by the requirement of good faith, called arbitrariness at the ILC. Confusingly, 
requiring good faith introduces a requirement of cognizance and trust in the act that 
makes the act less than unilateral because another state must recognize the act. Thus, the 
requirement of good faith in effect contradicts the requirement of revocability. 
Moreover, introducing the requirement of good faith makes unilateral acts difficult to 
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separate from acts of estoppel, as unilateral acts and estoppels both rely on good faith as 
a limit on the revocability of the act.  This means that unilateral acts can either be 
revocable and unilateral, or they can promote stability through good faith, but then they 
are no longer unilateral acts. In the latter case unilateral acts become indistinguishable 
from estoppels.  
 This conclusion leads to an examination of the problem of ―legalization‖ of 
unilateral acts. In this section of the chapter it is asserted that the revocability of 
unilateral acts indicates a low level of development of process. The processes that do 
exist provide little stability for state actors. This contrasts with the highly legalized 
processes for termination of treaties. The softness of unilateral acts impacts on their 
stability. It is concluded that unilateral acts do not have the procedural stability 
necessary to be considered a ―hard‖ legal obligation. 
 This chapter asks ―can unilateral acts be explained by the doctrine of process?‖ 
The problem that unilateral acts pose for the doctrine of process is that they lack the 
procedural stability to produce a ―hard‖ legal obligation; they do not provide the 
stability required to give legal authority to substance by turning it into a source of law. 
This is demonstrated by the requirement of revocability which is unable to produce 
procedural stability without limiting revocation in good faith. However, introducing 
good faith makes the act less than unilateral. Consequently, unilateral acts can be 
revocable or they can provide a stable process for substance to gain legal authority. 
This produces a second difficulty for the doctrine; when revocation is defined to 
include good faith, it becomes practically indistinguishable from an estoppel, and 
unilateralism is no longer its defining feature. Revocation on its own cannot create a 
stable process of international law. Further, even when revocation is interpreted to meet 
the requirements of the doctrine of process, its processes are practically 
indistinguishable from estoppels. This demonstrates the weak legalization of the 
process of unilateral acts. Consequently, the doctrinal difficulty posed by revocation, 
together with the difficulty in applying revocation in practice, helps explain the gap 
between the assertion that a unilateral act is legal and the ability to identify its legal 
obligation in practice. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Directions 
1. Introduction 
 
 
The final chapter of this thesis summarizes the conclusions reached about each research 
question. This summary will allow for conclusions to be drawn about the research 
problems identified in the introduction. This conclusion then returns to the context for 
this thesis in order to assess the implications of this research. Then the limitations of 
this research area are revisited and directions for further study are identified. 
 
 
 
2. Conclusions Drawn from the Research Questions 
 
 
 
This thesis asks the question ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ This research question was 
further subdivided into three subsidiary research questions: What is the definition of a 
unilateral act? What is the definition of legality? And do unilateral acts meet the  
definition of legality? It is necessary to summarize the discussion of each of these 
questions in order to reach some general conclusions about the legality of unilateral 
acts. 
 The definition of a unilateral act was developed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. This 
chapter opens with the premise that defining unilateral acts is difficult. As this chapter 
notes in the introduction, the ILC worked on this topic for six years and could not define 
unilateral acts. Consequently, the only way to understand unilateral acts is through an 
examination of the history of the development of unilateral acts. To undertake this 
examination Chapter 2 explored the history of unilateral acts and established that prior 
to the ICJ decision in the Nuclear Tests cases there was no doctrinal certainty that a 
unilateral act created a legal obligation. As a result this case is considered 
―revolutionary‖ and is critical to assessing when unilateral acts are ―legal.‖ 
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Further, the Nuclear Tests cases establish three main criteria for unilateral acts to 
be considered legal: intention, autonomy and revocation. Chapter 2 also demonstrates 
that these criteria have been applied in the subsequent case law and in the literature. 
Additionally, this case was cited as justification for the work of the ILC. Therefore, the 
criteria established in the Nuclear Tests cases are identified as a working definition of 
unilateral acts. In this thesis, a unilateral act is defined as any act that meets the criteria 
of intention, autonomy and revocation. 
 Next the definition of legality is developed. Chapter 3 of this thesis asks the 
question "what is legality?"  By answering this question this chapter also establishes the 
method of this thesis by providing an overview of the research question, by outlining 
the possible methods of this thesis, and by justifying the method ultimately adopted in 
this work - a narrow critical legal studies approach.  
 This chapter examines seven methods currently used to answer the question "what 
is legality?" The methods examined are: positivism, natural law, the New Haven school, 
international legal process, feminist jurisprudence, international law and international 
relations, law and economics and critical legal studies. This chapter explains that the 
most viable method for answering the question "what is legality" is a narrow critical 
legal studies approach. 
 The narrow critical legal studies approach begins from the premise that law is 
constructed from its doctrine and doctrine is defined as a rhetorical structure. In this 
method the internal structure of law, its doctrine, shapes international law and defines 
its legality.
1109
 Consequently, critical legal studies identify three doctrines that structure 
of international law: sources doctrine, substance doctrine, and process doctrine.
1110
 
These doctrines reflect the structures of the standard case books on international law. 
Each of these doctrines therefore plays a unique role in the structure of international 
law. For example, sources doctrine establishes the authority of international law, 
substance doctrine establishes a legitimate subject matter of law, and process doctrine 
establishes how a text is given legal authority. Each of these doctrines operates 
independently in order to structure discourse within the doctrine about the sources, the 
substance or the process of law. However, these doctrines also operate together to 
provide structure to international law. Consequently, for any subject matter of 
international relations to be considered legal it must be capable of explanation by each 
of these doctrines.   
                                                 
1109
 Koskenniemi, Apology (n 81) at p 566 ff. 
1110
 Trimble (n 274) at p 824. 
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 This analysis leads to the conclusion that a narrow version of critical legal studies 
is the most appropriate method for this thesis. Narrow critical legal studies methods 
assert that law is formed by its doctrine, an internal rhetorical structure, which in turn 
defines what is ―legal.‖ Therefore, this method is used in this thesis to answer the 
research question ―what is legality?‖ and it is applied to the broader research question 
―are unilateral acts legal?‖ This method is applied in Part 2 of this thesis where each 
doctrine of international law is compared to a component of the definition of a unilateral 
act.  
 This thesis builds on the definition of unilateral acts and legality established in 
Part 1 and undertakes the substantive analysis of unilateral acts in Part 2. The three 
chapters of Part 2 of the thesis answer the question ―are unilateral acts legal?"  Each 
chapter in this part of the thesis is devoted to one doctrine of unilateral acts - sources 
substance and process. Within each chapter, the doctrine of international law is 
examined and compared to the requirements of unilateral acts that correspond to that 
particular doctrine. Thus, Chapter 4 examines the doctrine of sources and compares the 
doctrine to the requirement of intention in unilateral acts. Chapter 5 examines the 
doctrine of substance and compares the requirements of autonomy to this doctrine. 
Chapter 6 examines the doctrine of process and compares the requirement of revocation 
to this doctrine. These chapters answer the question of legality because, as noted above, 
international law is structured by the doctrines of sources, substance and procedure. 
Therefore, if the requirements of unilateral acts cannot be explained by these doctrines, 
then they cannot be considered legal, as they do not fit within the structure of 
international law; they do not satisfy the need for legality. 
 Chapter 4 focuses on one aspect of legality defined in Chapter 3, the doctrine of 
sources. It asks the question: can unilateral acts be explained by the doctrine of sources? 
This chapter provides an overview of the research question, outlines of sources of 
international law, and the requirement of unilateral acts that provides the ―source‖ of a 
unilateral act‘s authority, intention, in order to assess the legality of unilateral acts. 
Context to this discussion is provided through the example of Iran's pursuit of nuclear 
weapons.   
After outlining the research question, this chapter provides an overview of the 
doctrine of sources. This section demonstrates that every source of international law is 
premised on a debate between consent and consensus which the doctrine of sources 
mediates. Following on this analysis, this chapter proceeds to examine the requirement 
of a unilateral act that establishes the source, of that act - intention. Intention provides 
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the legal authority of a unilateral act and in so doing acts as the source of a unilateral 
acts obligation. Further, this analysis reveals that intention is a "state of mind" and as a 
state of mind intention must be interpreted objectively. This requirement of objectivity 
is reflected in the most recent formulations of intention in the work of the ILC. The ILC 
terms this objective interpretation the "will of the state." Moreover, the work of the ILC, 
as supported by the case law, demonstrates that ascertaining objective intention requires 
that a third party can find in the unilateral act evidence that the state acted with 
intention. This objectivity conflates the "mental state" of the actor with the act itself in 
order to establish intention. Deriving the ―mental state‖ of the actor from the act allows 
the third party to establish ―consent‖ to the obligation contained in the unilateral act. 
However, will of the state alone is not sufficient to establish an obligation. In its 
Guiding Principles, the ILC supplemented the requirement of ―will of the state‖ with a 
further requirement, good faith. This requirement is introduced to resolve a doctrinal 
debate that arises from the objectification of intention: if an act is deemed to provide 
objective evidence of intention, then how can the objective observers separate the 
evidence of intention to perform the act from the evidence that the act intends to create a 
legal obligation? Acts may indicate intention to perform an action without providing 
unambiguous evidence of intention to create a legal obligation. Consequently, the ILC 
adds the requirement of good faith. Good faith requires not only that there is objective 
evidence of an intention to act, but also that there is objective evidence that other states 
believe that that act has created an obligation. This incorporates an element of 
consensus of the international community into the act.  To summarize: the ILC 
interprets intention so that it incorporates both consent and consensus making intention 
―fit‖ within sources doctrine. Additionally, as was demonstrated in this section of the 
chapter, neither manifestations of intention, ―will‖, nor ―good faith‖ truly represent 
state‘s intentions. Intention is a state of mind. However, objective interpretations of the 
will of the state can mean that a state is bound by the interpretation of the act, regardless 
of its state of mind. Moreover, ―good faith‖ means that a state can be obligated by an act 
because the third party hears evidence that a consensus of states believed the act 
manifested intent. Therefore, it is only through reinterpretation as ―will‖ and ―good 
faith‖ that intention can provide legal authority for a unilateral act. Intention does not fit 
naturally in the doctrine of sources; a state of mind cannot provide authority for a legal 
act.  
In addition to the doctrinal analysis above, the problem of intention is placed in 
the context of Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons. This contextualization reveals that 
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intention is extremely ambiguous as a source of authority for a legal obligation.  As 
noted above, the analysis of the example of Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons leads to 
two conclusions. First, objective intention, which is analogous to consent in sources 
doctrine, is rarely unambiguous in context. Second, the fact that objective evidence of 
intention is often ambiguous in context makes it less likely that a consensus will emerge 
in the international community that a good faith obligation has been created by a 
unilateral act.  These conclusions are important because even if intention can be 
interpreted to provide theoretical authority for a legal obligation it is extremely difficult 
to apply these criteria in practice.   
 This chapter asks ―can unilateral acts be explained by the doctrine of sources?‖ 
Ultimately, the problem that unilateral acts pose for the doctrine of sources is that they 
rest on neither consent nor consensus. The requirement of intention is purely internal: it 
is ―a state of mind‖. As a result it must be objectified and interpreted in order to 
provide any sort of legal authority. Consequently, intention is always redefined to 
reflect the requirements of consent and consensus. However, when intention is defined 
in this way it may not reflect the intention – the state of mind - of the acting state. 
Intention can provide predictability and authority as a source of law at the expense of 
the state of mind of the acting state, its defining feature.
1111
  Intention on its own cannot 
create a source of law. Further, even when it is interpreted to meet the requirements of 
the doctrine of sources as the example of Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons 
demonstrates, intention is extremely difficult to apply in practice. The doctrinal 
difficulty posed by intention, together with the difficulty in applying intention in 
practice, helps explain the gap between the assertion that a unilateral act is legal and the 
ability to identify its legal obligation in practice.  
  Similarly, Chapter 5 focuses on a second aspect of legality defined in chapter 3, 
the doctrine of substance. It asks the question: ―can unilateral acts be explained by the 
doctrine of substance?‖ To answer this question this chapter provides an overview of 
the research question, outlines the substance of international law and examines the 
requirement of a unilateral act that provides the substance of the unilateral act, 
autonomy.  This chapter then compares the requirement of autonomy to the doctrine of 
substance in order to reach conclusions about the substantive legality of unilateral acts. 
Finally, context for this analysis is provided through the example of the San Juan River 
dispute. 
                                                 
1111
 See generally Koskenniemi, Apology (n 81) at p 354. 
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  This chapter begins by providing an overview of the doctrine of substance. This 
analysis establishes that the doctrine of substance mediates debates between scholars 
over whether the subject matter of international law is derived primarily from 
individualism or altruism. Following on this analysis, this chapter proceeds to examine 
the requirement of a unilateral act that establishes the substantive legality of that act, 
the requirement of autonomy. Autonomy establishes that a unilateral act has substance 
when it reflects the interests of the state undertaking the act. However, analysis of this 
requirement demonstrates that autonomy alone cannot create a legal obligation. As the 
example of the tree that falls in the forest highlights, it is only when cognizance is taken 
of an act that autonomy can be exercised. Confusingly, requiring cognizance of the act 
makes the act less than autonomous because another state must recognize the act. It is 
for this reason that the ICJ introduces another substantive requirement for unilateral 
acts, the requirement of good faith. However, the requirement of good faith in effect 
contradicts the requirement of autonomy. Moreover, introducing the requirement of 
good faith makes unilateral acts difficult to separate from acts of estoppel, as unilateral 
acts and estoppels rely on good faith as a determinant of their substantive legal 
obligation, and in practice they both are premised on an element of autonomy. 
Therefore, unilateral acts are substantively indistinguishable from estoppels. 
 In addition to the doctrinal analysis above, the problem of autonomy is placed in 
the context of the San Juan River dispute. This contextualization reveals that autonomy 
is functionally indeterminate unless good faith is introduced, and once good faith is 
introduced the act is no longer autonomous. For example, it is Costa Rica‘s good faith 
in Nicaragua's statements that makes these statements legally relevant. However, once 
Costa Rica's good faith and the statements become legally significant, Nicaragua is no 
longer able to act autonomously. Further, the San Juan River dispute demonstrates that 
it is practically impossible to distinguish between the good faith required of  unilateral 
acts and good faith that produces the detrimental reliance required of an estoppel. 
These observations are important because even if the requirement of autonomy can be 
interpreted to provide a substantive basis for a legal obligation, in practice these 
obligations are always indistinguishable from estoppels. 
 Chapter 5 asks ―can unilateral acts be explained by the doctrine of substance?‖ 
The problem that unilateral acts pose for the doctrine of substance is that they rest 
entirely on autonomy, the interest of a single acting state. However, the requirement of 
autonomy is unable to produce a legal obligation without some form of cooperation by 
other states. As a result, it must be balanced by a requirement of good faith in order to 
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provide legal authority but introducing good faith makes the act less than autonomous. 
Consequently, a unilateral act can be autonomous, or it can produce a substantive legal 
obligation. This produces a second difficulty for the doctrine. When autonomy is 
defined to include good faith, it becomes practically indistinguishable from an estoppel, 
and autonomy is no longer its defining feature. Autonomy on its own cannot create a 
substantive legal obligation. Further, even when it is interpreted to meet the 
requirements of the doctrine of substance, the example of the San Juan River dispute 
demonstrates that autonomous obligations are functionally indistinguishable from 
estoppels. The doctrinal difficulty posed by autonomy, together with the difficulty in 
applying autonomy in practice, helps explain the gap between the assertion that a 
unilateral act is legal and the ability to identify its legal obligation in practice. 
 Chapter 6 completes the analysis of the research question "are unilateral acts 
legal?" Specifically, this chapter focuses on one aspect of legality defined in Chapter 3, 
the doctrine of process. To determine the legality of the processes of unilateral acts this 
chapter provides an overview of the research question, outlines the processes of 
international law and outlines the requirement of a unilateral act that determines the 
processes of a unilateral act, revocation. This chapter compares the doctrine of process 
to the processes of unilateral acts in order to reach conclusions about the legality of the 
processes of unilateral acts. 
After outlining the research question, this chapter then provides an overview of 
the doctrine of process and establishes that process doctrine mediates between the need 
to create stable legal obligations and the need to allow for change to these obligations 
when appropriate.  This is exemplified by the difference between hard and soft 
obligations.  Hard obligations are those obligations that have stable processes to allow 
substantive obligations to gain legal authority, whereas soft obligations lack these stable 
processes. 
 Following on this analysis, this chapter proceeds to examine the requirement of 
revocation, which is one of the few processes of a unilateral act. Revocation establishes 
that a unilateral act may be changed or terminated. However, it was demonstrated that 
unilateral acts cannot be revocable solely at the will of the state.  As a result, the ability 
to revoke a unilateral act is limited by the requirement of good faith, called arbitrariness 
at the ILC. Confusingly, requiring good faith introduces a requirement of cognizance 
and trust in the act that makes the act less than unilateral because another state must 
recognize the act. Thus, the requirement of good faith in effect contradicts the 
requirement of revocability. Moreover, introducing the requirement of good faith makes 
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unilateral acts difficult to separate from acts of estoppel, as unilateral acts and estoppels 
both rely on good faith as a limit on the revocability of the act.  This means that 
unilateral acts can either be revocable and unilateral, or they can promote stability 
through good faith and lose status as unilateral acts. In the latter case unilateral acts 
become indistinguishable from estoppels.  
 This conclusion leads to an examination of the problem of ―legalization‖ of 
unilateral acts. In this section of the chapter it is asserted that the revocability of 
unilateral acts indicates a low level of development of process. The processes that do 
exist provide little stability for state actors. This contrasts with the highly legalized 
processes for termination of treaties. The softness of unilateral acts impacts on their 
stability. It is concluded that unilateral acts do not have the procedural stability 
necessary to be considered a hard legal obligation. 
 Chapter 6 asks ―can unilateral acts be explained by the doctrine of process?‖ The 
problem that unilateral acts pose for the doctrine of process is that they lack the 
procedural stability to produce a hard legal obligation; they do not provide the stability 
required to link form to substance. This is demonstrated by the requirement of 
revocability, which is unable to produce procedural stability without limiting 
revocation in good faith. However, introducing good faith makes the act less than 
unilateral. Consequently, unilateral acts can be revocable or they can provide a stable 
process for substance to gain legal authority. This produces a second difficulty for the 
doctrine. When revocation is defined to include good faith it becomes practically 
indistinguishable from an estoppel and unilateralism is no longer its defining feature. 
Revocation on its own cannot create a stable process of international law. Further, even 
when revocation is interpreted to meet the requirements of the doctrine of process, its 
processes are practically indistinguishable from estoppels. This demonstrates the weak 
legalization of the process of unilateral acts. Therefore, the doctrinal difficulty posed by 
revocation, together with the difficulty in applying revocation in practice, helps explain 
the gap between the assertion that a unilateral act is legal and the ability to identify its 
legal obligation in practice. 
 In short, this thesis asks the question ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ Answering this 
question requires asking to two sub questions: ―what are unilateral acts?‖ And ―what is 
legality?‖ Answering the first question leads this thesis to define unilateral acts 
according to the criteria established by the ICJ in the Nuclear Tests cases. Answering 
the second question leads this thesis to define legality according to a ―narrow‖ critical 
legal studies method of international law. In this method international law is defined by 
270  Betina Kuzmarov 
its doctrine which, critical legal studies scholars argue, is a structure created by the 
rhetoric used by international lawyers to understand their own subject matter. In this 
thesis this structure is defined by the discourses of sources doctrine, substance doctrine 
and process doctrine. Legality is defined as a doctrinal structure created by these three 
doctrines. Therefore, answering the research question necessitates a comparison 
between the requirements of unilateral acts and the structure of international law. In Part 
2 of this thesis this comparison is undertaken in chapters devoted to each doctrine: 
sources, substance and process. In each chapter a particular doctrine is introduced and 
compared to the requirement of a unilateral act that performs the function of this 
doctrine within a unilateral act. That is, Chapter 4 examines sources doctrine and 
determines that intention performs this requirement for a unilateral act. Chapter 5 
examines substance doctrine, and determines that autonomy performs this requirement 
for a unilateral act and Chapter 6 examines process doctrine and determines that 
revocation performs this requirement for unilateral act. 
 However, this analysis reveals the difficulty with which unilateral acts are 
explained by each of these doctrines. For example, intention is a "state of mind" but a 
state of mind is never known other than by its objective manifestations. Objectifying 
intention satisfies a doctrinal requirement of sources doctrine, that an act indicate 
consent. Problematically, objectification of intention means that intention is found by 
interpreting evidence derived from the act itself. This means that intention can be 
determined even when a ―state of mind‖ does not in fact exist. This is troubling because 
it means that a unilateral act can either be based on intention, or it can meet the 
requirements of the doctrine. Similarly, the requirement of autonomy reflects 
substantive individualism – an obligation based on state interest.  However, autonomy 
cannot be determined in practice without a requirement of altruism. Therefore, the 
doctrine also requires good faith. Unfortunately, once good faith is introduced the act is 
no longer autonomous and is substantially indistinguishable from an estoppel. Lastly, 
difficulties also arise when unilateral acts are compared to the requirements of process 
doctrine. Unilateral acts have few processes, revocation being one of the clearest. 
Theoretically, an action can always be revocable if it is based on intention, but if an act 
is revocable at the will of the state, it does not promote the stability required to create 
legal processes. This obligation permits change but does not provide stability required 
by the processes of hardening of a legal obligation. Therefore, limits are considered on 
revocation in order to promote stability - limits of good faith or arbitrariness. These 
limits mean that unilateral acts cannot be arbitrarily revoked. This introduces stability 
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but precludes autonomy of the act because good faith implies, at a minimum, 
cognizance and trust in the act by another state, and trust leads to a requirement that the 
promise of the act be kept.  This means an act can either be autonomous and revocable 
or stable but not autonomous. 
 Consequently, the requirements of unilateral acts pose difficulties for each of the 
doctrines of international law; intention does not create a source of law, autonomy alone 
cannot support a substantive obligation and revocability cannot provide the stable 
processes required of a legal act. Therefore, unilateral acts cannot be explained by the 
doctrine of international law. To conclude, this thesis asks the question: ―are unilateral 
acts legal?‖ The answer to this question is no. The significance of these conclusions is 
presented in the next section. 
 
 
 
3. The Significance of the Conclusions of this Thesis 
 
 
 
This thesis identifies a problem with the legality of unilateral acts. The research 
question emerges from to the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the conclusions drawn from this 
thesis are applied to this context in detail in the next section of this chapter. For present 
purposes, it is sufficient to note that this act, the invasion of Iraq, is commonly referred 
to as unilateral, and yet three different justifications are put forward for why this act is 
legal (or, conversely, these justifications are rejected as illegal). The invasion of Iraq is 
constantly referred to as unilateral, and yet it is not clear that this claim has legal 
implications. A similar problem is seen in the examples of Osirak and the withdrawal 
from Lebanon and Gaza. These examples all highlight a gap between the assertion that 
an act is unilateral and the ability to assess legal implications of these acts. This gap is 
explained by the analysis undertaken in this thesis. Further, the ability to explain this 
gap is significant because events such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003 indicate a need to 
address the legality of unilateral action comprehensively – as a product of the sources, 
substance and processes of law. This thesis fills this gap by examining the requirements 
of unilateral acts, defined in the Nuclear Tests cases, and comparing them 
comprehensively to the doctrine of international law defined by the structure formed by 
sources doctrine, substance doctrine and process doctrine. This thesis specifically 
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contributes to the literature by providing this detailed and exclusive study of unilateral 
acts. 
 Moreover, by undertaking the analysis outlined in the previous section this thesis 
concludes that unilateral acts are not legal, because requirements of unilateral acts 
cannot be explained by the doctrine of international law. Specifically, unilateral acts 
cannot establish a source of international law because intention cannot provide a basis 
for legal authority; unilateral acts cannot establish a substantive legal obligation without 
collapsing into estoppels; and unilateral acts cannot establish processes that can clearly 
separate unilateral acts from other good faith obligations such as estoppels. This 
analysis explains why the legality of unilateral acts is so difficult to determine: they lack 
the required doctrinal development to mediate the requirements of sources substance 
and process. Consequently, this thesis is significant for its application of a narrow 
critical legal studies approach to the requirements of unilateral acts in order to resolve a 
practical problem -- the difficulty in applying the requirements of unilateral acts to 
specific acts of states such as the invasion of Iraq noted above. 
 To summarize, this thesis reaches one significant conclusion, that the gap between 
the claims that a unilateral act is legal and the ability to assess the legality of the specific 
act exists because unilateral acts are not legal, in the sense that the requirements of 
unilateral acts cannot be explained easily by the doctrine. Moreover, this analysis also 
leads to a further point that emerges from this first conclusion - unilateral acts may give 
rise to legal obligations in situations of estoppel. Estoppels, unlike unilateral acts, meet 
the requirements of the doctrine, so when a unilateral act creates an estoppel it creates a 
legal obligation. This fact may perpetuate some of the confusion in the doctrine because 
many unilateral acts seem to create an obligation but these cases, including arguably the 
Nuclear Test cases, are  instances of estoppel. 
 These theoretical findings also have practical application – they can explain the 
difficulty in assessing the legality of specific acts such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The 
next section of this chapter applies these conclusions to this context. 
 
 
4. Implications of this Research in Context 
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The purpose of this section of the conclusion is twofold. First, it returns the discussion 
of this thesis to the context in which this research emerged. Second, it develops the 
conclusions reached in previous parts of this chapter and applies them to the context of 
this thesis. This twofold purpose leads to a discussion of the limitations of this thesis 
and directions for future research in subsequent parts of this chapter. 
 To recall the facts: On March 20, 2003 the US and their coalition partners, 
including the United Kingdom, invaded Iraq.
1112
 Popular reports continually spoke of 
this invasion as ―unilateral‖1113 so the term unilateral became, in a sense, shorthand for 
all the justifications advanced for the US-led invasion. These justifications were 
complex and evolved over the course of the events that led up to the invasion of Iraq. 
First, the invasion of Iraq was justified as an act of preemptive self-defence. Second, the 
invasion of Iraq was defensible because Iraq was in defiance of United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions by possessing and making weapons of mass destruction. 
Consequently, military action was appropriate to enforce these resolutions. Third, the 
invasion of Iraq was warranted as a humanitarian act to bring democracy to the Iraqi 
people.  
 The first justification of the invasion, preemptive self-defence, was first advanced 
by President Bush in 2002 and it became the official policy of the US in the its National 
Security Strategy of 2002.
1114
 This non-binding policy document stated that the US: 
 
 
….will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by 
…defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at 
home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches 
our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the 
support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if 
necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively 
against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people 
and our country…1115 
 
 
 
In this policy the US expanded its definition of self-defence under international law to 
include preemptive action to prevent terrorism. This policy responded to the belief, held 
by the US and other states, that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and had not 
                                                 
1112
 Iraq Timeline (n 1). 
1113
 Norton-Taylor (n 2); See also Cook (n 2). 
These two examples illustrate that the term ―unilateral‖ was widely used, even by senior politicians, in 
reference to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
1114
 Charlesworth, ―Is International Law Relevant‖ (n 3). 
1115
 NSS (n 4).  
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hesitated to use them against their own people, particularly against the Kurdish people 
of Northern Iraq. Yoo, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal 
Council US Department of Justice from 2001-2003,
1116
 explains the standard for 
preemptive self-defence established for the invasion of Iraq as follows: 
 
 
The use of force in anticipatory self-defence must be necessary and 
proportional to the threat. At least in the realm of WMD [weapons of mass 
destruction], rogue nations and international terrorism, however, the test for 
determining whether a threat is ―imminent‖ to render the use of force 
necessary at a particular point has become more nuanced…Factors to be 
considered should now include the probability of an attack; the likelihood 
that this probability will increase, and therefore the need to take advantage 
of a limited window of opportunity; whether diplomatic alternatives are 
practical; and the magnitude of harm that could result from the threat.. 
Applying the reformulated test to for using anticipatory self-defense to Iraq 
reveals that the threat of a WMD attack by Iraq, either directly or by Iraq‘s 
support of terrorism, was sufficiently imminent to render the use of force 
necessary to protect the United States, its citizens and allies. 
1117
 
 
 
 
The argument for preemptive self-defence was soon supplemented by a second 
argument that invasion of Iraq was warranted by Iraqi failure to implement UNSC 
Resolutions that required it to destroy its weapons of mass destruction.
1118
 This 
argument rested on the fact that earlier resolutions had demanded this disarmament, 
justifying invasion, and on the ambiguity of the resolutions involved in this debate. Yoo 
explains this argument as follows: 
 
 
 
Resolution 678 authorized members states ―to use all necessary means to 
uphold and implement resolution 690 (1990) and all subsequent resolutions 
and to restore international peace and security in the area.‖ One of the most 
important ―subsequent relevant resolutions‖ was Resolution 687. Pursuant to 
resolution 678, the United States could use force not only to enforce 
Resolution 687‘s cease-fire, but also to restore ―international peace and 
security‖ to the region. In Resolution 1441, the Security Council 
unanimously found that Iraq was in material breach of these earlier 
resolutions and its continued development of WMD programs, its support 
for terrorism, and its repression of the civilian population presented a strong 
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ongoing threat to international peace and security. These findings triggered 
Resolution 678‘s authorization to use force in Iraq. Suspending the cease-
fire and resuming hostilities in Iraq was an appropriate response to Iraq‘s 
material breaches of Resolution 687.
1119
  
 
 
 
The final rationale advanced for invading Iraq was humanitarian. Some argued that the 
invasion of Iraq was necessary to bring democracy to the Iraqi people.
1120
 Each of these 
justifications was put forward and debated by politicians, academics and the popular 
press. However, the second justification – that invasion was authorized by Security 
Council Resolutions – appears to have been the ultimate justification for the coalition‘s 
invasion of Iraq. 
 Therefore, in 2003 the term unilateral act was commonly used to refer to a range 
of justifications for the US‘, and its coalition partners', actions in Iraq, actions that were 
undertaken without support, or arguably approval, of any multilateral institution. In light 
of this range of justifications, the precise meaning of a unilateral act was unclear and the 
assessment of the legal source and substantive legality of such acts was widely debated. 
Further, the debate over the invasion of Iraq was part of a wider trend in international 
law. The US had repeatedly acted in its preemptive self-defence before invading Iraq. 
Yoo notes incidents in Libya, Panama, Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan.
 1121
  
 Thus, in 2003 the term unilateral was shorthand for the justifications of the 
invasion of Iraq. The only commonality that can be drawn from these justifications is 
that term ―unilateral‖ refers to actions undertaken without reference to multilateral 
institutions, justified by a variety of legal means. However, the legality of these acts is 
contested and indeterminate. Consequently, this suggests a problem with identifying the 
circumstances in which a unilateral act will be considered legal. In fact, the three 
justifications for the invasion of Iraq indicate profound disagreements about the source 
and substantive basis of the invasion. Well informed people disagree on this issue, 
raising questions about the nature of unilateral acts. This disagreement leads to the 
research question of this thesis: ―are unilateral acts legal?" The analysis of this research 
question led to conclusions about the legality of unilateral acts that have been outlined 
in previous sections of this chapter. These conclusions can now be applied to the 
context of the invasion of Iraq outlined above. 
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 The invasion of Iraq is justified by three different legal concepts: as preemptive 
self-defence on the part of the US and its allies, by Iraqi defiance of UNSC resolutions 
and as a humanitarian act. Among these justifications it appears that Iraqi defiance of 
Security Council resolutions serves as the most widely advanced reason for the 
invasion. Interestingly, this is the only justification to remove the invasion from a 
unilateral context -- when unilateralism is defined by the Nuclear Tests cases. If the 
invasion of Iraq is justified by the fact that Iraq is not complying with UNSC 
resolutions, the act of invading is unilateral as it occurs without explicit multilateral 
approval. However, it does not meet the requirement for a legal unilateral act as defined 
by the Nuclear Test cases; the intention to invade is clear from the act of invasion, but 
the act is not autonomous because it enforces existing legal obligations, UNSC 
resolutions. Therefore, according to the Nuclear Tests cases this act is not a unilateral 
act capable of producing legal obligations. Additionally, the revocability of enforcement 
of UNSC resolutions is not clear. Therefore, this justification of the invasion of Iraq is 
similar to the situation in the Eastern Greenland case where unilateral acts take place in 
a bilateral context which ensures the act is not autonomous. The act is, to paraphrase 
Fitzmaurice, unilateral in form but not in substance. Therefore this justification does not 
need to be discussed further, as the legality of the invasion in this case is not derived 
from the unilateral nature of the invasion, but is contextualized by other obligations of 
international law. More difficult to explain within the doctrine are the first and third 
justifications for the invasion of Iraq: preemptive self-defence and humanitarian 
intervention. It is these justifications that are the focus of this section of the chapter. 
 Preemptive self-defence is official policy of the US since the National Security 
Strategy of 2002. According to this policy the US may take preemptive action to 
prevent harm when it "is necessary and proportional to the threat", which is a more 
"nuanced" test of imminence of a threat then traditional tests of proportionality.
1122
 
Applied to Iraq, this test means that the invasion is permitted by the basis of the security 
threat posed by Iraq's believed possession of WMD. This justification is related to the 
ban on use of force an Article 2(4) of the of the United Nations, and the exception for 
self-defence contained in Article 51 of the Charter. However, the relationship of this 
justification for invasion to established legal standards of self-defence, does not 
preclude examining this act as a unilateral act (unlike the justification of Iraqi non-
compliance with UNSC resolutions discussed above). The determination to invade Iraq 
is in fact a unilateral act for the following three reasons. First, the assessment of the 
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need for self-defence is applied solely by the US, and its allies, without reference to 
other states. Second, the expansion of the definition of self-defence, while common 
practice in the US, is not widely accepted; it exists as a justification that is legally 
indeterminate. Third, the use of preemptive self-defence in the invasion of Iraq is 
undertaken without the approval of the international community and so this act is 
unilateral. Consequently, from this perspective the invasion of Iraq is a unilateral act 
capable of explanation by the definition of legality established in this thesis. 
 Therefore, the justification of preemptive self-defence meets the definition of a 
unilateral act established in the Nuclear Tests cases. First, the invasion of Iraq 
represents objective intention of the US and its allies. Second, the act is autonomous as 
it explicitly disavows a reaction or quid pro quo on the part of other states. Third, the 
act is revocable as the US and its allies can revisit their intention to invade Iraq at any 
time prior to the invasion. Consequently, because this justification meets the definition 
of legality established in Chapter 2, questions about the legality of the invasion of Iraq 
can compared to the structure of legality established in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
Similarly, the justification of the invasion of Iraq as a humanitarian intervention 
also meets the definition of a unilateral act established in the Nuclear Test cases. This 
definition is applicable to this justification of invasion for the following three reasons. 
First, the need for humanitarian intervention is determined solely by the US and its 
allies. Second, the applicability of humanitarian intervention in Iraq is debated, and the 
legality of this justification for invasion is not clear.
1123
 Third, this "humanitarian act" is 
undertaken without the approval the international community. Therefore, according to 
this justification, the act is undertaken with humanitarian intent, it is autonomous, and 
the intervention is revocable prior to invasion. It meets the criteria for a unilateral act 
established in the Nuclear Tests cases. 
 To conclude, the invasion of Iraq is justified according to the criteria of a 
unilateral act established in this thesis, whether one considers it preemptive self-defence 
or a humanitarian intervention. Therefore, analysis of this act according to the criteria 
for legality used in this thesis can shed some light on why the legality of this act is 
difficult to determine. 
 The first element of legality is the doctrine of sources. This doctrine requires that 
an act is capable of mediating the debate between consent and consensus as the basis of 
international legal obligations. This chapter argues that the requirement of a unilateral 
act that performs this mediatory function is intention. Intention is doctrinally 
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problematic as it cannot provide the legal authority required of a legal obligation. To 
explain: Intention is a "state of mind" and as such intention is interpreted objectively 
from the act itself. However, the very act of objectification means that intention cannot 
be determined other than by the cognizance taken of the act and the interpretation of the 
act that is made from that cognizance. Applied to the invasion of Iraq, this means that 
the legal authority of the invasion of Iraq is determined by objective interpretation of the 
act itself from which the US‘ intention is determined. However, this requirement of 
objective interpretation means that it is not the US‘ intention that is relevant but how 
other states perceive its intention and react to that. It also means that the US and its 
allies cannot know the legality of their actions prior to the objective interpretation of 
their actions. This uncertainty means that the US‘ intention is ultimately unascertainable 
and may even be irrelevant to the determination of legality of the invasion of Iraq. This 
leads to a situation in which the assessment of the act by other states can directly 
conflict with the US‘ intentions. Further, this analysis helps shed light onto two areas of 
confusion over the invasion of Iraq: the fact that the US‘ intentions and the assessment 
of these intentions are in conflict, and the fact that differing interpretations of formal 
legality are drawn from the very same action. 
 Similarly, the doctrine of substance mediates debates over whether the text of the 
law is individualistic or altruistic, whether the subject matter of a law should reflect the 
interests of a state or the needs of the international community. Unilateral acts cannot fit 
within the doctrine of substance because the requirement of a unilateral act that provides 
the substance of the act, its autonomy, is purely individualistic in nature. As a result, the 
doctrine of substance in effect introduces a requirement of good faith, cognizance and 
trust, as a limitation on autonomy. As the discussion in Chapter 5 demonstrates, an act 
can either be autonomous, or it can meet the requirement of good faith, which 
effectively creates a community interest in the act. However, once the requirement of 
good faith is introduced the act is no longer autonomous. In fact, it becomes 
indistinguishable from the reliance required of an estoppel. Applied to the invasion of 
Iraq, the difficulty unilateral acts pose for the doctrine of substance is acute. Whether 
one justifies the invasion as an act of preemptive self-defence or as a humanitarian act, 
the autonomy of the invasion of Iraq is questionable.  Autonomy is defined as an act 
that is undertaken without an expectation of an exchange, quid pro quo or reaction by 
another state. However, the invasion of Iraq is not autonomous for two reasons. First, 
the act of invasion is a response to Iraqi acts, whether defined as violations of 
international humanitarian law or the possession of WMD.  This means that the invasion 
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of Iraq is in fact a response to the unilateral acts of Iraq. This creates an appearance of 
reciprocity which makes the invasion less than unilateral and more akin to other 
reliance-based obligations such as estoppels.  Second, one can see the act of invading 
Iraq creating good faith in states who object to the invasion. This is evident from the 
protests by countries such as France and Germany that the invasion is illegal.
1124
 
Therefore the autonomy of the invasion of Iraq is difficult to ascertain and the autonomy 
of the invasion is impossible to separate from the context of the invasion, whether this 
context is found in prior Iraqi acts or protests of other states that the invasion is illegal. 
This lack of autonomy explains the difficulty in determining the legality of the 
substance of the invasion of Iraq. 
 Lastly, the doctrine of process mediates between the law‘s need for stable 
processes and the law‘s need to respond to change. The requirement of a unilateral act 
that performs this function is revocation. A unilateral act is theoretically revocable if a 
state‘s intention changes but in order to introduce stability into the processes of 
unilateral acts, the Nuclear Tests cases introduce a requirement of good faith. 
Revocation is limited when a unilateral act induces cognizance and trust. This 
requirement ensures that the balance is maintained between stability and change, but as 
with the substance of a unilateral act, the requirement of good faith also ensures that the 
act is now responsive to the reaction of other states in a way that precludes unilateral 
action and makes the act impossible to distinguish from an estoppel. Applied to the case 
of Iraq, it is clear that the US can revoke its intention up to the time of invasion, but 
states are also free to take notice and respond to the planned invasion. In the case of Iraq 
cognizance took the form of protest of the legality of the invasion. These protests 
demonstrate that even if revocation occurs (which is not a factor in this case), it is never 
clear whether revocation is in response to protests of the act or a change of intention. 
This demonstrates the role of good faith in the processes of unilateral acts, as well as the 
difficulty in distinguishing between good faith in unilateral acts and estoppels. 
 Consequently, the claim that unilateral acts are not legal helps explain the gap 
between the claim that the invasion of Iraq is legal and the ability to ascertain the 
legality of this act in practice. This thesis demonstrates that the gap between the claim 
of legality and its ascertainment is not a result of competing justifications of legality. In 
fact, competing justifications of legality result directly from the structural deficiencies 
in the concept of unilateral act itself. The concept of unilateral acts cannot be explained 
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within the doctrine of international law and as a result these acts are not legal. This 
leads to a conceptual vacuum in which the term unilateral is used as shorthand for 
competing justifications of the same act. 
Similar difficulties exist within the other examples of context provided in the 
introductory chapter. For example, the Israeli actions at Osirak and their withdrawals 
from Lebanon and Gaza are of indeterminate legality, precisely because of the fact that 
unilateral acts are not capable of explanation within the doctrine of international law. 
The bombing of Osirak is a unilateral act, as it is an act undertaken outside the 
multilateral context, but it does not fit within the definition of a unilateral act in the 
Nuclear Tests cases because the legality of this act is determined only on the basis of 
the reaction of other states to the act. Israeli intention is never considered relevant to the 
assessment of the legality of the bombing as it is clear that Israel believes it is within the 
law and acts on this intention. It is the reaction -- the cognizance of other states to this 
act - that raises questions about the legality of the act. This means the legality of the 
bombing of Osirak is neither intention based nor autonomous. The legality of Osirak 
can never be ascertained with any certainty if this act is viewed as a unilateral act.  
Additionally, Israel's withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza also remain legally 
uncertain because these acts do not involve cognizance and trust. As a result intention 
and autonomy are never determined. This demonstrates that intention alone cannot 
produce a legal obligation without cognizance being taken of the act. However, as is 
repeatedly observed, once cognizance is taken of an act, the act is no longer autonomous 
or intention based. It becomes indistinguishable from an estoppel. In the cases of 
Lebanon and Gaza Israel withdraws from the territories as it promised. However, Israel 
kept its promises, so other states did not have to explicitly claim good faith in their acts. 
This means that the legality of these acts, as unilateral acts, is never determined. This 
demonstrates that the uncertainty regarding the legality of these actions is not a result of 
competing justifications of their legality, but that competing justifications of legality 
result from the fact that these acts cannot be explained by the doctrine of international 
law. This thesis asks the question ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ Applying the conclusions 
reached in this thesis to the context in which this thesis has emerged indicates that 
unilateral acts are not legal. 
This analysis is significant because it explains the gap between the claim that the 
invasion of Iraq is legal (or illegal) and the difficulty of substantiating these claims in 
practice. The only conclusion that can be reached from this analysis is that this gap 
exists because of doctrinal problems inherent in unilateral acts. These doctrinal 
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problems indicate that unilateral acts are not legal. This raises a final question: If 
unilateral acts are not legal acts, what are they?  How can unilateral acts be explained in 
terms of law and in terms of international relations? These questions are expanded on in 
the penultimate section of this chapter.  However, before these questions can be 
discussed further the limitations of the conclusions of this thesis must be discussed. 
 
 
 
5. Limitations of the Conclusions Reached in this Thesis 
 
 
 
As noted at the outset of this thesis, the research question "are unilateral acts legal" is a 
broad and difficult question. As a result the conclusions in this thesis are limited in a 
number of significant ways. 
The first limitation on the conclusions of this thesis is the definition of unilateral 
act adopted. For purposes of this thesis, unilateral acts are defined by the criterion 
established in the Nuclear Tests cases. This limitation is necessary in order to establish 
workable parameters for the subject matter of this thesis. Further, this limit is defensible 
because the Nuclear Tests cases are the leading case in this area. However, this 
definition limits the scope of this thesis significantly; it excludes acts which do not meet 
this definition. Specifically, this thesis does not discuss certain categories of acts that 
otherwise appear to be unilateral: Unilateral acts of retaliation under trade agreements, 
notifications required by treaties and humanitarian interventions by regional and 
multinational organizations. These acts are excluded because the autonomy required of 
unilateral act is, by definition, not present in these acts. Consequently, the definition of 
unilateral act adopted in this thesis limits its scope. It also leads to a final caveat: the 
conclusions reached in this thesis only apply to acts meeting the definition of unilateral 
act used in this thesis. 
 The second limitation in this thesis is the definition of legality. In order to assess 
the legality of unilateral act it is necessary to determine which acts display the required 
qualities of law. In Chapter 3 of this thesis current definitions of legality are examined 
and a ―narrow‖ critical legal studies method is adopted. This method is adopted because 
it ―takes law seriously‖ on its own terms thereby narrowing the scope of legality. In this 
thesis legality is determined by a comparison of the requirements of unilateral acts of to 
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the doctrines of international law identified by the critical legal studies method. 
However, adopting this approach limits the scope of the conclusions of this thesis. This 
limitation is necessary because the meaning of legality is contested in the doctrine 
therefore limits have to be drawn in order to define legality in a way that allows for a 
meaningful method of assessing legality. Adopting a ―narrow‖ critical legal studies 
method allows for this to occur. The choice of this method is justified and more fully 
discussed in Chapter 3.  However, for present purposes it is sufficient to note that the 
use of this method limits the conclusions reached in this thesis to a specific definition of 
legality. Further, by defining law as a product of doctrinal debate, this thesis determines 
that legality is a matter internal to law. Therefore, the conclusions in the thesis are 
limited to conclusions about legality defined in legal doctrine; this is opposed to 
political, socio-legal or philosophical analyses, which are specifically excluded. 
 Additionally, the conclusions reached in this chapter reveal a further limitation on 
the analysis in this thesis. This thesis restricts its analysis to unilateral acts; this focus 
specifically precludes detailed discussion of other concepts discussed in this thesis such 
as soft law, good faith and estoppels. Unilateral acts are intimately related to these 
concepts and yet it is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss them in great detail. This 
is a limit on the conclusions in this thesis, and it is also the subject of the next section of 
this chapter - further research. 
 
 
 
6. Further Research 
 
 
This thesis asks the question "are unilateral acts legal?" The answer to this question is 
twofold: unilateral acts are not legal, and, further, in order for unilateral acts to be 
considered legal they must become effectively indistinguishable from estoppels. These 
conclusions raise several interesting questions for future study. First, if intention cannot 
create the legal authority required of a legal obligation, what is the relationship between 
unilateral acts and other sources of authority in international law? Specifically, what is 
the role of unilateral acts in treaty formation and in custom formation? Second, if 
unilateral acts cannot be substantially distinguished from estoppels, then what is the 
relationship between these two concepts? Does the mutual reliance of good faith 
indicate that there is one common good faith obligation based on reliance? Third, if 
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unilateral acts lack the processes necessary to legalize, then what is their role as a non-
legal or soft obligation in international relations? Future studies can examine each of 
these questions with the aim of elaborating the role of unilateral acts in international 
relations and with the goal of forming a common understanding of obligations such as 
unilateral acts and estoppel. This thesis begins this dialogue with the hope that others 
will build on this research. 
 
 
 
7. Implications of this Thesis 
 
 
 
This thesis concludes that unilateral acts are not legal. Building on this conclusion this 
thesis will now discuss the implications of this thesis in three areas doctrine, practice 
and method. 
 An ongoing problem in the doctrine of international law is the explanation of 
unilateral acts. This problem is defined by the gap between the asserted legality of 
unilateral acts in the doctrine and the difficulty with determining this legality in 
practice. This thesis addresses this gap by determining that unilateral acts are not easily 
explained by the doctrine. This leads to the conclusion that unilateral acts are not legal. 
This conclusion implies that a more nuanced view of the role of unilateral acts in the 
doctrine is necessary and this thesis suggests that a primary direction for doctrinal 
development is to examine the relationship of unilateral acts to estoppels and to seek 
clarification of the relationship of unilateral acts to soft law. This conclusion also 
implies that a more nuanced view of unilateral acts focuses on the way that unilateral 
acts contribute to the creation of legally authoritative of obligations such as custom, 
treaty and estoppels. Therefore, this thesis has many implications for the doctrine of 
international law. 
 This thesis also has many practical implications. These implications are best 
summed up in the phrase "fitting a round peg into a square hole." Doctrine tries to make 
unilateral acts ―legal,‖ but practically these acts do not fit in the structure of legality. 
This difficulty is demonstrated in such examples as the invasion of Iraq, Osirak, 
Lebanon and Gaza, Iran‘s pursuit of nuclear weapons and the San Juan River dispute. 
The practical implication of these examples is that unilateral acts are best treated as 
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indeterminate or perhaps even political acts unless the unilateral act results in an 
estoppel. 
 Lastly, this thesis has implications for method. It applies the ―narrow‖ critical 
legal studies method as a way of establishing the meaning of legality and demonstrates 
the potential of the ―narrow‖ critical legal studies approach as a method of determining 
legality. An obvious implication of applying the critical legal studies approach as a 
method of defining legality is its usefulness in separating ―legal‖ from ―non-legal‖ 
obligations. 
 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
 
 
This chapter opens with a summary of the conclusions of each substantive chapter of 
this thesis and concludes that unilateral acts are not legal. The significance of this 
conclusion is that it resolves the gap between the asserted legality of unilateral acts and 
the difficulty in determining this legality in practice. Further, when this conclusion is 
applied to the context of this thesis, the invasion of Iraq, the fact that unilateral acts are 
not legal explains why debates over the legality of this invasion remain unresolved. 
Finally, the limitations of this thesis are discussed, areas of further research are 
suggested and the implications of the research question are drawn. This thesis concludes 
the way it opens - with the question ―are unilateral acts legal?‖ However, it ends with an 
answer: no. 
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Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States 
capable of creating legal obligations 2006  
Copyright © United Nations 2006 Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its Fifty-eighth 
session, in 2006, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission‘s report covering the 
work of that session (A/61/10). The report, which also contains commentaries on the draft articles, will appear 
in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2006, vol. II, Part Two. 
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Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States capable of creating legal 
obligations  
The International Law Commission,  
Noting that States may find themselves bound by their unilateral behaviour on the international plane,  
Noting that behaviours capable of legally binding States may take the form of formal declarations or 
mere informal conduct including, in certain situations, silence, on which other States may reasonably 
rely,  
Noting also that the question whether a unilateral behaviour by the State binds it in a given situation 
depends on the circumstances of the case,  
Noting also that in practice, it is often difficult to establish whether the legal effects stemming from the 
unilateral behaviour of a State are the consequence of the intent that it has expressed or depend on the 
expectations that its conduct has raised among other subjects of international law,  
Adopts the following Guiding Principles which relate only to unilateral acts stricto sensu, i.e. those 
taking the form of formal declarations formulated by a State with the intent to produce obligations 
under international law,  
1. Declarations publicly made and manifesting the will to be bound may have the effect of creating 
legal obligations. When the conditions for this are met, the binding character of such declarations is 
based on good faith; States concerned may then take them into consideration and rely on them; such 
States are entitled to require that such obligations be respected;  
2. Any State possesses capacity to undertake legal obligations through unilateral declarations;  
3. To determine the legal effects of such declarations, it is necessary to take account of their content, of 
all the factual circumstances in which they were made, and of the reactions to which they gave rise;  
4. A unilateral declaration binds the State internationally only if it is made by an authority vested with 
the power to do so. By virtue of their functions, heads of State, heads of Government and ministers for 
foreign affairs are competent to formulate such declarations. Other persons representing the State in 
specified areas may be authorized to bind it, through their declarations, in areas falling within their 
competence;  
5. Unilateral declarations may be formulated orally or in writing;  
6. Unilateral declarations may be addressed to the international community as a whole, to one or several 
States or to other entities;  
7. A unilateral declaration entails obligations for the formulating State only if it is stated in clear and 
specific terms. In the case of doubt as to the scope of the obligations resulting from such a declaration, 
such obligations must be interpreted in a restrictive manner. In interpreting the content of such 
obligations, weight shall be given first and foremost to the text of the declaration, together with the 
context and the circumstances in which it was formulated;  
8. A unilateral declaration which is in conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law is 
void; 
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9. No obligation may result for other States from the unilateral declaration of a State. However, the 
other State or States concerned may incur obligations in relation to such a unilateral declaration to the 
extent that they clearly accepted such a declaration;  
10. A unilateral declaration that has created legal obligations for the State making the declaration 
cannot be revoked arbitrarily. In assessing whether a revocation would be arbitrary, consideration 
should be given to:  
 (i) Any specific terms of the declaration relating to revocation;  
 (ii) The extent to which those to whom the obligations are owed have relied on such 
obligations;  
 (iii) The extent to which there has been a fundamental change in the circumstances.  
 
__________  
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